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Abstract 
 
Since the reformation of the Chinese economy, two notable trends have developed. 
First, the growing prominence of multilateral economic regimes (MERs) on the political 
agenda of Beijing has propelled deepened engagements between Chinese policy actors 
and institutions, and the agencies of MERs. This development is accompanied by a 
second trend, which is a growing dynamism in China’s economic diplomacy within the 
multilateral arenas. This dynamism is reflected in the evolving national preferences and 
approaches for multilateral economic negotiations, from outright resistance to gradual 
flexibility, and in some cases, acceptance. The simultaneous and parallel developments 
of these two trends stem a curiosity on whether a causal relationship exist between the 
deepened China-MER engagements and the dynamism of China’s economic diplomacy. 
Has Beijing’s open-door policy to global economic integration opened new windows of 
opportunity for the MER agencies to influence China’s economic diplomacy and its 
preference formation? In what way(s) and/or in which capacities can the agencies of 
MERs assert influence on China’s economic diplomacy preference formation? Under 
what conditions is this form of external influence successful? What are the long-run 
implications of the deepened China-MER engagements on Beijing’s economic 
diplomacy preference formation structure? What does the China-MER relationship tell 
us about China’s economic diplomacy preference formation in the 21st century?                 
 Although China’s partake in the international political economy has received 
much scholarly attention, few studies have attempted to decode China’s economic 
diplomacy preference formation, and even fewer have investigated the important nexus 
between the China-MER relationship and the behaviours of Chinese economic 
diplomacy. This thesis is a response to the knowledge deficit in these regards. By 
examining China’s participation in the multilateral climate change, and trade 
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negotiations, the thesis addresses the primary research question, how do multilateral 
economic regimes and their agencies influence China’s economic diplomacy preference 
formation? The study finds that the MER agencies do affect Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation. However, their influence peaks at an absorption level 
whereby Chinese preferences adapt to external preferences but not to the extent of 
reforming traditional principles and beliefs. The comparatively more effective ways of 
asserting influence for the MER agencies is through a costs-and-benefits calculus, 
information dissemination, shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, and informal negotiation 
practices. In general, Chinese policy actors do not refute the influence of the MER 
agencies; rather they absorb and adapt to it. In addition, the MER agencies assert 
influence at different stages of the preference formation, and over time, implicitly 
establish themselves as integrated policy actors in Beijing.   
 On the whole, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding about how, why, 
and when international linkages matter in China’s economic diplomacy, and to the 
extent of driving preference transformation. The study provides useful analytic lenses 
that flesh out the variety of functions the MER agencies have in shaping and informing 
China’s national preferences and negotiation approaches. At the same time, it offers a 
fuller description of how the Chinese policy actors and institutions respond to (implicit) 
external interventions in its policy processes. Consequently, this thesis is a significant 
contribution that adds value to the scholarly debates and knowledge-building about one 
of the most important political and economic phenomenon of our time.   
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Chapter 1  
 
THE CODED ‘DRAGONOMIC DIPLOMACY’ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the mainstream academia, a prevalent assumption about China’s economic diplomacy 
decision-making is that it is often characterised by adjectives such as “centralisation,” 
“convolution,” and “asymmetric transparency” (Johnston 2008). Like any government 
across the globe, the decision-making system and process in Beijing is without a doubt a 
complex one for the exterior eye to decipher. This is further challenged by the 
asymmetric transparency genome of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which does 
a good job of sheltering its inner processes away from international scrutiny. However, 
when one considers the genesis of China’s economic diplomacy preference formation, 
characterising the process as “centralised” – as the notion is conventionally understood 
– dismisses the metamorphosis of the central government over the last 30 years, and 
distorts the imagination of China from its modern reality. To consider a process as 
“centralised” is to suggest that it has a consolidated power under a central control. 
Perhaps this was the case some 60 years ago when Chinese diplomacy was defined by a 
“strong man” politics under Mao Zedong. Chinese economic diplomacy in the 21st 
century has departed away from such motif of governance and subscribes to new 
notions such as “collective decision-making,” “social democracy,” and “liberal 
conduct.”        
 When Deng Xiaoping emancipated the national economy from state planning, 
the central government recognised China’s need for economic and professional 
resources to pull itself out of the poverty gutter and international isolation and 
opprobrium. As part of its catching-up strategy, entry into numerous mainstream 
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multilateral economic regimes (MERs) were pursued. Chinese leaders believed doing so 
will not only help China access economic resources but also mark its place in the 
multilateral fora. Since then, two notable trends have developed. First, China has 
established close relations with the MERs in which it holds membership. As such, the 
engagements between the Chinese policy actors and the agencies of the MERs have 
grown rapidly. Beijing frequently invites the MER agencies to take part in the 
preference formation of China’s economic diplomacy – directly or indirectly – as policy 
advisors or information distributor, among other capacities. In the words of one Chinese 
policymaker, “Seeking policy advice from agencies of the MERs has almost become a 
normal practice in the decision-making process; and we communicate with MERs very 
frequently in our daily works.”1 Hence, the engagements between China and the MER 
agencies have grown substantially since Beijing opened its front doors in the late-1970s.    
 The second notable trend is the augmented dynamism in China’s economic 
diplomacy. This is reflected in their national preferences and approaches to multilateral 
economic negotiations. For example, China’s preferences and negotiation approaches 
for the multilateral climate change and trade negotiations have evolved much since its 
initial participation. Although the basic principles of China’s negotiation approach 
remained constant, their national preferences for some of the substances of negotiation 
have evolved from outright resistance to gradual acceptance and/or flexibility. Some 
examples of such transformations include the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
and mitigation modalities under the climate change negotiations; and the government 
procurement agreement (GPA) and the trade on services under the trade talks. Evidently 
China’s preferences are not static; rather, it is dynamic. Based on the researcher’s 
observations, this dynamism has become much more prevalent in China’s economic 
diplomacy in recent years. 
                                               
1
 Personal interview.  
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 Significantly, the two trends seem to have manifested in relative proximity to 
one another; and from an observational point-of-view, the deeper the China-MER 
engagements, the more dynamic China’s economic diplomacy become. This kind of 
observation prompts one to ponder whether there is any causal relationship between the 
two trends. To what extent is China’s growing economic diplomacy dynamism the 
result of the deepened China-MER relationship? Did Beijing’s “open-door” policy open 
new windows of opportunity for the MER agencies to influence China’s economic 
diplomacy preference formation? If so, in what capacity or through which mechanisms 
can the MER agencies assert influence?  
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the interesting and meaningful nexus 
between the deepened China-MER relationship at the agency-level, and the growing 
dynamism in China’s economic diplomacy. To be sure, the thesis is interested in the 
institutional agents and agencies that administer and govern the broader member-state-
driven MERs. As such, rather than referring to the impacts of the geopolitical 
composition of the MERs, this study places emphasis on the actors and agencies that 
facilitates and mediates between the member-states (i.e., the heads of the MERs such as 
the Secretary-General and Managing-Director, the presiding staff and Secretariat, the 
Negotiation Committees, the Chairs, the Working Groups, the research units, and so 
on). An investigation on the cause-effect of economic diplomacy implies a focus on the 
preference formation process. As such, the thesis has a particular interest in examining 
the causal relationship between the aforementioned nexus in the context of China’s 
economic diplomacy preference formation. Ultimately, the thesis aims to address the 
following primary research question: how do the MER agencies influence Chinese 
economic diplomacy preference formation?  
 Despite much scholarly attention to the domestic-international linkage debate (as 
will be discussed later in this chapter), significant gaps remain in our knowledge, 
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especially regarding the nexus of the MER agencies and Chinese economic diplomacy 
preference formation. The goal of this thesis is to address the primary research question. 
It does so by parsing the interaction of domestic policy actors and the agencies of the 
MERs along two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the ways the MER agencies 
assert influence on China’s economic diplomacy preference formation. This is the how 
question, and it is embodied in the primary hypothesis. Three possible mechanisms of 
influence are explored: the costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination, and 
reputation reinforcement. The thesis finds the first and second mechanisms have the 
most consistent absorption level of influence where China absorbs and adapts to the 
MER agencies but not at the expense of their traditional principles and beliefs. The 
second dimension looks at the roles of the MER agencies in shaping China’s negotiation 
approach. This dimension poses the what question, and it is addressed by the secondary 
hypothesis. Three likely roles are tested: the MER agencies as mediators of shuttle 
diplomacy proximity talks, as facilitators of informal negotiation practices (INPs), and 
as instigators of side-payment bargaining. The thesis finds that all three roles have some 
degrees of impact, although the former two are believed to trigger more immediate and 
sustainable influences than the latter. The three primary theoretical approaches that 
guide the derivation process of the two claims are rationalism, cognitivism, and 
contractualism. The empirical bases of analysis are case studies on the Conference of 
Parties (COP) climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO).       
 Building from the aforementioned two claims, the thesis makes three additional 
arguments about the correlation between the deepened China-MER engagements and 
China’s growing dynamism in economic diplomacy. First, the Chinese policy actors do 
not reject, but absorbs the influence of the MER agencies into its preference formulation 
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equation. This is indicated by China’s adaptive – rather than retrenchment – reaction to 
the MER agencies’ costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination, proximity 
talks, and INPs. Second, the MER agencies’ influence occurs on a progression, and it is 
asserted at different stages of the economic diplomacy decision-making process 
(discovery, definition, determination, and deliberation). As a result, Chinese policy 
actors find it much more difficult to escape from the external influences when shaping 
preferences. Third, the MER agencies are implicitly and indirectly integrated into 
China’s economic diplomacy preference formation process as an interested party. This 
implies that China’s economic diplomacy decision-making is essentially not a national-
only activity. Rather, national preferences and negotiation approaches are the products 
of an implicitly shared process involving national and international agencies.    
 The added-value of this thesis to the existing body of knowledge is considerable. 
The study offers a clear understanding about the transnational interactions at the 
agency-level of political polities, and in the context of economic diplomacy. It fleshes 
out the variety of functions that the MERs have in their dealings with Chinese policy 
actors and agencies. As well, a fuller description of how Chinese policy actors and 
agencies respond to the ways the MERs’ agencies assert influence is provided. This 
thesis, therefore, illuminates the ways in which the MER agencies may influence the 
growing dynamism of China’s economic diplomacy, its preference formation, and 
negotiation approaches. The study also offers some thoughts on the long-term 
implication of this causal relation on China’s economic diplomacy decision-making 
structure. Relatedly, the thesis forwards a pair of testable hypotheses distinct from the 
extant literature. Finally, the present study contributes to thin scholarship on Chinese 
economic diplomacy. For all the research on China’s integration with the global 
political economy, there has been surprisingly little work on how Chinese economic 
diplomacy should be conceptualised, about its genesis, and the underlying processes 
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(i.e., how policy actors and agencies from different levels bargain and coordinate with 
each other to derive a coherent national position, what resources they bring to the 
negotiating table, and what determines the outcome of these bargains). The lack of 
analyses on Chinese economic diplomacy is worrying because of the level of 
significance attached to China in many of the world’s most important economic 
negotiations, including climate change and international trade. Therefore, this study is 
both vital and timely for the academic and policy communities alike.       
 The present introduction chapter is divided into six sections. In section two,     
China’s discussion of the research enquiry is made with considerations about the history 
and approach of China’s participation in MERs, the research puzzle, and limitations in 
the existing literature. Section three subsequently offers a summary of the research 
design. Section four provides a structural overview of the thesis.  
 
1.2 A Chinese Economic Diplomacy and Multilateral Economic Regimes 
Economic diplomacy is a new concept in China. Broadly speaking, economic diplomacy 
is an instrument for negotiating cross-border economic issues between national 
governments on matters including exports, imports, investments, aid, the environment, 
property rights and so on.
2
 For much of China’s modern political and economic history, 
economic diplomacy has been blurred with the general practices of diplomacy. As the 
country opens up to global economic integration, however, it became more aware of the 
intricate political implications entangled with economic transactions, such as the 
political risks involved in cross-border financial investments. In turn, Beijing has, over 
the past decade, recognised the pertinence of economic diplomacy and has actively used 
the instrument for protecting Chinese interests abroad.
3
 In particular, Beijing views 
economic diplomacy to be crucial for economic growth and national development 
                                               
2
 For more on economic diplomacy, see Nicholas Bayne and Stephen B. Woolcock (2007); and Henk-Jan 
Brinkman (2005).  
3
 Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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through its function facilitating access to foreign markets, attract foreign capitals, 
establish free trade agreements (FTAs) and encourage Chinese enterprises to venture 
out into the global economy. In this sense, economic diplomacy in a Chinese context is 
the promotion of cross-border economic interests and relations in support of its 
national objective (development) through trade, investment, financial, and 
environmental policies.  
 When economic diplomacy is placed in a multilateral scope, its objectives 
become institutionalised and facilitated by the MERs – conventionally referred to in the 
literature of International Relations (IR) as “international regimes.” Stephen D. Krasner 
(1983) famously defines international regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.” Oran R. Young (1989: 13) likewise perceives 
international regimes as “specialised arrangements that pertain to well-defined 
activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the 
members of international society.” This thesis builds from these definitions, but makes 
references to multilateral rather than international regimes on the grounds of definition. 
To refer to regimes as international generally implies an arrangement only involving 
nation-states. But to refer to regimes as multilateral means having many sides and 
therefore diverse parties that goes beyond just nation-states and include agencies of the 
regime itself as well as other non-governmental organisations. For this reason, 
multilateral is the more fitting name for the kind of regimes this thesis is concerned 
with. As such, this thesis understands the MERs as specialised intergovernmental 
arrangements with particular focuses on economic issues, and characterised by multi-
parties, multi-issues, multi-roles, and multi-values.  
The various types of MERs include international economic organisations (in the 
broader sense) such as the United Nations (UN), the WTO, and the Bretton Wood 
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institutions; international economic conventions such as the UNFCCC, and the Basel 
Convention; and other treaties and accords involving three or more parties. The MERs 
serve crucial functional needs of the international political economy as an overseer of 
cross-border economic activities, and as a facilitator of multilateral economic 
negotiations. Although nation-states ultimately establish and maintain the MERs, once 
institutionalised, it can exert independent influence. For example, the WTO has certain 
rights to monitor the trade activities of its member-states. The classic example is the 
annual review of China’s implementation of its WTO commitments in the first eight 
years after accession. Insofar as the MERs are organised by means of treaties, they 
provide an important source of formal international economic law.         
 When Deng Xiaoping, a former leader of the People’s Republic of China, 
opened the country’s front gates in 1978 to a liberal economy, memberships in 
numerous MERs were pursued for the purpose of overcoming domestic resistance to 
economic reforms, and address its resource deficit problems (Bergsten et al., 2008: 13, 
223). Maintaining good relations with MERs have since occupied a prominent position 
on China’s political agenda. As Elizabeth Economy (2001: 230) describes, “China has 
shifted from an insular, autarkic state into one that has assumed a prominent role in 
global affairs, seeking to participate in the full range of debates” and virtually all 
accords and treaties that regulate state behaviour. Today, China holds membership to 
most existing MERs (table 1.1) and has a participation rate well above the global 
average (Johnston, 2008: 32-39).  
 Beijing’s congenial view of the MERs spawned out of three beliefs. First, 
Beijing likes the fact that MERs are congenial to their national interests, and that it 
enables member-states the option to suspend their obligations without the need to 
withdraw from the system altogether (Lanteigne, 2005: 148). The flexibility puts China 
at ease with adapting to, and managing the multilateral system within the domestic 
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circumstances. Second, MER memberships assist Beijing in their efforts to implement 
economic and political reforms across numerous sectors and institutions, including the 
state administration and bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
businesses, and the trade of goods and services. By attaching domestic governance with 
international rules, Beijing was able to justify domestic reforms as a need to adapt to the 
international market. Third, the establishment of stronger ties with the MERs is a part of 
China’s interest to preserve a stable international environment that is conducive to its 
domestic development goals. And additional incentive is reputation-building. The 
implicit offshoot effect of doing so ensures the political legitimacy of the ruling 
Communist Party of China (CPC).
4
 In a way, these three beliefs also constitute the 
macrostructure of China’s approach to the MERs and form the foundation of their 
preference formation for economic negotiations.        
 
Table 1.1 China’s Multilateral Economic Regime Memberships (1949-2007) 
 
Year    Membership 
 
1949-1970    7 
1980     66 
1990     161 
2000     222 
2007     298 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
 In this context, Samuel S. Kim (1998: 60-71) defines China’s approach to the 
MERs as characterised by the “maxi-mini principle.” The principle implies the 
maximisation of rights and the minimisation of responsibilities. That is, China’s 
approach to MERs is directed at “state-enhancing, not state-diminishing functionalism.” 
Economy (2001: 232-233) likewise argues that Beijing employs the MERs for the 
purpose of enhancing its own economic capabilities rather than to transfer the rights of 
the state to an international decision-making body. Undeniably, it is naturally expected 
                                               
4
 The political legitimacy of the CPC rests on nationalism, economic growth, and social development. 
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that China, as like other nations, will first question how the MERs can benefit the state, 
and only second vice versa. At the same time, however, the principle is also too simple 
an explanation of China’s real approach to the MERs. An obvious case in point is 
China’s WTO accession. Beijing paid a significant admission price for membership and 
was unable to play the game on its own terms. Even in the years following accession, 
China was subject to WTO surveillance. Looking further back into China’s early reform 
years, China has been largely in the catching-up and integration phases of MER 
participation. As it grapples with the international regulatory frameworks, rules and 
norms, China felt it was treated, especially by other major economies, as a marginal 
player in many economic negotiation processes.
5
 Even today, the Chinese government 
believes it has limited actual and real rights in some of the key MERs. Beijing begs the 
question, “how can China maximise responsibilities if it does not have sufficient 
institutional rights?”6 MERs like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank have recently granted more voting quota to China, but much more MERs have yet 
to follow suit. Before more rights are acquired, however, the Chinese government feels 
it is holds an undermined capacity to participate proactively. 
 Some scholars (i.e., Christensen, 1996: 37) have pointed to China’s unresolved 
ambivalent approach to the MERs, and that Chinese leaders will continue to view the 
MERs with suspicion, especially those whose rules they did not help write. Nicholas 
Lardy (1999: 221) similarly argues that the Chinese leaders have at times resisted 
reformative steps necessary for integration to the MERs. But this was not done out of 
political spite. Rather it was for fear of slowing economic growths and triggering an 
inflation of the unemployment rate. This view is very much shaped by their socialist 
principles; the Chinese leaders believe international cooperation and interdependence 
can, at times, be in conflict with the perceived needs of domestic stability, with the 
                                               
5
 Interview with an expert from Tsinghua University, Beijing, 22 November 2012.  
6
 Interview with an expert from China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, 25 October 2012; Interview 
with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 23 October 2012. 
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authority of the party leaders more generally. Such is a contrast with liberal 
democracies, which generally view international cooperative behaviour as 
complementing the domestic standards and goals.         
 With these said, the observations of this study does find China’s participation in 
MERs to be generally a dynamic one that have shifted from reserved postures of a 
spectator to active participation as reflected in their negotiation behaviours. It has 
frequently spoken out against trade protectionism at the WTO;
7
 and in 2003 alone, 
China submitted a total of 65 independent written submissions, and over 100 joint 
submissions in relation to the DDA to Geneva (Xinhua Newswire, 24 July 2008). 
Although these figures are below that of the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US), it is greater than most other member-states. At times, the Chinese 
delegation has demonstrated direct and blunt articulation of criticisms for other 
countries. Such was the case when China highlighted the weaknesses of the economic 
and financial policymakers (of American origin) from the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund, 8 October 2010). These behaviours implies that Beijing is not only motivated by 
a system-maintaining approach to the MERs, but also by one of system-reformation as it 
grows more confident and competent in dealing with international economic affairs. 
This is even more so given China’s incentive to transform the unipolar concentration of 
world power towards a multi-polar system (Kent, 2002: 348). As a responsive strategy 
to the international standing of the US, the MERs are therefore an important vehicle for 
China’s international reform agenda.      
With increased multilateral activities, the government elevated the use of 
economic diplomacy since the 1990s, for managing and executing multilateral 
economic negotiations under the auspice of the related MERs. China’s economic 
diplomacy since then has seen both continuities and changes. While the fundamental 
principles of Chinese economic diplomacy have largely remained constant, some more 
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 Interview with an expert from Tsinghua University, Beijing, 22 November 2012. 
31 
 
substantive policy preferences have evolved from a posture of resistance to inclinations 
for flexibility, pragmatism, and in some cases, even adoption. Dynamic negotiation 
behaviours as such can be found in China’s postures at the DDA under the WTO, and 
the COP under the UNFCCC. For the purpose of illustration, let us briefly consider 
these examples with more details.  
Since COP1, China has presented both continuities and changes in its national 
preferences on climate change issues. What remained the same are the fundamental 
principles for negotiation: (i) the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities;”8 (ii) support for the UNFCCC as the only climate change regime; (iii) 
insist on the “no regret” principle9 (Yu 2008: 59). Beijing further holds that policies 
which do not advance its economic development should be funded by the developed 
countries (China Ministry of Science and Technology, 1998: 3-10; Economy 1997: 20). 
Yet, China has had preference changes for the Kyoto Mechanisms, which include the 
joint implementation (JI), the international emissions trade (IET), and the CDM. In the 
early phase of negotiations on the Kyoto Mechanisms (1997-2000), China was in clear 
reluctance to negotiate the modality, arguing that they are measures designed to help the 
developed countries escape from their mitigation commitments. Observers viewed 
China’s negotiation posture as passively resistant, and often articulate a preference for 
“no response.” By the turn of the millennia, however, China’s policy preference on the 
matter transformed from outright opposition to gradual, if muted, acceptance (Yu, 2008: 
58). In 2000, China forwarded a “no regrets” policy and accepted the IET. Two years 
later, China had formally accepted and ratified the CDM. Implementation followed 
immediately thereafter, with projects in Gansu and Shanxi provinces. Beyond the Kyoto 
Mechanism, China has also demonstrated growing flexibility and pragmatism towards 
                                               
8
 The “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle implies that China will share responsibilities 
in information communication and scientific research without incurring any economic burdens or 
requirements that would reduce their energy use. 
9
 The “no regret” principle means that China will share some concrete responsibilities to reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions provided they do not adversely affect its economic development. 
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the international binding mitigation targets. The shift in preferences was reflected in 
their negotiation position at the 2011 COP17 meeting in Durban.    
 Like climate change, China’s participation in the DDA trade negotiations has 
entailed both continuities and changes in policy preference. For the most part, China has 
remained consistent in its overall position, which is also in line with the Recently 
Acceded Members (RAMs): it is unwilling to contribute further beyond its WTO 
accession commitments. China regularly reinforces its status as a developing nation still 
in the process of digesting its WTO obligations made during accession. Yet, when the 
negotiation issues are considered more specifically, shifts in China’s policy preferences 
can be identified. One notable example is China’s attitude towards the GPA. Although 
joining the GPA was one of the sub-conditions of China’s entry into the WTO, the 
Chinese delegation hesitated to partake in the negotiations for several years post-
accession. This position swung the other way in April 2006 when Beijing agreed to 
commence its GPA accession negotiations by late-2007. To date, China has submitted 
three revised proposals to the GPA Committee, each with expanded, though 
incremental, amendments on the procurement coverage. Other areas of preference 
change include the negotiations on the trade in services. For much of the DDA round, 
observers have criticised China for acting passively during the services negotiations and 
for purposely marginalising itself (Sally, 2011: 9). The Chinese delegation argues that it 
has already made comprehensive commitments during its accession and therefore 
should not be subject to further obligations. China further argues that its service sectors 
are too underdeveloped to weather the competitive storms of foreign firms. But in the 
recent years, China has actively promoted liberalisation and a reduction in restrictions, 
especially in developed countries, on the movement of natural personals at lower skill 
levels (Mode 4 services trade). China has also expressed new interests to negotiate on 
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opening up cross-border trade (Mode 1 services trade), which is the delivery of a service 
from one country into another.       
 Although not all preference changes are extensive in an equal magnitude, the 
climate change and international trade examples nonetheless illustrate that China’s 
approach to the MERs and its economic negotiations is a dynamic one that have 
evolved from rigid resistance to flexibility, and in some cases, adoption. The dynamism 
of China’s economic diplomacy develops as the relationships between the agencies of 
the Chinese government and the MERs deepen. In an interview with a Chinese policy 
officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), it was suggested that dialogue with 
members of the MERs occur on a very regular basis, and consultation with the MER 
agencies during the preference formation process has become an informally integrated 
stage of policymaking for cross-border economic issues.
10
 These two developing trends 
– a growing dynamism in Chinese economic diplomacy and the road towards a tight-
knitted inter-agency relationship between Beijing and MERs – prompts questions 
concerning the consequential impact the MER agencies have on China’s policy 
preference formation for multilateral economic negotiations. Have China’s global 
integration created new windows of opportunity for the MER agencies and actors to 
influence China’s economic diplomacy preference formation? If yes, in what way(s) 
and/or by what function(s) can they do so?  
 Questions about influence on policy, in essence, concerns the preference 
formation processes. Here, policy preference formation is understood as the complex 
process by which a range of relevant political and private actors (referred to in this 
thesis as agencies) concerned with a policy issue, work with or against one another to 
carry out a proposed course of action. Policy initiatives are often considered 
simultaneously, with each involving different sets of specialised and concerned 
agencies. Some scholars believe China’s economic diplomacy policy preferences are 
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shaped solely by the centralised decision-making process within Beijing and have no 
relevance to external agencies whatsoever. For example, Hongyi Lai (2010) describes 
preference formation is shaped only by the paramount leader, the formal institutions, 
and the growing pluralistic government agencies. In a similar vein, Zhu Liqun (2010) 
places emphasis on the domestic factors as playing more decisive roles in shaping 
Chinese preferences. Michael H. Hunt (1996) and Thomas Robinson (1994) also believe 
in the primacy of domestic politics, the weight of the past, and the importance of 
ideology and personality as the primary determinants of Chinese preferences.  
Without denying the significance of domestic actors in shaping Chinese 
preferences, it is also important to recognise that political steps towards economic 
liberalisation has prompted an outburst of international transactions, and spawned 
concomitantly, a stark increase in global externalities including the standardisation of 
product labelling to the enforcement of copyright and patent laws. The implication of 
these developments on China, as like most nation-states, is a reduced capacity to 
manage the global externalities without multilateral policy coordination. Although 
economic liberalisation has not deprived China of its sovereignty, it has, to an extent, 
circumscribed its economic policy space. Since China is a political subject participating 
in the MERs, there is therefore no reason to expect that it will not be influenced by 
them.       
Over the past 30 years, an influx of scholarly attention has invested into learning 
about the domestic-international linkage (Dai, 2007; Moravcsik, 1998; Milner, 1997; 
Pahre and Papayoanau, 1997; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 
1993; Cowhey, 1993; Snyder, 1991; Rogowski, 1989). IR students have studied the 
ways that multilateral systems can either propel or undermine national politics; and how 
national interests can circumscribe their postures for multilateral negotiations. For 
realists, the nation-state’s preference formation is bounded by the international 
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distribution of power. Robinson (1994: 555-602), for instance, argues that the structure 
of the international system, and the Chinese decision-makers’ estimation of its relative 
power against the international power structures determine China’s preferences. 
Meanwhile, liberal scholars believe that the world economic activities, including 
international norms and institutions, constrain a country’s policy preferences (Keohane 
and Nye, 1989: 34-35; Ruggie, 1992: 561-598). For instance, Thomas G. Moore and 
Dixia Yang (2001: 194) argue that the MERs condition Chinese preferences by 
conforming them to international rules, structures and norms over time.   
Even though international factors have impact, both the realist and liberal camps 
overemphasise their influence capacities and underestimate the decisive role of 
domestic variables in the preference formation equation. Of equal seriousness, even in 
their claims about international influences, details about the method to which the MER 
agencies influence national interests and incentives are neglected. So while they argue 
for influence, it is uncertain how such influence are stemmed or channelled to the 
national level and constrains preferences. Other studies have also criticised these 
traditional schools of thought for underestimating the impact of factors such as ideology 
and transnational networks on altering the preferences of nation-states; and for the lack 
of empirical observations, which renders their assumptions insignificant (Haas, 1990; 
Moravcsik, 1989; Smith, 1987; Donnelly, 1986).    
From an international political economy (IPE) perspective, Robert Putnam 
(1988) plugs economic diplomacy preference formation into a “two-level game.” The 
logic is that the interaction between the international and domestic levels shape national 
preferences. Putnam’s argument crucially takes into consideration the dynamic 
interaction between the domestic and international levels in economic negotiations. 
However, his approach also suffers from a risky assumption that preferences are shaped 
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only by the two levels and disregards the interactions between the international, 
domestic, and individuals who make policy decisions.  
Jeffrey C. Alexander and Bernhard Giesen (1987) examine such relationships in 
the “micro-macro linkage” approach. The approach examines the three levels of 
activities and the fluidity of movement between the international, domestic, and 
individual agencies. Because neither the macrostructure nor the decision-makers at the 
micro level have absolute control over the national policy, the three levels mutually 
influence each other in preference formation. The advantage of this approach is its 
encapsulation of the three dimensions of the policy macrostructure, taking into account 
elements of the levels (in a vertical way) and the structures (in a horizontal way). Yet, 
this approach also leaves questions unaccounted for. For instance, how the multilateral 
agencies’ influence converges with, and therefore alters, the preferences of the national 
macrostructure and individual decision-makers? In what way(s) or through which 
functions does the multi-level relationship affect each other?             
Building from previous studies on the reciprocal nature of the domestic-
international linkage (i.e., Almond, 1989; Gourevitch, 1978; Hintze, 1975), some 
researchers have investigated in the ways of which national policymakers are 
connected with the multilateral system (Coleman and Perl, 1999; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995). This strand of literature 
posits that the influence of the MERs varies as it is often mediated by different kinds 
of national government agencies (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000; Walsh, 1994; Bennett, 
1991). The shortfall of this literature is that while they claim the MERs have 
fundamentally changed how nation-states make policy, they do not specify how the 
changes are actualised (Botcheva and Martin, 2001; Lazar, 2001). Scholars of public 
policy also avoid this question. The literature (i.e., Gummett, 1996, Parry, 1993; 
Willett, 1988) that looks at the MERs and public policy tend to place more attention 
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on international public policy (i.e., the analysis on cross-border interactions for 
solving common public policy concerns) as opposed to how national preferences are 
affected by the MER processes, or their affiliated agencies. 
Numerous studies have considered China’s relationship with the MERs more 
specifically. For example, Economy (2001: 231) argues that the process of 
establishing the MERs may influence the manner in which China makes policies 
through the establishment of new institutions, the emergence of new policy actors (or 
the enhancement of others), and the development of new ideas, values, or orientations 
among Chinese decision-makers.  Margaret Pearson (2001: 338) adds that the MERs 
can affect preference formation through an international imposition of market norms 
in the domestic economy. Kim (1998) looks at the decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
MERs as key to shaping preferences. R.W. Hu (1998) contends that the learning 
process in the integration with the MERs drive domestic preference formation. Based 
on the theoretical assumption that a state’s preferences are shaped by its national 
identity, Qin Yaqing (2010: 47-50) argues the deeper China’s integration with the 
international system, the more its identity changes, and this gives MERs a stronger and 
more positive effect on China’s preference formation.    
Although these studies have respectively contributed to the understanding of 
China’s relationship with the MERs, they commonly suffer from three drawbacks. 
First, the literature dismisses details about how the MERs’ influences are actualised 
and subsequently channelled through to the national preference formation processes. 
As well, there are seldom discussions about the agencies involved, it does not explain 
the actual role of the MER agencies in shaping Chinese economic diplomacy, how or 
why their influences are either positive or negative, and the effects spawned from the 
China-MER relationship. Second, these studies takes China for granted, viewing it as 
a generic unit, while disregarding the reality that it umbrellas a complex and 
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multileveled system with an array of political agencies and actors. The disregard for 
this problematically dismisses the fact that different agencies have different 
relationships with various MER actors and therefore can stem different kinds of policy 
effects and/or acceptance of external influences. Finally, these studies do not treat 
their claims with sufficient empirical backing and therefore are largely hypothetical 
and theoretical by nature in terms of what decision-making axioms and rules would 
have been necessary in order for given observable outcomes to have occurred. This 
was perhaps due to a methodological constraint (i.e., a lack of access to the relevant 
Chinese policy actors). As a result, their findings only drew causal inferences and 
certain basic rules about Chinese preference formation based on patterns of manifest 
actions.        
Despite the abundant academic attention on the international-domestic linkage, 
little is known about the implications of the deepened relationships between the 
agencies from Beijing and those of the MERs on China’s economic diplomacy 
preference formation. Nor is there a clear understanding about how the MER agencies 
can either promote or inhibit Chinese policy preference changes. As the preceding 
discussion shows, the current literature has, by and large, only addressed the obvious 
dimension of the China-MER interaction (i.e., on the macro-institutional level). As 
such, it has overlooked the possibility that the MER agencies can also have an 
influence on Chinese preferences for economic negotiations. Thus there remains a 
research gap in the possibility of incorporating policy preference changes induced by 
the MER agencies into China’s economic diplomacy decision-making. What are the 
impacts of the MER agencies on Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation? 
What accounts for China’s varying responses to the MER agencies – from acquiescing 
to standing firm? What are some long-run implications of the China-MER 
engagements at the agency-level have on the decision-making structure of Beijing?  
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The primary objective of this thesis is to address this literature gap and 
contribute to the knowledge-building in this respect. The thesis is interested in two 
aspects of the China-MER relationship. First, it is interested in the mechanisms to 
which the MER agencies can influence China’s economic diplomacy policy 
preferences. This is important for understanding the role(s) the MER agencies play in 
the macro-political structure. As such, it contributes to a better and more 
comprehensive understanding about how Chinese economic diplomacy is shaped and 
by whom. Of course, the study of economic diplomacy is not only concerned about 
preference formation. It is also interested the derivation of national approaches at the 
negotiation-stage of decision-making. As such, the second dimension of this thesis 
examines the role(s) of the MER agencies in shaping China’s approach to multilateral 
economic negotiations. As part of this analysis, the thesis looks at how the MER 
agencies make deliberate efforts to shape the negotiation outcomes. Thus the primary 
research question of this thesis is: how do multilateral economic regimes and their 
agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy policy preferences and negotiation 
approach?  
Two on-going economic negotiations are used as the case studies that form the 
basis of analyses: the COPs climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC, and the 
DDA trade negotiations under the WTO. Ultimately, the contribution of this thesis is 
considerable. It provides a new conceptualisation of the relationship at the agency-
level between the Chinese government and MERs. Further value added is given to the 
fact that this is a study on Chinese economic diplomacy policy preference formation – 
an important policy concern that has thus far received little scholarly attention.     
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1.3 The Research Design 
The primary hypothesis addresses the primary research question: how MER agencies 
influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation. This hypothesis is mainly 
concerned with the preference formation stage of decision-making. The hypothesis 
holds that:   
 
H1: The agencies of multilateral economic regimes can influence Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation through three primary mechanisms: costs-and-benefits 
calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement.  
  
An underlying assumption for the primary hypothesis is that the level of actual 
influence the MER agencies have through the three mechanisms is contingent on four 
situational factors: national objective, policy goals, policy settings, and policy 
instruments.  
The secondary hypothesis addresses the supplementary impact of MER agencies 
on the negotiation dimension of Chinese economic diplomacy. The hypothesis is 
therefore concerned with the decision-making during the negotiation processes. As such, 
it holds that:     
 
H2: The agencies of multilateral economic regimes can shape China’s negotiation 
approach and ultimate outcome through three capacities: as a mediator through shuttle 
diplomacy proximity talks, as a facilitator of informal negotiation practices, and as an 
instigator of side-payment bargaining.   
 
An underlying for the secondary hypothesis is that the actual influence of the three roles, 
which are also their advantage as well as contingencies, rest on a core set of drivers for 
41 
 
China’s negotiation approach, referred to in this study as the social instigators. They are 
expectation, trust, and personal reputation. The three social instigators are cumulatively 
necessary criteria for maximising the MER agencies’ impact.    
The research strategy can be summarised in three stages. The first stage is to 
identify the mechanisms of MER influence on the Chinese government, for which the 
propositions of the aforementioned three schools of thought were referred to as the 
research skeleton of this study. The second stage is to account for the degrees and 
variations of MER influence on China’s economic diplomacy policy preference 
formation. The third stage elaborates on how MER agencies shape China’s approach to 
economic negotiations and the consequent outcome. This study approaches the research 
question and the hypotheses testing (more details in the next chapter) through an 
integrative methodology of comparative analysis. The research variables of this study:  
 Independent variable: (the influence of) the MER agencies; and  
 Dependent variable: Chinese economic diplomacy policy preference 
formation.  
The sceptical reader might find this research enquiry problematic. The MER agencies 
do not appear out of thin air but are promoted by nation-states to serve particular 
global interests, values, or preferences (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 492). By focusing on 
the influence of the MER agencies on China, it carries the risk of omitting a relevant 
part of the story (i.e., China’s influence on the MERs) and perhaps takes instances of 
strong Chinese influence on MERs as cases of precisely the opposite process. To be 
sure, given the interaction between the political agencies of China and the MERs, it is 
comprehensible that both directions of influence exist, and the need to avoid the risk 
of circularity is a legitimate concern. With this said, the thesis has several 
justifications for only focusing on the influence of the MER agencies on China. First, 
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the empirical research of this study gives at least some indications about the depth and 
width of the influence of the MER agencies, which makes it significant and relevant in 
itself. Under certain circumstances, the MER agencies are found to shape, at varying 
degrees, both policy preferences and negotiation processes, even in ways unintended 
by the MER agencies. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to explore how and 
under what conditions the MER agencies make a difference in China’s economic 
diplomacy policy preferences and approach to negotiations.  
Second, wherever this kind of influence proves to be significant, it is important 
to recognise that the MER actors constitute just as much policy influence on the 
Chinese government as the reverse happens. Finally, if under certain conditions the 
influence of the MER agencies can modify Chinese preference formation, then it is 
expected that it will also trigger (possibly with low-intensity) processes of integration 
and therefore the dynamic between national and international agencies.   
 
1.3.1 Why multilateral economic regimes? 
Why does the present thesis choose the MER agencies for tracing international 
influence on Chinese economic diplomacy? After all, Chinese policy actors encounter 
a myriad of external influences from bilateral interactions with other nation-states, as 
well as on a regional level. From a theoretical perspective, rationalists, cognitivists, 
and contractualists commonly assume a connection between existing normative 
structures within the MERs and the assimilation of these norms in the preferences of 
nation-states. It is in the MERs where the interaction between agencies is most likely 
and where processes of internalising external influences are most concentrated. As 
James P. Muldoon (Jr.) (1998: 3) observes, it is also within the MERs that economic 
diplomacy with an emphasis on interpersonal communication, informal discussions, 
and bargaining manifest. As well, the MERs generally have features, objectives, 
43 
 
norms, and beliefs that challenge the core assumptions and ideologies of national 
policy actors. So if China is to be influenced by any counter-attitudinal agencies, it 
ought to be from those of the MERs. 
For the most part, when IR scholars look for the effect of international regimes, 
the unit of analysis has tended to be the regime (Johnston, 2008: 27; Meyer et al., 1997; 
Eyre and Suchman, 1996). The problem with this is that regimes are unitary actors that 
do not participate in the preference formation; rather, the agents and actors of the 
MERs do (i.e., the Secretary-General, Chairs of the negotiation committee, working 
group members, and so on). For this reason, this thesis treats the influence of the 
MERs as effects of the individual or agency affiliated with the regimes, and in turn, 
the effects of these agents on the economic diplomacy policy preference formation and 
negotiation approach of China.  
 But how would one know if the costs-and-benefits calculus, information 
dissemination, reputation reinforcement, side-payment bargaining, proximity talks, 
and INPs had led to cooperative policy preferences from China? First, it is necessary 
to show that the Chinese government and its policy actors are conducive to these 
mechanisms of influence. Second, it is of imperative to show that after some 
engagements with the MER agencies, the preference of policies (as reflected through 
their postures and arguments) have evolved in a way that converges with the 
preferences of the MER. Third, it is essential to show a shift in China’s preferences 
that is consistent with the arguments made by the MER agencies. These are the areas 
to which this thesis tests.  
 Crucial to note that it is one thing to identify the consequences of influence 
(i.e., the instances of change) and quite another to measure it, particularly since the 
MER agencies can generate different kinds of change, which renders them difficult to 
analytically and methodologically compare with each other. Therefore, the dependent 
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variable of this research needs to be measured in a consistent but flexible way. The 
literature on “Europeanisation” has established four indicators of impact: inertia, 
absorption, transformation, and retrenchment (Radaelli, 2000, 2002; Borzel and 
Risse, 2000, 2003; Lenschow, 2006). Inertia indicates a lack of MER influence. Under 
this circumstance, the Chinese government stay beyond the reach of MER the 
agencies, and no changes in the preference or approach changes can be identified. 
Furthermore, the policies and norms derived from the MER agencies are not endorsed 
by any domestic actor, or it is only able to build weak intra-governmental coalitions 
with no or very little impact. Absorption implies some influence of the MER agencies 
over China, but it is only to the point of adaptation. In other words, absorption implies 
a situation in which China formally adopts new policies and measures derived from a 
MER agency, but “without changing their essential features and the underlying 
collective understandings attached to them” (Borzel and Risse, 2000: 10). What it does 
do is allow Chinese decision-makers to acquire new capacities to address particular 
issues both internally and externally.  
Transformation indicates a deeper influence from the MER agencies on China, both 
in terms of preference formation and in shaping the negotiation approach. In both cases, 
it implies a paradigmatic change in “the fundamental logic of political behaviour” 
(Radaelli, 2002: 117; Borzel and Risse, 2000: 10). Such preference changes are 
expected to become institutionalised. The implication on the process is that the change 
is expected to lead to a sizeable alteration in the distribution of power within Beijing, as 
well as the emergence of dedicated administrative entities, working groups, committees 
or networks, and/or the creation of specific bureaucratic routines. A relevant increase in 
the competence and ability of the Chinese government to address a particular issue is 
subsequently expected both in terms of its internal capacities and its international 
“actorness” (Costa and Jorgensen, 2012). Finally, retrenchment indicates a situation 
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where the Chinese government reacts against the activities of the MER agencies. In 
contrast to inertia, the negative reaction from China towards the MER agencies is active 
and explicit. Therefore, China is expected to take specific measures to counteract the 
effects of the MER agencies.  
The way that this thesis identifies the qualitative influence and classifies them 
under any of the four indicators is as follows. If a MER agency is found to have 
triggered preference changes without any constraints imposed by the situational factors, 
then it is considered to have transformation influence. If a MER agency stimulates new 
policy adaptation but is circumscribed by one or more of the situational factors, then the 
influence is at the absorption level. If the MER agency does not lead to any adaptation 
processes and is limited by one or more of the situational factors, then it has inertia 
influence. Finally, if there are indications of rebellion or lashing-out behaviour from 
China as a result of its engagements with MER agencies, then it indicates a 
retrenchment influence. On the whole, this qualitative scale covers all the possible 
magnitude and directions of policy change and is comprehensive enough to include 
different kinds of preference changes. For these reasons, this study adopts these four 
indicators as the measurement of influence.      
 
1.3.2 Why Chinese economic diplomacy?  
Chinese economic diplomacy is an appropriate area of focus for analysing the 
influence of MER agencies on China. China is at present still novice in the practice of 
economic diplomacy based on its brief history participating in economic negotiations 
under the auspice of MERs. Yet, China is also a “hard-realpolitik” state. These two 
features make Chinese economic diplomacy ideal for testing because if there is any 
MER influence, it is expected to be relatively easy to identify given the likely contrast 
between a China that just entered MERs and a China deeply involved in MERs. And 
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China is the kind of state where its hard-realpolitik worldviews stipulates a strong 
resistance to external influences. For these reasons, Chinese economic diplomacy is a 
relatively easy case for identifying the MER agencies’ influence.  
 If the rationalists are correct, then Chinese preferences is expected to be 
formed on the basis of (i) exogenous material (dis)incentives that constrains China 
from insisting on its traditional preferences; (ii) fresh information that ensures the 
Chinese decision-makers are not disadvantaged by any means; and (iii) an alteration of 
policy actors involved either as a result of previous policy failures or in response to a 
desire for effective participation in MER-related affairs and therefore requires a 
reconfiguration of the locus of decision-making. Suppose the cognitivists are right, 
then a positive preference should be a function of the learning processes and therefore 
internalising global norms and practices. In such case, one should anticipate a 
convergence over time in the views and beliefs between Chinese policy actors and the 
MER agencies. If the contractualists are right, then pro-social policy preferences 
should be the outcome of a desire to secure an internationally recognised co-operator 
reputation.   
 Assuming that the Chinese government engages with MER agencies with 
realpolitik preferences that are generally at odds with those of the MER agencies, the 
following analytical assumptions are expected to be empirically plausible. First, the 
thesis assumes that the growth of global interactions has created a situation of complex 
interdependence of which strips China of its full autonomy to unilaterally regulate its 
economic affairs.
11
 In this context, MER agencies to which China engages does affect 
Beijing’s economic diplomacy policy preference formation. This assumption is derived 
based on three reasons. First, the most current MERs are designed around the concept 
of “embedded liberalism,” which challenges China’s socialist ideology, generally 
speaking. The need to adapt to a socialist liberal framework therefore implies the need 
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 Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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to integrate with new ideas and different approaches to the formation of preferences. It 
also implies the need to adapt to new realities in the political and economic paradigms, 
and reshapes how Beijing understands the global political economy. Second, MERs 
operate on a principle of multilateralism, which have already reoriented China’s 
economic diplomacy philosophy to also place a heavy emphasis on this principle. 
Third, some MERs have important distributive functions that can affect Chinese 
politics. These three reasons collectively impose significant challenges to Beijing 
especially because China cannot change these features upon joining MERs.     
 The second assumption is that MER agencies matter in Chinese policy 
preference formation. MER agencies have agenda-setting powers alongside their roles 
as facilitators and implementers. These agencies are endowed with the first-mover 
advantage when they propose a certain course of action or set of policy 
recommendations that may alter China’s preferences. Crucial to acknowledge is that 
although Chinese decision-makers do not have the first-mover advantage, they do hold 
veto powers, which is why it is important for MER agencies to take into account their 
preferences. In addition, as the principal-agent theory (Tirole, 1986; Pratt and 
Zeckhauser, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1983) points out, the MER agencies possess 
attributes (i.e., expertise, material resources, and signalling capacities) of which the 
Chinese decision-makers may benefit. In addition, the MER agencies disseminate 
standards for which the Chinese decision-makers establish their expectations on matters 
such as compliance by all member-states. Therefore, with its insulation from power 
politics, the MERs have the ability to alter the range of available national preferences, 
negotiation approaches, and bargaining strategies of China. The MER agencies, 
consequently, constitute an important intervening variable, even if it is not an 
independent one.  
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 Third, MER agencies generally use a mixture of approaches to interacting with 
Chinese policy actors. One such strategy is contracting, a form of interaction that 
generates Pareto-efficient outcomes (Drezner, 2006: 11-12). In this type of interaction, 
the MER agencies influence Chinese decision-makers through the proffering of pacific, 
rather than coerced, incentives. It is important to recognise that this criterion does not 
exclude the plausible situation where decision-makers are offered new incentives for 
cooperation. Unlike contracting, persuasion enables the preference ordering of Chinese 
decision-makers to be altered through new forms of inter-subjective understandings 
(Hurd, 1999). Persuasion in this sense comes with different components. In order to 
persuade Chinese decision-makers, it is essential that they are exposed to new ideas in 
order to transform their worldviews. Persuasion is also generated through the 
establishment of social connections and creates non-material incentives that run in 
parallel with other national-states. The friendly relationship between China and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices had China align 
their preferences for the global antitrust policy with international practices (Sell, 1998). 
As such, persuasion requires a great degree of social interaction. Like contracting, 
however, persuasion is choice theoretic, and has important elements of strategic 
interaction. For instance, the MER agencies strategically select the forums for 
objectives involving persuasion. Forums that are suitable for persuasion may not 
necessarily be appropriate for contracting. It is assumed that the MER agencies use a 
combination of both interaction approaches with Chinese political actors, under varying 
circumstances and at different stages of the preference formation.      
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1.3.3 Case selection and analysis 
This thesis centres on how MER agencies can influence China’s economic diplomacy 
preference formation, and two sets of mechanisms are examined as possible ways of 
causing preference changes. In this context, the analysis centres on how these three 
mechanisms engages with, and alter, China’s preference formation. Choosing the main 
empirical cases, however, requires some care. Two main MERs were selected: the 
UNFCCC and the WTO. In most cases, the level of China’s ultimate preference change 
is not necessarily in China’s interests in an obvious sense. To derive optimum accuracy, 
each MER case study is dissected into more specific “case pair” focuses, based on two 
modalities within the negotiation agenda. Each “case pair” will be from the same 
negotiation process but with different outcomes. The first set of case studies concerns 
China’s participation in the UNFCCC, and the “case pair” focuses on the CDM and the 
international mitigation commitment negotiations. The second set is on China’s 
participation in the WTO’s DDA negotiations. The “case pair” looks at the international 
trade in services and the GPA negotiations. The reason these two sets of case studies 
were selected is because they commonly demonstrate evolving Chinese preferences, 
from strong resistance to either adoption and/or flexibility positions. At the same time, 
the case studies exhibit different degrees of preference shifts and flexibilities which 
enable this thesis to analyse causes and implication of variances and draw clearer 
probable causalities. And lastly, these two on-going negotiations have more resources 
available for research purposes, which is a methodological advantage. To determine the 
shape of the variables, observable implications are derived from the hypotheses.  
The one challenge for this study is the level of access to China’s preference 
formation processes. Any research that involves micro-level analyses involves what 
Herbert A. Simon (1985: 303) calls “specification of the situation” which is “data 
intensive,” and “time consuming.” And due to the opaque nature of the Chinese 
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political system, access to the relevant data at the micro level presents an obstacle to 
the empirical research of this thesis. Yet, it must be made clear that this thesis does not 
intend to open every “black box” in Chinese economic diplomacy decision-making. Its 
purpose is more modest, but none the less valuable – namely to provide a preliminary 
understanding and framework within which to examine the combined impact of 
international and domestic environments on the multiple levels of agents involved in 
China’s economic diplomacy decision-making. It also intends to enhance scholars’ 
ability to analyse the choices and preferences of Chinese decision-makers when faced 
with concrete economic policy issues in a diplomatic context. Out of necessity then 
the qualitative data are collected from a mix of sources. The starting point was the 
related academic resources, such as books, journal articles, and conference papers. 
Government documents circulated by Chinese policy actors were also used. Internet 
sources including the online editions of Chinese newspapers and other related websites 
concerning climate change and international trade were useful. To ensure accuracy of 
information, multiple sources were gathered to ensure the reliability of events, and 
facts.    
Just as important, this study has relied on over 190 interviews with key Chinese and 
non-Chinese decision-makers and negotiators that work in climate change and 
international trade-related policy issues, representatives of the UNFCCC and WTO 
Secretariats and other international organisations, Chinese industrial actors, and experts 
from the Chinese and international epistemic community. In addition, data from the 
participant observation at the COP17 and 2011 DDA negotiations are used to 
complement the interview data. Undoubtedly, the researcher has limited access to the 
decision-making processes due to the “asymmetric transparency” (不对称的透明度) 
characteristic of the Chinese political system. As a result, there is reason to suspect the 
level of honesty interviewed policy actors have communicated their responses. Another 
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possibility is that interviewees can purposely exaggerate or simplify their answers. This 
makes the data problematic on empirical grounds and the actual intentions of Chinese 
decision-makers difficult to decipher. But to minimise this effect, the researcher has 
carefully paid attention to the professional position of the interviewee, the inter-personal 
dynamics during the interviews, the wording of the interview questions, and carry out 
follow-up interviews where necessary for clarification. In doing so, some of the 
aforementioned obstacles are remedied.  
 Data about the events during the negotiations are based on onsite observations 
and reports from non-governmental organisations. To supplement the above 
information sources, participatory observations were conducted on-site at the 
UNFCCC’s COP17 negotiations in Durban for the climate change case study; and at 
the 2011 Ministerial negotiations on the Doha Round in Geneva for the trade case 
study. Access into the informal negotiations between Parties of the Member States 
were granted during the observations; and further onsite interviews were conducted 
with representatives of numerous delegations as well as the multilateral economic 
regimes participating in the negotiations. Additionally, reports from organisations such 
as the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) published by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD); and the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) were used. Both organisations are regarded as 
independent and reliable sources of information, and are widely referenced within 
academia as empirical observations of the various dimensions of the multilateral 
climate change and trade negotiations.  
 
1.4 Structure of Thesis  
The present chapter begins Part One of the thesis. In Chapter Two, the theoretical 
debates and frameworks are presented for the purpose of generating the primary and 
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secondary hypotheses. The hypotheses are informed by an eclectic set of theories from 
the existing literature, and tested through an integrative methodology and within-case 
analyses. Chapter Three traces the evolution of China’s economic diplomacy preference 
formation processes, from the Mao Zedong government to the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang 
Zemin eras, and the Hu Jintao administration. This chapter provides the context for 
probing the hypotheses in the subsequent sections of the thesis.     
Part Two of the thesis starts with Chapter Four, which inaugurates the empirical 
analyses by examining China’s participation in the COPs climate Change talks and the 
“case pair” negotiations on the CDM and international mitigation commitment. Both 
negotiations witnessed unique negotiating position changes from the Chinese 
delegation. Chapter Five examines the DDA negotiations for international trade and 
particular attention is on the “case-pair” negotiations on the GPA and trade in services. 
As like in climate change, both these case studies exhibited increases in China’s 
negotiation positions’ flexibilities from the start of the negotiations to the present-day. 
Chapter Six offers a comparative analysis on the findings from the two case study 
chapters and draws some “probabilistic causalities” on how the MER agencies influence 
Chinese preferences through the evaluation of each individual variable before analysing 
any interplay between them. Due to the qualitative nature of the data, any causality 
established can only be treated as relative rather than absolute. Furthermore, the long-
term consequence of the China-MER engagement on Beijing’s decision-making 
structure is discussed.   
Part Three of the thesis begins with Chapter Seven, which offers a discussion on 
the role(s) MER agencies play in shaping China’s negotiation approaches. Here, the 
mechanisms of side-payment, proximity talks, and INPs are examined alongside the 
social instigators. Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the thesis with an overarching 
discussion on the broader implications of the primary findings from both theoretical and 
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policy perspectives. The relevance of the findings on other emerging market economies 
is assessed thereafter. Finally, some remarks are made regarding a future research 
agenda.  
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Chapter 2   
 
LAYING THE THEORETICAL BRICKWORKS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the post-Cold War era, China recognised that economic globalisation has blurred 
the boundaries between the domestic and international spheres, turning many national 
affairs into transnational issues. In the face of this mainstream current, Chinese leaders 
believed it was of imperative to establish itself as a prominent member in multilateral 
economic regimes (MERs). In 1989, China joined 157 MERs in the form of accords, 
treaties, international conventions, and international institutions. By 2011, this figure 
rose to approximately 300 (Zhang, 2011: 129). As China’s relationship with the MERs 
deepen, what are some consequential implications on China’s economic diplomacy 
preference formation? Suppose the MERs and their agencies do affect national 
preferences, through what mechanisms can it best diffuse its influence? Numerous 
theoretical approaches have contributed to the international-domestic debates, and 
offer a selection of possible variables for this thesis. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
discuss these contending perspectives. The goal is to look across various research 
lenses to see how different streams of literature could illuminate the drivers, 
engagement processes, and motivational attributes that enable a shared preference 
formation process.       
 Given that economic diplomacy is about both national preferences and the 
negotiation process, this chapter crafts two analytical frameworks in order to analyse 
the different stages of decision-making and hence dimensions of possible MER 
influence. Both frameworks are integrative and built from the assumptions of 
rationalism, cognitivism, and contractualism. The underlying assumption is that MER 
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agencies influences Chinese economic diplomacy through different stages of decision-
making and participation in the multilateral processes. As such, the first framework 
looks at how MER agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference 
formation. The mechanisms of the costs-and-benefits calculus, information 
dissemination, and reputation reinforcement are identified as the most likely variables. 
The purpose of the second framework is to examine what role(s) MER agencies play 
in shaping China’s negotiation approach within a multilateral setting. The MER 
agencies as an instigator for side-payment bargaining, a mediator through shuttle 
diplomacy proximity talks, and a facilitator of informal negotiation practices (INPs) 
are identified as the most plausible roles with a capacity for influence. Together, these 
two frameworks help yield the primary and secondary hypotheses of this thesis on the 
causal relationship between the dependent (Chinese economic diplomacy preference 
formation) and independent variables ([the influence of] the MER agencies).      
 In the next section, a brief discussion on the limitations of the mainstream 
theoretical approaches is made. In sections three and four takes on the tasks of 
presenting the first and second frameworks respectively. Section five introduces the 
primary and second hypotheses of this study. Section six makes some concluding 
remarks.    
 
2.2 The Limits of Orthodox Traditions 
When the notion of preference formation is meshed with an investigation about the 
influence of MER agencies, it often implies a concern about preference change. In other 
words, it is about how national preferences are affected by the activities and processes 
of the MERs and its agencies. The conventional perception of preference change occurs 
from events and/or processes outside of the relatively stable internal decision-making 
system (Sabatier, 1998; Heclo, 1994). This perception is based on the belief that the 
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preference formation process constitutes distinct and self-equilibrating national 
decision-making systems consisting of already-established definition of policy issues, 
legal and fiscal frameworks, government programmes, actors and institutions (Eisner, 
1994; Harris and Milkis, 1989). But in the event that new extraneous elements are 
introduced into the system, the preference formation processes could be thrown out of 
equilibrium and thus trigger preference changes. In this context, the MER agencies are 
the external intervention intruding in an otherwise stable Chinese preference formation 
process. Based on this logic, it is assumed that engagement with MER agencies, one 
way or another, disturbs Beijing’s economic diplomacy preference formation process. 
The more interesting question is how?  
 Scholars of international politics and economy have had a long tradition of 
debating about the relative weight of external forces on the domestic environment. The 
most classic school of thought is the systemic theory realism. Realists argue that the 
primary goal of foreign policy, broadly speaking, is the survival of nation-states in the 
international system. Applied to the present context, realists would argue that Chinese 
economic diplomacy preferences are shaped by the interplay of international forces 
(i.e., between the MER agencies and the multilateral processes). Descended from 
realism is Peter Gourevitch’s (1978) second-image reverse (SIR) model, which 
highlights the impact of the international actors, like MERs, on the domestic settings. 
SIR advocates argue that MER agencies impose critical constraints onto, and frame, 
China’s available preference options; and that national preferences are largely shaped 
in response to the changing dynamics within the MERs (Tow, 1994; Ross, 1986). To 
this effect, “the external sources of Chinese policies” can be viewed as “a matter of 
conditioning and shaping” its policy options (Cumings, 1989: 220); the internal 
elements of Chinese politics are “not the critical determinants” of economic diplomacy 
preference formation (Pollack, 1984).   
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 A second stream of theorising began with the works of Karl Deutsch (1957) and 
Ernst Haas (1958) on the impact of parties and interest groups in the process of the 
European regional integration. They highlight the importance of the “spill-over” effect 
and the feedback process between domestic and international developments. As such, 
their work gave birth to the themes of international regimes, interdependence, and 
transnationalism. The intellectual heirs of this tradition, namely Joseph Nye and Robert 
Keohane (1977), eventually reformed the school of thought into the interdependency 
theory. The theory has three primary characteristics, including the use of multiple 
channels and actors in the interaction between states, and between states and the MERs; 
the role of economic variables in changing agendas and linkages between prioritised 
issues; and bringing about non-military instruments of statecraft (Keohane and Nye, 
1989). By focusing on the MERs, the theory promotes the greater use of soft power, 
diplomacy, and cooperation through the forms and procedures of international law. In 
this respect, MER agencies influence Chinese preferences through the general 
interactions of diplomacy, and institutional rules, norms and principles.
12
     
 A case in point for the two strands of thought is China’s accession into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) – the descendent of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Advocates of both theoretical traditions can extract evidence 
to suggest how porous China’s preference formation is to the WTO agencies’ influences. 
For instance, the realists would point to the fact that the leading trading partners, 
particularly the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) used their power 
advantages to compel China in accepting more protocol and obligations on the 
accession than China was initially willing to accept. The interdependency theorists, in 
the meantime, can find support for their claims in the fact that China’s preferences were 
constrained by the WTO’s systemic rules and norms, as well as by the monitoring 
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 The effectiveness of these mechanisms lies in the fact that they imply obligations, even though these 
obligations are not enforceable through a hierarchical legal system. 
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systems, such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. Taking into consideration the binding force of the WTO’s regulations, 
China had a limited capacity to make a selective application. For example, although 
some aspects of China’s trade policy regime remain opaque, China has adopted 
measures to increase the alignment of its national standards with international norms 
and hence have increased the level of transparency of its trade-related policies, practices 
and measures. This was the case for the Regulation on Open Government Information. 
Just as well, some reformist Chinese decision-makers were perhaps also interested in 
exposing its policies to the WTO’s influence in order to push for economic reforms.  
Yet, as important as the WTO agencies’ influences were, it did not take on a 
blank slate. Margaret Pearson (2001) found that even though the GATT/WTO 
influences came to affect China’s trade policy in the mid-1980s and much of the 1990s, 
China’s preference changes throughout the process were also the product of domestic 
influences. The vitality of domestic forces was particularly apparent in the original 
impetus for a policy of openness, and this remained in place even as the international 
influences grew. Two of the strongest domestic influences during China’s GATT/WTO 
accession negotiations were the pluralisation of policy inputs and the related role of 
internal lobbying. Domestic actors beyond the core political structure placed brakes on 
numerous occasions during China’s quest for WTO membership. As well, the agencies 
peripheral (i.e., ministries, local governments, and grassroots actors) to the formal 
decision-making structure became much more influential over time. Even if they did not 
ultimately prevent a WTO accession, this periphery certainly shaped the process. Thus, 
it is clear to see that domestic variables do matter in China’s preference formation – a 
reality that is underestimated by the realist and liberal traditions. Additionally, by 
overemphasising on the role of MER agencies, they assume that the Chinese 
government (and perhaps even the MERs), as a unitary actor, can only fashion national 
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preferences in a one-off manoeuvre. As a result, they disregard the important micro-
processes of the Chinese political system in preference formation and neglect to answer 
the crucial question of how different domestic actors interact with the MER agencies. 
Even in their assumptions on external influence, the systemic and liberal 
traditions provide few prescriptions for the way(s) the MER agencies can actualise 
influence. Although the interdependency theory does comparatively better in this regard 
by placing some attention to the conduits of influence and the way in which it can shape 
perceptions of national interests and policy preferences, it nonetheless dismisses details 
on the dynamics between its proposed channels and the domestic dimensions of 
decision-making. These theoretical approaches further lack generalisability across time, 
settings, and policy sectors. Due to the limitations of the orthodox traditions, the thesis 
will adapt to the inclusiveness of the conventional theories as only analytical guidance 
for the dependent variable. They are not adopted as part of the analytical framework.   
 
2.3 A Framework for Preference Formation  
To capture how the MER agencies can influence China’s national preference 
formation, a framework that prescribes mechanisms with the potential capacities to 
affect China’s symbolic macrostructure is needed. The symbolic macrostructure refers 
to the political motivations, incentives, and ideological beliefs that are part of the 
interpretive lens through which Chinese decision-makers’ perceptions are formed. A 
shift in the symbolic macrostructure is important in effectively influencing Chinese 
preferences, as well as in identifying the role(s) MER agencies play in contributing to 
such a change process. This thesis identifies three strands of theoretical assumptions 
that inform a framework for preference formation: rationalism, cognitivism, and 
contractualism. These three theoretical approaches were selected for their assumptions 
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about how various dimensions of the symbolic macrostructure can be affected through 
the respective mechanism of influence they assume.      
 
2.3.1 Rationalism and the costs-and-benefits calculus 
Rationalism is an interest-based framework that assumes nation-states act as unitary, 
rational actors. The approach begins with the identification of problems to solve and 
objectives to achieve. Decision-makers thereafter select utility-maximising policies 
based on a costs-and-benefits calculus of the options vis-à-vis their national objectives, 
and the consequences of each available alternative (Underdal, 1998: 7). This behaviour 
is congruent with the generally value-maximising mentality of the Chinese decision-
makers when meeting economic objectives (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). For 
instance, the most beneficial long-run solution for the Chinese government is one where 
the predicaments of climate change or trade protection are avoided. Still, rationalists 
argue that as a rational actor, China will weigh the benefit against possible 
consequences of committing to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission mitigation, or in 
reforming the national monetary system for inflation control. In the process of executing 
the calculus, however, decision-makers (of any government) are often constrained by 
the access to complete information on the consequences of the available policy options.  
MER agencies, on the other hand, are well-resourced with private, public, and 
professional information, which grants them a comparative advantage in determining 
the costs and benefits faced by China. It also enables them to envisage solutions to a 
given problem based on their interests. For instance, Chinese decision-makers involved 
in the climate change debate often associate China’s abatement costs to the potential 
consequences of limiting economic development.
13
 However, the Conference of Parties 
(COP) presidencies rationalises that abatement measures do not necessarily have 
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 Other factors include uncertainties about the availability of alternative energy sources, scientific doubts, 
and its own institutional, technological and financial capacity to take on mitigation measures. 
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negative costs attached. Given that GHG mitigation can improve areas such as air 
quality, energy efficiency and security, abatement measures actually benefit China’s 
national development (Buen, 1998). The calculus made by the COP presidencies, in 
theory, reframes the symbolic macrostructure of the Chinese decision-makers by 
restructuring their incentives in tackling climate change. In reality, although the Chinese 
government has yet to accept international mitigation targets, its domestic efforts, over 
the recent years, in reducing GHG emissions, as well as their augmented flexibility at 
the multilateral negotiation table indicates that, with other variables held constant, it is 
plausible that the costs-and-benefits mechanism has some degree of impact on China’s 
preference formation. Accordingly, the rationalists argue that the MER agencies 
influence Chinese policy preference formation by framing China’s costs-and-benefits 
calculus on cooperation.  
 
2.3.2 Cognitivism and information dissemination 
Like the interdependence theory, cognitivists focus on the role of the MER agencies, 
and argue that decision-makers enter the preference formation processes with both 
imperfect information and tentative preferences, but both of which can be resolved with 
new information (Underdal, 1998: 21). A sizeable literature argues that preference 
changes usually require the manifesto of new ideas to be incorporated in the preference 
formation (True, Jones and Baumgartner, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Blyth, 1997). Nye 
(1987: 378) points out, “New information alters prior beliefs about the 
world…Knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national interest, and 
eventually goes further to take effect in the whole procedure.” In turn, cognitivists 
believe the MER agencies can influence national preferences through a function of 
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information dissemination. This function enables the MER agencies to alter how 
decision-makers define their interests (Krasner, 1983: 363).
14
  
 In post-reform China, economic expertise ran thin across many policy areas. 
Hence, the external information disseminated from MER agencies was instrumental to 
China’s development of issue-specific expertise among its decision-makers (Economy 
2001). Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg (1990: 151) and Pearson (2001), for 
instance, found strong evidence that the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) contributed not only to the deepening of the expertise among Chinese 
decision-makers concerned with international trade, but also to reconfigure the balance-
of-power among various individuals and groups of Chinese technocrat policymakers 
involved in the preference formation process.  
As a matter of fact, cognitivists argue that the impact of information 
dissemination goes beyond just changing ideas, it also affect domestic policy structures. 
In order to manage external information (i.e., synthesise information, analyse its 
implications on China, monitor details, and outcome assessments), new policy 
structures are established. For example, the intellectual property rights tribunal was 
created within China’s judicial system in order to treat the national patent, copyright, 
and trademark protection affairs vis-à-vis the WTO protocol. For every environmental 
treaty China has signed, national expert-led leading small groups (LSGs) are established 
to coordinate the information and preference formation (Oksenberg and Economy, 
1997: 12-13). The LSGs typically involve various government agencies as participating 
policy actors in the preference formation process, either by being tapped to provide 
data, participate in policy discussions, and/or engage in offshoot activities. This 
development thereby stems a trend of pluralisation and decentralisation in the decision-
making system.  
                                               
14
 The catch is that for ideas to have an impact, they must be widely shared by key policymakers 
(Krasner, 1983: 19). 
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Furthermore, through frequent interactions, domestic decision-makers are 
expected to become inculcated with the values held by the MER agencies and advocate 
for broader preference reforms of its national preferences (Economy, 2001: 237). For 
instance, officials from the former State Planning Commission (SPC) who were 
assigned to represent China at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have, over the years, become far more sympathetic to 
environmentally proactive measures than their colleagues with less engagements of this 
nature. On the whole, information dissemination has the potential to affect China’s 
symbolic macrostructure by influencing the ideological beliefs of decision-makers, and 
therefore, constitute a probable mechanism with likely influences on China’s national 
preference formation.   
 
2.3.3 Contractualism and reputation reinforcement  
The contractual framework is an interest-based theory that adopts the systemic 
assumptions of the state as “crucial actors” in world politics; and that states cooperate 
not to implement high ideals but as a means of advancing their utility functions by 
furthering self-interested economic and political interests (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986: 
226; Keohane, 1984: 24; Harsanyi, 1969: 521). These calculations are informed, 
although not exclusively determined, by the stable and (temporarily) consistent 
preferences of actors (Powell, 1994: 318; Snidal, 1986: 43). In the present context, 
contractualists would argue that the MER agencies help China overcome barriers of 
cooperation by reducing the kind of uncertainty imposed by a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(Keohane, 1984: 97). As long as the MER agencies have monitoring arrangements, they 
will reduce China’s fear of being cheated on due to the greater probability that the 
cheater will be caught and therefore reduces the expected utility of cheating 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 186). Moreover, the more material benefits 
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(i.e., aid and technology) China receives, the more likely that it will deposit more 
attention to its international compliance and commitments. However, a monitoring 
function does not necessarily constrain Chinese preferences for economic negotiations. 
Surely, economic negotiations are generally for the establishment of new rules and 
protocols rather than to reinforce the existing ones.  
 With this said, contractualists argue that the monitoring of national reputation is 
one mechanism to which monitoring does have an impact. MER agencies often assess 
the nation-states’ reputation by setting international standards of behaviour of which 
national performances are measured against. They also do so by linking these standards 
to specific issues, and by providing forums where such evaluations can be made 
(Keohane, 1984: 94). Thereby reputation monitoring creates “either an enabling or a 
disabling environment,” (Foreign Policy Centre, 2002: 9), and enables the MER 
agencies to raise the costs associated with non-compliance. The significance of this 
mechanism lies in the fact that reputation in politics is an instrument of power, and can 
affect a country’s international status quo (Wang, 2006: 91). Robert Jervis (1970: 6) 
goes further to suggest that a desired reputation can often be “of greater use than a 
significant increment of military or economic power.” For China, its reputation capital 
can affect its capacity to build international alliances that are vital for achieving their 
national objectives, as well as for influencing international events. As such, when public 
opinion is activated, the climate of opinions can limit or broaden policy choices and 
actions available to China. That is why foreign perceptions and opinions of China are 
important to the Chinese decision-makers.  
In fact, cultivating a favourable reputation has been a part of China’s diplomatic 
mandate, especially following the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Hence, it is safe to assume 
that reputation-management is a part of China’s economic diplomacy thought process. 
For this reason, it is also probable that an international standardised system for 
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measuring reputation can incentivise as well as constrain China’s preference formation. 
In fact, contractualists believe even in situations where there is no change in economic 
calculations, China’s preferences can still evolve along the spectrum of commitment 
because of concerns regarding non-monetised commodities like reputation (Johnston, 
1998: 584; Rowlands, 1995: 247). Since the reputation mechanism can alter China’s 
symbolic macrostructure by restructuring its motivations, it is a plausible mechanism 
for testing in this thesis.  
 
2.3.4 Similarities and differences 
The three approaches outlined above provide three different mechanisms for 
understanding how MER agencies can influence China’s economic diplomacy 
preference formation. Based on the rationalist approach, one can expect that preference 
formation is influenced by the expected costs relating to an economic problem, on the 
one hand, and the costs of taking action, on the other. This implies that Chinese 
decision-makers face a two-fold challenge in economic diplomacy decision-making. 
While the Chinese decision-makers have to evaluate the costs of commitments versus 
the costs of non-commitment, it has to also consider the costs-and-benefits of 
participating in a multilateral cooperation. Yet the two-fold challenge offers the MER 
agencies the opportunity to reshape China’s perceived costs and benefits by establishing 
their own calculus based on its access to the private and public information of the 
member-states. In this way, the costs-and-benefits calculus mechanism constitutes a key 
method of influence diffusion.      
The cognitive theory, by comparison, highlights how national interests are 
tentative by nature and are variable as new information is encountered. Informal 
dialogues, research collaborations, and other social forums are all occasions where the 
MER agencies can use information to reshape the perceptions of the Chinese decision-
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makers regarding the optimal policy preference. Contractualists move away from the 
socialisation process and maintain a microeconomic and game theoretic style of analysis. 
Advocates of this approach believe neither information nor calculus-based mechanisms 
have much impact on shaping preferences. Rather, it only alters the perceived costs-and-
benefits of pursuing those preferences (Frank, 1988: 143). When attempting to 
maximise economic gains, the effects of non-monetised values such as reputation take 
particular prominence in the thought process of the Chinese decision-makers. The MER 
agencies therefore can best influence Chinese preference through a reputation 
reinforcement mechanism.        
 Although the three approaches embody different assumptions, they commonly 
assume that the Chinese government behaves in accordance with the principle of 
rationality as the starting point (Bang, 2004: 17). Hence, all three approaches expect 
Chinese decision-makers to act in a rational manner, and participate in multilateral 
economic negotiations for the advancement of their national interests. Yet, the 
approaches differ in their assumptions about the actualised degrees of rationality, and in 
how national preferences are formed and influenced. Rationalists believe preferences 
are based on rational calculations of the costs and benefits of different policy 
alternatives. Here, the MER agencies play a crucial role in providing better-informed 
costs-and-benefits analyses that would otherwise not be available to China. Cognitivists, 
on the other hand, have a more dynamic view of rationality and assume that preferences 
evolve through the exposure of new information. Hence, the MER agencies are more 
effective as information disseminators. Still, contractualists stress the importance of 
non-monetised incentives such as reputation and accordingly promote the reputation 
reinforcement mechanism as the best way to influence Chinese preferences.    
 The differences between the three approaches do not stop there. They also 
deviate in their explanatory powers on the preference formation outcome. The strict 
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rationality assumption and the parsimony of the rationalist approach grant it stronger 
explanatory powers to predict causal relationships – whether these predictions are right 
or wrong is a different question. Yet, the rationalist approach oversimplifies reality; it is 
risky to assume that China’s economic diplomacy preference formation can be inferred 
from only a costs-and-benefits calculus and identified as a priori. Other variables 
including domestic political processes are expected to also contribute to the formation 
of preferences. The rationalist approach further makes the precarious assumption that 
the Chinese leaders enjoy complete knowledge of all alternative solutions and have a 
capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of the consequences for each option. This 
reality is unwarranted in practice. As well, rationalists presuppose a unity of views 
within the Chinese state. But given the multiplicity and fragmentation of the Chinese 
political processes, such presupposition is difficult to maintain. Cognitivists further 
criticise rationalism’s focus on the inter-subjective meaning structures, which bind 
actors together and projects a looser fit between the structural constraints, interests, and 
choices. As Haas (1983: 57) points out, there is simply no “optimal” choice.  
Although it is widely acknowledged that very few actual preference formation 
processes come close to this idea, the approach nevertheless remains widespread in the 
study of Chinese political economy. The main advantage of this approach lies in its 
ability to provide plausible hypotheses on the objectives and solutions that avail 
themselves to Chinese decision-makers in a situation where the nature of the China’s 
political system limits the researcher adequate access to the preference formation 
processes. It goes without saying that this approach seems particularly well adapted to 
approximate the decisions of a political system with a comparatively higher degree of 
autonomy from social pressures and in which its political leaders enjoy considerable 
power over their subordinates.  
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 The strengths of rationalism are areas to which the cognitive theory lacks. 
Whilst the cognitive theory contributes valuable attention to the effects of socialisation 
variables, it offers comparatively vague assumptions, and yield hypotheses that are 
methodologically difficult to confirm. For instance, it is hard to empirically trace the 
process of internalising ideas and beliefs, and the actual influence of norms on actor 
behaviour is also challenging to measure. In particular, it is hard to determine if norms 
are used for mere public diplomacy rhetoric or that it actually constitutes a value of the 
national economic policy. As rationalists argue, engagement with discourse, unlike 
choice, is indeterminate of policy outcomes (Underdal, 1998: 23). As a result, it is 
difficult to realise whether a preference shift was the outcome of exposure to new 
information, or due to other exogenous constraints that arise from non-cooperation, or 
the result of other monetised or non-monetised incentives.  
Moreover, the cognitive assumptions find it difficult to explain why (or when) 
certain discourse is successfully transplanted in Beijing while others result in failure. 
For example, why has the concept of low-carbon development spread but the 
prohibition of GHGs has not? This goes to show that cognivitism has a lack of thought 
for agency. This is in part because the cognitivists relies more upon structural forces 
than agency to explain preferences, even though ironically an obvious central tenet of 
this approach is the mutual interactions of structures and agents (Checkel, 1997; Wendt, 
1987). Meanwhile, the causal mechanism for the spread of discourse can arguably suffer 
from passitivity. Martha Finnemore (1996), for example, assumes that domestic 
institutions mimic accepted global practices without understanding the logic of those 
practices. At the end of the day, rationalists argue in a strategic problem context, 
decision-makers are more likely to be moved by perceived threats and/or opportunities 
arising from the environment and other consequential incentives rather than cognitive 
factors (Allison, 1971: 33).                                       
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 Critiques of this nature reflects the rationalists’ tendency to take for granted the 
fact that national preferences are nothing more than mirrors of the actors’ interests 
(Halpern, 1989). As recent studies (i.e., Beland, 2005; Lieberman, 2002) that attribute 
greater roles to cognitive variables have shown, by manipulating strategic 
representations, political actors can create conditions propitious to the formation of 
coalitions that transcend cleavages due to conflicting material interests. It is through this 
process of strategic representation that actors come to shape their perceived interests 
with regard to a given issue. The social construction of problems and of the available 
solutions provide the raw materials that enables the concrete expression of political 
interests, what is desired, or are able to be desired. In turn, an analysis that places 
emphasis on the international discourse can reduce the researcher’s “disposition effect” 
by refocusing the analysis on the actor-level intentions and preferences (Constantin, 
2007). This is why the cognitive approach is a worthwhile one for this thesis to test.       
 Finally, the functional nature of the contractualist assumptions run the risk of all 
post hoc arguments, where institutions may be interpreted as having arisen because of 
the functions they must serve, when in fact, they appeared for adventitious reasons 
(Keohane, 1984: 81). As well, the reputation mechanism suffers from a similar 
methodological challenge as the cognitive approach. Being able to observe reputation-
building behaviour means that such behaviour is probably undertaken with the 
likelihood that it will be observed. Certainly, there is no point engaging in it for 
reputational purposes unless it is observable to others. But if behaviour is designed to be 
observed, and both the observer and actor know this, then the observer should have 
doubts that it is indeed high-cost behaviour, or that MER agencies actually have an 
effect on those behaviours. This is even more so given the expectation that Beijing’s 
reputation costs will vary across the “size and nature of the audience in which it places 
value” (Johnston, 1998: 559). What this implies is that the reputation mechanism may 
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only be effective if China perceives the costs of the alternative options on its reputation 
are high. With this said, the approach has an advantage in its generalisability capacity 
and applicability to the China context. Given how highly valued the government places 
reputation in its decision-making, it is worthwhile to test this approach in the present 
thesis.           
Based on their similarities and differences, the three approaches make a fitting 
and complementary ensemble of theories to inform the framework for the how question 
of the MER agency influence on Chinese preference formation. All three schools of 
thought introduce mechanisms that affect China’s symbolic macrostructure, and each 
framework helps inform and refine the a priori assumptions about the variables of 
influence.   
 
2.3.5 The situational factors 
It is important to recognise that regardless of how the MER agencies influence Chinese 
preferences, it is constrained in reality by the institutional macrostructure of the central 
government. The institutional macrostructure is the established systems through which 
policymakers must operate within, and include factors as the rules, norms, and protocols 
of political action, the mechanisms of the preference formation process, and the scope 
and degree of participation by the relevant policy actors (including the power factor). 
This assumption is spawned from the structure-agency theory. According to the theory, 
in the broadest terms, agency is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to 
make their own free choices, while structure is the recurrent pattern of arrangements 
which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available (Barker, 2005: 448, 
664). Structures (i.e., Chinese decision-making system) and agents (i.e., Chinese 
decision-makers) possess different qualities. One characteristic of structure is anteriority 
(i.e., the pre-existing features of China’s decision-making system). Second, structure 
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has endurance; and third, structure has the capacity to both propel and undermine (i.e., 
the existing allocation of decision-making powers that enable some policy actors and 
constrain others). Among the qualities of agency are self-consciousness, reflexivity and 
cognition (Joseph, 2008: 117). The features of structure and agency makes them 
mutually complementary, and the relationship is one of “pre-existent structures, 
possessing causal powers and properties…result[ing] in contingent yet explicable 
outcomes” (Carter and New, 2004: 5-6).        
 Accordingly, it is important to know at least three things when testing the 
influence of the MER agencies. First, what are the characteristic of the political and 
social structures in which the agencies of the Chinese government and the MERs are 
interacting at time t? What are the pre-defined norms and the associated policy 
preferences of the Chinese decision-makers at the time of engagement with the MER 
agencies? Second, what are some of the characteristics of the Chinese decision-makers 
that engage with the MER agencies at time t? How do these characteristics limit or 
enhance the influence of the MER agencies? Third, what is the context of which 
Chinese decision-makers interact with the MER agencies at time t+1? The net effect of 
the MER agencies’ influence is therefore a function of the characteristics of the context 
to which they interact with Chinese policy actors in an on-going and deeply integrated 
feedback relationship, and mediated by the multilateral systemic process. 
 These three areas coupled with considerations for the institutional 
macrostructure stems four situational factors: the policy settings, the policy instruments, 
the policy goals, and national objectives which specify the course of action intended to 
operationalise an abstract goal. To illustrate, the policy goal of an industrial trade 
program might be to enhance the diversification of industrial trade exports. The 
appropriate policy instrument for this purpose may include a subsidy set at a specific 
rate. The policy instrument selected would be determined by the political context at the 
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time. Finally, the national objective is the specific programmatic principles deployed to 
inject substance into the abstract policy goals. In the present context, such might be a 
plan to enhance national technological capacity from outsourcing by a certain 
percentage over a fixed period of time.        
It is easy to imagine the relevance of the four situational factors. For instance, 
the systemic political context and bureaucratic interest pre-sets the setting to which the 
influence of the MER agencies will be either enhanced or inhibited. Factors could 
include Beijing’s policy frameworks and systems, political dynamics and power 
relations among/across levels of the Chinese government, and contention among the 
recognised interests and the resulting levels of trust and impact on working relationships. 
Such is the criteria of settings. As well, policy settings highlights how different sources 
of power are allocated within China’s economic policymaking community, and how 
they are mobilised by different groups in a struggle for decision-making control (Zhao, 
1996: 25-26). Policy setting determines which kind of influence mechanisms can be 
effective in generating preference change. Such is the instrument. The level of impact of 
the instruments rest upon the objectives of the policy problem at hand (i.e., is it of 
interest to the decision-makers? Are the initiatives costly? Or beneficial? Does it have 
political relevance?). Such is the policy goals. Finally, the success of the MER 
agencies’ impact is contingent on its compatibility with the national objectives (i.e., 
national interest), of which in China’s case, is national development.  
 
2.4 A Framework for Negotiation Approach  
In this study, it is assumed that China’s policy preference formation is only one of the 
two fundamental dimensions of China’s economic diplomacy that can be affected by the 
MER agencies. The second dimension is China’s negotiation approach. To study this 
dimension, a separate framework is established primarily with a focus on the decision-
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making that takes place during the negotiation process and of which shapes China’s 
negotiation approach. Although important, this dimension has seldom been examined 
by the current literature, which makes building an analytical framework challenging. 
With this said, based on the assumptions of rationalism, cognitivism, and 
contractualism, the MER agencies are likely to shape China’s negotiation approaches in 
three capacities: as a mediator through shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, a facilitator of 
informal negotiation practices, and an instigator of side-payment bargaining. 
Rationalists, cognitivists, and contractualists commonly believe the three mechanisms 
are mediatory by nature, and this quality has the potential to influence decision-making. 
Where they differ is in the kind of cognition that mediatory measures can alter as 
well as in the steps MER agencies need to take to successfully assert influence on 
China’s negotiation approaches. Rationalists hold that actors shape their negotiation 
approaches and envision the desired outcome based on the available policy options and 
the expected outcomes produced by those available options. Whilst preferences for the 
desired outcome is assumed to be fixed, the decision-makers’ prior expectations are not. 
Rather, their uncertainties about the accuracy of their expectations cause them to renew 
it as new information is accessed (Walsh, 2005: 5). Influence mechanisms of a 
mediatory nature, from this perspective, are most effective when MER agencies have 
superior private information about some characteristics of the foreign parties or the 
utility associated with each available negotiation approach that may be important to the 
Chinese decision-makers.      
 The cognitive theory focuses on how social interactions could alter the decision-
makers’ identities, and as such, it makes it an easy starting point for analysing 
mediatory mechanisms. They argue that the negotiation process itself is a process of 
learning, where new ideas are adopted and beliefs formed (Underdal, 1998: 21-22). 
Since economic negotiations typically depend on cognitive factors such as scientific 
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knowledge, ideas, and a process of social learning (Stein, 1993), the knowledge of 
policymakers will endure an evolutionary process that is open to the influence of 
international discourse. Gradually, it transpires into new ideas and beliefs, and 
eventually modify negotiation approaches. Drawing on the Habermasian theory of 
communicative action, cognitivists hold that influence stems out of honest 
communications between the agencies of the Chinese government and the MERs. Such 
interactions do not entail the use of material power resources to impose their views on 
the Chinese decision-makers, and as a result, can generate more convincing arguments. 
This view contrasts with rationalism, which forbids the possibility of mediation to 
change the preferences of the decision-makers for the desired negotiation outcome; how 
they are defined in the context of the preferred outcome; and the definitions of what is 
right (Finnemore 2003, 154; Risse 2000, 20). 
 Finally, contractualists believe mediatory mechanisms are nothing more and 
nothing less than an effort to change the costs-and-benefits calculus of the Chinese 
decision-makers. Advocates believe these efforts often attach both positive and negative 
incentive structures to secure a cooperative negotiation approach. Contractualists argue 
against cognitivism by suggesting that mediatory influences do not change the basic 
beliefs of decision-makers, especially about what kind of game is being played. With all 
said, all three approaches share the view that mediatory mechanisms does have 
influence, and to this extent, let us now turn our attention to each of the three 
mechanisms respectively.      
 
2.4.1 Shuttle diplomacy proximity talks 
The term shuttle diplomacy came about from an American anecdote of diplomacy. 
Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, then-US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
attempted to broker peace in the Middle East by “shuttling” back-and-forth between 
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nations in the region and with numerous leaders to produce cease-fires and peace 
agreements. Although the term shuttle diplomacy is often broadly used to describe 
situations where negotiators from one party (be they from a nation-state or a MER) 
travel across borders to meet with their negotiating counterparts, the private meetings 
with national leaders are called proximity talks (Hoffman, 2011: 273). The WTO 
Managing-Director, Pascal Lamy, has held proximity talks with Chinese leaders during 
his shuttle diplomacy trips to Beijing over the course of his time in this capacity.
15
 
Former WTO Managing-Director, Mike Moore, also went on tours to China to promote 
the DDA (Jawara and Kwa, 2004: 198). Numerous COP Presidents (i.e., the Mexican 
Presidency) have conducted shuttle diplomacy before its annual meetings (i.e., COP16) 
to encourage Beijing to adopt a cooperative negotiation approach. Members of the IMF 
have also travelled to Beijing to gather insights about China’s perspective on economic 
issues such as its currency, how China wishes to contribute to the global economy, and 
how it thinks the future world economy should be managed.
16
  
The micro-process of proximity talks is persuasion, which involves changing the 
perspectives and attitudes of the decision-makers regarding the causality and effects of 
non-material pressures (Johnston, 2008: 25-26; Walsh, 2005: 3). Proximity talks have 
two approaches to persuasion: the central route and the periphery route. The central 
route is where the MER agencies weigh evidences and puzzles through counter-
attitudinal arguments, and draw conclusions that are usually different from what the 
Chinese government had begun with. This form of mediatory persuasion is a process 
involving high-intensity cognition, reflection and argumentation about the content of 
new information (Bar-Tal and Saxe, 1990: 122). In the climate change negotiations on 
mitigation, the UNFCCC Secretariat and the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have communicated counter-attitudinal arguments to Beijing, such as 
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 Interview with a senior advisor to the WTO, Beijing, 22 November 2012. 
16
 Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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the suggestion that mitigation measures improve energy efficiency, and can therefore be 
considered as a “no-regret” policy option because of its consistency with China’s 
national development goals. Pascal Lamy has executed similar strategies of persuasion 
when he argued that accession into the WTO’s government procurement agreement 
(GPA) would enhance China’s public procurement rule-making and contribute to better 
governance over the private regulations of procurement activities.  
The peripheral route constitutes the second persuasion approach. The peripheral 
route is where the MER agencies communicate on the basis of an institutionalised 
relationship. The conversations are therefore more personalised, private, and casual. The 
Chinese decision-makers will first look for clues regarding the nature of the relationship 
and make judgements accordingly about the legitimacy of the counter-attitudinal 
arguments they make. Like other countries, China often finds proximity talks with in-
groups to be more effective than with out-groups. And talks with sources that are liked 
are accepted more than sources that are disliked. The determining factor of liking is 
based on familiarity and level of exposure to that source. In addition, given the complex 
and fragmented nature of China’s bureaucratic system, it is often necessary to not just 
be liked and familiarised by a few relevant agencies. Rather, it is necessary for a MER 
agency to be liked by all the relevant agencies in order to enjoyed stronger influences. 
Otherwise, it will not be able to surpass the pre-existing beliefs held by those that do not 
trust the MER agency doing the talking. In all, the thesis finds this mechanism of 
influence to be a plausible one for testing the influence of the MER agencies on China’s 
negotiation approaches.  
 
2.4.2 Informal negotiation practices 
The INPs are customary practices and usages that can take the form of informal plenary 
meetings under the chairmanship of a subsidiary body of the MER. Alternatively it can 
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also be discussions in a private room between parties, in a corridor between two or more 
individuals of any party, or in the form of roundtables where member-states are divided 
up in smaller groups. Generally, negotiations in an open, formal plenary with all 
delegates tend to be cumbersome at best of times, but become unmanageable when too 
many issues complicate the negotiation agenda. INPs streamline the negotiation process 
by allowing texts to be discussed by smaller, more specialised groups of negotiators, 
who then present their work to the wider body of states in the plenary for final decision-
making.
17
 It is not uncommon for the Director-General (and sometimes the Chair of the 
General Council or one of the other Councils or committees) to be party to these 
informal consultations in order to help steer the discussions. For example, the “services 
signalling conference” called by Pascal Lamy in the capacity of the Trade Negotiation 
Committee (TNC) Chairman, in July 2008, discussed service negotiations and 
exchanged potential offers and requests on a “without prejudice” basis (Footer, 2011: 
230). During the 2011 COP17 meeting, the South African COP President called a 
roundtable (or the “huddle”), which included representative from China, the US, EU, 
and India, to discuss a final resolution on the mitigation issues as part of the broader 
“Durban Package.” From personal observations in the negotiation room, the South 
African COP President, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Chair of the roundtable, had placed 
much pressure on China, India, and the US to accept the middle-range proposal 
forwarded by the EU. Interviewed observers further indicated that the deputy Director-
Generals of the WTO have a high tendency to exercise corridor discussions with 
Chinese delegates to promote their own visions of an agreement and steer INPs towards 
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 Depending on the stage of negotiation and the specific topic, informal groups may be known as contact 
groups, drafting groups, working groups, informal consultations, or other terms. The common 
characteristic of these settings is that they are conducted in English only, and often exclude non-
governmental organisations. 
78 
 
that end.
18
 The UNFCCC’s Secretary-General, Christiana Figueres, is also regularly 
sighted having corridor conversations with Chinese decision-makers.    
The most opportune time for MER agencies to exercise INPs is when Chinese 
negotiators encounter negotiation dilemmas with another Party. At this stage, the MER 
agencies use INPs for consensus-building (Blackhurst and Hartridge, 2004: 708). The 
objective of the informal (and sometimes private) face-to-face interactions is to 
convince Chinese decision-makers to take cooperative actions. The outcome could see 
effective influence on China’s negotiation approach. Additionally, INPs are effective for 
establishing trust and reducing uncertainty.
19
 As well, it can raise awareness. In the 
climate change negotiations on the clean development mechanism (CDM), the COP 
Presidencies in the earlier years of negotiations purportedly reiterated discussions on the 
Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms – which were then unfamiliar concepts to the Chinese 
delegation – in small group discussions. The repetition of these concepts in informal 
consultation meetings caught the attention of Chinese decision-makers, and prompted 
Beijing to look into the issue more seriously.  
According to past experiences where individuals were put together in small 
informal face-to-face situations, there tends to be a substantial increase in the levels of 
cooperation.
20
 Among the experiments is an analysis by David Sally (1995) which 
showed that face-to-face communication, on average, increases the rate of cooperation 
by more than 45 per cent. The results also indicate that there are no alternative variables 
which enjoy an effect similar to that of the face-to-face exercises. For instance, in a 
series of public-good experiments by Jane Sell and Rick Wilson (1991; 1992), Elena 
Rocco and Massimo Warglien (1995), and Rob Moir (1995), they found much less 
cooperation in signalled promises to cooperate made through computer channels 
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Interview with a policy advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 4 September 2012. 
19
 Interview with a senior advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 22 November 2012. 
20
 See E. Ostrom et al. (1994) for extensive citations to studies showing a positive effect of the capacity to 
communicate.  
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compared to the face-to-face method using the same research design. Accordingly, it is 
plausible that the INPs are an effective medium for the MER agencies to influence 
Chinese negotiation approaches.  
 
2.4.3 Side-payment bargaining 
Between the rationalist, cognitive, and contractualist approaches, the notion of incentive 
features prevalently. As such, it is argued especially by the rationalists that the most 
attractive incentives for China – a developing country – are usually material ones since 
they are concerned about their capacity to adapt to the impacts of the global economy 
(Rowlands, 1995; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994). The ability to adapt to international 
standards are often closely related to how much economic resources a country has, and 
if this capacity is low, then the country becomes more vulnerable to the impact of the 
economic problem. That is why resource assistance could be an effective policy 
incentive.  
It is imaginable that preferences can be changed by the possibility of receiving 
economic and technical assistances in exchange for taking on commitments. MERs can 
argue that any policy change for taking commitment is actually promoting China’s 
economic development. Such was the argument made by the WTO Negotiation 
Committee during China’s long accession negotiations. They discussed the kind of 
assistance China could benefit from as a result of holding a WTO membership. But in 
return, China is also required to make a deeper set of reform commitments. As well, 
numerous COPs Presidencies have emphasised a similar point to the Chinese 
government in the discussions about carbon emission mitigation measures. In fact, a key 
reason China sought membership in MERs since the 1980s was for the economic and 
technical benefits. In this way, it is arguable that China’s interest in cooperation can be 
triggered by the possibility of furthering its economic goals, which can be attained 
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through economic side-payments. That is why it is imaginable that by acting as 
instigators of side-payment, MER agencies could potentially pull significant weight in 
the outcome of China’s negotiation approach.  
 
2.4.4 The social instigators 
Between the three mechanisms of influence, the underlying impact is rooted from the 
fact that MER agencies, as the intermediary of economic negotiations, possess diverse 
motives for choosing a certain form of behaviour or set of values and recommendations 
towards a policy they are attempting to affect. Paradoxically, the fact that the MER 
agencies possess goals and objectives of which they attempt to further through 
mediatory mechanisms has been a neglected aspect of research. It tends to assume that 
while the member-states possess goals and objectives that underlie the behaviour they 
undertake – the incompatibility of which forms the basis of disagreements and 
negotiation impasse – any MER is wholly or, at worst, largely motivated by a desire to 
bring about a settlement (Mitchell, 1988: 29-30). To this point, it is crucial to note that 
the goals and objectives of the MER agencies should not be taken for granted and are a 
proper subject for academic analysis. Furthermore, the underlying motives from which a 
MER initiatives arise and which are sustained
21
 are likely to have a marked influence on 
the way that the MER agents conducts the process, on the manner in which China reacts 
to the MERs’ activities and on the eventual outcome particularly in terms of the form 
any final settlement might take.     
 The strengths of the three mechanisms lie in their ability to enhance the innate 
drivers of Chinese preference formation: expectation, trust, and personal reputation.  
According to the research interviews, a fundamental reason for China’s poor 
                                               
21
 There is no implication here that MERs’ aims and objectives can be viewed as constants. The 
objectives of all Parties, be it a MER or a nation-state, are dynamic. The fact that goals and preference 
orderings alter over time is one reason for cases in which unacceptable outcomes at one point in time 
become acceptable later.  
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cooperative behaviour is Beijing’s low expectations that other negotiating parties will 
reciprocate if China did take on commitments. This finding is supported by past 
experiments on negotiation behaviours; the expectations of mutual commitment from 
one another at the negotiation table often determines negotiation outcome. This was 
evident at the 2011 DDA negotiations in Geneva, where numerous negotiators indicated 
that they do not even intend to work hard towards an agreement since they did not 
expect other delegations to be interested in any form of an agreement. As one senior 
member of the WTO Secretariat suggested, there’s not a big political will to push 
through an agreement by most member-states; no expectations to be pragmatic.
22
 
Likewise, Chinese negotiators for climate change have indicated their expectation for a 
lack of progress in the negotiations on a post-2020 framework at COP18 even before 
the negotiations began. But this finding is not surprising given that China has had a long 
history of holding low expectations for multilateral economic negotiations, and this 
explains its persistent negotiating style of holding-back – it simply does not believe or 
expect other negotiating parties to actually reciprocate any cooperative gestures. This 
was the case when China’s COP15 pledge was received by a silent audience.  
Poor expectations are often the result of asymmetrical information or a problem 
of “adverse selection” (Hoffman, 2011: 279). In multilateral economic negotiations, the 
adverse selection problem presents itself when the negotiating parties do not know that 
they have a range of possible agreements. Negotiation theory shows that parties often 
hide their bottom-line positions because of the fear that their candour will be exploited 
by other negotiating parties who are not willing to be transparent on an equal level 
especially with regards to their underlying interests. The classic example, as illustrated 
by Elinor Ostrom (1998) is when a person with an over-abundance of oranges (but who 
prefers apples) proposes a trade of some of the oranges with someone who has an over-
                                               
22
Interview with a senior member of the WTO Secretariat, London, 2 February 2012; Interview with a 
financial advisor from EXIM Bank, Beijing, 20 November 2012. 
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abundance of apples (but who prefers oranges). The latter agrees to a trade but feigns a 
lack of interest in oranges so as to secure more advantageous trading terms (such as two 
oranges for each apple). In this situation, MER agencies embody the capacity to affect 
decision-makers’ expectations by altering the extent to which they expect their present 
actions to be affected by the behaviour of others on future issues through signalling, for 
instance. With this said, the reverse is also true; the pre-existing expectation of decision-
makers can also condition the extent of influence MER agencies can inflict on China’s 
negotiation approach.   
Second to expectation, though no less important, is trust. It is often the case that 
a root cause of uncertainty is trust.
23
 This problem was admitted by a senior member of 
the WTO Secretariat: “You don’t feel trust among negotiators in the WTO…or in the 
climate change negotiations” not just toward other countries but also towards the 
multilateral institutions, in its agenda, and intentions.
24
 And one Chinese policy advisor 
to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) observed, when there is distrust from 
individual negotiators, they can reject a proposal simply based on personal grudge.
25
 In 
general, China’s lack of trust towards the multilateral system is a major concern.26 In 
the CDM negotiations, a key problem in the negotiation process was China’s distrust in 
the underlying intention and motive behind the initiative, especially with regards to 
where the benefits will flow to. It was only after the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) and other UN agencies had demonstrated to the Chinese government, through 
pilot simulations, how the benefits come about that trust was rejuvenated. In the DDA 
negotiations on trade in services, Beijing has a lack of trust in the capacity of the 
WTO’s regulatory framework to manage and govern deeper liberalisation of world 
services between nations, and with enough authority.  
                                               
23
 Trust is the “expectation of one person about the actions of others that affects the first person’s choice, 
when an action must be taken before the actions of others are known” (Dasgupta, 1997: 5). 
24
Interview with a senior member of the WTO Secretariat, London, 2 February 2012. 
25
Interview with a policy advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 25 October 2012. 
26
 Interview with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 23 November 2012.  
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In the GPA, the Chinese government has struggled to trust the WTO’s protocol 
and governance on government procurement, arguing it is vague and ambiguous in 
many aspects of the proposed framework. Clearly, trust, or the lack thereof, is a 
significant hindrance to the multilateral process. For the Chinese government, as for any 
government, trust is seen as the bedrock of effective negotiations, and the presence of 
trust is indispensable to reaching an agreement. This is supported by the theoretical 
presupposition that in the context of a social dilemma, trust affects whether an 
individual is willing to initiate cooperation in the expectation that it will be reciprocated 
(Ostrom, 1998: 12). Hence, one central variable which has hindered China from taking a 
cooperative approach to the negotiations and an undermining factor of MER influence is 
distrust over whether its negotiating counterparts will actually comply with agreements, 
and whether MERs are capable themselves as process managers.   
Finally, external influence and cooperation is not possible without the 
underlying element of personal reputation. Chinese decision-makers and negotiators 
have a strong culture of saving face. And after an international negotiation, Chinese 
decision-makers do not want their constituents to think that they “caved” in some 
manner to foreign demands. This is even the case in situations where the stakes are 
relatively modest; China does not want to be the one that “blinked” as this is a sign of 
weakness. At the multilateral, having a strong personal reputation is equally important. 
When Chinese negotiators gather with other delegates at the negotiation table, the social 
dynamic is similar to that of a high school classroom. There are clear social cliques or 
distinct groups of friends. No one wants to be the odd one out or be seen as obsolete. 
The weaker negotiators admire representatives of larger nations, and no one wants to be 
seen as difficult and non-cooperative. In this emotional and mentally vulnerable state of 
mind, Chinese negotiators and decision-makers, have a relatively high desire to acquire 
and/or maintain a respectable reputation amongst its peers at the negotiation table. This 
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is the most opportune time for MER agencies to exert influence on Chinese decision-
makers and take advantage of the reputation card as soft leverage. As one Chinese 
delegate to COP17 acknowledged:  
 
When a Chinese negotiator is in an informal, they are most prone to the logics of other  
parties and the Chair. The repeated encounter to new ideas makes it mentally accepting  
because of the social pressure and dynamic. As people, we all want to be respected and  
feel that we fit-in. At the same time, the environment often makes Chinese negotiator  
more sympathetic to the Secretariat’s text.27  
 
The logic is thereby simple: if a Chinese negotiator is positively received as having a 
reputation that is trustworthy, then they are more likely to be accepting of the external 
discourse. However, if their reputation is negatively perceived, the MER influence is 
more likely to be undermined.  
 
2.5 Primary and Secondary Hypotheses 
The present study posits two hypotheses, in light of the preceding frameworks, to be 
tested in the remainder of this thesis. The core intended argument to be tested is: MER 
agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation through varying 
direct and indirect capacities and during different stages of decision-making. However, 
the level of actualised influence is contingent on a range of situational factors and 
social instigators.    
Informed by the a priori assumptions of the first framework, the primary 
hypothesis addresses the primary research question: how MER agencies influence 
Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation. This hypothesis is mainly 
concerned with the preference formation stage of decision-making. The hypothesis 
holds that:   
 
                                               
27
 Personal Interview.  
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H1: The agencies of multilateral economic regimes can influence Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation through three primary mechanisms: costs-and-benefits 
calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement.  
  
An underlying assumption for the primary hypothesis is that the level of actual 
influence the MER agencies have through the three mechanisms is contingent on four 
situational factors: national objective, policy goals, policy settings, and policy 
instruments.  
The secondary hypothesis is informed by the assumptions of the second 
framework. It addresses the supplementary impact of MER agencies on the negotiation 
dimension of Chinese economic diplomacy. The hypothesis is therefore concerned with 
the decision-making during the negotiation processes. As such, it holds that:     
 
H2: The agencies of multilateral economic regimes can shape China’s negotiation 
approach and ultimate outcome through three capacities: as a mediator through shuttle 
diplomacy proximity talks, as a facilitator of informal negotiation practices, and as an 
instigator of side-payment bargaining.   
 
An underlying for the secondary hypothesis is that the actual influence of the three roles, 
which are also their advantage as well as contingencies, rest on a core set of drivers for 
China’s negotiation approach, referred to in this study as the social instigators. They are 
expectation, trust, and personal reputation. The three social instigators are cumulatively 
necessary criteria for maximising the MER agencies’ impact.    
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2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has introduced an inclusionary and integrative framework for the analysis 
of the influence of MER agencies on Chinese economic diplomacy. The framework was 
informed by the theoretical assumptions of three approaches: rationalism, cognitivism, 
and contractualism. According to these three approaches, two sub-frameworks were 
derived, one for analysing the influence of the MER agencies on Chinese preference 
formation, and the other for studying how MER agencies can shape China’s negotiation 
approach. The reason for having two separate sub-frameworks is because economic 
diplomacy is, in essence, concerned with these two dimensions. Thus, the first 
framework argues that three mechanisms have the potential to affect preference 
formation: costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination, and reputation 
reinforcement. These mechanisms are assumed to primarily inflict influence at the 
domestic, preference-shaping and policy-drafting stages of decision-making. The reality 
of their actual influence is contingent on the situational factors. Based on this 
framework, the primary hypothesis was derived.  
 In order to fully encapsulate the different dimensions of economic diplomacy, a 
second framework was established to analyse the role(s) of MER agencies in shaping 
China’s negotiation approach. Based on the rationalist, cognitive, and contractualist 
approaches, three roles were identified: a mediator through shuttle diplomacy proximity 
talks, a facilitator of informal negotiation practices, and an instigator of side-payment 
bargaining. The social instigators can propel or constrain the influence of MER agencies 
through the respective roles. According to the assumptions of the second framework, 
the secondary hypothesis was crafted. On the whole, this Chapter has established the 
case for a new look at how MER agencies matter in determining the nature of Chinese 
economic diplomacy. 
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Chapter 3    
 
A PAINTING OF THE DYNAMIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A study on Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation cannot begin without 
first understanding the intrinsic nature of the decision-making structure within the 
central government. In modern Chinese political history, the brutal and scarring century 
of humiliation – which featured the Opium War of 1840, the collapse of the imperial 
system in 1911, the subsequent decades of war against Japan, an intermittent conflict 
between the Nationalist Party (国民党) and the Communist Party of China (CPC, 中国
共产党), followed by the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, 中华
人民共和国) in 1949 led by the CPC (Collins and Cottey, 2012: 5-6; Clegg, 2009: 50) 
constitutes a revolutionary period of great significance. The entrenchment of the 
communist regime not only re-established an independent and functioning Chinese state, 
but also inaugurated a new political, economic, and social order with features that have 
defined Chinese politics for the last six decades.  
From the macroscopic perspective, China’s state structure is a centralised one 
that involves a single, cohesive decision-making body unencumbered by the need to 
achieve agreement from other decision-making bodies.
28
 Yet, Chinese politics and 
processes have also evolved since its establishment, especially after the death of Mao 
Zedong – the foundational leader of the communist revolution – in 1976. The collective 
authority that characterises the Chinese government today at the microscopic view of 
                                               
28 On issues that touches the “hard politics” territory, China’s decision-making is still a top-down 
approach; if a Ministry disagrees with the suggestions made by senior leaders, the leaders will find ways 
to make them agree (i.e., through compensation). But the same-level ranking agencies will need 
coordination. Interview with an expert from China University of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 25 October 
2012. 
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interagency relations within the economic bureaucracy reveals that China’s decision-
making structure is, in reality, somewhat decentralised. There are multiple decision-
points, and no single actor can act independently. State actions require the overcoming 
of potential domestic veto points, which are not limited to formalised institutional 
arrangements; and decision-making actors may even include enterprises whose active 
support is essential to policy success. Therefore, the centralisation characteristic of 
Chinese decision-making – particularly concerning economic issues – is not a fixed and 
absolute one.  
 Whilst not challenging the fundamental principle of the one-party communist 
rule, China has begun to experience a significant liberalisation of the state governance 
since the late-1970s. One important aspect of the liberalisation was a policy to re-
engage with multilateral economic regimes (MERs). China’s growing involvement with 
and dependence on the world economic system heads the list of reasons for its deepened 
involvement in various MERs. The MERs have, in turn, provided numerous material 
benefits in contribution to China’s development; and active participation in these 
structures insure China an important role in the decisions that affect the world economy 
on which its development depends (Sutter, 2008: 112-113).  
In the previous chapters, it was assumed that MERs ultimately affects Chinese 
preferences in economic diplomacy through the engagement processes. This chapter 
delve into this assumption and illustrates how China’s decision-making structure and 
processes have evolved. As the MER-Beijing relationship deepens, how does it affect 
Chinese decision-making and the operational framework? Has there been any 
institutional adaption? Have the domestic “rules of the policy game” changed in order to 
mediate MER forces? The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the relevant policy 
actors in Chinese economic diplomacy decision-making; and explore some implications 
of the dynamic China-MER relationship on the decision-making structure in Beijing. 
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Doing so will critically develop an accurate depiction of the domestic scene and lays the 
foundation for subsequent analyses.  
The next section provides a brief overview of China’s political power structure 
and the actors relevant to economic decision-making will be drawn. Section three 
examines the evolution of China’s economic decision-making processes over the course 
of three periods: the exclusionist, engagement, adaptation, and modernisation eras. The 
fourth section considers the implications of MER-Beijing engagements on China’s 
decision-making, and section five provides some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 The Chinese Political Structure 
At the Plenary Session of the First Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
the Common Programme – which established the country’s political system – was 
adopted. According to the Common Programme, the core governance structure of the 
Chinese political system is as follows: at the apex of the regime is the Political Bureau 
(or Politburo) of the CPC, which is crystallised in the form of a leadership core (领导合
心) that can be either a single person (i.e., Mao Zedong) or a group (i.e., as during and 
after the Deng era). The Politburo oversees the governing regime of the PRC which 
consists of three major vertical systems (系统): the CPC, the government, and the 
military. The three major systems operate on five levels: centre (中央); province (圣) 
(for the party and the government); prefecture (地); county (线); and township (乡). In 
order to effectively control the operations of the political system, this structure is further 
divided into six major functional sectors (系统 or口)29 – a management system known 
as guikouguanli（归口管理）  (Lu, 2001: 39-40). Each sector is supervised by a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and the direct sectoral supervision is 
                                               
29
 The six sectors are military affairs; legal affairs; administrative affairs, which is responsible for 
industrial and agricultural production, finance and commerce, foreign affairs, and so on; propaganda; 
United Front; and mass organisation affairs. 
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conducted through an institutionalised body such as a committee or a non-standing 
organ such as a leading small group (LSG; 领导小组). The LSGs (consisting of the 
principals from various government agencies) coordinate between the state bureaucracy 
and the party leadership and has the important task of facilitating consensus-building 
and coordinate decision-making among key political stakeholders.  
 According to the Constitution of the PRC, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC, 中国共产党全国代表大会) is formally the highest organ of state power (Article 
57 of the 1982 PRC Constitution). Among its wide ranging functions and authority, the 
NPC has powers to examine and approve the plan for national economic and social 
development, and examine and approve the State budget (Bo, 2013: 18). Next to the 
NPC is the State Council (de facto cabinet), the executive organ of state administration. 
According to Article 89(1) of the Constitution, the State Council can “adopt 
administrative measures, enacts Administrative Rules and Regulations, and issue 
decisions and orders.” Led by the Premier, the State Council directs 27 
ministries/commissions.  
Compared with the NPC, the State Council plays a more important role in 
economic decision-making for two reasons. First, a majority of economic policies come 
out of the State Council in the form of State Council administrative rules or 
departmental regulations. Second, the 1984 NPC Standing Committee resolution 
requires the NPC working groups to collaborate with the State Council in the research 
and drafting of legislation for the implementation of economic policies. This implies 
that a majority (80 per cent) of policies adopted by the NPC are proposed by the State 
Council in the first place. To be sure, the NPC does play a policy role – its Standing 
Committee, which convenes in full every two months, is required to deliberate a draft 
policy in full session at least three times before a vote for release. But this only happens 
after a consensus has been reached within the State Council and a final draft has been 
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passed to the NPC’s Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission. Therefore, 
policies are typically drafted within the State Council and officially approved by the 
NPC (table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1   Policy Type and Associated Policy Actors 
 
Policy Type Level Issued Approval Authority 
Law (法律) Drafted by Ministry or 
Commission/Coordinated by State 
Council Legislative Affairs 
Office/Passed to NPC 
National People’s Congress 
State Council Regulation  
(行政法规) 
Drafted by Ministry or 
Commission/Coordinated by State 
Council Legislative Affairs Office 
State Council Executive 
Committee 
 
Working closely in parallel with the State Council is the Party Politburo, headed 
by the General-Secretary of the CPC. The Politburo is the principal administrative 
mechanism of the CPC and its Standing Committee is the most powerful body in 
practice (Collins and Cottey, 2012: 41). The Politburo in general consists of members 
resident in provinces and cities other than Beijing, and is a relatively large institution. 
Due to its size, the Politburo has often found it too cumbersome to make policy 
decisions that demand immediate attention. So in accordance with the Party 
Constitution adopted at the 12
th
 Party Congress, de facto decision-making power rests 
with the Politburo’s Standing Committee.30 The Standing Committee has traditionally 
appointed nine of the most powerful CPC leaders to occupy, ex officio, China’s 
principal real or formal power loci (Lu, 2001: 39-60), but membership was reduced to 
seven at the recent 18
th
 Party Congress (Xinhua News, 15 November 2012).
31
 The 
                                               
30
 The most important policy decisions, such as major shifts in policy orientation, are generally still 
subject to deliberation by the full Politburo, although most Politburo members are only marginally 
involved in the actual deliberation of policies. The members of the Standing Committee include the 
General Secretary of the CPC, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the Premier of the State 
Council, the State President, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 
the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the General Secretary, the 
Director of the Central Advisory Commission, and the First Secretary of the Central Disciplinary 
Commission. 
31
 The current members (in order) are: Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu 
Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli.   
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Standing Committee meets weekly to endorse a wide range of decisions, and one 
Committee member, in particular, takes charge of the foreign affairs sector (外事口). 
This person would also act as the head of the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs 
Work Leading Small Group (FAWLSG; 中国中央外事工作领导小组). Though the 
Politburo Standing Committee wields substantial decision-making power, it does not 
deny the relevance of the preeminent leader of the PRC. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao have exerted an imminent role in economic diplomacy decision-making on the 
basis of the “three-in-one” (三比一) principle. The formula seeks to better coordinate 
policy by permitting the government’s “Number One” to be appointed commander-in-
chief on the one hand, and as president, to be received abroad with the protocol reserved 
for heads of state,
32
 on the other (Cabestan, 2009: 69). However, owing to the opacity of 
the CPC-led political system, the preeminent leader’s powers are much harder to 
delineate compared to the President of the United States (US), for instance.  
 
3.2.1 Bureaucratic actors 
Mapping the constellation of bureaucratic agencies in economic diplomacy decision-
making is a challenging task for two reasons. First, the governance of economic 
diplomacy in the PRC is often blurred with general diplomacy and foreign economic 
policy, which makes it difficult to distinguish a specific selection of agencies solely 
responsible for economic diplomacy. Second, every economic issue is interrelated to a 
series of different issue-areas which implies the need to coordinate with a range of 
different domestic agencies although these may vary between different economic issues. 
This makes it challenging to identify just one set of actors. But for the purpose of this 
study, let us explore the prevalent (rather than absolute list of) actors relevant to the case 
studies – climate change and international trade – of this thesis.  
                                               
32
 The role of the leader was further pronounced in March 2004 in an amendment to Article 81 of the state 
constitution that declared, the “President conducts state affairs” (国家主席进行国事). 
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 Before we do so, however, it is useful to briefly explain the structure inside a 
typical Chinese ministry/commission.
33
 According to Article 90 of the Constitution, the 
ministries/commissions under the State Council can “issue orders, directives, and 
regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective departments.” These are generally 
referred to as “department regulations” ( 部 门 规 章 ). Structurally, each 
ministry/commission consist of a division of labour among the Vice Ministers and 
Assistant Ministers, with each taking charge of a number of regional and functional 
departments (司) or bureaux (居) in an arrangement similar to the practice of sectoral 
control by the Politburo Standing Committee. Each department or bureau has one chief 
officer in charge of the overall work of the department and also the work of one or two 
divisions (除). He is assisted by two deputy chiefs, each of whom takes charge of a 
number of divisions. Further down the chain of command, a division chief is assisted by 
two deputy chiefs, with each in charge of a particular aspect of the division’s 
responsibility.  
In a number of bureaucracies there is another layer of power structure defined by 
sections (科).34 According to the internal regulations, department officials have the 
power to oversee the day-to-day operations that fall under their respective jurisdictions 
under established rules. The proposed action is often referred to the responsible 
ministerial leader for ratification. In case of matters that have no rules or precedents to 
follow, it is usually up to the ministerial leadership (and above) to make the final call 
(Lu, 2001: 55-57). Since the ministerial officials’ futures rest on the level of their 
professional effectiveness as administrators, government agencies are generally very 
protective of their ministerial interests and objectives. With this said ministers are still 
answerable to the Politburo and the State Council, and are required to regularly discuss 
                                               
33
 Although Commissions generally hold slightly more authority in decision-making than ministries, this 
thesis will classify the two as both ministerial-level agencies.  
34
 The exact number of vice ministers, assistant ministers, deputy directors of departments, and deputy 
division chiefs varies by bureaucracy.  
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with the Secretaries of the ministerial Party Committees before they carry out policy 
deliberation. Depending on the nature of the policy in question, the minister will usually 
direct the relevant departments and oversee implementation.  
 
3.2.1.1 Climate change policy actors 
Political debates on climate change began in the 1980s, and initially led by the China 
Meteorological Administration (CMA), although it was still subjected to the State 
Council (Ye, Ma and Zhang, 2007: 9). The CMA’s expertise shortage soon promoted 
the National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA, renamed the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection or MEP in 2008) to the lead agency status in climate change 
decision-making. The NEPA/MEP was primarily responsible for environmental 
decision-making and the implementation of regulations. Additionally, it took charge of 
the overall coordination, supervision and management of key environmental issues.  
By the mid-1990s, the Department of Treaty and Law under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA; 中华人民共和国外交部) was designated the responsibility to 
supervise works related to the international climate change organisations and 
agreements; and to ensure that China’s political and economic interests were served at 
multilateral negotiations. The MFA is an executive agency responsible for day-to-day 
economic diplomacy decision-making. As well, it plays a decisive role in the tactical 
aspect of the process. That is, when strategic policy decisions are made by the central 
leadership, it often consist of no more than a vague concept, basic policy orientation, 
broad policy guideline, or long-term policy goal – just the “bones” of policy. So it is 
generally up to the MFA to make tactical policy choices and work out detailed plans for 
the realisation of the leadership’s policy goals, and add the “flesh and blood” to China’s 
international economic policy. Acting as the primary spokespersons of China, the 
MFA’s input in decision-making (knowledge, assessments, and professional 
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experience) should not be underestimated. However, the Ministry is only one of a 
diverse array of bureaucracies influencing economic diplomacy preference. Major 
foreign policy decisions are made at a higher level, in power loci such as the Central 
Finance and Economics Leading Small Group (CFELSG; 中国财经领导小组). And 
yet, as a provider of processed information to central decision-makers, the MFA can 
significantly shape policy outcome. And among the Chinese bureaucracies, the central 
leadership regards the MFA as a more reliable provider of information than other 
sources (Lu, 2001: 50-52).
35
 For these reasons, the MFA’s inputs often play a 
significant role in shaping the central leadership’s perceptions; and the MFA’s policy 
recommendations usually prevail over other bureaucratic agencies in the battle for the 
leadership’s attention. 
When the senior leaders began to recognise the effects of climate change on 
China’s energy security, economic development, and quality of life, various institutional 
arrangements were made to address climate change. One such arrangement was the 
establishment of the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) in 
1998. The NCCCC comprises of 15 government agencies, chaired by the former State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC, reformed into the National Development 
and Reform Commission or NDRC in 2003) and represented the highest climate change 
decision-making body in Beijing.
36
 It facilitates the formulation of China’s preferences 
and multilateral climate change negotiation positions.  
 By 2003, the NDRC (国家发展和改革委员)37 took over all climate change policy 
coordination responsibilities, including undertakings on the coordination of energy-
                                               
35
 Much of the information provided by the MFA is processed as opposed to the raw material generated 
by the Xinhua News Agency. And the MFA’s diplomatic missions abroad frequently send cables directly 
to the central leaders. The MFA’s internal publications also provide a constant flow of up-to-date, 
concise, readable information. 
36
 The NCCCC was the successor of the Climate Change Coordination Leading Small Group (CCCLSG) 
established in 1990. 
37
 The NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council, charged to study and 
formulate policies for economic and social development, maintain the balance of economic development, 
and to guide restructuring of China’s economic system. 
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saving and emissions reduction policies. Moreover, the NDRC was charged to lead the 
Chinese delegation to the Conference of Parties (COPs) negotiations and ensures that 
China fulfils its obligations under the UNFCCC. The move indicates a shift in the 
relative value that the CPC attaches to the climate change issue as well as a transformed 
governmental conceptualisation of the issue from a purely scientific issue to a 
predominantly developmental one (Bang, Heggelund and Vevatne, 2005). The move 
also reflected the clear need to coordinate climate change policy with energy decisions.  
In 2007, the State Council created a working group on responses to climate 
change and the reduction of gas emissions, the National Working Group for Addressing 
Climate Change and Energy Savings (国家应对气候变化和捷能剑派工作小组), and it 
is headed by the Premier (formerly this was Wen Jiabao; today it is Li Keqiang). The 
Office of this working group was launched within the NDRC (NDRC, 2007). The MFA 
had also established its own LSG in charge of international works on climate change, 
headed by its Minister, Yang Jiechi (Le, 2007). However, its scope of action is narrower 
and its coordination power relatively weak. To be sure, the LSG is not, by definition, a 
decision-making organ. However, its preferences are likely to influence the final 
outcome. The ratification of these decisions by the central leadership is sometimes 
simply a formality while at other times decisions are made by the central leadership in 
accordance to the suggestions of the LSG with minor modifications. Since decisions at 
this level often involve cross-ministerial jurisdiction or interest, the LSGs therefore play 
a pivotal role in the decision-making processes.  
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) plays a crucial role as an operational focal point 
for the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) projects in China. The MOF’s Department 
of International Cooperation acts as a window agency through which much of the 
international funding for climate change projects from development banks, such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, are transferred. Other periphery actors 
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include the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, 
and the State Forestry Administration.   
Beyond government agencies, the epistemic communities play a crucial 
advocacy role in climate change decision-making. Such institutions include the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, the National Climate Center, and Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), among others. Academic institutions make similar contributions to 
climate change research in China. Among the institutions include Tsignhua University, 
Peking University, and Nanjing University. Meanwhile, many professional associations 
within China have concerned their work relating to climate change issues. Among the 
associations is the China Association for Science and Technology, the Chinese Society 
of Forestry, and the Ecological Society of China. The epistemic communities actively 
organise occasions where they can promote the exchange of ideas and findings on 
climate change issues. Additionally, multilateral organisations have, in recent years, 
further established local committees in China, and have made positive contributions to 
China’s climate change efforts (Ye, Ma and Zhang, 2007: 9). Among these include the 
International Geo-Biosphere Program (IGBP), the World Climate Research Program 
(WCRP), and the Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP).   
 
3.2.1.2 International trade policy actors 
The organisational structure that governs China’s international trade decision-making is 
a complex matrix which requires extensive bargaining and coordination. Once the 
Politburo’s Standing Committee has established the basic strategic decisions,38 the bulk 
of the policy decisions rest within the State Council structure that consist of a nucleus 
core – where most of the official decision-making authorities are concentrated – and a 
set of orbiting agencies (Pearson, 2001: 346). At the apex of the nucleus are the 
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 Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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President and the Premier. Deng Xiaoping sanctioned the decision to seek membership 
in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the mid-1980s. Jiang Zemin 
and Hu Jintao have since kept that commitment. Often the President defers to the 
opinion of the Premier as to what constitute an acceptable package, and the Premier 
would in turn receive inputs from interested parties, such as reports from the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM; 商务部), the World Trade Organization Leading Small Group 
(WTOLSG), the FAWLSG, and the CFELSG.
39
 Chaired by the Premier, the CFELSG 
coordinates activities within MOFCOM and the MFA; when necessary, resolve frictions 
between these two ministries (Ding, 2008); and supervises the activities of the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) – an agency that oversees China’s US$200 billion 
sovereign wealth fund (Weisman, 2008). The LSGs sanction most of the formal 
negotiation positions to the WTO.  
Since China commenced serious negotiations to join the WTO, the MOFCOM 
(successor of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation [MOFTEC, 对
外贸易经济合作部]) has become an integral part of the multilateral trade negotiations 
decision-making process. It is an executive agency under the State Council, primarily 
responsible for formulating Chinese policies on foreign trade, export and import 
regulations, foreign direct investments, consumer protection, market competition and 
negotiating bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. The MOFCOM claims the 
largest number of WTO-related economic and legal experts among its ranks; and it 
supervises economic missions abroad including foreign aid programs. In addition, it 
plays an important role in identifying potential sources of access to energy products and 
other raw materials, as well as new market and investment opportunities for Chinese 
companies (in particular, but not exclusively, state companies). Since decisions on 
China’s foreign trade and economic relations are considered less sensitive politically 
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Interview with a policy advisor to the WTO Division of the MOFCOM, Shanghai, 25 April 2012. 
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than other foreign policy issues, the MOFCOM often has a higher degree of policy 
authority than the MFA, though many issues within its purview are run through the 
CFELSG (Lu, 2001: 52). Despite the MOFCOM’s large role in the WTO affairs, its 
authority is limited due to the distinctively divided responsibilities among different 
ministries. For example, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has the primary 
responsibility to negotiate on finance (i.e., currency convertibility, banking, and 
securities); the Ministry of Information Industries (MOID) take the lead in 
telecommunications negotiations; the MOF on accounting and insurance services; the 
MOA on market access for agricultural products; and the Ministry of Internal Trade on 
distribution. Moreover, the MOFCOM does not actually have an official capacity to 
authorise package deals negotiated at the multilateral level; instead, they must report 
back to the LSGs and the State Council for the final approval. For these reasons, the 
MOFCOM’s direct authority on negotiations becomes watered-down.  
The MOFCOM’s WTO Division is responsible for the day-to-day WTO affairs. 
Although the WTO division is formally under the International Trade and Economic 
Affairs Department of the MOFCOM, it reports directly to the Vice Minister due to the 
importance of its work. It works under the guidance of senior officials, determines the 
implications of their assigned tasks, accumulate and assimilate policy reports and 
analyses crafted by research institutes, participate in negotiations, and report back to 
their authorities on the negotiation outcomes. Additionally, the WTO division 
coordinates China’s negotiation positions with relevant and interested bureaus and 
industries (i.e., respond to external interests on any aspect of the negotiations and 
integrate it into the overall position). Any interagency disputes that cannot be resolved 
between the divisions are then referred to the minster of MOFCOM for coordination, 
usually through a process of bargaining.  
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Two additional economic agencies under the State Council that matter in 
economic decision-making include the MOF and the PBOC. The MOF is charged with 
managing the state budget, financial and tax policies, and hard currency reserves, 
among other duties. It also plays a primarily macro-level role in the reform of the 
financial management systems of state enterprises and other public institutions, by 
monitoring the local budgetary and construction fund spending, for instance. 
Meanwhile, the PBOC is China’s central bank and a core agency for the making of 
monetary policies. Among its duties are monetary policy research, monetary policy 
formulation and implementation, and target-setting (Liew, 2004: 28). As well, it 
maintains payment and settlement systems; supervises financial institutions; and 
oversees the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).  
An agency that works closely with the MOF and the SAFE is the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT). Among its responsibilities include formulating and 
administering China’s tax regime, which includes tax incentives for investors. 
Meanwhile, the China securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) work hand-in-hand with the PBOC. The 
former regulates bonds, stocks, and mutual fund markets; while the latter oversees the 
banking system of China. Both the MOF and the PBOC participate in the policy 
processes for international trade and financial negotiations, not just as a domestic 
interest player but also represents their interest abroad as representatives of the Chinese 
delegation.       
Beyond the core structure are peripheral actors that can, at times, impose 
influence on policy outcome. These actors include the economic commissions and 
cross-functional bureaus of the central government. They are responsible for ensuring 
China’s overall economic interests are integrated in both the negotiations and in the 
coordination meetings. Other actors include the local governments and industries, which 
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grew more active in the negotiations in recent years. Overall, China’s international trade 
decision-making power remains concentrated with the elite few, but the decision-
making process is also a revolving and dynamic; and the constellation of organisations 
involved vary, depending on the issue of concern.  
 
3.3 The Evolution of China’s Economic Diplomacy Decision-making  
Since the establishment of the PRC, Beijing has had an evolving relationship with the 
MERs. The first stage is the exclusionist era (1949-1971), of which China was largely 
isolated from the MERs, in part because of its own decisions and in part because of the 
decisions of others. The second stage is the transition era (1972-2002), which was a 
period of rapid entry into the MERs albeit often in a relatively modest role. Since 2003, 
China has transitioned to the proactive era, which constitutes the third stage. Not only 
has it become a more active international political and economic actor, it has also begun 
to question some of the structures and norms of the MERs that it has joined.  
Numerous studies have often been fascinated with questions of whether 
Beijing’s active and sceptical orientation poses a fundamental challenge to the 
international economic order (i.e., Harding, 2011; Clegg, 2009; Sutter, 2008); and 
whether China can be accommodated through relatively modest and evolutionary 
changes in the structure and norms of the international economic system (i.e., Guo 
2013; Chan, Lee and Chan, 2012; Schlichting, 2008). Yet, few scholars have looked at 
the nexus of China’s political reforms and its evolving relationship with MERs. In 
contrast to the prevalent literature that assumes a static decision-making process in 
China (i.e., Lai, 2010; Lu, 2001; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988) this section illustrates 
a dynamic decision-making process shaped by its deepening integration to the MERs. 
This effect is noted in the concept of “institutional adaptation” which refers to the 
“long-term substitution of existing practices and structures with new ones” not just in 
102 
 
response to the demanding forces of MERs, but also as a proactive attempt to mediate 
those forces and maximise the ability of the state to manoeuvre effectively in the 
remaining or residual policy space (Zhao, 1996: 25). As a means of illustrating the 
dynamism of decision-making, the aforementioned three eras are explored in the 
sections below.  
 
3.3.1 The exclusion period: 1949-1971 
Immediately after the establishment of the new Chinese government, Beijing attempted 
at re-establishing its international recognition and legitimation in the international 
community by making efforts to regain its seat in the UN. At the time, China’s attitude 
towards multilateral regimes was generally positive. But this quest proved elusive, 
largely because of the US refused to recognise the PRC, causing China to become 
increasingly critical of the multilateral order.
40
 In turn, the PRC adopted a unilateralist 
diplomatic strategy and an isolationist attitude towards all western-led multilateral 
regimes, viewing them as imperialist mechanisms designed to undermine national 
sovereignty and hamper the development of international socialism (Lanteigne, 2005: 
145). At the same time, China refused to join the MERs established by the Soviet 
Union. Beijing did, of course, enter a bilateral military alliance with the Soviet Union in 
1950, and accepted Soviet aid and advice on central planning in the mid-1950s. But 
Beijing refused to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) (Harding, 
2011: 26). Instead, the Chinese leaders preferred to conduct its ties with the Third 
World on a bilateral basis, only to attenuate most of these relationships during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During this period, China’s foreign policy primarily 
focused on national security issues. Foreign trade and economic aid were but 
                                               
40
 The US recognised the Republic of China (ROC) led by the Nationalist Party in Taiwan as the official 
government of China, and hence supported the ROC’s bid for a seat in the UN instead of the PRC. For 
Mao Zedong, the PRC could not join the UN or other institutions with a ROC presence, as doing so 
would imply the recognition of two Chinas. 
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instruments for the realisation of China’s international political and security objectives. 
Hence, the concept of economic diplomacy was largely absent from its political agenda.  
As a result, decision-making was considered as a sensitive area of decision-
making, and always officially claimed “there is no trivial matter in foreign affairs” (外
事无小事). Hitherto, Beijing’s general diplomacy decision-making process under Mao 
was a classic socialist model. The state operated in a hierarchical system characterised 
by a one-person domination (Mao Zedong) over a single vertical command system 
(Zhang, 1996: 80-81). Major decision-making was determined by Mao Zedong, with a 
limited degree of top leadership involved in some key decision-making. Premier Zhou 
Enlai and a few top leaders were mainly implementers of his ideological visions in 
foreign policy strategies and policies (Barnett, 1985: 7). The rest of the political 
institutions and government agencies participated in a demand system of decision-
making.  
 
3.3.2 The transition period: 1972-2002 
In the 1970s, two developments triggered a renewed interest in Beijing to gravitate 
toward multilateralism. The first was the 1971 decision by the UN General Assembly to 
pass Resolution 1758 that legitimately restored the PRC’s rights in the institution. In 
particular, the US realised that China’s communist regime was not a passing 
phenomenon and the prospect of the Nationalist government of Taiwan to recover the 
mainland were becoming increasingly remote. And given its large population, its 
economic resources, and strategic location, China would most likely become a major 
power in Asia. For these reasons, the US concluded that continuing to isolate China 
from the international system would be a mistake (Harding, 2011: 27). Consequently, 
Washington supported the restoration of the PRC’s seat within the UN. This 
development significantly influenced Beijing to enter other MERs thereafter, although it 
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also kept its involvement at a relatively modest level, by initially joining only a small 
number of UN agencies (Gill, 2010).
41
 A reason for such prudence was in keeping with 
the Maoist suspicion that the MERs were dominated by foreign powers pursuing selfish 
interests at odds with China’s. The other reason was the lack of experience and 
expertise within the MFA and the overall Chinese government apparatus after the chaos 
of the Cultural Revolution (Sutter, 2008: 114). With these said, Beijing also believed 
that joining the international economic order could provide China with concrete 
economic benefits to which the country desperately needed.
42
 The members of the 
international financial and trading systems appeared eager to make direct investments in 
China and to buy Chinese exports if they were inexpensive and well made. Chinese 
leaders recognised that encouraging incoming foreign investment – tentatively at first, 
and then increasingly enthusiastically – could provide not only the capital and 
technology, but also the designs, brands, and marketing channels, all of which could 
greatly enhance China’s export potential (Harding, 2011: 28).  
In addition, China found that it would benefit from support from the 
international financial institutions it had once scorned, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and, even more so, the World Bank. This support was not 
primarily financial, even though China had later accepted loans from the World Bank.
43
 
Instead, what was most useful to China were the technical advice in the design of its 
policies for economic reform and modernisation plans, which Beijing has studied 
carefully and usually implemented effectively. Having put aside the Maoist practices, 
Chinese officials gained more experience in the MERs and the better perceived benefits 
                                               
41
 The multilateral groups China did join involved little actual cost to its sovereignty and ability to avoid 
constraints or costly commitments, while the symbolic benefits of membership (prestige, recognition, 
standing out as a leader for developing world interests, and having a voice in world affairs) were 
enhanced.  
42
 Following the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy was in complete shambles. Industrial production 
decreased by 14 per cent and agricultural production essentially ceased (Second China 2009).  
43
 Combined with loans and assistance from the Asian Development Bank, which China joined in the 
mid-1980s, China became the largest international recipient of foreign assistance in the 1980s and much 
of the 1990s. 
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of integration implied that Beijing’s previous approach of limited involvement 
eventually gave way to much greater participation in MERs during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 This brings us to the second development. By the late-1970s, the growing 
international economic interdependence coupled with China’s desperate need for hard 
capital – in order to pull itself out of the economic despair – stipulated the Chinese 
leadership – lead by Deng Xiaoping – to place economic issues in the foreign policy 
business. Deng subsided Mao’s zero-sum thinking and adopted a gradualist approach to 
joining the Western economic system – a method he refers to as “crossing a river by 
feeling the stones” (Lanteigne, 2005: 60-61).44 In 1978 during the third plenary session 
of the 11
th
 Central Committee of the CPC, the government decided to shift is foreign 
policy focus from national security to economic modernisation. Rhetoric such as 
“keeping in line with the international track” (与国际接轨), “behaving according to 
international norms” (按照国际管理办事), and “engaging in the international society” (
参与国际社会) became part of the popular discourse within the political apparatus. 
Deng Xiaoping famously said, “The colour of the cat does not matter, as long as the 
mice are caught.”  
As opening-up gathered further momentum in the 1980s and 1990s, and as 
Beijing sought to shift its national strategy from system-transformation to system-
reformation, it became evident that “politics in command” gave way to the idea that 
politics should serve the economy. In 1980, Beijing restored membership in the Bretton 
Woods institutions (Kim, 1999: 46-47). Soon it became the World Bank’s largest 
country borrower, and worked closely with the IMF in technical learning and advice on 
its economic development. Since then, China’s MER memberships nearly doubled 
between 1984 and 1996 (from 29 to 51) (Sutter, 2008: 114, 117). By this time, the 
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 For instance, in 1979, Beijing reversed its opposition to receiving overseas development assistance 
(ODA), before it engaged with the IMF and World Bank in the early-1980s. The result was a steady 
influx of capital. 
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Chinese government appeared to truly have accepted multilateralism as a platform for 
promoting its strengths as an attractive economic opportunity (Pearson, 2006).     
Towards the late-1990s, Beijing recognised its economic and diplomatic success 
placed it in a more prominent position to operate more actively within world affairs. 
Equally important was Beijing’s growing concern with the perceived American 
unilateralism and “hegemony.” Promoting international multilateralism was therefore 
perceived as a useful fall-back position for guarding against the US unilateralism. As 
well, it helped China build international coalitions in favour of a more “democratic” 
world economic order that would not be dominated by US leadership (Carlson, 2006).  
However, having been largely isolated from the MERs for years, China was ill-
equipped to handle interactions with them (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). To address 
domestic inadequacies, Beijing strengthened ministerial staff training, and set-up a UN 
Small Group in the Bank of China.
45
 This group helped analyse the costs-and-benefits 
of membership in the UN financial agencies. To ensure effective participation in the 
MERs, Beijing implemented major administrative reforms from the individual to 
collective decision-making. Deng realised that this form of decentralisation was a 
necessity as the country’s integration with MERs increased the complexity of its foreign 
relations, which meant that retaining the same high level of concentration in decision-
making power as Mao did became impossible.
46
 These sentiments were expressed in a 
speech by Deng entitled “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” 
addressed to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the Party on 18 August 1980 (Zhou, 2012: 27).
47
 As a result, the preponderant role of 
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 Interview with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 21 September 2011. 
46
 Zhang (1996: 81) also points out that a domestic stimulant to the administrative reforms was in 
consideration of the lessons from the Cultural Revolution and the constant domestic instabilities (which 
led to the 1989 Tiananmen incident) created an unprecedented challenge to the CCP regime’s legitimacy 
and decentralisation was seen as a necessity. 
47
 On 31 July 1986, then Vice Premier, Wan Li, pointed out in his speech entitled “Democratic and 
Scientific Decision-making Is an Important Topic of Political Reform,” that the basic objective of reform 
of the decision-making system was to realise democratic and scientific decision-making. Recalled by an 
interviewee during a personal interview.   
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the paramount leader was undermined in order to advance the power of the nuclear 
circle in economic diplomacy decision-making (Lampton, 2001). There is no longer a 
chairman of the CPC Central Committee, just a Secretary-General, who is responsible 
for convening the meetings of the Politburo and its Standing Committee and presiding 
over the work of the Secretariat (Zhou, 2012: 30).
48
  
Subsiding Mao’s one-person domination, Deng retreated from active 
involvement in policy decisions on key economic issues such as the normalisation of 
economic relations with the US, and allowed Zhao Ziyang (third Premier) and Hu 
Yaobang (Party General Secretary), for instance, to make key economic decisions. This 
change gave birth to new power centres at par with the paramount leader (Zhao, 1996: 
83-84). These power centres are not institutionalised, but based on personal prestige and 
connections; and the power centres often had conflicting policy opinions. For instance, 
Chen Yun (senior revolutionary leader) famously clashed with Deng over China’s 
economic development policy directions. While Deng favoured rapid growth at the 
expense of stability, Chen perceived stability as the paramount goal (稳定压倒一切) 
over growth (Dittmer and Wu, 1994: 493).  
By the turn of the third generation of leadership, economic affairs became so 
prominent that Deng and his colleagues felt it was necessary to promote technocratic 
bureaucrats such as Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji, all of which manifested to 
the centre of political power in the 1990s. Because these technocrats individually lacked 
absolute authority, collective decision-making replaced earlier vertical authoritarianism. 
As Jiang explained in his political report to the 16
th
 Party Congress in 2002, attention 
has been paid to the horizontal division of decision-making power whereby [it] has been 
rationally divided, legalised and institutionalised according to the different functions of 
the ruling party and state organs (Zhou, 2012: 29).  
                                               
48
 It is prescribed that the Secretariat does not have a decision-making function, but is just ad 
administrative office of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.  
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 In order to manage the dismantling of the planned economy, and the complex 
issues negotiated under the MERs, the leaders felt the need to reform its administrative 
structure and operations in order to serve their fast-developing economy as well as the 
needs of its MER memberships. The restructuring in 1982 aimed to reduce the 
unusually large numbers of ministries/commissions under the State Council, which had 
soared to 100 in 1981. These were reduced to 61.
49
 In addition, State Councillors and 
State Council Executive Meetings were created to aid the work of the Premier (head of 
the State Council). Elder officials were replaced with younger cadres that had the right 
political and professional credentials (Lee, 1991; Whyte, 1989). The 1993 restructuring 
reduced the number of employees of agencies under the State Council by 20 per cent 
and that of the local government (administration) by 25 per cent (Lai, 2013: 49).  
To improve its professionalism in decision-making so as to measure up to the 
level of professionalism in the MERs, Beijing established a supra-ministerial 
coordination body to replace existing agencies, especially the SDPC. As a leading 
agency in the planning of China’s economic and industrial developments during the 
planned economy era, the SDPC was effective in aggregating interests and coordinate 
decision-making because the lacklustre formal market regulation provided it adequate 
autonomy to plan and project authority, and it had specialised sections that would 
directly interact with its counterpart (对口) sector.50 After MER membership, the need 
to treat the market in a liberal manner implied that indirect economic levers of economic 
policies have replaced the old administrative tools of central planning as the standard 
instrument of short-term macroeconomic management (Liew, 2004: 35). As a result, the 
continuing use of the SDPC would be problematic for two reasons. First, the SDPC had 
a predisposition for central planning and therefore had vested interests in the 
                                               
49
 The number of agencies under the State Council went back up to 72 in 1988, although restructuring in 
that year reduced it down to 68, and those related to economic reform being the focus of merger and 
reduction.  
50
 For example, the SDPC’s finance bureau controlled the banks; and its bureau for rural and agricultural 
policies discussed and approved every stage of the rural reform (Hamrin and Zhao, 1995: xxxviii). 
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perpetuation of the status quo. This essentially implies the SDPC’s inability to act with 
impartiality.
51
 Second, a move to market regulation via legislation (as required by the 
MER protocols) meant that a body with legal expertise was better suited to act in a 
coordination capacity (Becker, 2006: 148-149). Other organs such as the Central and 
State Council LSGs were also found inappropriate to play a coordination role due to 
partisan interests, inadequate professional staff, and their overloaded responsibilities.   
 One solution was to convert the CFELSG into the supreme decision-making 
organ following a process of decentralisation in 1993 (Liew, 2004: 25). The leaders 
expanded the role of the various departments (办公室) under the CFELSG to perform 
tasks including coordinating various subgroups, supervise the CFELSG’s research 
office (研究室), and commission external research projects. In addition, it assists the 
CFELSG and the Standing Committee of the Politburo in their policy deliberation and 
supervision by producing reports and position papers. Given the nature of its work, the 
Director of the departments is therefore highly influential in decision-making. Arguably 
at times their influence can surpass the Politburo members of the non-standing 
committee as they work directly under the top leadership. For example, when the 
departments decided to devalue the RMB in 1994, it was taken straight to the 
Politburo’s Standing Committee before informing their decisions to the other members 
of the State Council. The remaining members of the Politburo were unaware of this 
decision until it was announced by the State Council (Liew, 2004: 28).  
The multiplying numbers of policy concerns within the MERs also prompted 
China to urgently expand the roles and capacities of its ministries/commissions. In 
1998, when China was preparing to push for WTO entry, the government was 
restructured to better regulate the emerging market economy. Several new ministries 
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 The problem was so severe that calls within the State Council were made to resurrect the old State 
Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System (SCORES) (国务院经济体制改革办公室) so 
that more independent body can conduct reform planning. 
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were created to manage increasingly important aspects or sectors of the economy. These 
include the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the National Drug 
Administration. A number of ministries that oversaw state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and heavy industry were abolished, reducing the institutional leverage of the SOEs. 
Instead, the former State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) was empowered to 
supervise SOEs and assumed a new and prominent role concerning macro-economic 
management. Other prominent regulatory commissions were the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission was formed in 1992 for overseeing securities, and the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission was set-up in late-1998 to supervise the insurance 
industry. The number of departments under the State Council shrank significantly from 
40 to 29 (Lai, 2013: 49-50).   
In January 2000, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) held a 
meeting to discuss the rule of law revisions necessitated by MER membership. The 
meeting was reportedly attended by the heads of the legal departments of all relevant 
ministries/commissions. During the meeting, the departments were instructed to clean-
up their own rules and regulations in order to comply with the MER rules (Jin and 
Zhang, 2001). On 19 September 2001, the CPC Party Central Committee General 
Office and the State Council General Office announced that various ministries and 
commissions had sorted out more than 2,200 laws, rules and regulations, two-thirds of 
which were in the foreign economic and trade system. Approximately 116 items needed 
to be revise, 573 needed to be abolished, and 26 new items needed to be drawn up 
(Becker, 2006: 159).  
Procedurally, this era saw increasing numbers of government agencies marshal 
differentiated information in support of their preferences and interests that are often in 
conflict with other agencies. This era generally had government agencies encouraged to 
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be more self-supporting and thus strengthened the capacity among and within the 
government bureaucracy to work vigorously in protection of their interests throughout 
the decision-making processes. At the same time, there was a general decline in the 
heavy inclination for ideological instruments, and the trend towards decentralisation in 
personnel management enabled many government agencies to become policy 
entrepreneurs. Collectively, these systemic and structural changes reduced the extent to 
which government agencies respond to the orders from higher levels as they have done 
so in the past (Lieberthal, 1992: 8-9). Hence, there were numerous reporting lines 
throughout the system, functional as well as territorial organs with resultant problems of 
governance. One territorial level organisation contains within it several bureaucratic 
ranks. A unit cannot issue binding orders to another unit at the same bureaucratic rank, 
not even if it is at a higher territorial level. Each territorial unit still has considerable 
power to control the unit one level down; therefore, bureaucrats at every level spend 
volumes of time negotiating for more flexibility (Yu, 2008: 33).  
At each level of the organisational hierarchy, government representatives make 
decisions by a rule of consensus. If they all agree, the decision is automatically ratified 
by the higher hierarchy. If the bureaucrats cannot reach consensus, then the decision is 
referred to the senior officials, and if they fail to reach an agreement, then either nothing 
happens or the CPC intervenes with a solution (Shirk, 1992: 68). Due to the “selfish 
departmentalism” nature of the bureaucratic agencies, each with an intention to promote 
their own interests, the consequences of this system is, first, the speed of the decision-
making process is generally slow; and the consensus-building process tends to be 
protracted. Second, it is relatively difficult to identify when a decision has actually been 
made (Lampton, 1992: 57-58). 
  Under these contexts, the process of decision-making transitioned from vertical 
authoritarianism to a collective decisions-making system. The first stage is the framing 
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of opinions by the relevant heads of divisions. He/she discuss their opinions with the 
division chiefs for an agreement. Selected others or the whole division may join the 
discussion if necessary. A draft proposal is worked out at this level before the issue goes 
to the department directors. The pooling of wisdom guarantees that in most cases the 
suggestions of the division are accepted. The directors of the department then sign the 
document with some technical amendments or alterations and hand it over to the 
minister or vice minister. If the issue is of a routine or less important nature and within 
the ministerial competence, then the proposal can be ratified directly and enter the 
implementation stage so long as other Ministers turn on their green lights. Otherwise, it 
travels to the top leadership for a final decision.
52
 At any given level from the 
department up, the co-signature of at least two leading persons in charge is required for 
most cases before the issue advances further. When a significant difference of opinion 
occurs, the matter is handed back down with the views of the higher body for 
reconsideration. On such occasions or on critical and urgent issues, a top leader or a 
minister may directly consult his subordinates or call a meeting of relevant persons in 
the hierarchy (Yang 1995, 95-96).  
When an issue falls into the jurisdiction of more than one department in a 
ministry or ministries, the primary department/ministry that is responsible for the case is 
obliged to initiate interdepartmental or inter-ministerial consultations and take up the 
drafting of the proposal. The process also starts at the division level and goes up step by 
step basically following the same procedure as described above. Counterpart 
consultations are conducted among the corresponding divisions or departments when 
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 Depending on their importance, major decisions concerning national development normally goes 
through to the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the Central Working Conference or the plenary session of 
the Central Committee, and/or the Party Congress. Decisions on major issues falling within the 
responsibilities of the State Council must be discussed by plenary meetings or executive meetings of the 
State Council; work rules, procedural rules, and a democratic life meeting system have been established 
in the Politburo and its Standing Committee to institutionalise collective decision-making; and a system 
has been established of soliciting opinions concerning major policy decisions, that is, before any major 
decision is collectively made, intra-party democracy must first be given full play, in-depth investigations 
and research must be undertaken, and the opinions of all localities, departments and democratic parties 
must be listened to (Zhou, 2012: 30-31). 
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necessary. The document must be co-signed by all the departments or ministries 
involved before it is delivered to the proper authority for final ruling. Disagreement by 
any party indicates inadequate consultation among the participants, and renegotiation is 
required until a consensus is reached. 
   
3.3.3 The proactive period: 2003 – Present   
Since 2003, new signals indicate a new round of political transformations towards more 
sophisticated, constructive and confident approaches in economic affairs. It embraced 
the constellation of MERs, their rules and norms, as a means to promote its national 
interest. China has insisted on being treated as a shareholder, and not just as a 
stakeholder – in other words, as an actor that has the right to participate in the making 
of decisions, not just one that is affected by their outcomes. For instance, China has 
sought a greater share of the capital – and thus a greater share of the votes – in both the 
IMF and the World Bank.
53
 China is also beginning to question some of the norms that 
underlie the existing MERs, as can be seen by their activities in the WTO. China has 
further proposed the formation of new MERs to fill in the gaps within the existing 
institutional structure, and use them to either replace or complement regimes which are 
not performing well. For instance, China played a major role in creating the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its more cautious endorsement of the East Asian 
Summit (or ASEAN+6) reflect the widespread disappointment with the 
accomplishments of APEC. By organising the Boao Forum, China endeavoured to 
create an Asian equivalent of the World Economic Forum in Davos. In 2011, a Chinese 
citizen became a deputy managing director of the IMF. Likewise, in June 2008, Justin 
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 China’s voting rights in the IMF have increased over the decades, from 2.58 per cent in 1980 (the ninth 
largest among single member states) to 2.95 per cent in 2001 and 3.82 per cent in 2011 (the sixth largest). 
In contrast, the voting power of China within the World Bank seems to have declined. In 1988 China’s 
voting power was 3.19 per cent in the World Bank, with a share of US$3000 million, and 2.01 per cent in 
the International Development Association (IDA) (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990: 65-66; 74-80). By 
2011, its voting power in the World Bank was reduced to 2.72 per cent and in the IDA it grew very 
slightly to 2.05 per cent.   
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Yifu Lin, a Chinese national, became the World Bank’s chief economist. These 
developments reflect China’s rising influence within these MERs.     
Beijing’s proactive approach to the MERs has led the leaderships’ new 
appreciation of the notion of economic diplomacy as an important instrument for 
dealing with international economic affairs. As like previous years, Chinese leaders 
argued that a proactive approach to multilateral economic negotiations is not possible 
without an efficient and professional administrative system. Therefore, a series of 
restructuring took place in 2003, after China entered the WTO. The government was 
reformed in order to serve a highly internationalised and marketised economy. The 
SDPC was renamed the NDRC, and the SETC was reorganised into the MOFCOM. In 
light of significant new issues, the National Drug Administration was restructured into 
the National Food and Drug Administration, and additionally the National 
Administration of Work Safety was set-up. In order to supervise the performance of 
SOEs and state banks, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, respectively, were 
established (Zou, 2008: 153-162). Finally, the National Electricity Regulatory 
Commission was formed in 2003 to oversee the electricity sector (Lai, 2013: 50). In 
general, economic diplomacy decision-making became less personalised and more 
institutionalised. In particular, Hu Jintao has paid greater attention to formal institutions 
in decision-making, laid a greater emphasis on proactive and pragmatic diplomacy, and 
compared with his predecessors he collaborates more closely with Premier Wen Jiabao 
in administering foreign economic affairs. Because Wen relies on the State Council and 
especially the MFA, his close working relationship with Hu has also elevated the 
relevant bureaucratic agencies with a greater role in external economic affairs than 
before (Lai, 2010: 37, 154).  
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But the bureaucratic influence does not stop at the MFA threshold. In this 
political era, central decision-makers are much more susceptible to bureaucratic 
influence, particularly by ministerial perspectives, than previous leaders. Although the 
Politburo Standing Committee remains the most important general body in economic 
diplomacy decision-making, the MFA and the MOFCOM now also have the capacity to 
execute economic policies. Meanwhile, top functional agencies like the CFELSG and 
the FAWLSG continue to specialise in managing the day-to-day affairs, and drafting 
proposals for foreign economic policies. Like the previous era, competing inter-
ministerial interests are still apparent within these apparatus, which makes bargaining 
equally important in the inter-agency coordinating processes.  
In general, the top leaders deal with the key policies and oversee the wider and 
larger political future (i.e., the maintenance of social stability) and leave the ministries 
to set the policies of foreign economic affairs due to a lack of time and expertise.
54
 This 
implies that ministerial-level actors now enjoy increased authority to execute policy 
decisions and day-to-day affairs. Similarly, while China have divided economic 
decision-making authority among its sprawling CPC apparatus and government 
bureaucracies, interest group politics, idiosyncratic preferences of individual top 
leaders, factional considerations, provincial governments’ lobbying, think tank 
advocacy, and business actors’ lobbying of their interests in the early-stages of decision-
making,
55
 all contribute to the functioning of preference formation. Of course, the 
central body retains the utmost decision-making power,
56
 and the key agencies, 
technocratic expertise and coordination mechanisms (i.e., regular top-level meetings) 
manage the process (Pei, 2011).  
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 Interview with a member from the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Commerce, 
Beijing, 23 November 2012. 
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 In fact, the government often invite large business organisations for consultation. Important to note that 
this only applies to the larger and often state-owned enterprises rather than smaller private ones. 
56
 If an issue can be considered by the top leaders, then it has a much better chance of being addressed 
than issues that are not of the interest of the leaders.  
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 In terms of process, the decision-making of multilateral economic policies today 
are as follows. After the SCLAO has compiled the legislative plans (立法工作安排), a 
State Council Secretary-General Conference is convened
57
 whereby it reviews the draft 
plans, and make amendments where necessary. A review of recent legislative plans 
indicates that MER commitments and timelines dominate the PRC’s economic 
legislative agenda. Upon the approval of the plans, the relevant ministries/commissions 
are designated assignments, marking the beginning of the policy design process. Policy 
drafting occurs internally, and if the policy involves more than one 
ministry/commission, a joint drafting team may be set-up to begin the process of 
research and writing. The ministry/commission in charge of coordinating the process 
typically invites experts in to give advice at this point. Thereafter, select 
ministries/commissions bargain between themselves in an effort to reach a policy 
consensus. It is at this point that the policy pathologies have an opportunity to wreak 
havoc with the policy process. Absent a strong policy coordination body, policies can 
easily get bogged down in endless rounds of negotiations, abandoned altogether in the 
face of bureaucratic refusals to come to a consensus, or pushed up to a higher level for 
possible resolution in an “escalation of coordination.” As a result of the demands of 
MERs, there exist today a much more extensive process of consultation and bargaining 
aimed at not only crafting a domestic consensus in a timely manner, but also reconciling 
domestic interests to the greatest extent possible with international pressures and 
commitments.  
Once the policy has been drafted and an agreement has been reached among the 
ministries and commissions, one of several things can happen depending on the type of 
policy being created. If the policy is routine in nature and falls logically under an 
existing NPC law or State Council regulation, then after drafting the departmental 
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 The attendees at the State Council Secretary General Conference are the Secretary General of the State 
Council General Office, his Vice Secretary Generals, and the Director and Vice Directors of the SCLAO. 
117 
 
regulation internally, the ministry/commission will pass the policy independently, and 
no higher approval is needed. If, however, the SCLAO finds the policy to be of 
contradiction with existing international agreements under certain MER, the policy will 
be returned to the ministry/commission for amendment. This latter process is critical as 
it ensures of China’s ability to comply with the terms of its international agreements and 
maintain credibility (figure 3.1).   
 
Figure 3.1  Departmental Decision-Making Processes 
 
 
 
 
        Consensus Building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process is a bit more complex if the issue affects more than one ministry/ 
commission. Generally speaking, most economic policies today affect more than one 
ministry/commission. For example, the MOFCOM, which has the office that handles 
WTO issues, is often a second party on many policies, as is the State Tax 
Administration. In cases such as this, the initiating ministry drafts the departmental 
regulation internally, as discussed above, and it is then circulated for comments and 
consideration to the other relevant ministries or bodies. Alternatively, a joint drafting 
committee might be formed to facilitate the coordination process. If consensus is hard to 
reach or if the matter is more important, then it is raised to the Director-Generals (司长) 
of the ministries. If no consensus can be reached at the Director-General level, the 
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matter is raised to the Vice-Minister. In most cases, problems are fixed at this level. 
However, in cases where consensus cannot be reached, then the SCLAO will be asked 
to coordinate consensus. Once a consensus is reached, the departmental policy will be 
circulated to each minister for signature (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2  State Council Decision-Making Processes 
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On the whole, China’s present day economic diplomacy decision-making has 
evolved from vertical authoritarianism to one characterised by both “macro-
authoritarianism” and “micro-democracy” (Pei, 2011). At the macro-level, China is a 
one-party state in which the CPC enjoys an unchallenged political monopoly. At the 
micro-level, agencies, officials, bureaucracies, and interest groups (i.e., SOEs and local 
governments) vigorously compete for power and influence to defend their policy turfs 
and interests tenaciously.
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3.4 Changes and Implications 
Modern Chinese decision-making for economic diplomacy has evolved from “vertical” 
to “horizontal” authoritarianism, thanks largely to the growing perplexities of the 
negotiating issues involved. Yet, it must be made clear that this trend towards 
pluralisation and decentralisation is by no means a connotation that the top leadership is 
suffering from an erosion of decision-making powers. The core nucleus group of leaders 
remain utterly important in Chinese policy. What has changed is the process.  
China’s decision-making system reform is a gradual process; and it 
demonstrated that in order to adapt to its role inside MERs, it has to change its own 
processes. In turn, the following transformations occurred. First, to manage the wide-
ranging and technical issues covered by the MERs, there has been a domestic shift from 
power-based decision-making to professionalised and specialised
59
 processes. The most 
important feature of traditional decision-making is that it is power-based. But since 
Deng’s open-up policy, decision-making has evolved from the old impulsive style based 
on experience and personal judgement to more professionalised and specialised 
approaches. Tools, analytical methods, and procedures have since been introduced into 
the policy process, with intellectual, technical and methodological support. Therefore, 
decision-making is no longer the undertaking by a monopoly of leaders. Experts, 
academics, and policy advisory bodies have become an integral part of the decision-
making rational and evaluation processes. More broadly, this change has also 
transcended Chinese decision-making from non-institutionalised to institutionalised 
processes. During the exclusionist era, China’s decision-making system was far from 
complete and robust, and one of its outstanding problems was low institutionalisation. 
Since China opened up to the international system, its decision-making has focused on 
system strengthening and institution-building. As a result, the institutionalisation of 
decision-making has significantly improved. 
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 By scientific, it implies decisions made on a rational choice basis.  
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 The second change, and closely related to the first, is the shift from individual to 
collective decision-making. As multilateral negotiation agendas tend to be cross-cutting 
in policy issues, it diversified interests within the Chinese government, and expanded 
the actors’ relevance to the policy processes. As a result, there was a gradual transition, 
in post-Mao China, from a “strong man” system to an elitist structure in which any key 
decision-making is still made by the top leadership, but collectively by a small group of 
top leaders at the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, aided by bureaucratic institutions 
and agencies, by means of providing top leaders information, intelligence, policy 
consultation, analysis, and recommendation.  
To be sure, the decision-making structure and processes remains characterised 
by a centralised, elitist, and closed-door model, which is defined, constrained, or 
determined by the party-state political system, as long as such a system remains 
fundamentally unchanged (Guo, 2013: 280). But as Lucian Pye (1966: 47) rightly points 
out, the differentiation of highly centralised decision-making structures is an important 
indicator of political development because it causes “specialised functions of various 
political roles in the system to increase.” The positive implication is that it increases the 
stability and predictability of China’s foreign economic policy. On the whole, as one 
senior policy advisor to the MOFCOM said, “China’s decision-making structure has 
significantly evolved as it tries to converge with the international economic system, 
ideologies, norms, and standards.”60  
 The third regards the impact MERs have on the redistribution of bureaucratic 
power and authority in China’s foreign economic decision-making processes. This was 
evidently seen within the State Council in terms of the transformation of the ministerial-
level agencies such as the MFA, the MOF, and the MOFCOM. As bureaucratic players, 
they were elevated significantly in power and authority in the decision-making and 
legislative contexts. The CFELSG is another case in point whereby entrance into the 
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 Interview with a senior policy advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 22 November 2012. 
121 
 
MERs and the broader multilateral economic system took centrality, and in order to 
serve China’s economic interests the CFELSG became an important locus for the 
making of China’s foreign economic policies. But was bureaucratic power and authority 
really redistributed? After all, the empowerment of these actors does not in and of itself 
imply a redistribution of bureaucratic power and authority.
61
 One apparent factor of 
change is the context – membership in MERs and negotiating international economic 
agreements imply that legislation became much more important in a relatively short 
period of time. For example, in the energy sector, between 1978 and 1995, only one 
piece of legislation was passed. By contrast, between 1996 and 2005, three major pieces 
of legislation were promulgated. As a result, this puts bureaucratic agencies like the 
SCLAO in a more central position with regard to economic policy. But if the SCLAO’s 
power increased simply because legislation became more important (i.e., it became 
more relevant as an organisation), this would not necessarily constitute an institutional 
adaptation engineered by the leadership in order to enhance policy coordination and 
thus respond more effectively to the challenges of internationalisation. It is therefore 
important to note that context was not the only thing that changed. The SCLAO became 
more powerful and had more authority due to proactive actions by the CPC prior to 
significant shifts in the policy environment. By empowering the SCLAO through 
upgrades in bureaucratic rank, bestowing additional resources and personnel on the 
office, and taking away the ability of the ministries/commissions to rely on internal 
documents (i.e., through acts as the Administrative Permissions Law), it put the SCLAO 
firmly in the driver’s seat with regard to legislative issues. 
 From the preceding discussion, one more conclusion can be drawn with regards 
to the institutional adaptation effect spawn out of participation in multilateral economic 
processes: in an implicit way, the MERs in essence have established themselves as 
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 In order to make such claims, there needs to be a corresponding loss of power or authority in other 
government bodies. 
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interested parties to China’s decision-making process. Their interests and agendas are 
indirectly integrated and seriously discussed in Beijing, and their requirements, in turn, 
have the capacity to reconfigure national processes. This constitutes the MERs as an 
integrative policy actor with an active participation in China’s decision-making process. 
Significantly, this implies that China’s economic diplomacy decision-making in the 21st 
century is not necessarily a stand-alone internal process. Although, on the surface, 
China’s preference formation is determined by its national interests and domestic 
factors, a deeper examination of the inner undergoing reveal a different story. The 
MERs play critical behind-the-scenes roles that indirectly shape Chinese economic 
diplomacy. As such, China’s economic diplomacy is today arguably shaped by a 
collective system involving domestic and international agencies.      
   
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the intention of grasping a deeper understanding about China’s 
domestic economic diplomacy decision-making processes. By examining four periods 
of political development in China, the chapter revealed a relationship between China’s 
integration with MERs and an evolving internal decision-making process. When the 
Chinese government had limited interaction with the MERs during the exclusionist 
period, the diplomatic decision-making was characterised by the revolutionary, 
charismatic “strong man” system. As Deng thawed the country’s thick closure to the 
outside world, and explored avenues of international participation during the transition 
period, he recognised a parallel need for the government to instigate institutionalised 
and decentralised forms of decision-making. With the growing complexity of China’s 
foreign economic relations by the time of the adaptation period, the Chinese 
government facilitated this trend with a party-state technocratic elitist system of 
“collective decision” at the top of the political structure. When economic diplomacy 
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became integral to China’s national interest, the government of the proactive period 
adjusted the decision-making to further formal institutionalisation and pluralisation.  
 Overall, this short analysis demonstrated an important evolution in the decision-
making processes of the Chinese government did take place over the course of the three 
periods. Whilst retaining traditional patterns, the number of decision-making loci in 
economic diplomacy has continued to increase by adding bureaucracies within 
economic agencies. A recurring theme of this trend mentioned in the preceding analysis 
is that such dissemination of decision-making centres has required increase coordination 
between decision-makers, policy officers, and experts. Like other countries, the Chinese 
government today relies on multiple and complex organisations to make and carry out 
economic diplomacy policy. Under Hu Jintao, China’s global rise and growing 
involvement in world affairs have necessitated effective coordination of various facets 
of the country’s international discourse and activity. This need has been partly 
addressed by the growing role and numbers of specialised LSGs. But much remains to 
be done, for much of the inter-ministerial coordination at present are rather fragmented 
and incoherent. True, bureaucratic tensions are inevitable and the effectiveness of any 
government system rests in its ability to put together coordination mechanisms capable 
of resolving such conflicts of interests. With these said, there are also certain major fault 
lines that remains to be bridged. At the moment, there are no new initiatives altering the 
traditional inefficiencies in this regard. As a result, centralisation of decision-making 
continues to be – at least on paper and in political principles – the CPC’s rote answer to 
the need for better coordination.  
Furthermore, as a response to the requirements of MER participation, domestic 
changes occurred which helped to overcome some of the pathologies associated with 
management by exception and fragmented authority. This institutional adaption – the 
redistribute of bureaucratic authority – have resulted in the emergence of a new area of 
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policy activity in the deeply interwoven Beijing-MER environment where draft policies 
are examined and evaluated in a broader context to ensure that all bureaucratic interests 
are considered, international agreements are balanced with domestic policy imperatives, 
and policy externalities are fully understood. Although consensus-building between 
ministries and commissions over initial policy drafts still occurs, the outputs from that 
process are now subject to a second round of revision and bargaining that incorporates 
information and inputs from additional policy actors, including those who are well-
versed in international law. This has resulted in heightened policy coordination 
functions and enabled the State Council to maximise remaining or residual policy space. 
It is also significant in so far as the institutional adaptations needed to create this new 
area of policy activity have resulted in a diminishing ability of ministries and 
commissions to thwart reforms through control of policy relevant information and 
refusal to come to a consensus. 
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Chapter 4  
 
A DECRYPTION OF THE CHINA-UNFCCC RELATIONSHIP 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary research enquiry of the present thesis is to examine the mechanisms to 
which the agencies of multilateral economic regimes (MERs) can influence China’s 
economic diplomacy preference formation. To this end, a primary hypothesis was 
derived, and it holds that: MER agencies assert influence on China’s economic 
diplomacy preference formation through three primary mechanisms: the costs-and-
benefits calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement. This 
chapter constitutes the first of the two case study analyses that test the validity of the 
primary hypothesis, with an examination of China’s participation in the global climate 
change debate. The purpose of this exercise is to investigate a possible correlation 
between China’s deepened engagements with the UNFCCC agencies and its national 
preferences changes.     
When Deng Xiaoping transformed China’s62 inward-looking agrarian economy 
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for less than one per cent of the 
world’s total (USDA, 2011). Today, China’s rapid development, heavy reliance on 
carbon-intensive coal, and the widespread application of inefficient technologies in its 
industrial sector have qualified it as the world’s largest carbon dioxide (CO₂) emitting 
country (IEA, 2011: 8-9).
63
 This status has made China an important participant in the 
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 The reference to China includes Hong Kong.  
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 In 1990, Chinese CO₂ emissions increased by almost 40 per cent at approximately 680 million tons, 
due to strong economic growth; and in 2000, China contributed 15 per cent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (World Resources Institute, 2002). In 2004, the country consumed 1.97 billion tonnes of coal, 
an increase of about 90 per cent over 1990; in 2005 it consumed 2.2 billion (People’s Daily, 5 March 
2006). China’s large reliance on fossil fuels further increased China’s global share of CO₂ emissions to 
approximately 20 per cent in 2006 (IEA, 2008). Between 2008 and 2009, China had a five per cent 
increase in its CO₂ emissions and by late-2009, China had surpassed Japan as the world’s largest 
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multilateral climate change negotiations. As the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat-General, Christiana Figueres, said during the 
17
th
 Conference of Parties (COP17) China Pavilion Launch Ceremony, “When I look 
back at what has been happening in the negotiations over the last week, it has been like 
a sail boat sailing through a tough rough sea but the wind is blowing in the right 
direction. China will act as a great boost to the move ahead of the negotiations."
64
  
Since its inaugural participation in the multilateral climate change negotiations, 
China’s national preferences have indicated both continuities and changes. What have 
remained constant are the fundamental principles
65
 that were set in stone in the lead-up 
to the ratification of the UNFCCC regime. China has, since then, consistently 
maintained with its core principles in the climate change negotiations. What has 
changed is the newfound flexibility and pragmatism in China’s policy preferences on 
the substance of negotiations, particularly concerning the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM or the mechanism) and international mitigation commitments (or 
mitigation). To what extent, and in what way(s), could the UNFCCC agencies have 
triggered changes in China’s policy preferences? The purpose of this chapter is to 
address these questions, and it takes the CDM and mitigation negotiations as focal 
points of analysis. The case-pair offers the opportunity to understand whether and how 
China’s interaction with the UNFCCC actors can alter national preference.  
The analysis is based on interviews with 36 Chinese government officials, 
policy officers, negotiators, and advisors with first-hand engagement in climate change 
                                                                                                                                         
automobile producer, exceeded the United States as the world’s largest market for car sales, and its 
increasing economic prosperity has brought increasing consumer expectations that are unlikely to be 
curbed in the foreseeable future (Zhu, 2010: 38). This combination of factors has made China the world’s 
biggest emitter of CO₂ in 2010 (IEA, 2011: 8-9). 
64
 Personal observation. 
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 This involves four key themes. First, like other developing countries, China is a victim country of the 
adverse effects of climate change. Second, China has consistently advocated the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” between the countries of different economic developments, and in 
accordance to the respective historical per capita emissions made. Third, developed countries should take 
on the responsibilities of technology transfers and financial provisions as measures of contributing to the 
global climate change challenge. Their responsibilities are justified by the current and historical 
emissions. Lastly, the priority for China is national development and poverty eradication. For more 
information, see Ida Bjorkum (2005). 
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policymaking; 12 members from various Chinese enterprises involved in climate 
change projects; 12 delegates from non-Chinese national parties; 16 representatives of 
the UNFCCC Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and other non-governmental 
organisations. Finally, 21 experts and academics within the field of Chinese climate 
change politics were interviewed (mainly from China, the United Kingdom [UK], and 
the United States [US]). Personal observations at the Durban COP17 negotiation and the 
relevant secondary sources are used as supplementary information. The next section 
provides a background on China’s participation at the CDM and mitigation 
negotiations, respectively. Section three applies the hypothesised mechanisms of 
influence for policy preference formation with the empirical findings. The last section 
provides some concluding analyses.    
 
4.2 The Case Studies 
In spite of its comparatively late interest in climate change issues, Beijing did take the 
issues seriously from the outset, and this is reflected in the fact that China was one of 
the first national signatories of the UNFCCC regime, and by its active promotion of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Thus far, China’s participation in the COPs climate change negotiations 
under the UNFCCC suggests two particularly interesting transformations of policy 
preferences over time: the CDM and the mitigation of emissions. Both case studies offer 
the opportunity to understand whether and how China’s interaction with the UNFCCC 
may cause a shift in policy preference in Beijing. Beyond merely adding one more voice 
to the choir, these case studies can help identify which hypothesised variables within the 
Beijing-UNFCCC interactions, if any, are relatively significant in shaping Chinese 
policy. To this purpose, let us now turn to each case study respectively.  
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4.2.1 The clean development mechanism 
The CDM was proposed at COP3 in Kyoto (1998) for meeting two objectives: (i) assist 
non-Annex I Parties
66
 in achieving sustainable development whilst contributing to 
climate change mitigation efforts; and (ii) assist Annex I Parties in compliance with 
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (greenhouse gas [GHG] 
emission caps) by investing in the certified emissions reductions (CERs) generated from 
the CDM projects in non-Annex I countries (Carbon Trust, 2009: 14.; Grubb, 2003: 
159). When the formal negotiations began, China did not know how to react to the 
CDM because of technical uncertainties. The China Meteorological Administration’s 
(CMA) lack of knowledge and experience in the area meant they were unable to identify 
the implications of the initiative on China; or calculate its costs-and-benefits.
67
 The 
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA, reformed into the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection or MEP in 2008) and the State Science and Technology 
Commission (SSTC, reformed into the Ministry of Science and Technology or MOST) 
contributed reports but with deviant arguments, some crediting the CDM proposal while 
others against it. The inconclusive research efforts channelled mixed messages to the 
political elites, and caused many scientific and political uncertainties about the 
initiative. As a result, China’s position at COP3 was a cautious one, where the 
government reiterated that CO₂ emissions should be unilaterally resolved rather than 
shared by all member-states. The key concern for China was realising the beneficiaries 
of the mechanism, to which they concluded it would be those that already trade carbon 
or those with an established climate change science and technology sector. Countries, 
like China, without a sophisticated technological structure and financial capacity would 
                                               
66
 Annex I Parties are those countries listed in Annex I of the treaty and are primarily industrialised 
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Interview with a Chinese official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 15 September 2011. 
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be left in a disadvantaged position.
68
 Hence, Beijing feared that the initiative was a 
political scheme (政治阴谋)69 designed to help Annex I countries escape their climate 
change commitments; and submitted a request to the Chair to erase it from the 
negotiation agenda.
70
 To resolve contentions on the CDM proposal, the Committee of 
the Whole under the COP facilitated an informal contact group sessions chaired by 
Brazil in November 1998, and it involved the US and members of the “G77 plus China” 
(Group of Seventy-Seven Plus China). The meeting apparently established the initial 
building blocks for a consensus (Cole 2012, 44).  
 Internally, after the establishment of the National Climate Change Coordination 
Committee (NCCCC), new window-agencies emerged to deal with UNFCCC-related 
affairs. The communications between Beijing and the UNFCCC agencies rose starkly in 
the form of informal dialogue, information exchanges, and project collaboration.
71
 One 
example is the 1999 research collaboration between UNFCCC experts, the MOST, and 
NEPA on a report illustrating the cross-border transmittable effect of CO₂ emissions, 
and the tangible benefits (i.e., access to clean energy technologies) of the CDM as an 
effective emissions reduction initiative (Economy, 2001: 246-248). This activity was 
suggested to have shaped a general view within the MOST and the NEPA, that China 
was “missing out on significant opportunities by not agreeing to any sort of 
cooperation” on the CDM initiative, and that a “more proactive policy was needed to 
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 Interview with an official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 15 September 2011; 
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 Some Chinese sceptics even called the mechanism a tool of Western “environmental imperialism” (Liu, 
1997). 
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of other non-Annex I Parties. Interview with an official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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purposes. Later, the MOF will coordinate the different preferences or interests among different 
bureaucracies for consensus-building. Once this has been reached, it will be fed back to the. Interview 
with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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gain access to new technologies from abroad.”72 But these suggestions were not realised 
in China’s COP4 and COP5 negotiation positions, although China refrained from 
flagging any objections to the negotiations on the CDM initiative (Zhang, 2003: 69). In 
the last hours of the COP5, the UNFCCC Secretariat acknowledged that China’s 
cautious attitude was caused by the government’s unfamiliarity with the initiative.73 To 
address this problem, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was asked to invest in 
pilot CDM simulations across China.
74
 In 2001, China received US$173 million in GEF 
grants – 17 per cent of the GEF’s climate change reserves – for seven CDM pilot 
simulations in the Gansu Province (Yu, 2008: 84). In the same year, the GEF and the 
UNDP jointly allocated US$50.7 million to pilot CDM simulations in China. In 2002, 
the GEF committed US$840 million to assist the Chinese government in building a 
CDM market. Most of the simulations were carried out jointly with various government 
ministries, such as the simulation on renewable power energy with the Ministry of 
Power. Efforts were also made to attract participation from state- and private-
enterprises, which then led to the development of CER-trading consultancy firms.
75
 For 
instance, the Centre for Socio-Eco-Nomic Development based in Geneva was assigned 
by the UNFCCC carried out a simulation exercise “Can we make a CDM deal?” in 
China to deepen the understanding of CDM deal making among government officials, 
and industries to assist them in attracting foreign investment (Yiu, Niederberger and 
Saner, 2002). Throughout the simulations, the GEF widely distributed technical 
assistance in the form of information and training on best practices.
76
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 Between late-2001 and 2006, other donor agencies and countries have also carried out capacity-
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 The outcome was increased awareness and interest in the CDM particularly from 
the industrial actors. They were attracted to the mechanism’s potential to improve 
energy efficiency, increase access to new technologies, international funding, and 
technical expertise that can be gained.
77
 Industrial actors also realised that the CDM has 
the potential to create a new market sector that will generate new business opportunities 
and jobs without hampering China’s economic development. 78  Similarly, local 
authorities – from the provincial level to the county and community stratum – that had 
little interests or awareness for the CDM initiative in the past, showed new interests in 
the potential material benefits spawned from CDM projects (Ye, Ma and Zhang, 2007: 
9). So together with the industrial actors and the domestic scientific community, they 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the MFA’s hard stance on the CDM at the COPs, 
arguing that China is missing out on important prospects in technological advancements 
and business opportunities.
79
 Having seen actual benefits spawn out of the CDM 
projects through the simulations and also due to the industrial pressures, the State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC, reformed into the National Development 
and Reform Commission or NDRC in 2003) asked the NCCCC to conduct new studies 
on the impact of the mechanism, its market, and China’s potential as a competitor on a 
global scale.
80
  
In late-2001, a joint study on Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) was launched by 
a partnership between the NCCCC, the World Bank, Germany and Switzerland 
(published in 2004). The study projected that China had the potential to take around 50 
per cent of the global CDM market (World Bank 2006). This finding sent an 
encouraging signal to the Chinese policymakers and after numerous inter-ministerial 
                                                                                                                                         
as well as other projects that studied urban transportation and renewable energy. For more details on these 
projects. Interview with an expert and coordinator from ESP China, 1 September 2011. 
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 Interview with a researcher from Tsinghua University, Durban, 7 December 2011. 
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and concerns. Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Durban, 3 
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coordination and consultations with the UNFCCC technical staffs, the NDRC – 
designated authority to approve the CDM initiative – reached a consensus to adopting 
the mechanism on the ground that it would serve China’s domestic and international 
development objectives. For instance, domestically, the mechanism would improve 
energy efficiency, combat pollution, grant new accesses to international funding and 
technologies, and an economic opportunity to establish new sectors. The outputs include 
job creation and the dissemination of technical know-how – all of which support 
China’s development.81 Additionally, the CDM – being a market-driven mechanism – 
serves the government’s interest to reform its economy into a market-driven system, 
whilst planting the green and low carbon concepts in the market practices and within 
Chinese firms.
82
 Internationally, the CDM negotiations were in a deadlock. Developed 
countries especially from Europe found it challenging to integrate the CDM concept 
within its domestic mitigation structures.
83
 By comparison, China, as a country still 
developing in this area, was more suited to test the waters. Doing so not only addressed 
the difficulties faced by the West but would also contribute to China’s international 
image-building as a cooperative player.
84
  
 During COP6, the Chinese delegation spoke about the CDM in favourable terms 
and called it a “win-win” initiative with likely benefits for the developed and 
developing countries alike (Yu, 2008: 58). The Chinese delegation actively participated 
in the debates about the guiding rules and procedures for the implementation of the 
CDM initiative. The main concern now was how it can ensure that developing countries 
are void of binding commitments (Harris and Yu, 2005: 53). The Chinese delegation 
argued that any adoption of the CDM should not have any binding obligations attached 
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to the developing countries. In addition, the CDM initiative (including the nuclear 
energy projects) should cover all technologies, with the exception of sink activities 
(Tangen, Heggelund and Buen, 2001: 242).
85
 During COP7 in Marrakech, additional 
issues also arose from the negotiations which concerned China, one of which was the 
political risk attached to the unratified Kyoto Protocol, and the US’s opt-out of the 
framework compounded this concern. Second, China voiced concerns over the technical 
risks faced by the developing countries due to its limited access to the necessary 
professional resources to undertake the complicated CDM procedures and the UNFCCC 
also lacked any form of capacity-building measures to help tackle the technical 
bottlenecks in terms of baseline identification, monitoring plan development, and 
validation and verification conduction, for instance. Third, as CDM projects have high 
transaction costs resulting from charges on registration, validation, monitoring, and 
verification, it brings with it financial risks which could cause the margins to shrink to 
the extent that the deal simply becomes less attractive to the industries. Fourth, the 
Chinese delegation pointed to the limited details provided in the proposal concerning 
CER price – China feared selling their CERs at too low a price.86 Finally, China wanted 
the participation in CDM projects to be voluntary.  
In response, the COP7 presiding staffs (i) pushed for greater funding from the 
Annex I group and the UN Funds for developing countries; (ii) signalled the 
possibilities for technical assistance and training opportunities to enhance developing 
countries’ professional competence in CDM dealings; (iii) assured the inclusion of 
Chinese representatives in the CDM governance;
87
 and (iv) achieved consensus on the 
voluntary basis of CDM participation. In exchange, China was required to submit to 
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international monitoring, validation, and verification systems – something the MFA 
strongly resisted in the past. According to one Chinese negotiator, in order to gain 
China’s acceptance of this condition, the COP7 President reinforced numerous times the 
significance of China’s compliance in this regard to its international reputation as a 
cooperative and responsible player.
88
 China eventually agreed to this condition and 
confirmed its commitment by establishing the CDM Monitoring and Management 
Centre (监督管理中心), which reports directly to the UNFCCC regarding its CDM 
performance.
89
 Other establishments include the China CDM Fund under the MOF, 
CDM monitoring and research departments under the MOST and the MEP,
90
 and new 
institutional structures and streamlined transparent CDM procedures to facilitate the 
implementation of CDM projects. In early-2002, China called for an accelerated launch 
of the CDMs, and in August that year, the government formally accepted the 
mechanism (Zhang, 2003: 69). In all, China’s policy preferences on the CDM evolved 
from absolute resistance to eventual adoption.  
  
4.2.2 Mitigation  
The concept of mitigation in the present context refers to the action of reducing the 
intensity of radiative force (i.e., GHGs) for reducing the likely impacts of climate 
change (Molina et al, 2009: 616-621).
91
 From the outset, the Chinese government 
viewed climate change as the outcome of the industrial economies’ high consumption 
patterns and luxurious lifestyles. For this reason, developed countries should take on the 
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responsibility of mitigation first. As a developing country, China believed it should only 
monitor as opposed to participate in the mission to tackle climate change.
92
 China was 
strongly opposed to any international-binding mitigation commitments for developing 
countries as it was regarded as a threat to China’s economic development. At the time, 
many domestic government institutions such as the CMA relied on outdated 
methodologies (i.e., paleoclimatology), which often yielded conservative findings on 
the impact of climate change. Other institutions such as the Energy Research Institute 
(ERI) under the SDPC/NDRC, the NEPA/MEP and the SSTC/MOST had no tradition 
of climate research. As a result, serious differences in approach and understanding 
towards climate change and mitigation emerged between China and other countries. In 
response, the GEF initiated a research programme in 1992, entitled “GHG emissions 
strategy study,” with US$2 million technical assistance. The goal was to raise 
awareness in China concerning mitigation. However, Beijing’s response was less-than-
enthusiastic (Yu 2008, 90). The UNFCCC Secretariat then partnered with the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the UNEP, and the UNDP to provide 
monitoring equipment for GHG emissions in China, share computer modelling 
techniques with officials from the NEPA/MEP and the SSTC/MOST, and provided 
technological assistance in developing response measures.  
 Interviews with members of these agencies suggested that the NEPA/MEP and 
SSTC/MOST derived more proactive policy recommendations on mitigation than other 
ministries/commissions. One SSTC/MOST policymaker recalled that his basic 
knowledge on mitigation came almost entirely from his involvement in activities with 
experts from the international agencies; and he noticed radical reorientation of policy 
preferences in his colleagues and himself.
93
 As domestic agencies increased in their 
understanding about mitigation in the late-1990s, a divergence in opinions began to 
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manifest among government ministries concerning the degree to which China ought to 
contribute to the international mitigation efforts. At one end of the spectrum, officials 
from the NEPA/MEP and the SSTC/MOST stressed that China had a responsibility to 
participate in international mitigation because it was a major contributor to climate 
change – the country was the third largest emitter in the world at the time. At the other 
end of the debate, members of the SDPC/NDRC and the MFA were less enthusiastic 
and argued that economic development and sovereignty concerns necessitate a limited 
Chinese response. The internal contention quickly earned China an international 
reputation as one of the most recalcitrant participant in the mitigation negotiations by 
consistently advocating the weakest reporting obligations without any concrete 
measures or timetables for reducing GHG emissions. In 1996, the Chinese Academy of 
Science (CAS) hosted a major conference on climate change and its effects on China. 
The resulting 560-page report, Studies on Climate Change and Its Effects, included a 
number of articles that point to the potential wreckage and devastation emissions can 
cause. But instead of advocating mitigation, the report recommended adaptation
94
 as the 
best way of addressing climate change. This recommendation reinforced support for the 
conservative position that China should refuse international binding commitments on 
emissions reduction.   
 By the 2000s, China began experiencing the impacts of climate change through 
year-on-year natural disasters which have disrupted the lives of 200-400 million people 
annually; and an economic loss of more than 200 billion RMB per annum (Ma, 2006). 
In the summer of 2011 alone, a series of floods in central and southern China affected 
36 million people, destroyed 432,000 hectares of crops – reducing vegetable output by 
20 per cent from a year earlier – and caused an economic loss of US$6.5 billion (News 
One, 2011; Press TV, 2011; Yap, 2011). The high frequency of extreme weather events 
                                               
94
 Adaptation means that China will take steps to adapt to the impacts of climate change as they occur. 
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stipulated a growing recognition among senior officials that climate change is a major 
threat to the wellbeing of the Chinese people (Christoff, 2010: 646). In response, the 
NDRC conducted a series of pilot projects in partnership with the GEF and the UNDP 
to test the abatement costs of mitigation.
95
 One example is the “Energy Conservation 
and GHG Emissions Reduction in Chinese Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)-
Phase II” (2000-2007) project. The GEF and the UNDP jointly contributed 
US$7,992,000 to this project, which attempted to (i) reduce GHG emissions in the 
TVEs sector by increasing the utilisation of energy efficient technologies and products 
in the brick, cement, metal casting and coking sectors; (ii) build technical capacity for 
energy efficiency and product quality improvement in TVEs; (iii) create access to 
commercial financing; and (iv) expand the application of best practices for local and 
national regulatory reform.  
All objectives were achieved by 2007 with positive outcomes. It revealed that a 
green and low-carbon economy does not hinder but enhance economic development.
96
 
Unfortunately, these results were criticised by the government’s conservative economic 
advisors who continued to push development needs over mitigation. They emphasised 
that with per capita income in urban China only at US$1,702 per annum (as of 2005),
97
 
and over 135 million people still under the poverty line, mitigation actions could 
hamper efforts to fulfil the social and industrial needs of the Chinese people (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 6 July 2006; World Bank, 23 May 2006).
98
 The two-sided debate 
eventually prompted the decision-makers to maintain economic growth and implement 
a domestic environmental regulatory response to the threat of climate change under the 
framework of its development objectives. 
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 In 2007, the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 
fourth assessment report was widely distributed within Beijing, not least because 28 of 
its own experts participated in the authoring of the report.
99
 Numerous Chinese 
negotiators claimed that this report played an important part in raising the leaders’ 
awareness about the implications of GHG emissions on the country’s development and 
a recognition that mitigation was as much a moral responsibility as it is a scientific and 
economic one. At the same time, Beijing felt intense pressures from the COP 
Presidencies and other countries to realise that committing to mitigation was the 
responsible thing to do given that China was about to overtake the US as the world’s 
largest emitting country. All the while, the international media hammered heavier 
scrutiny over China’s quietism on tackling climate change, portraying it as a negligent 
player.
100
  
In the context of its growing international limelight and scrutiny, China attended 
COP12 in 2007 with new pragmatism; and submitted its first National Climate Change 
Programme and Communication to the UNFCCC. The Chinese delegation diminished 
their resistance to engaging in dialogue concerning mitigation, which was a drastic 
contrast to the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 where China indicated a disinterest in 
mitigation discussions until it had achieved “medium-level” development, measured 
usually by a per capita income of US$5,000 indicator (Pan, 2005). Arguments as such 
seem to have diminished and seldom heard in the negotiations today.
101
 The government 
also invited Chinese experts that participated in the authoring of the IPCC fourth 
assessment report to join the Chinese delegation at the subsequent COPs. According to 
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one delegate, their expertise was frequently applied during negotiations.
102
 These 
experts stressed that CO₂ emissions are a risk to all countries including China and 
acknowledged that a cut in emissions is essential for safeguarding China’s environment 
(Zhu, 2010: 38). It should be no coincidence that during the Bali negotiations in 2007, 
the Chinese stance on mitigation negotiations no longer rules out the possibility for 
China to play a more active role in the global climate protection efforts which would 
include mitigation commitments.
103
 This is a step forward even though the parties did 
not reach an agreement on the quantitative figures (Oberheltman and Sternfeld, 2009: 
141).  
China’s growing active participation can also be seen through its submission of 
two proposals for a post-2012 global climate agreement at the 2008 COP14 negotiations 
in Poznan. One was the Cumulative per capita emissions convergence proposal, where 
China demanded an ultimate “equity” – the merge of the cumulative per capita 
emissions by 2100. Additionally, the proposal suggests that by 2050, the global total 
GHG emissions should be reduced by 25 per cent compared to the 1990 levels, or 
halved if Annex I countries’ emissions turn negative by 2040 (Hallding, Han and 
Olsson, 2009: 97). The other proposal was the Carbon Budget Proposal (CBP) drafted 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The CBP proposed an overall 
framework to half the international emissions by 2050, also referred to as the “450 
ppm/2°C target.” The proposal allows China’s emissions to peak by 2030, with 45 per 
cent higher emissions compared to the 2005 level. As well, it proposes reducing 
emissions to 55 per cent below the 2005 level by 2050 (Pan and Chen, 2008). In 
comparison to the American plan (i.e., down to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent 
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below 1990 levels by 2050, which would equate to around 15 per cent below 2005 
levels by 2020, and about 85 per cent below those levels by 2050) (Stern, 2009), the 
CBP sets-up more ambitious targets for China. Beijing’s shift along the proactivity scale 
was further indicated by its COP15 pledge in Copenhagen (2009) to cut domestic 
emissions by 40-45 per cent per unit of GDP by 2020.
104
 To materialise this pledge, 
China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) set domestic targets to reduce GDP per unit of 
energy use by 16 per cent, and reduce GDP per unit of CO₂ emission by 17 per cent 
(NDRC, MOST and MOA, 2011: 5).  
During the COP15, China also actively pushed members of the “G77 plus 
China” to focus on making concrete arrangements for mitigation. As Hu Jintao’s brief 
statement to the UN Climate Summit in September 2009 emphasises, “Fulfilling our 
respective responsibilities should be at the core of our efforts.”105 In 2011, during the 
final hours of the COP17 negotiations in Durban, the Chinese delegation expressed their 
support to a legally-binding treaty for the post-2020 period. The 2020 earmark was 
particularly emphasised because its pilot projects for mitigation will require at least a 
decade to manifest results, which equates to the year 2020. The government would 
ideally want to wait until then to make a decision on the next step. As for its agreement 
for the 2015 deadline to negotiate a new framework, this was largely based on the date 
of publication for the fifth assessment report of the IPCC on the scientific review of the 
climate change effects and works to measure the effectiveness of emission pledges by 
individual countries.
106
 Although further details can only manifest in the coming COPs, 
this position is an indication that China might soon be ready to set a timetable and limit 
for its emissions at the international level. On the whole, climate change and mitigation 
especially was a sensitive topic some years ago, but today, it is a widely talked and 
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researched area in China.
107
 In all, China’s policy preferences on mitigation have shifted 
from a state of resistance to increased flexibility.   
 
4.3 UNFCCC and the Mechanisms of Influence 
Having explained the case study backgrounds, let us now apply the empirical findings 
to the hypothesised mechanisms of influence: costs-and-benefits calculus, information 
dissemination, and reputation reinforcement.   
 
4.3.1 Costs-and-benefits calculus  
In the early years of negotiations, Beijing generally held the view that measures for 
tackling climate change were incompatible with growth generation and quantified 
binding GHG commitments will cause unfavourable macroeconomic ramifications on 
China’s national development (Tangen, Heggelund and Buen, 2001: 243). The calculus 
manifested from the following considerations: (i) China’s rapidly developing economy 
embody largely energy-intensive sectors that are sensitive to energy consumption cuts; 
(ii) the available energy-efficient technologies are considered as backward and the 
prospect of quick improvements even with technological and financial transfers is not 
perceived as probable; and (iii) China’s coal-dominated energy structure generally 
complicates efforts in CO2 reductions without further reductions in its energy supply 
(Ye, Ma and Zhang, 2007: 9). For these reasons, curbing emissions was perceived as a 
political threat, with costs outweighing the benefits. The Chinese negotiators therefore 
refused to commit to climate change measures. To reverse Beijing’s pessimism, the 
UNFCCC agencies, together with the UNDP, and the IPCC presented reports containing 
their calculations of the costs-and-benefits of the climate change measures on China’s 
development. In general, they argued that there is an overall consistency between 
climate change action and sustainable development. In most cases, they emphasised, a 
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drop in CO2 emissions can actually improve energy efficiency and conservation. In 
addition, it raises living standards (i.e., through air quality improvements and pollution 
level controls), and climate change action can lead to new industrial development 
opportunities in the low-carbon technology sector, and create new jobs. The costs of 
non-commitment, however, include devastating impacts on crucial aspects contingent to 
development including the climate-sensitive sectors in agriculture and China’s already 
scarce water resources (IPCC, 2001; 2007; UNDP, 2009/2010; Stern, 2006).     
The research interviews indicate that these calculations were generally received 
positively and triggered the Chinese decision-makers to re-evaluate their national 
preferences. In particular, China’s vulnerability to climate change and the direct 
implications for long-term economic growth and social stability entered the political 
debate. Public concerns and awareness of China’s vulnerability against climate change 
came to a new height when its first National Assessment Report on Climate Change was 
released in 2006, commissioned by the MOST, the CMA, and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS). The report was informed by a number of UNFCCC research initiatives 
and it provided an overview of the potentially devastating consequences of a 
temperature rise on China’s agriculture, eco system, water resources, coastal zones, and 
social and economic stability (Zhang and Zheng, 2007: 4). Rationalists argue that 
calculations with high expected damage costs often drive proactivity because national 
interests are threatened. This effect played out when the implications of vulnerability to 
climate change was recognised as harmful to China’s national objectives.  
The recognition of China’s vulnerability in light of climate change was found to 
have been one trigger for new policy preferences. In the past, China’s preference was to 
deflect emission reduction obligations, and their case was strong given that Chinese 
assertions were not dependent on emission reductions by other countries. It could thus 
achieve its goal in the absence of any deal. The altered balance in China’s cost 
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assessment changed this situation, and China now has a stake in other countries’ 
emission reductions. In theory, China in this kind of a bargaining game means that the 
achievement of its own interests is partly in the hands of others, and this implies that it 
will have to be prepared to give in order to gain. Its hesitance to commit fully to this 
altered balance became apparent during the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009.   
With this said a comparative examination of the two case studies showed that 
whilst both modalities exhibited preference changes, the extent of the change and the 
speed of change differ; the CDM case had much deeper and faster preference 
transformations than mitigation. What explains this variance? The interviews suggest 
that the decision-makers’ perception of political threat resulting from (non-)action is a 
key contingency of the UNFCCC agencies’ influence.108 In general, Chinese decision-
makers accept that climate change consequences are profound.
109
 But they also perceive 
the threats stemmed out of the abatement costs on China’s short-term development 
goals to be even more devastating than the threats of not tackling climate change. For 
example, the consequence of not fulfilling the short-term economic objectives of growth 
and poverty reduction for the purpose of addressing the long-term threats of climate 
change could put the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 
peril. By comparison, the CDM initiative is perceived to be attached with lower threats 
as it does not undermines but enhances China’s short-term priorities, as well as 
contributes to their long-term objectives. In this sense, it is arguable that costs-and-
benefits calculated by the UNFCCC agencies that forwards low (political) threats to the 
Chinese government are more likely to generate greater influence than otherwise.  
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Even so, one should be careful when determining the true nature of the influence 
and to ensure that a policy preference shift is not just tactical play. For instance, the 
Chinese delegation has regularly referred to the IPCC’s reference of China as one of the 
most vulnerable countries against the consequences of climate change to promote itself 
as a victim of global warming and that the industrialised nations should therefore make 
the first move in tackling the global problem. As Zhang Zhihong (2003: 79) contends, 
“Claiming that it [China] is a victim legitimises demands for compensation and 
validates purported concerns over the climate change issue.” If increased Chinese 
rhetoric on vulnerability is mere tactical play, then it is not necessarily an indication that 
the UNFCCC agencies’ costs-and-benefits persuasion actually impacts Chinese 
decision-making. One can certainly rebut this by pointing to an increase in the 
emphasises from Beijing’s on its need for adaptation activities, for example, in response 
to fears over the high damage costs, as suggested by the IPCC, as an indication of 
effective UNFCCC influence. Yet, these emphases were also often linked to 
international funding and technologies. For instance, Beijing stressed in its Initial 
National Communication (2004: 18), ”China is relatively sensitive and vulnerable to 
climate change in the fields such as agriculture, natural ecology and forestry, water 
resources, sea level and coastal belts, desertification and natural disasters. Technical 
support and funds are therefore needed for mitigating or adapting to the aforementioned 
areas.” This would certainly indicate that a shift in policy preference could be the 
outcome of more than just a simple costs-and-benefit calculus.  
 
4.3.2 Information dissemination 
According to the empirical findings of this research, 69 per cent of interviewees believe 
that China’s prudent national preferences in the pre-COP7 years were the outcome of 
unfamiliarity. One Chinese negotiator said, “Unlike the large quantities of available 
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information today, Chinese decision-makers in the 1990s lacked resources and 
competent experts on climate change science.”110 Although scientific research started in 
the late-1980s, large-scale policy-related research programs did not launch for another 
10 years. The government had therefore a capacity-impairment at the time in climate 
change preference formation – otherwise interpreted by foreign delegations as an act of 
“passivity.”111 Following the establishment of window-agencies, it was common for the 
UNFCCC agencies and Chinese policymakers to exchange dialogue, ideas, and 
information during the policy research stage of decision-making.
112
 Approximately 92 
per cent of interviewees believe that, over time, the high frequency of interaction 
between policymakers and the UNFCCC agencies reoriented the former’s policy 
preferences towards climate change issues.  
An internal study by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) likewise found that policymakers with less interaction with external actors 
generally had a lower level of understanding and interest toward climate change issues, 
whereas those with greater interest and capacity had comparatively more engagement 
with outside actors.
113
 Interviewees further indicated that the way the IPCC framed 
issues in the early stages of the expert review very much shaped China’s policy options 
in the longer-term.
114
 An obvious example of this is the IPCC’s identification of the 
environmental issues as a global problem and the coinage of the “global climate” 
concept. Thus, the UNFCCC agencies have a particularly effective role in issue-
framing, which also leads to awareness-raising. These findings are in line with the 
cognitivist assumptions that the transmission of ideas can influence perception and 
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issue-framing. Accordingly, it is expected that this mechanism of influence generates 
substantial impact on China’s CDM and mitigation preference formation.  
 However, this expectation was not actualised in the CDM case study. In the 
early years of the negotiations, there was no evidence to suggest that information 
dissemination caused any preference shifts and the Chinese delegation remained quiet 
on the issue at COP4 and COP5. Interviews suggest external influence were hindered by 
the domestic power structure. Although the CMA was, in theory, the leading agency for 
policy coordination, the actual policy outcome was shaped by the interests of a few key 
agencies such as the SDPC and the MFA. Even though the China Meteorological 
Administration (CMA) led the scientific and research stages of policymaking, it gave 
way to the SDPC and the MFA when it came to the political discussions (Economy, 
1997: 30). Since the CMA, MOST, and SEPA were window-agencies for the UNFCCC-
related affairs, the international discourse disseminated to them would not have reached 
the more decisive policymakers. One decision-maker from the MOST recalled that on 
numerous occasions prior to COP4, they emphasised to officials from the SDPC/NDRC 
about the environmental benefits spawned from the CDM initiative. But because of their 
marginal influence, they had limited capacity to shape the final preferences. This is why 
in spite the new influx of UNFCCC information China maintained its cautious position 
throughout COPs 3-5.  
Since the COP5, the UNFCCC agencies began disseminating CDM-related 
information to other ministries/commissions and the related industries in China. This 
occurred just as the GEF-sponsored CDM simulations took off. The study identified a 
higher degree of UNFCCC influence from this round of information dissemination 
activities and it was reflected from the general change in attitude amongst the 
ministerial and industrial actors, from resistance to gradual favouritism towards the 
CDM initiative. The awareness-raising impact was so successful that it even triggered 
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domestic industries to lobby the government to adopt the initiative. This was verified by 
numerous Chinese decision-makers, one of which claims during an interview that, 
“China’s attitude shift in the CDM was to a large extent driven by the forces of the 
domestic industries.” He further suggests the degree of influence information 
dissemination has over preference formation is dependent on the extent to which the 
Chinese industries support the discourse.
115
 Because Chinese industries wield the power 
to affect the country’s economic growth,116 support from these actors adds substantial 
political weight to the efforts of the UNFCCC agencies.    
The mitigation case also paints a mixed picture. Even though information was 
frequently fed to Beijing – primarily through research efforts – the impact was relatively 
small. An example of this is the GEF’s 1992 research programme.117 Likewise, the 
NEPA/MEP and the UNEP together set-up a series of UN-sponsored projects including 
the Joint Centre for an Environmental Information Network intended to assess China’s 
environmental situations. The reaction from the key decision-makers was lukewarm 
(Yu, 2008: 90), and there were no policy preference changes identified at the 
subsequent COPs. The issue here is that most research efforts were scientific by nature, 
and there was little analysis on the potential benefits that could come out of mitigation 
efforts. This, coupled with China’s comparatively low per capita emission level at the 
time, failed to stir momentum among the decision-makers. Some officials even argue 
that such studies were inappropriate for the China context due to its “Eurocentric” issue-
framing.
118
  
Interestingly, however, whilst the case study illustrates a limited influence, many 
interviewed Chinese negotiators believe that information dissemination does play a role 
                                               
115
Interview with a Chinese delegate to COP 17 in Durban, 9 December 2011. 
116
Interview with an official from the Chinese mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 November 2011. 
117
Interview with an officer from the Department of Climate Change, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, Beijing, 22 September 2011; Interview with an expert from the ESP China Ltd., 
Beijing, 1 September 2011; and a policymaker from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in London, 
1 July 2011. 
118
Interview with members of the UNDP in China, Beijing, 5 March 2012. 
149 
 
in framing and guiding Beijing’s preference formation on mitigation. An obvious 
example is the shift in the Chinese decision-makers’ framing of mitigation from a 
scientific problem to an economic concern that is of imperative to “sustainable 
development” – a European notion that the Chinese delegation rejected in 1992, 
accusing it as an attempt to impose “alien values” on China. Another indication would 
be the findings of the IPCC’s fourth assessment report (2007) of which triggered a sense 
of urgency in China to address the side-effects of climate change. The report prompted 
China’s first National Climate Change Programme, released in 2007, which includes 
detailed domestic commitments to reduce national emissions; the 2008 Climate Change 
White Paper; and its COP15 pledge to cut emissions by 40-45 per cent by 2020. An 
additional indication is the fact that Beijing will determine their bottom-line for a post-
2020 mitigation framework once the IPCC’s fifth assessment report is released in 
2014.
119
 These indications all suggest that information dissemination does have an 
impact on China’s mitigation policy preferences; the international community 
recognises China to place particular emphasis on knowledge-sharing.
120
 But the extent 
to which the UNFCCC agencies can use information to influence preference formation, 
in this case, is limited only to the guidance on policy focus, as opposed to the actual 
policy outcome.  
 In the preceding analyses, it is clear to see that both cases exhibited mixed 
outcomes based on an information dissemination mechanism of influence. Information 
dissemination, though weak to begin with, did eventually play an impact on China’s 
CDM preference formation in the later years. However, the picture is less bright for 
mitigation as information dissemination imposed only marginal influence. What 
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explains the variances? One contingency is the nature of support international discourse 
holds. As discussed above, it is not sufficient to merely hold the support of second-tier 
government agencies like the MOST and the MEP. Instead, support from the 
government’s vital constituents, notably the industries, is of imperative in order to 
enhance the political weight of international discourse in Beijing. The logic behind this 
is that such support increases the government’s political risk of non-action. The 
availability of industrial support for the CDM case, and the lacklustre of it in mitigation 
is a key explanation for the deviant UNFCCC impact materialised between the cases. 
The importance of industries lies in its wield on China’s economic growth and the 
leadership’s legitimacy.121 While the government used to push the industries forward, 
today, the industries are pushing the government. To be sure, industries, state-owned 
and private alike, do not formally participate in preference formation.
122
 But they do 
lobby their interests in Beijing, and in many cases, their interests are reflected on the 
policy agenda.
123
 As one policy officer points out, “Information is a contribution to the 
shift in China’s position, but it alone is an insufficient influence.”124 The acquisition of 
support from key constituents is fundamental. 
The second contingency is the cost to China’s economic structure. Over the 
years, China’s economic structure has been largely characterised by emission-intensive 
sectors such as manufacturing, which constitutes 42 per cent of its GHG emissions 
(Rong, 2010: 4586). A meaningful response to climate change via mitigation would 
require a complete reorientation of China’s energy structure and substantial investment 
in new energy-efficient technologies. The Chinese government acknowledges that a 
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replacement of coal with natural gas could cut emissions by two-thirds. But unlike 
countries such as Brazil, which gets 90 per cent of its energy from hydropower, China 
only have a limited amount of alternative energy sources apart from coal, and an over-
reliance on imports is unrealistic and unsustainable in the long-run (Xu and Zhang, 18 
February 2013). This means that moving to clean energy is a massive challenge and 
requires a rapid economic restructuring that could affect China’s sustainable growth in 
the future as well as meeting other social objectives such as employment. It was a 
similar concern that is partially responsible for the US Senate’s balking at the Kyoto 
agreement. When the economic cost is high, information dissemination is thus only 
useful as technical guidance (i.e., statistic surveys to measure certain aspects of 
mitigation)
125
 and less of an influence on preference formation.  
This situation, however, can be overlooked by decision-makers if the large 
abatement costs contribute to China’s economic development. This was evident in the 
later years of the mitigation negotiations, whereby the government clearly recognised 
the challenges of remaining with the traditional economic model – based on high-
volume consumption of energy and raw materials – to its national development (Zang, 
2009: 209). The government also recognised that the long-term viability of China’s 
economic success hinges on transforming its low-key manufacturing and export-led 
growth to a more balanced strategy
126
 that is synonymous with a low-carbon economy 
(Beijing Review, 10 December 2012). The “change of China’s economic development 
pattern” (转变经济发展方式) stood at the very top of China’s political agenda, and as 
such, lowered the previously high economic costs of abatement. As highlighted by a 
report published in 2009 by the Task Force on China’s Pathway towards a Low Carbon 
Economy, “Central to the vision of a low carbon economy is the recognition of its 
                                               
125
Interview with a professor from the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai, 22 August 
2011. 
126
 The strategy entails the production of technologically advanced and globally competitive goods, the 
expansion of the service sector, and the development of domestic consumer markets. 
152 
 
potential economic, social and political benefits, rather than just the associated costs.” 
The reduced economic costs therefore is likely to be associated with an evidently 
increased seriously among Chinese decision-makers in the dealing of international 
discourse towards the later years of mitigation policymaking as seen in the case study. 
The CDM case presents evidence which further support this finding. As China had not 
yet established a market infrastructure that would require altering after a CDM 
adoption, the economic costs associated with the mechanism was comparatively lower 
in all aspects, and increased the perceived feasibility of the system in China. Thus, a 
third contingency has to do with the level of compatibility between the international 
discourse and China’s policy interests.   
As a further note, the UNFCCC agencies’ role as provider of operational advice 
can sometimes fall prey to concerns relating to the legitimacy or credibility of the 
output that are unrelated to the quality of the science as such. While broad membership 
subsidiary bodies lend well to legitimacy in providing the expert advice required for 
achieving a treaty’s governance goals, in practice they have often failed to deliver 
salient and timely advice to China. For example, China has complained that the 
Committee on Science and Technology (CST) is inefficient and ineffective in part 
because of its large size and composition (ENB, 2001). Even at the first meeting of the 
COP, participants to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) process worried that the CST would be dominated by “politically-oriented 
members and never get down to “scientific business” (ENB, 1997), a problem they felt 
also existed in the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
subsidiary bodies. Indeed, the CST did not agree to any impact indicators until 2009 and 
it will take more time to develop the accompanying methodology and data collection 
strategy. Many believe, however, that in addition to its size, the politicisation and lack 
of necessary expertise within the CST is at least in part to blame.  
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4.3.3 Reputation reinforcements 
Contractualists argue that reinforcing China’s reputation through frequent assessments 
of its performance is an effective way of channelling influence to Beijing.
127
 As a 
country that has aspired to be perceived by foreign actors as a country that abides by the 
rules and regulations of the UNFCCC, the way the COP Presidencies assess China’s 
performances in the climate change negotiations matter much for a government that is 
keen to be portrayed as “responsible.” As a matter of fact, China’s initial decision to 
participate in the UNFCCC in the early-1990s was largely driven by a desire to present 
itself as a responsible player on the international stage. The global condemnation of the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown caused much concerns about international isolation and the 
related negative effects on China’s export-oriented economy.  
As a result, China, in comparison with other countries, can be easily influenced 
by the reputation card given its sensitivity to external criticism, and it would make much 
effort to prevent international censure (Johnston, 1998: 519). In the words of Yang 
Zhang and Yongnian Zheng (2008: 8), from the beginning, China’s “wish to be seen as 
a respected member of the international community [has been] one important factor 
behind its climate change policymaking.” Likewise, Deborah Seligsohn et al. (2009) 
and Karl Hallding, Guoyi Han and Marie Olsson (2009) observe that China’s climate 
change policies meshes with concerns about its international reputation and an ambition 
to be perceived both domestically and internationally as a “responsible” nation-state. 
Such preferences are in line with China’s traditional objective to redefine its position in 
global politics. The notion of China’s emergence as a responsible big country and its 
stated ambition to develop its “comprehensive national power” were key sources of 
national strength (Zheng, 1998: 192-193).  
In the context of the climate negotiations, members of the UNFCCC have, since 
COP1, actively circumscribed China’s negotiation behaviours by measuring it against 
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the UNFCCC protocols; and by reinforcing its emerging economic status. The 
UNFCCC Secretary-General has pointed to China’s rising income, in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP), and increased per capita emissions, which also inflates 
the government’s actual responsibility to take-on mitigation commitments.128 Numerous 
indications suggest that the outcome of such reinforcement prompted a shift in China’s 
general outlook towards the need for mitigation. When the negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol proceeded in 1997, China made clear that it does not wish to discuss 
internationally-binding commitments on mitigation until its economy has reached a 
“medium-level” development. This kind of argument is seldom heard today even 
though it continues to reinforce its developing country status. The use of softer rhetoric 
is an indication of its effort to build a benign and cooperative international image. The 
second indication is China’s objective to improve its international reputation as one of 
three core objectives going into the COP15 and COP16 negotiations (Conrad, 2012: 
442). A part of this objective was the COP15 pledge to cut carbon-intensity by 40-45 
per cent by 2025, and they displayed significant domestic mitigation efforts at the 
COP16 conference in Cancun.   
However, this study also found, especially in the mitigation case, that a concern 
for reputation does not necessarily correlate to an influence over preferences. In 
addition to the lacklustre preference changes in the earlier rounds of negotiations, the 
2006 COP in Nairobi had China take a step back by preoccupying itself with wording 
details and legal aspects of the negotiated text. When announcing its COP16 objective 
on international reputation, the Chinese delegation also implied that such objective 
would not be integrated into an internationally cooperative framework (Conrad, 2012: 
454). So on the one hand, reputation reinforcement seems to be effective in reorienting 
China’s policy preferences; on the other, this method of influence did not actually 
catalyse an agreement with Beijing.  
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What this study also found was that intergovernmental politics can be an 
impediment to the UNFCCC agencies’ influence through this mechanism. That is, the 
lack of leadership from the US, and the mild pressure coming from China’s key trading 
partners, have helped keep the costs of non-commitment on China’s reputation 
relatively low (Economy, 1997: 39). Therefore, China feels less need to succumb to the 
UNFCCC agencies’ recommendations. Even though Beijing is concerned about their 
reputation, and especially whether it is seen as a major power, the intergovernmental 
politics have not pushed the costs of low-commitment on its reputation high enough to 
induce a change in national preference. As such, the UNFCCC agencies’ reputation 
reinforcements were undermined. The united non-commitment position of the “G77 
plus China” members also helps keep China’s reputation costs low. This united front 
enables China to hide slightly away from the limelight at the multilateral fora. The 
finger-pointing exercises to America’s inactive positions, together with the support of 
its position by the G77 members jointly undermine the impact of the reputation 
reinforcement mechanism.  
As for the CDM case, there were little data to indicate a real correlation between 
reputation and the country’s adoption of the CDM. With this said, interviewed 
negotiators from China did suggest that one of the considerations for its eventual 
adoption was that it would make China look good internationally to push the 
mechanism forward at a time when it was stuck in deadlock (around COP6 and COP7). 
Again, one cannot deny the change in China’s negotiating rhetoric – from blunt 
resistance to benign and softer tones – as well as the domestic efforts addressing climate 
change. Did the reputation factor lead to these changes? One interviewee implied that 
China’s reputation for consistently promoting a non-commitment approach is today 
being increasingly challenged after it was placed as the world’s largest emitter.129 One 
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key lesson learned from the COP15 is a need for China to improve its international 
“actorness”– which is to know how to conduct oneself more diplomatically and 
strategically. By speaking and behaving in a way that is conducive to perceptions of 
compliance and activism, the Chinese government believes that it could improve its 
international reputation without having to make real commitments. In the words of the 
minister of the MEP, China’s softer tone on the issue of mitigation was executed largely 
to prevent China from being taken as a scapegoat again and be blamed for the failures of 
future talks.  
The Chinese government believes the UNFCCC is a useful space for achieving 
greater international “actorness” since it has a large global media exposure. The 
government has certainly become more aware and careful with public opinion and the 
international media, and it has learnt to use these mediums to its advantage. During the 
Tianjin mini-ministerial meeting before the COP16, China used a media blitz to 
promote its energy initiatives, took aim at developed countries for inadequate emission 
cuts, and showcased its model environmental technologies. According to Barbara 
Finnamore, China program director for the US-based Natural Resources Defense 
Council, “China is looking to rehabilitate its reputation” and the Tianjin conference was 
“an opportunity to not only show they’re responsible and proactive, but also to raise and 
frame the issues” (cited in Tran, 9 October 2010). Still, important to note that reputation 
reinforcement does not necessarily influence national preferences. It may only induce 
preference changes for the purpose of improving its diplomatic actorness. Meanwhile, 
the extent to which reputation reinforcement can actually be effective depends on the 
level of intergovernmental pressure and behaviours.  
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the primary hypothesis on preference formation was tested against the 
empirical findings from the case study on China’s involvement in the COP climate 
change negotiations under the UNFCCC. Three mechanisms of influence were applied, 
each with mixed outcomes. Like the assumption of rationalism, the UNFCCC agencies 
used its analyses on the costs and benefits to make a case that China’s national 
development is likely to be threatened by the impacts of climate change. The CDM and 
mitigation cases showed that such intervention by the UNFCCC agencies had a certain 
influence on China’s preference formation in the context of the case studies, but this 
influence was often at a tuck-or-war with considerations about the expected abatement 
costs, especially in the case of the mitigation negotiations, among the decision-makers. 
Moreover, Beijing has, to an extent, used its vulnerabilities to the consequences of 
climate change to its advantage by pushing-off commitments while pursuing 
international funding and resources essential for coping with the effects of climate 
change. In particular, the prospect of funding and technology, obtained through 
economic side-payments, can strengthen China’s incentives to take action than a costs-
and-benefits calculation. This is because the prospective future economic gains are 
considered to be more definite than the costs of future damages surrounded by the 
senses of uncertainty. Thus, prospective gains will be much more effective in shaping 
the decision-making processes even if the prospective loses are likely to be large.  
The likelihood of acquiring foreign technologies and attract foreign investments 
is a key reason for China’s altered preferences concerning the CDM initiative. China 
was originally sceptical of the idea, and the Chinese decision-makers particularly 
viewed it as a loophole purposely created by the developed countries to help them 
escape from their commitments in tackling climate change. China also feared that the 
CDM was part of a larger strategy to lure developing countries into making future 
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commitments. However, this policy preference changed when the government realised 
that the CDM is actually a much more realistic channel for technological transfers from 
abroad – an area which the developed countries have failed to deliberate in the past – as 
well as access further funding. What is more, adopting the CDM initiative contributes to 
China’s reputation-building – it is a relatively low-cost kind of participation that brings 
high profile rewards. Thus, the anticipated tangible and intangible benefits spawned 
from adopting the CDM were primary driving forces for China’s eventual ratification of 
the initiative. Yet, a similar conclusion cannot be made for the mitigation case, whereby 
the Chinese government had no desire for external technological or financial aids.  
Certainly, the mitigation case showed that decision-makers did not submit to 
economic side-payments the way it eventually subjected itself to the UNFCCC’s 
performance monitoring system in order to establish a respected international 
reputation. This can be seen in China’s follow-up behaviour, which is reflected in its 
submission of the Initial National Communication in 2004. China’s initial attitude 
towards reporting and monitoring was negative as it concerned the principle of 
sovereignty. But China later recognised that further prolongation of the process can 
inflate the reputation costs. Hence, Beijing completed their first National 
Communications to show that it does care about climate change. Its submission secured 
much positive attention. However, this is not a reflection of the significance of 
reputation reinforcement. True, reputation matters to Beijing, but its response comes 
mainly in the form of an improved international actorness as opposed to any preference 
change. Then there’s information dissemination. It has inflicted a certain influence over 
China’s decision-making in the CDM and mitigation cases, but like the other 
mechanisms, it has not caused immediate and unconditional transformations in China’s 
preferences.   
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On the whole, the case study on the climate change negotiations finds that the 
primary hypothesis is partially valid. All three mechanisms were found to have partial 
and conditioned capacities to influence China’s national preference on climate change 
issues. While the influence is not transformative, it is also not non-existent or 
ineffective; some impact was felt. For this reason, all three mechanisms have an 
absorption-level of influence. That is, the UNFCCC agencies are able to reorient 
China’s policy preferences but only at the adaptation level.     
This outcome further verifies the underlying assumption of the primary 
hypothesis, which is that the level of UNFCCC influence is affected, and contingent on 
national objectives, policy goals, policy settings, and policy instruments. With respect to 
national objectives, it was evident to see that the degree in which the UNFCCC agencies 
could influence Chinese preferences for the CDM and mitigation modalities through 
information dissemination was contingent on China’s national objectives, especially 
with respect to economic development strategies and therefore the perceived economic 
costs associated with executing the discourse. The policy setting contingency is found in 
all mechanisms. For instance, the internal power structure undermined the channel of 
information dissemination for the CDM and mitigation issues. And setting is 
particularly important in determining the effectiveness of reputation reinforcement, as 
largely defined by the level of perceived international pressures on China to act 
responsibly and the recognised implications of a low-reputation on its future foreign 
economic relationships. Finally, policy instruments were found to be important in 
information dissemination, such as the integration of domestic constituents, like 
industries, to push for preference changes. Thus, Chinese preference formation in 
climate change diplomacy certainly provides ways for the UNFCCC agencies to exert 
influence but its success is contingent on the range of situational factors.    
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Chapter 5 
 
A DECRYPTION OF THE CHINA-WTO RELATIONSHIP 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was suggested that the primary objective of this 
thesis is to explore how the agents of multilateral economic regimes (MERs) and the 
role(s) that they play, affect Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation. To this 
end, two case studies are deployed as the empirical tests for the primary hypothesis, 
which holds that the agencies of multilateral economic regimes influence Chinese 
economic diplomacy preference formation through three primary mechanisms: the 
costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement. 
In the previous chapter, the first case study on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was examined, with the purpose of 
investigating a possible correlation between China’s deepened engagements with the 
UNFCCC agencies and its evolving policy preferences in the CDM and mitigation 
negotiations. The chapter found the primary hypothesis partially valid. The present 
chapter is intended to examine the second of the two case studies, with a focus on the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
negotiations on international trade. As such, the purpose of this chapter is similar to that 
of the previous; to investigate whether a correlation exist between a deepened China-
WTO relationship at the agency-level and China’s growing dynamisms in its national 
preference in trade issues.     
China’s accession into the WTO in 2001 was a milestone achievement for the 
multilateral trade regime. After 16 years of active lobbying, and faced with an ambitious 
set of concessions, added by the eight years of perpetual surveillance and monitoring of 
161 
 
its performance, China became the 143
rd 
WTO member-state on 11 December 2001, 
during the same session of which the DDA was launched – the successor of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement. As a major global economic engine, China became a 
cornerstone to reaching a DDA agreement. In the words of the WTO’s Managing-
Director, Pascal Lamy, “A multilateral trade system cannot exist without agreement 
from China.”130  
 Throughout China’s participation in the DDA, there have been both continuities 
and changes in its policy preferences. What remained constant are the fundamental 
principles of China’s position on international trade laid out in its initial application to 
accede the WTO in 1986. At the same time, China’s policy preferences have also grown 
in flexibility and pragmatism in areas such as the government procurement agreement 
(GPA) and trade in services. To what extent are the WTO agencies accountable for the 
growing flexibility in these areas? How important were the WTO agencies in the change 
processes of China’s preferences, and in the broader international trade decision-making 
process? And in which capacity could it potentially influence preference formation? By 
examining the case-pair of the GPA and services trade, this chapter elucidates the extent 
the WTO agencies can assert an influence on China’s international trade diplomacy 
preference formation; and correspondingly, test the primary hypothesis.   
The analysis for this chapter as well as for the next are based on interviews with 
42 Chinese government officials, policy advisors that have had first-hand experience in 
forming trade policy, Chinese industrial actors, non-Chinese negotiators at the WTO, 
WTO representatives, and Chinese academic that work on international trade issues. 
Personal observations at the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Geneva in December 2011 
and the relevant secondary sources are used as supplementary information. The next 
section takes a historical look at China’s participation as well as the related evolving 
policy preferences in the GPA and services negotiations, respectively. Section three 
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 This quote is cited from Pascal Lamy’s opening speech for the 2011 Ministerial Meeting.  
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tests the validity of the hypothesis with the empirical findings of the case-pair. The last 
section offers some concluding remarks.    
 
5.2 The Case Studies 
From China’s participation in the WTO’s DDA negotiations, policy preference changes 
in two modalities can be identified: the GPA and the trade in services. Both cases 
provide the opportunity to understand whether and how China’s interaction with the 
WTO agencies can influence preference formation.  
 
5.2.1 The government procurement agreement  
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) under the WTO came into force at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
131
 It provides an international legal framework for 
the liberalisation and “transparent” governance of public procurement markets 
(Anderson, 2008: 162), with coverage ranging from pencils and paper clips to computer 
systems, telecommunications equipment and consultation services.
132
 At present, the 
GPA is only a plurilateral agreement covering 42 WTO member-states. Although 
China had agreed to start negotiations to join the GPA as one of the terms of its WTO 
accession, it would take seven years before actual negotiations began. Immediately 
following China’s WTO accession, Beijing’s position was that the transparency in 
government procurement issue should be left to the national governments for 
appropriate action. Many Chinese leaders believed that the GPA was the West’s first 
step is to push for a market access agenda. As one Chinese negotiator asked, “If this 
was not the case, why were they so keen on it? That this will only help the developing 
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 Important to note is that the GPA is different from the Singapore issue of transparency in government 
procurement. While the independent GPA framework of the WTO is intended to liberalise government 
purchases, the Singapore issue of transparency under the DDA is to help reduce corruption and improve 
efficiency.  
132
 Typically, this accounts for between 10 and 15 per cent of GDP for developed countries and up to 20 
per cent of GDP for some developing countries (Jawara and Kwa, 2004: 42). 
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countries by promoting good governance has raised suspicion amongst Chinese 
decision-makers about the actual motive behind the GPA framework.”133 Although the 
Doha Declaration emphasised that the GPA negotiations should be limited only to 
transparency aspects and should not restrict the scope for countries to give preferences 
to domestic goods and suppliers, China remain suspicious.  
Their distrust was not without reason. The GPA that came into force on 1 
January 1996 goes beyond just transparency issues. According to the framework, it is 
mandatory for member-states to apply the principle of national treatment on goods and 
services, and suppliers of other parties to the GPA. In addition, member-states are 
required to abide by the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, which prohibits 
discrimination among goods, services, and suppliers of other parties. Thus adhering to 
this version of the GPA would become a costly affair for China, not least because 
making information on procurement widely available involves substantial costs. 
Moreover, transparency itself can have market access implications by making 
information available to foreign suppliers unless they are barred from the procurement 
bids (Evenett and Hoekman, 2004). Many interviewees argue that if the level of 
government procurement transparency has little to do with market access then the 
transparency issue has little implications on trade. Given that there is no implication on 
trade, why should an agreement of this nature be negotiated inside the WTO – an 
institution established to promote trade rather than good governance?
134
 As a result, 
China had little interest to accede to the GPA. China’s reluctance to join the GPA was 
aided by the “Indicative Time-Frame for Accession Negotiations and Reporting on the 
Progress of Work” of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, which 
watered-down the 18 months deadline to which China was required to accede to the 
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Interview with a Chinese negotiator to the WTO, Beijing, 11 November 2012. 
134
Interview with an expert from the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 13 
February 2012. 
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GPA framework following its WTO entry. Taking advantage of this ambiguous and 
“indicative” deadline, China did not take the GPA as an urgent matter.135 
At first, major economies like the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU) did not care much about China’s slow progress in the GPA; rather they were more 
concerned about ensuring that China had implemented its broader WTO 
commitments.
136
 Some years later, however, when the US and EU realised the value of 
government procurement for pursuing certain industrial policy objectives, they began 
questioning China about its accession pledge.
137
 The US in particular called China to be 
more transparent in its government procurement processes.
138
 Against a history of Sino-
US political distrust, China responded, “If there’s no trust, why should there be 
transparency? The US should act as a reasonable leader in order to increase China’s 
trust before asking for transparency.” 139  China maintained that it was not ready to 
negotiate on the GPA accession; it did not see the GPA as in their interest (i.e., moving 
them away from their welfare status quo).
140
 Additionally, China criticised the 1996 
GPA framework (Art. XXIV: 7(b) and (c)) as outdated and insisted on regulatory 
revisions in order to provide an appropriate basis for negotiation. China feared that the 
old rules did not provide enough clarity on the type of entities and actions covered – an 
issue of great relevance to China’s complex governmental spending system. 141  The 
understanding for a revised text was subsequently reached, and new principles were 
added to the old text to take into account of, among others, the existing government 
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 Interview with a policy advisor from the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation under the MOFCOM, Beijing, 19 November 2012. 
136
 Interview with a member of the Department of Treaty and Law, MOFCOM, Beijing, 23 November 
2012.  
137
 In its 2001 accession to the WTO, China stated their intention to “initiate negotiations for membership 
in the GPA by tabling an Appendix 1 offer as soon as possible.” Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, para. 341. 
138
 Personal interview.  
139
 Interview with an expert from Tsinghua University, Beijing, 22 November 2012.  
140
 Interview with a member from the Department of Treaty and Law, MOFCOM, Beijing 23 November 
2012. 
141
Interview with a policy advisor to the WTO Division of MOFCOM, Shanghai, 2 March 2012. 
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procurement practices, and additional flexibility provisions for the tendering process 
(Anderson, 2008: 172-173).  
In following, the US and EU continued to pressure China to begin negotiations; 
they argued that China wants international investments and yet it does not open its 
procurement market, which makes investors incline towards investing in their own 
countries than in China.
142
 However, Beijing had some concerns of its own. For starters, 
the mere fact that all of the existing members in the GPA were developed countries 
caused some hesitation in Beijing. Second, China was unclear about how it could 
benefit from joining the GPA, which leads to the third concern on effectiveness. The 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) voiced concerns about China’s industrial capacity 
to compete against foreign firms, and that China cannot commit to current proposals 
without concessions.
143
 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) countered the MOFCOM’s 
hesitations by arguing that a GPA membership would contribute to the government’s 
motive for industrial reforms, and this argument appealed to the elite decision-
makers.
144
 They further argued it was better to participate in the GPA rather than let 
others dictate the rules.
145
 So in April 2006, then Vice-Premier, Wu Yi, announced 
China’s agreement to commence the GPA accession negotiations by late-2007 (US 
Department of Commerce, February 2006).  
However, the subsequent accession proposal drafting process was not an easy 
one for Beijing. With a young national procurement regime, established only in 2003,
146
 
the government was just learning about what it is, and how to operationalise it (i.e., how 
to regulate the procurement regime and operationalise it to general practices). Then 
there is Beijing’s fragmented policymaking structure, which has the MOF as the 
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Interview with an expert from Fudan University, Shanghai, 25 April 2012. 
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Interview with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 23 September 2011. 
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Interview with a policy advisor to the WTO Division of MOFCOM, Shanghai, 2 March 2012. 
Interview with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 23 September 2011. 
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 Interview with an expert from the Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade, Shanghai, 25 April 2012. 
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 In 2000, the State Development Planning Commission drafted and implemented the country’s first 
piece of primary legislation on government procurement known as the Tendering Law; but a more 
comprehensive Government Procurement Law was later drafted and implemented in 2003 by the MOF. 
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“bookkeeper,” the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as the 
“investor,” and the MOFCOM as the “trader.”147 Rather than coordinate a coherent 
policy, these three agencies each built their own “fortress of regulation” on government 
procurement, and at times enacted conflicting rules for the tendering process, the 
approved procuring agencies, review procedures, and so on. As a result, not only are 
there a duplication of responsibilities and a waste of resources, but also produced 
inconsistencies and jeopardised the certainty in China’s evolving legal framework on 
government procurement. Even though the State Council has attempted to resolve these 
issues by establishing an inter-ministerial coordination organ
148
 for governing 
government procurement activities in 2005 – under the “Interim Measure on Inter-
Ministerial Coordination Mechanism on Tendering Proceedings”– the structure was still 
vague. For instance, while the NDRC is designated as the head agency for managing 
issues relating to government procurement, the MOF leads the GPA negotiations 
(Wang, 2010). As a result, China’s negotiating behaviours tend to be relatively 
ambiguous even in their application for GPA membership.
149
 
 China submitted its first offer of accession together with its application in late-
2007. Although the negotiating parties praised this as a good start, they were unsatisfied 
with the proposal, viewing it as a limited offering. First, the foreign negotiating parties 
felt that the initial coverage of entities were limited (i.e., only to the agencies of the 
central government) and excluded key sub-national bodies. Second, the proposed 
coverage of entities (including goods and services) were rather small, and it only 
included general products. Third, it had a much higher threshold compared to the 
average level of incumbent member-states. Finally, a number of derogations were made 
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 Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
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 According to Article 4 of the Interim Measure, the main duties of this coordination mechanism 
include: (1) analysing the status of tendering regulations and discussing possible solutions for regulating 
tendering activities involving multiple government organs; (2) resolve inter-agency conflicts regarding 
the administrative supervision of tendering; (3) exchange of information; (4) coordinate the promulgation 
of tendering regulations by different departments; (5) communicate the enforcement of tendering rules; 
and (6) joint survey and research (Wang 2010). 
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Interview with an expert from UBIS, Beijing, 12 March 2012. 
167 
 
by China in the general notes.  Some believed that China had deliberately delivered a 
poor proposal to lower the international expectations on China (Tu 2011; China Daily, 6 
August 2010).  
Important to note, the GPA framework also poses significant challenges for 
China’s domestic procurement law. For instance, GPA Article XXIV: 5(a) requires that 
each Party shall ensure, no later than the date of entry into force of the agreement that 
the conformity of not only its “laws, regulations and administrative procedures” but also 
the “rules, procedures and practices” are applied by the covered entities with the GPA 
(cited in Wang 2010). This involves establishing the required procedural rules by the 
GPA, training purchases to use them, and monitoring their application. For a country 
with a weak government procurement framework, the costs of adaptation are high. 
Interviews indicate that the WTO in turn created new incentives for China to offer an 
improved proposal by driving up their economic gains. In particular, it was suggested 
that the WTO’s presiding staffs facilitated negotiations with the developed countries for 
financial and technical assistance (for supporting domestic industries); and more foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) to China (i.e., manufacturing).
150
  
On 9 July 2010, Beijing submitted a revised offer, which contained only very 
modest improvements from the initial coverage, especially with regards to the central 
entity coverage. Here, Beijing agreed to raise the threshold over time, and made new 
offers on the services procurement. But these improvements were far lower than 
expected. During the 25-26 May 2011 meetings of the Government Procurement 
Committee in Geneva, the Chinese delegation met bilaterally with many GPA parties, 
including the US and EU countries. According to the Government Procurement 
Committee Chairman, Nicholas Niggli, “They had good discussions with [China], and it 
seems also that the bilateral cooperation – with people travelling to Beijing, for instance 
– has been extremely fruitful” (cited in Inside US-China Trade, 1 June 2011).  
                                               
150
Interview with an expert from Peking University, Beijing, 23 September 2011. 
168 
 
A second revised offer from China was submitted in November 2011. In this 
offer, sub-central government entities in a number of the most economically advanced 
regions were included for the first time. Even so, numerous GPA member-states were 
still unhappy with the revisions, and countries such as the US, EU nations, Switzerland, 
Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, asked China to reduce the thresholds for increasing 
international competition in the bidding of its public procurement projects. Doing so 
would require China to scale-back exemptions and align its procurement legislation 
with the GPA framework. As part of the streamlining, the coverage of entities needs to 
be expanded to include local governments and state agencies, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and public utilities (Beattie, 15 December 2012). Niggli has stressed that, “Five 
years into the process of China’s accession to the GPA, there is some distance to go 
before a meeting of minds is achieved” and “positions are still quite apart, although the 
process is moving in the right direction” (cited in Geneva Watch, 20 July 2012).  
Following the conclusion of an updated GPA framework in December 2011 
(Robinson and Kenny, 15 December 2011), China submitted a newly revised offer in 
late-2012 that took into account the suggestions made by GPA members. Even though 
the accession negotiations are on-going in the writing of this thesis, China’s revised 
offers for entry into the GPA framework demonstrate a dynamic shift in policy 
preference from 12 years ago; from a position of reluctance and deliberate stalling to not 
only an agreement to accede, but also perpetually expand its accession offer coverage.    
 
5.2.2 Trade in services 
The “General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS) was brought into the GATT 
during the Uruguay Round, and its negotiations have perpetuated under the DDA. The 
GATS embodies all measures that affect the range of sectors under the trade in 
169 
 
services.
151
 The WTO defines trade in services as “the supply of a service through one 
of four modes” (cited in Mattoo, 2002: 2-3). Mode 1 is cross-border supply. It is the 
trade in goods, and arises when a service crosses national borders (i.e., the purchase of 
software or insurance by a consumer from a supplier located abroad). Mode 2 is 
consumption abroad. It arises when the consumer travels to the geographic base of the 
service supplier (i.e., to purchase tourism, education, or health services). Mode 3 is 
commercial presence. It involves FDI (i.e., when a foreign bank or telecommunications 
firm establishes a subsidiary unit in another country). Mode 4 is the movement of 
individuals. It occurs when independent service providers or employees of a 
multinational firm temporarily moves to another country.  
At the start, China aligned its position with the Recently Acceded Members 
(RAMs) – it has little appetite for new commitments as it faces great challenges 
implementing its ambitious commitments made during accession.
152
 In a 
communication with the Council for Trade in Services not long after China’s WTO 
accession, it implied that domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well 
as infant industries “found it difficult to develop their business against fierce 
competition from big foreign competitors, especially as some of China’s services 
industries are still at [their] infancy” (Cited in TWN, 18/19 December 2002).153 There 
were deep internal rejections to further liberalisation particularly from the SOEs as they 
feared a break-down of gains.
154
 Also true was that services only accounted for 
approximately 30 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) at the time, which 
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 The only explicit sectoral exclusion from GATS is certain “hard” rights in the aviation sector. 
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 China’s WTO accession commitments in services include: for most sectors, modes 1 and 2 are either 
fully open or unbound, and not subject to specific restrictions. Commitments on mode 4, specifically 
horizontally rather than sector by sector, are also standard: entry is guaranteed only for managers, 
executives and specialists – who must either be intra-corporate transferees or employed by foreign 
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 An example of this is a communication submitted to the Council for Trade in Services not long after 
China’s WTO accession. In the communication, China implied that its infancy services sectors such as the 
tertiary industry are much smaller in scale than the foreign counterparts and has generally found it 
challenging to compete against the larger competitors from abroad.  
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 Interview with a policy advisor of the China Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation under the MOFCOM, Beijing, 19 November 2012. 
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is much less than the 70 percent share of GDP in the US, EU, and Japan.
155
 Meanwhile, 
the few Chinese service suppliers that have expanded abroad (i.e., the Bank of China in 
London) did not do so well, and failure stories de-motivates Chinese firms to venture to 
foreign markets.
156
 For these reasons, Beijing did not have any incentive to respond 
actively in this regard, justifying its “quietism” as a reflection of a need to adapt to, and 
improve its knowledge on, the complicated services framework under discussion.
157
 Of 
course, it can be expected that some of the protection is due to political and economic 
pressures from interest groups, but the government generally felt the necessity to protect 
its domestic suppliers from external competitions because of arguments relating to 
industrial infancy or the facilitation of “orderly exits.” Thus, China’s national 
preference at the DDA negotiations in 2001 was characterised as “big door open, small 
door shut;” that is, the Chinese delegation called negotiations on services to address the 
development gaps in services between the developed and developing countries with the 
latter entitled to flexibility as stipulated in the GATS.   
 The negotiation problems assumed a new sense of urgency in the wake of the 
backlash from the failed trade talks in Cancun (September 2003). At this meeting, China 
took advantage of the most favoured nations (MFN) and the national treatment 
obligations under the GATS, and this allowed exceptions to be listed. Beijing listed 
international maritime transport – for cargo sharing agreements with certain countries. It 
also permitted joint ventures (JVs) as well as the establishment of wholly-owned 
shipping subsidiaries on the basis of bilateral agreements.  Beijing did not cease the 
existing subsidiaries in aviation, audio-visual and medical services. Other situations of 
discriminatory provisions include: the requirement of all legal representatives to reside 
in China for at least six months of each year; the large majority of doctors in JV 
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hospitals need to be of Chinese origin; capital requirements for JV construction 
enterprises must be different from domestic enterprises; JV travel agencies are 
forbidden to supply its services to Chinese citizens travelling abroad; and foreign 
insurance companies are subject to a 20 percent cession with a Chinese Reinsurance 
company (though this was to be phased out in four years) (Mattoo, 2002). In the digital 
communications sector, government-sanctioned blocking of western news and 
entertainment websites was a routine occurrence; and in July 2004 Beijing announced 
the regulation and filtration of phone text messaging (Kahn, 2004: A3).
158
 The 
developed countries were unpleased with China’s restrictions and pressured Beijing to 
take commitments to liberalisation. China’s responded by reiterating the imbalanced 
gains from services trade liberalisation at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial meeting, and 
by arguing that developing countries should be granted the space for policy 
readjustments, especially the right to administer and standardise the services market.
159
 
With these said, China did begin to show new interest in Mode 4 services, and joined a 
host of developing countries in asking for reductions in the restrictions on the 
movement of people, especially those with lower skill-sets – an area where China have 
a comparative advantage (TWN, 3 July 2003). The Chinese government also showed 
new interest in Mode 1 services. Beijing believed that services in goods are much easier 
to manage and generally has a lower political risk attached due to the minimal 
ideological implications.
160
 
 In the 2006 high-level meeting in Geneva, China returned to its traditional low-
profile and leadership-avoiding national preferences. Although the official rhetoric for 
China’s “quietism” was that it needs time to digest the new WTO obligations, critical 
observers argue that Beijing did not want to step on the toes of either the developed or 
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state corruption and abuses of power. 
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 This was expressed in the national statement made by Chinese Minister of Commerce, Bo Xilai.  
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developing countries, and it wanted to avoid extra international pressure to further open 
its services markets through stronger WTO commitments.
161
 China also wanted to 
prevent itself from being labelled the troublemaker (Sally, 2011; Huang 2008, 26). 
Without denying the truth in these observations, the empirical interviews of this study 
identified a primary source of uncertainty at the time for the Chinese government – 
which explains its sudden quietism – is the impact of services trade liberalisation on 
regulatory freedom and the limitations to its autonomy to enforce appropriate regulatory 
policies. For Beijing, its experiences in the multilateral negotiations made it believe that 
the WTO system was generally ill-equipped in dealing with the regulatory standards 
dimension of services trade. This systemic weakness substantially reduced the scope for 
Beijing to make binding commitments to liberalise access to its services markets 
(Hoekman andVines, 2007: 321-324).  
Although unpopular to other countries, Beijing also felt the need to maintain 
restrictions on foreign ownership (especially in telecommunications and life insurance) 
because: (i) the limited foreign ownership will help balance the efficiency-enhancing 
and rent-appropriation elements of FDIs; (ii) by inducing foreign investors to form 
equity JVs, local firms can learn through collaboration; (iii) drastic cuts in surplus 
labour triggered by an immediate transfer of control can be prevented by gradual 
retractions in ownership; and (iv) a general political reluctance to accept foreign control 
of the essential domestic services sectors. These domestic sensitivities made Beijing 
reluctant to concede to stronger GATS commitments. In response to American 
criticism, China publicly accused the US of hypocrisy for heavily subsidising its own 
industries while requesting other countries to expose theirs’ to fierce international 
competition. Additionally, Beijing highlighted the deep reforms already undertaken as 
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 For instance, China is viewed by the developed countries as “the biggest beneficiary” of the 
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developed countries. 
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part of the accession process, and further commitments in Mode 1 services were made 
since the DDA negotiations (Sally, 2011: 9; Beattie, 2011). Such strong policy 
preferences surprised the negotiation arena because of its notable contrast to the 
country’s usual modest and low-profile national preferences.  
 Following a suspension of the talks after the July 2006 negotiation impasse, 
Pascal Lamy called an informal meeting held under the Trade Negotiations Committee 
(TNC) on the morning of 16 November 2006. The stated purpose was to discuss the 
situation on the DDA negotiations, including contentions in the services trade talks. The 
decision to call an informal TNC came after a Green Room meeting on 10 November 
2006, to which Lamy invited some 20 influential Members, including China. The 
meeting allowed members to use the informal TNC to agitate for the resumption of the 
trade negotiations by discussing how to revive the talks after it broke-off from 
deadlock-breaking offers of tariff or subsidy cuts. Then during a Green Room meeting 
on 22 January 2007, Lamy agreed to a request by the services demandeurs (i.e., the US, 
EU, and Japan) to emphasise in Davos that services trade is a critical component of the 
overall market-access negotiations, of which a meaningful offer in services 
liberalisation could unlock possible concessions by major developed countries in the 
agriculture and industrial goods talks (Leal-Arcas 2007). Domestically, the impasse of 
the 2006 negotiations caused business groups in China to acknowledge the considerable 
costs that would be incurred by a failure to conclude a global trade pact (World 
Economic Forum, 12 February 2007). Business groups voiced concerns about the 
potential loss of considerable economic welfare gains and about the risk of weakening 
the safety net that the WTO provides against rising protectionist tendencies (European 
Business for Doha, 25 January 2007). 
By this time, China’s business service exports have rapidly expanded, growing 
at 15 per cent per annum from 1995-2005 (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007: 369). 
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Although the restrictions on foreign equity were pervasive, they were gradually phased 
out, with the exception of some elementary telecommunications and life insurance. And 
with the exception of retail distribution, explicit restrictions on a number of firms were 
gradually phased out (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007: 377-381). Arguments for 
changes in technologies and the reform of natural monopolies in the state-provision of 
major services sectors enabled more sectors of the services industries to be 
internationally contested through the mediums of international trade (i.e., mode 1 of the 
GATS) and FDI (mode 3). Policy reforms, including liberalisation and privatisation, 
have thus complemented technological changes in support of enlarging the trade in 
services. The outcome of this includes rapid growths in the international exchanges of 
business services that were historically non-tradable and further rapid expansion in 
services-related FDIs. China’s policy pursuit for increased contestability of the services 
market can be explained by several reasons. For one, in order to ensure that capital is 
deployed where it has the best returns, it is of imperative to have an efficient and 
competitive financial sector. In the telecommunications services sector, its features as 
an immediate input, a conduit of information, and other digitisable products, lower-
costs and higher-quality telecommunications can generate economy-wide benefits. The 
transport services sector likewise positively contributes to improving the efficiency of 
product distribution within and between nations. Other services sectors with a 
commercial nature (i.e., accounting and legal services) contribute to reducing the 
transaction costs associated with the operation of financial markets and the enforcement 
of contracts. In the retail and wholesale distribution services, it significantly influences 
the competitiveness of market players domestically and internationally, and improves 
the important producer-consumer relationship (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007: 370).  
In the meantime, a World Bank report pushed China to open up its services 
sector to international trade and investment. Doing so would help introduce advanced 
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technology and expertise, promote reforms, increase competition and ultimately 
enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of China’s service sector. It would also 
provide China with “leverage” in international trade negotiations to aggressively push 
for the opening of their partners’ services markets (Reuters, 29 February 2012). In 2008, 
China positively expressed its extended interests in services trade. In reference to the 
“signalling conference” held during the July 2008 mini-ministerial meeting, 
Ambassador Sun Zhengyu reiterated in his statement: 
 
“[I]n spite of our very extensive commitments in our services schedules, we are going to make 
new efforts, we are going to give signals to consider, on condition that others will reciprocate, 
some new sub-sectors, and some improved offers. Eventually the level of openness of our 
service markets will be roughly at the same level as some developed countries. So that will be 
our contribution.”  
 
In 2011, the Chinese government pledged to open roughly 110 subcategories
162
 out of 
160, which will be the same as many developed countries. In addition, China is 
considering the liberalisation of model 4 services.
163
 According to national statistics, 
services sectors (which range from transportation to retail and wholesale distribution 
and tourism and hospitality) accounted for 44.6 per cent of China’s GDP in 2012. That 
is less than one point behind the growth of the traditional industries (45.3 per cent). The 
services sectors are rapidly developing and its growth may reflect the on-going 
government rebalancing of the development strategy from exports to consumption. 
Certainly, the rise of services contributes to such rebalancing efforts. For instance, 
services tend to be labour-intensive, which means that their expansion should encourage 
faster job creation, higher wages and more household spending (The Economist, 23 
February 2013). These benefits have all stipulated the government to announce an 
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agenda to encourage the conclusion of a multilateral framework for the trade in services. 
So since 2001, China’s policy preference on services trade has evolved from resistance 
to further liberalisation of its services sectors, and even more to newfound, though 
incremental, willingness to open-up previously closed areas.  
 
5.3 WTO and the Mechanisms of Influence 
This section takes the empirical findings from the background study of the case-pair to 
test the three hypothesised mechanisms of influence: the costs-and-benefits calculus, 
information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement.  
  
5.3.1 Costs-and-benefits calculus  
In the early years of the GPA negotiations, Beijing tended to outweigh the costs of 
accession over the benefits based on the belief that a GPA membership does not enlarge 
their overseas market access. For example, although exporters of homogenous goods 
may see some benefits, it is nevertheless likely to a fall in the purchases of differentiated 
products and a rise in the government’s foreign sourcing of homogenous goods. Beijing 
was thus uninterested in acceding to the GPA framework. In response, the Committee 
on Government Procurement under the WTO drafted an analysis for China entailing the 
prospective benefits of GPA membership. One particular emphasis made was on 
corruption. They argued that China’s existing government procurement system grants 
more discretion to procurement officials, and this cause expanded opportunities for 
corruption and bribery. One study argued that corrupt officials have the tendency to 
deliberately expand their expenditures on (especially the highly differentiated) projects 
including aviation and construction where there are few comparable reference prices 
within the market. Their econometric analyses further suggested that “officials with an 
interest in rent collection are likely to employ non-transparent procurement regimes to 
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expand government spending on those items where the opportunities for self-
enrichment are greatest” (Evenett and Hoekman, 2004, 276). As a result, the SMEs will 
be dis-incentivised to go through the standard process of contract biding and take the 
easy route of bribing officials in charge. The firms’ motivation to supply to the 
government’s needs and do the jobs well is also reduced.  
The consequence of entry joining the GPA, on the other hand, includes a shift in 
the government’s demand for more homogenous goods and less differentiated ones. At 
the same time, it would raise the number of firms willing to bid for contracts as opposed 
to resort to bribery. Such changes will improve price efficiency. As well, there will be a 
drop in the demand for imported differentiated goods, which implies that increasing 
transparency need not necessarily raise foreign market access in total. Overall, the GPA 
can contribute to reforming China’s domestic procurement regime and improve its 
justice and equity.
164
 The ultimate objective of these estimations was to raise 
government and industrial awareness on how China can benefit from a GPA 
membership.
165
  
 The services case similarly illustrates Beijing’s long-held conviction that the 
costs attached to further liberalisation commitments outweighed the benefits. The 
regulatory concerns have been a key impediment to the Chinese decision-makers from 
taking cooperative action. For example, the Chinese delegation frequently points to the 
intangible nature of services, which makes it hard for buyers of services to investigate 
or test their quality prior to purchase. The extent of asymmetric information often 
creates a necessity to regulate services in order to protect the consumers, on the one 
hand, and remedy market failures due to imperfect competition and incomplete 
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165
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information.
166
 To reframe the Chinese decision-makers’ pessimism in this regard, the 
WTO’s Council for Trade in Services held167 informal discussions with members of the 
Chinese delegation and reasoned that since most services are, itself, inputs for the 
production of other services and goods, introducing competition through an expansion 
of market access opening to foreign service providers will actually reduce the “cartel 
effect”168 and attenuate the “cost inefficiency effect.”169 FDI is a case in point. It is a 
key medium for foreign providers to import their services into the domestic market, 
generate competitive pressures, and in so doing, induce internal and allocative 
efficiency. The existing services FDIs in China have already demonstrated that it is a 
valuable source of new knowledge, and contributes to the Chinese economy’s 
production and export of advanced and superior products. As the barriers of trade drops 
for producer services, imports (including through FDIs) will increase, and the costs of 
imported services will decline. Even if such situation displaces some domestic firms, 
the improved quality of services as well as the expanded variety of available services 
will nonetheless spawn positive public externalities for service providers due to a rise in 
the total factor productivity (TFP) (Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2005). WTO 
experts further argue that increased competition in service sectors through international 
liberalisation can boost growth.
170
 For example, analyses on the effects of trade and 
investment openness for the financial and telecommunications sectors found that fully 
liberalised countries grew, on average, one percentage-point faster than other countries 
(Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian, 2006), increases productivity in the 
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 The cartel effect is “the mark-up price over marginal cost that incumbents are able to charge owing to 
policies that restrict entry” (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007). 
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 The cost inefficiency effect is “an environment where there is limited competition the marginal costs 
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Interview with a policy advisor to MOFCOM, Beijing, 25 October 2012. 
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manufacturing sector (Francois & Hoekman 2010), and contributes to adding valuable 
inputs into infrastructure development (Jensen 2011).   
 Comparing the two cases, the WTO agencies’ were identified to have impact, 
but to varying degrees. According to the interviews for both cases, there was a strong 
belief that the WTO’s costs-and-benefits analyses were accepted by Chinese decision-
makers because they demonstrated strong congruencies with the government’s domestic 
reform agendas. The Committee on Government Procurement, for instance, made a 
strong case for the GPA membership by highlighting the political benefits of controlling 
corruption (i.e., through its rules, MFN obligations, and offsets). The argument appealed 
directly to the Chinese leaders and galvanised domestic political support. Since the mid-
1990s, Beijing has been vigilant about ferreting out official corruption, bribe-taking, 
and dereliction of duty. In his opening speech to the 18
th
 National Party Congress, 
former President Hu Jintao stressed the urgency in addressing corruption
171
 before it 
erodes public confidence
172
 and cause the “fall of the state” (BBC News China, 8 
November 2012; Phillips, 8 November 2012). Leaders believe the GPA could be a 
useful external force for pushing domestic political anti-corruption efforts. This motive 
was found, through interviews, to be a dominant reason for China’s submission to the 
GPA accession in 2007.
173
  
Likewise, the WTO’s analyses were perceived to be useful supplements to the 
government’s existing plans to reform its services sectors. As one MOFCOM policy 
advisor points out, China’s national preference shift in services over the recent years has 
much to do with the fact that an international agreement on services would be beneficial 
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 The Chinese business magazine, Caixin, reported in early-2012 that China’s Central Bank believes as 
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profile mass protests focusing on land grabs and environmental issues. Personal observation.  
173
Interview with an expert from China University of International Business, Beijing, 17 February 2012. 
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for the country’s next round of economic reforms. 174  This is not least because the 
average annual rate of growth in the services sectors such as the tertiary industry is 
approximately 10.8 per cent of added value between 1978 and 2007. This is at least 
three to six percentage-points higher than the agriculture and manufacturing sectors in 
China (Zhang and Evenett, 2010: 9). In addition, the Chinese decision-makers believe 
that opening-up Mode 4 services will help address its domestic unemployment 
problems.
175
 Because opening-up contributes to China’s domestic objectives, the 
decision-makers were more willing to accept the WTO’s rationalisations.176 Arguable 
then, the WTO agencies’ costs-and-benefits calculus is influential, especially when it 
serves China’s national objectives.177  
However, where the case studies differ is in the extent of which the WTO’s 
influence was absorbed into real policy shifts. While the GPA case illustrated perpetual 
expansion of compromises by the Chinese government in terms of its offer coverage, 
the services trade preference shifts were largely incremental. What explains this 
variance? From the qualitative data, it is clear to see that a key contingency of influence 
is the perception of the decision-makers. For instance, decision-makers for the GPA 
generally perceived a strong set of benefits as a result of accession, especially to 
China’s future political system. Reversely, the risk of not participating in the GPA was 
considered detrimental to the CPC’s political legitimacy. By comparison, decision-
makers for the services trade modality generally perceive liberalisation as beneficial for 
its domestic economic restructuring. At the same time, however, the short- and medium-
term political cost of not non-action is also not high and open to debate. More 
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 Services reform has already begun in June 2012 with the establishment of the “Qianhai” project based 
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importantly, the decision-makers believed that with the suggested benefits are potential 
costs. For example, although consumers in theory should favour services reforms as it 
expands the diversity of services available to them at competitive prices it is also 
possible that they will oppose such reforms due to a fear that doing so will lower 
consumer welfare, including the quality of services.
178
  
Another concern the decision-makers had concerns the notion of “stability 
maintenance.” That is, a primary goal for Beijing was to maintain short-term stability in 
its service sectors, despite a need to improve long-term efficiency. Nowhere was this 
debate more imminent than in the banking sector reforms. The thought process is that as 
long as the short-term financial crises do not occur, the chance of resolving the long-
term problem, including efficiency, is possible. But if China was to liberalise its 
services sectors, then uncontrollable events such as a global financial crisis could erode 
long-term certainty and short-term stability (Wu, 8 October 2012). A further political 
fear was that services trade could undermine Beijing’s autonomy to enforce domestic 
regulatory standards since trade brings with it regulatory intrusion, and service suppliers 
will only be subject to the home market’s rules. This is especially the case for mode 1 
and 4 services – if trade is permitted to occur on the basis of qualifications and 
certifications obtained in their home country, then it is uncertain whether foreign 
providers will seek to also meet Chinese norms. Thus, the regulatory concerns of 
excessive intrusiveness, inherent unpredictability in commitment implications, and the 
capacity to set-up complementary measures for achieving regulatory and social 
objectives clouded the perceptions of the decision-makers regarding the WTO agencies’ 
relatively more positive calculus of the gains from services liberalisation. It goes to say 
that the different degrees of perceived benefits vis-à-vis the costs generate variances of 
influence, as seen in the two cases.   
 
                                               
178
 Interview with an experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 8 November 2012. 
182 
 
5.3.2 Information dissemination 
When asked about China’s passive participation in the DDA negotiations, especially in 
the fore years of the negotiations, 97 per cent of Chinese and non-Chinese interviewees 
commonly believe that the country was in a learning process with regards to the WTO 
system and the specialised issues on the DDA. As a US official said, “A major problem 
in China is economic literacy and a lack of it in Chinese officials; this is very 
problematic for negotiations.”179 The GPA negotiation is a case in point. Unlike the 
strong domestic drive to WTO membership, the country’s accession into the GPA 
framework was, in the beginning, almost neglected by the senior leaders. Jiang Zeming 
and Hu Jintao have rarely mentioned the issue in public; and Wen Jiabao only 
occasionally acknowledged it in passing (Xinhua News Agency, 29 April 2010). For the 
most part, China’s attitude on the issue was relatively ambiguous. The interviews 
suggest that Beijing’s ambivalence was primarily caused by a lack of understanding 
about the framework; even today, Beijing is still in a process of familiarising itself with 
the laws of the GPA.
180
 To raise government awareness, the technical staffs at the WTO 
offered consultative support, especially from 2005, to policymakers from the 
MOFCOM, the MOF, among others.
181
 However, the support was mostly elementary, 
and little substantive policy assistance was received as the WTO does not itself have 
enough experts on government procurement.
182
  
Even so, interviewees recalled that the MOFCOM and the MOF, in particular, 
“became very supportive of joining the GPA after realising its purpose and benefits as a 
result of consultative learning with WTO members.” 183  The MOFCOM Minister 
subsequently stressed to the State Council that becoming a GPA country could help the 
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government promote new industrial reforms and drive the country’s procurement 
system towards openness and transparency.
184
 The conservative decision-makers 
rejected this argument however and argue that it is not appropriate or necessary to 
depend on foreign pressures to push for domestic reforms.
185
 In the end, the 
MOFCOM’s proposal was overshadowed by more imminent members of the central 
government; and the influence of information dissemination was undermined. This goes 
to show that the influence of international discourse can at times be barricaded by 
internal politics. The finding is supported by the qualitative data, which has 72 percent 
of respondents share the view that information dissemination is effective in improving 
the policymakers’ understanding about the legal and professional aspects of the GPA, 
but not necessarily in influencing national preferences.  
 Like China’s initial GPA stance, its early policy on services was characterised as 
ambiguous. Because of the wide range of complex and technical issues involved in the 
services negotiations, from finance to telecommunication and distribution, it has 
required a labyrinth of government agencies to participate in the knowledge catch-up 
marathons, and often behaved passively in the process at the multilateral negotiations.
186
 
As Bernard Hoekman and Aaditya Mattoo (2011: 14) point out, “Matters are already 
complex when negotiations revolve around traditional trade policies such as tariffs and 
quotas; but they are an order of magnitude more complicated when it comes to services 
given that there is almost invariably a regulatory dimension.” 187  The interviews 
illuminated that the Council on Services Trade within the WTO have actively supported 
the relevant agencies in technical and specialist training through various forms of 
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Interview with an expert from the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 17 
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information dissemination on (i) the scope and size of services trade liberalisation and 
regulations; (ii) the competitiveness of the relevant industries as well as the likely 
impacts of the services trade liberalisation on those industries; and (iii) other 
information relevant to its policy preference formulation.
188
 Participating policymakers 
suggested that whilst engagement with the Council produced positive learning benefits, 
they also felt the constant influx of diverse information complicated the inter-agency 
coordination process as different agencies received too diversified and at times 
contradicting information, which caused the emergence of competing ministerial 
interests.
189
 In the words of one Chinese negotiator to the WTO, “Information that were 
received were confusing as it covered so many different and varied details for different 
government departments, and the inter-agency discussions therefore became difficult, 
especially when different departments received different kinds and amounts of 
information, causing imbalances in knowledge and perception.” 190  As a result, 
establishing a coherent consensus becomes a challenge.
191
 This finding contrasts with 
the cognitive assumption that international discourse is useful in guiding inter-agency 
negotiations between domestic groups as it increases their mutual understanding about 
the country’s negotiation objectives and priorities. A similar implication for the GPA 
case study was not found. This variance could be due to the fact that the GPA-related 
WTO agencies only provided elementary support and therefore it was not significant 
enough to trigger a similar effect.  
 Related to this point is the WTO agencies’ lack of any robust mechanism for 
generating reliable information on regulatory substance and enforcement in different 
country contexts (Feketekuty 2010). In the case of the GPA, an explanation for the 
reduced influence of information dissemination is that the WTO agencies’ discourse did 
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not actually enhance Beijing’s understandings about the concept of “government 
procurement”; it failed to provide a clear definition of what the notion actually implies 
in political and economic terms. And neither the GATT 1994 nor the GPA 2007 
embodies precise definitions for the notion of “government procurement.” For instance, 
the GATT 1994 defines “government procurement” as the procurement for government 
purposes without referring to what government purposes are. Similarly, the GPA 2007 
defines the notion as any kind of purchases made by the covered entities rather than for 
other commercial purposes. The lack of a concrete definition in the WTO discourse – 
leaving each Party to legislate their own definition based on the scope of their 
government procurement activities – created difficulties for Beijing to ascertain how 
they should treat the negotiations. What the disseminated information from the WTO 
did clearly indicate in great detail were the political costs attached to joining the GPA. 
For example, Beijing might lose their authority to select between government control 
and market forces. Since Beijing believes it is important for the government to retain 
control over investment and consumption in order to meet economic and social 
development objectives, compromising this for entry to the GPA was unacceptable. A 
senior member of the WTO Secretariat admitted that the regime needs to improve its 
supply of updated information to nation-states. In fact, it was suggested that member-
states often do not even know where to find information and where to seek technical 
assistance within the WTO. This is one area the WTO agencies need to expand in 
capacity.
192
  
 In services, a policy advisor to MOFCOM points out that the WTO’s services 
norms tend to be vague and there were limited support offered to China – only on the 
labour issues were there some support.
193
 Within the Council on Services Trade, 
interviews revealed that there is limited sectoral/regulatory expertise to assist China or 
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any other country.
194
 For instance, the WTO comprises of around 600 people of which 
only approximately 300 are working staffs. Breaking down the calculus to 20 working 
departments, then each technical section is only comprised of approximately 10 
staffs.
195
 One Chinese negotiator went one step further to claim that, in many instances, 
the “WTO simply is not interested in expanding their expertise due to US and EU 
influences; if it was interested, it would have improved its expertise and information 
quality.”196 Instead, other MERs, such as the World Bank are the actual providers of 
regulatory and sectoral information and assistance for a number of services sectors 
including transport, telecommunications, and finance (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2011: 
15).
197
  
Members of the WTO have pointed out that in the absence of such mechanism it 
has actively hosted a range of training workshops which already serve similar purposes. 
However, interviews with members of the Chinese government reveal that these 
workshops are not usually treated with much seriousness; and this is even more so in the 
presence of language barriers.
198
 As a result, the influence stemmed from the workshops 
tends to be small. The lessons here is that the WTO agencies’ influence through 
information dissemination is contingent on (i) how detailed and precise the international 
discourse; (ii) the benefits of adapting to the information; (iii) the variety of information 
disseminated across different government agencies; and perhaps the most important 
element is (iv) the level of proficiency within the WTO’s working bodies.   
                                               
194
 Interview with a former member of the Department of Legal Affairs in MOFCOM, Beijing, 22 
November 2012. 
195
 Interview with a member from the Department of Law and Treaty, MOFCOM, Beijing, 23 November 
2012. 
196
 Interview with a senior member of the WTO Division in MOFCOM, Beijing, 22 November 2012.  
197
 For instance, on February 27, 2012, the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the 
State Council released China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society. 
The 468-page document contains six broad economic policy recommendations, including achieving the 
trade-related goal of “mutually beneficial relations” with the rest of the world (Reuters, 29 February 
2012).  
198
 Interview with a member from the Department of Law and Treaty, MOFCOM, Beijing, 23 November 
2012.  
187 
 
A further impediment to the impact of information dissemination is Beijing’s 
fragmented decision-making structure characterised by the inter-agency power 
struggles. As already mentioned, even though the MOFCOM is, in theory, responsible 
for the GPA negotiations and preference formation, the MOF also leads numerous 
dimensions of the negotiations due to its high-level content relevance. Meanwhile, the 
NDRC is the oversight agency against the GPA, although the MOF – a proponent of the 
GPA – has on numerous occasions implemented national positions outside the NDRC 
authority. Yet, the MOFCOM has the discretion to either accept or ignore other 
ministerial proposals, depending on the consensus and support from the leadership 
(Liang, 2003: 301-304). As a result of the fragmented decision-making structure, it is 
difficult for the WTO agencies to identify a reliable route for channelling its 
discourse.
199
 The preference formation for services points to a likewise situation. 
Although the MOFCOM is formally the lead trade policy agency and usually represents 
China in the services trade negotiations, it only has the authority of a negotiator on 
behalf of industries and not the authority of a real coordinator (Wang, 2010). In other 
words, the MOFCOM needs the endorsements of the relevant industrial ministries and 
commissions for its trade preferences, which is often very difficult to attain given that 
its interests tend to clash with fierce contradictions from other ministries in charge of 
various sectors such as banking, telecommunications, and insurance dimensions of the 
services negotiations.  
That is why domestic interest groups can at times be assertive in resisting further 
liberalisation beyond the WTO-accession levels, as long as the political leadership does 
not directly intervene in the preference formation. Moreover, as more representatives 
from other ministries join the MOFCOM at the WTO negotiation table, it further 
undermines the MOFCOM’s control over the discussions. For instance, negotiators 
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from other ministries blamed the MOFCOM officials for not understanding the real 
situation in their sectors, and as such, there was no reason why the MOFCOM officials 
should speak on their behalf (Liang, 2010: 716-717). In this context, even if the WTO 
agencies’ information was effective within a particular ministry it was disseminated to, 
the incoherence between the ministries can easily undermine the impact of the 
discourse. One Chinese expert have commented, “China’s domestic politics does 
interfere with China’s trade policy; and the lack of coordination due to competing 
interest between ministries is a key impediment.”200 Thus, the second contingency of 
influence through information dissemination is the policy setting in Beijing; especially 
the level of cohesion in the inter-ministerial coordination process.  
 The third contingency has to do with the political costs attached to the 
international discourse. On the GPA issue, the information disseminated to Beijing 
caused concerns about the impact of joining the GPA on the government’s autonomy. 
As the GPA rules directly regulates the government’s activities, and have a restrictive 
effect on state interventionist policies for market activities, membership would imply a 
reduced autonomy over consumption and investment. This is problematic for China 
because government investments have long been thought of as a useful and effective 
instrument for the stimulation of social investments. The 2008 financial crises is a case 
in point; Beijing injected a stimulus package of 4000 billion RMB in order to stimulate 
social investments. Although the WTO agencies stressed that opening its government 
procurement regime will not harm the Chinese economy, Beijing nonetheless worries 
that a GPA accession is not just a concern of market access but more importantly, imply 
the need to undergo major government reforms of the state sectors. These high political 
costs attached to supporting the WTO discourse caused some hesitation in Beijing.  
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Likewise, the information disseminated to Beijing on services was ineffective in 
shaping China’s policy preference because its intentions clashed with the interests of 
Chinese SOEs. Following the economic reforms since 1978, the SOEs have enjoyed 
augmented autonomy to make market-based business decisions. At the same time, since 
the deliberated reforms were only partial, they have retained the rents that were created 
by the former monopolised system. Together, it has become much more influential in 
Chinese policy because of its relative importance in generating the country’s revenue 
and employment.  As of 2012, Chinese SOEs contribute to approximately 36 percent of 
the world’s products.201 Naturally then, Beijing is keen to remain on good terms with 
the interests of the SOEs or risk domestic political and social instability. Moreover, 
numerous presidents of major SOEs hold an affiliation with some of the key 
government agencies. In a way we see a paradox: the sectors which benefited from 
partial reforms have become major resistance points for future reforms. Their resistance 
stems from the fact that their profits and rents under the existing system are likely to be 
lost if faced with external competition and scrutiny.    
 With this said, the powers of the SOEs are increasingly rivalled by the rapid 
growth of privately-owned enterprises (POEs). In the past, POEs were generally 
disadvantaged in the domestic market and resource access as a result of the SOEs’ 
monopolisation of the services sectors.
202
 This caused many POEs to look to foreign 
investors (i.e., through the “China-China-Foreign” or CCF JV system) in order to assert 
themselves within the domestic market.
203
 As more POEs take on the CCF, it created a 
loophole for foreign entry and undermined the coherent industrial policy protected by 
numerous service sectors from liberalisation (Gao and Lyytinen, 2000: 725). On top of 
this development, the size of the SOEs’ workforces has been falling from 85 percent in 
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1952 to approximately 30 percent at just over 60 million as of 2011.
204
 At the same 
time, there has been sustained growth in employment in private and foreign-owned 
businesses. The number of POE employees in urban areas shot up from 45.8 million in 
2008 to 69.1 million in 2012 (see figure 5.1) (China Labour Bulletin, 22 June 2013).
205
  
5.1  Working Population by Form of Ownership 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012 
The growing significance of the POEs,
206
 and their expanding relationship with 
foreign investors, added much pressure on the State Council to revise their national 
preferences on services trade in order to retain control over the domestic market, and 
mitigate any potential undermining of the CPC’s legitimacy. 207  One services trade 
policy advisor claims that an obvious correlation can be drawn between China’s 
national preference shifts in services and the business interests.
208
 In light of a 
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somewhat ineffective WTO information generating system, business and industrial 
actors seem to be controlling the steering-wheel of preference formation.    
 
5.3.3 Reputation reinforcement 
The third hypothesised variable of influence, advocated by contractualists, is reputation 
reinforcement; that is, the WTO agencies can constrain China’s preference formation by 
monitoring their performances against international standards and protocols. In theory, 
even in the absence of material constraints, states may act certain ways or refrain from 
certain behaviours in order to avoid a loss of status, humiliation, and/or other social 
sanctions (Johnston, 2008). Empirically, the WTO Secretariat works very closely with 
the media in the name of transparency and hold daily briefings with the press during 
negotiation sessions.
209
 The way the WTO agencies assess China’s preferences, and 
subsequently the way they portray China to the global media adds policy pressure on 
Chinese decision-makers. For China, the indirect influence of this is significant, and like 
in climate change, it saw cooperation in international trade as an opportunity to improve 
its disrupted international image from the events of the past century. It is this concern 
that prompted China’s keen interest to form a united developing country front. In 
November 2003, Supachai Panitchpakdi, former Managing-Director of the WTO, 
stressed that the organisation hopes China could work as a bridge between developing 
and developed countries to help restart the new round of trade negotiations, and stated 
that, “It [China] has a special status, because it is rapidly becoming a very, very 
powerful player in international trade” (Cited in BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 10 
November 2003). In the view of some interviewed Chinese decision-makers, 
maintaining China’s reputation is also a part of their international policy objective to 
maintain a stable international environment that is conducive to its national 
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development. Therefore, the reputation reinforcement mechanism can, in theory, drive 
Beijing towards more cooperative national preferences. 
 In reality, however, the GPA and services case studies reflect contrary findings. 
Neither of the two case studies indicated any evidence that members of the WTO 
actively sought to influence or guide China’s GPA nor services policy preference 
formation through the reinforcement of its reputation factor. As well, there was little 
indication that reputation has the level of impact that drives national preference 
changes. According to the interviews, whilst reputation generally matters in the norm-
compliance and commitment implementation decision-making processes, it becomes a 
secondary consideration in preference formation for multilateral economic negotiations. 
This view was supported by 79 per cent of the interviewees. In contrast to the climate 
change negotiations which is generally framed as a moral and ethical concern, and 
hence elevates the reputation costs of non-commitment, the moral and ethical concerns 
in trade negotiations, be it on government procurement or trade in services, is 
comparatively less of a concern and therefore the reputation costs of taking non-
commitment is lower. 
 Yet, one should not so easily dismiss this variable. With the increase of China’s 
global economic activities, the government does feel the pressures of scrutiny around 
the world, particularly on whether China will succeed in its market transition and the 
WTO has been a highly visible yardstick for that measurement. Hence, the government 
is very careful with public opinion and media commentary.
210
 A case in point is China’s 
first WTO dispute. The US filed a complaint with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
with regards to China’s preferential value-added tax (VAT) for domestically produced 
or designed semiconductors. The complaint claimed that all semiconductors sold in 
China were subject to a 17 per cent VAT, but domestic producers – including both 
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Chinese and foreign-invested firms – were eligible for an 11 per cent tax rebate, rising 
to 14 per cent if the products were designed and fabricated in the country. Imported 
semiconductors, on the other hand, did not qualify for any rebate (Liang, 2007).
211
 The 
US argued that the tax rebate for domestic producers violated the cardinal WTO 
principles of non-discrimination and national treatment in the GATT.
212
 Although China 
claimed that they were confused by the US’s actions (People’s Daily, 20 March 2004), 
the dispute was soon resolved without being escalated to the panel stage – on 14 July 
2004, China and the US notified the DSB that they have come to an agreement. 
According to the notification, China agreed to amend or revoke within a few months the 
measures at issue to eliminate the availability of VAT refunds on Integrated Circuits 
(ICs) produced and sold in China, and on ICs designed in China but manufactured 
abroad. The speed at which China settled the case is surprising considering that over 
three years of prior bilateral negotiations on the issue had failed to yield any meaningful 
results. The key factor that prevented China from litigation was the government’s 
concern for potential reputation loss associated with defending its protectionist 
measures in the formal WTO dispute resolution system (Li, 2012: 1130).  
 Several factors reinforced this fear for reputation loss. First, the Chinese 
leadership often finds it difficult to disentangle legal issues from political and 
reputation-linked concerns, and views the initiation of legal disputes in the WTO as 
tantamount to setbacks in diplomatic relations with the other countries (Gao, 2007). 
Interviews with Chinese negotiators on the VAT issue also suggested that they were 
given explicit instructions from Beijing to resolve the case at the consultation level by 
all means.
213
 This kind of aversion to litigation behaviour is in line with China’s 
Confucian philosophy that litigation would cause irreparable harm to normal 
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relationships and should be pursued only as a last resort (Diamant, 2000). Moreover, in 
the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership, China has been documented as being highly 
sensitive to a negative reputation because a loss of face and reputation (e.g., being sued 
and perhaps losing cases) would be detrimental to the CPC’s political legitimacy, both 
at home and abroad. As well, social pressures are particularly strong on novices in an 
uncertain environment (Checkel, 2005). China at the time of the VAT dispute can be 
clearly categorised as a novice in the WTO system. Merely into its third year as a 
formal WTO member, after decades of negotiations and promises to abide by 
international rules, Beijing was keen to steer clear of any action that might cause it to be 
stigmatised as protectionist and tarnish its image as a “responsible power.”   
Again, this is not to imply that reputation reinforcement can influence policy 
preferences. Sure, it is undeniable that Beijing cares very much about its reputation, just 
like any other country. But the reputation factor is a relative variable in the eyes of 
Chinese decision-makers and its significance varies according to the situation and 
circumstances of a given issue and at a given moment in time.
214
 Generally speaking, 
the view of the Chinese government is that if the WTO was to portray a negative 
reputation to the media about China, then no matter what it does, it will still be 
portrayed negatively. As one MFA policy advisor explained, “If a person is reflected as 
ugly through the mirror, no matter how that person dresses itself, it will still be reflected 
with an ugly image.”215 To the Chinese decision-makers, they know that the Chinese 
public generally hold the view that any negative image depicted of China is usually 
created by the western media and therefore it is an external problem that has no impact 
domestically whatsoever. Since it does not generally affect the Chinese public, it 
implies a relatively low political risk attached to a less-than-satisfactory reputation 
abroad, and thus, Beijing does not feel the need to change its preferences in response to 
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reputation-building. This is a basic domestic support versus international attempts at 
driving China’s reputation balance; when the former is stronger, then the impact of the 
latter is weakened.
216
 The reverse is also true: if domestic support is weak, then the 
impact of reputation reinforcement could be stronger. At the end of the day, China’s 
national interest remain at the centre core and the effectiveness of the reputation 
reinforcement mechanism is contingent on whether it (i) serves China’s interest; and (ii) 
the political and economic costs associated with a non-commitment approach – if the 
risks, especially politically, are high, then this mechanism is more likely to be 
impactful.
217
  
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Over the last decade of DDA negotiations, China has consistently upheld its 
fundamental principles and remained, for the most part, loyal to its modest policy 
preferences. The country has repeatedly called for the need to treat the RAMs with 
flexibility and permit the space for developing countries to learn, adapt and adjust its 
national regulations fit for international cooperation. At the core of China’s position is a 
reinforcement of the development dimension of the DDA, and a push for a balanced 
negotiation outcome between the developed and developing countries. But changes in 
national preferences have also occurred, especially concerning the GPA and services 
trade. Given China’s strengthened relationship with the WTO agencies, this chapter was 
interested to see whether actors of the multilateral trade regime have any capacity to 
influence Chinese preference formation on international trade issues.  
The study found that although it is difficult to pin-point one most effective 
mechanism of influence, all three have some influence, though at varying degrees. The 
mechanism with the least influence is reputation reinforcement. Because the multilateral 
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trade negotiations under the WTO are driven primarily by narrow commercial 
considerations rather than moral ones, and this lowers the political risk of adopting a no-
commitments national preference. With this said, the decision-makers also recognise 
that given the importance of international trade as a key economic lifeline of China, 
maintaining a reputable global image is of imperative, which means that policymakers 
do feel the need to consider reputation factors when forming its policy preferences. Still, 
this is a case-dependent factor that is contingent on the perceived political costs. For this 
reason, reputation has an inertia-absorption level of influence.   
 By comparison, a seemingly more effective mechanism is the costs-and-benefits 
calculus. By focusing on the benefits of cooperation, the WTO agencies have instigated 
a momentum in Beijing’s preference shifts for the GPA and services modalities, though 
to different extents. The presence of contingencies for this mechanism means that the 
costs-and-benefits calculus does not have a transformative degree of influence, though it 
also does not just have an absorptive-level of influence. Rather, its impact-factor sits in 
between transformation and absorption. Finally, information dissemination was found to 
be effective in reshaping policymakers’ awareness and understanding about the 
negotiating issues, but its capacity to change policy preferences is constrained by 
limitations in Beijing and at the WTO. Due to its limitations, this direct mechanism has 
an absorption level of influence.  
With all the mechanisms considered, none of the mechanisms have a 
transformative, retrenchment or inertia effect. Reputation reinforcement has arguably an 
inertia-absorptive influence level, while the costs-and-benefits calculus has an 
absorptive-transformative level of influence. Only information dissemination has 
absorptive influence. Based on these research outcomes, the primary hypothesis is 
partially valid. That is, none of the mechanisms can independently influence China’s 
trade policy preferences as each is tied with contingencies and limitations.      
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 This conclusion, however, does support the underlying assumption of the 
primary hypothesis, which suggests that the level of influence WTO agencies have is 
contingent on situational factors: national objectives, policy goals, policy settings, and 
policy instruments. In all cases, it was found that the influence level was dependent on 
whether the mechanisms serve China’s national objectives. The costs-and-benefits 
mechanism worked well for the GPA because it served Beijing’s political reform 
agenda on corruption. Information dissemination worked less well for services because 
it did not claim much benefit to China’s national objectives. China’s national objective 
to establish itself as a peaceful and cooperative nation also heightened the influence of 
reputation reinforcement to an extent. The policy goal contingency was a key 
determinant for the effectiveness of information dissemination and the costs-and-
benefits calculus. For instance, with a policy goal of tackling corruption, Beijing needed 
resources to which the WTO agencies provided, albeit at an elementary level. 
Reversely, the lack of congruency between China’s policy goals in services and the 
international discourse undermines the WTO agencies’ influence in this sector.  
Next, the impediment of Beijing’s fragmented coordination and decision-making 
processes is the policy setting contingency which has hampered the WTO agencies’ 
information dissemination efforts. As well, the extent to which China takes reputation 
reinforcements seriously also depends on the broader domestic and international 
settings by means of pressure and scrutiny. Finally, policy instruments as a contingency 
was featured in information dissemination. For instance, the WTO agencies’ lack of 
professional systemic support on issues such as the GPA and services undermined its 
perceived credibility by the Chinese decision-makers. In all, China’s trade diplomacy 
preference formation does have access points for WTO agencies to manoeuvre 
influence, but the extent of actualised influence is circumscribed by the situational 
factors.  
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Chapter 6 
  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SHADOW RELATIONSHIP  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to create a better understanding about the way(s) 
that multilateral economic regime (MERs) agencies can influence Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation. Two main MERs – the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
– were examined, and two “case-pairs” formed the empirical basis of study. The cases 
were considered appropriate because of the widely held perception that there would be 
no substantial change in China’s preferences in these areas but that change were 
identified. These case study data were applied to three hypothesised mechanisms of 
MER agency influence: the costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination, and 
reputation reinforcement.  The task of this chapter is to draw together the empirical 
findings and synthesise the results for the purpose of yielding generalisable conclusions 
regarding the primary hypothesis. These mechanisms of influence are largely applicable 
and probably effective at the national preference formation and policy-drafting stages of 
economic diplomacy decision-making. The key questions this chapter addresses are: 
were all hypothesised mechanisms effective or were some more so than others? What 
are some defining contingencies of influence? In the long-run, how does the China-
MER relationship affects Beijing’s decision-making structure?  
The goal here is not to identify clear causal mechanisms between success level 
and the institutional make-up or type of advice being produced. Rather, several factors 
can be identified, to which have had an impact on not only the credibility, legitimacy, 
and salience of advice, but also on the way advice is received and responded to by the 
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relevant policymaking body in Beijing. Our examples demonstrate that there is no 
single best approach, and that flexibility and adaptability are fundamental. Ultimately, 
the chapter finds that China does not refuse the influence of MER agencies. Rather, it 
absorbs and adapts to their influences within the existing domestic system. Sometimes 
policy actors will use the MERs’ influence to their own advantage in the domestic inter-
agency bargaining process. With this said, the highest probable influence of the MER 
agencies can achieve is, on average, an absorption level, and the costs-and-benefits 
calculus and information dissemination mechanisms are arguably most effective ways 
of channelling influence.   
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Sections two, three, and four 
discuss and synthesise the empirical results for the costs-and-benefits calculus, 
information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement mechanisms respectively. 
Thereafter, section five accounts for the variance of influence by discussing the related 
contingencies. Section six discusses the implication of the MER agencies’ influence on 
China’s decision-making structure. Finally, the last section concludes the present 
chapter.    
 
6.2 Costs-and-Benefits Calculus 
The interest-based rationalist approach holds the belief that states act as unitary rational 
actors, whereby the decision-makers will evaluate their policy options based on a costs-
and-benefits calculus; and formulate positions that is perceived to be maximising the net 
national gains (Bjorkum, 2005: 15; Underdal, 1998: 7). Accordingly rationalists argue 
that the MER agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation 
through an incentive restructuring process that involves assisting Beijing in determining 
a best outcome among different equilibria situations where more than one efficient 
solution exists. Usually this can be achieved through the calculations of the estimated 
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costs and benefits faced by China (Costa and Jorgensen, 2012: 4; Scharpf, 1997: 39; 
Chayes and Antonia, 1993: 178). In the process of doing so, the MER agencies structure 
the political situation and leave their own imprint on China’s preference formation. 
Based on these assumptions, it was hypothesised that the MER agencies influence 
Chinese national preference formation through the mechanism of costs-and-benefits 
calculus.  
As seen in the previous chapters, both “case-pairs” exhibited this kind of 
activities by the respective agencies from the UNFCCC and the WTO. The empirical 
data indicate that the UNFCCC actors have, over the past 15 years, frequently offered 
costs-and-benefits analyses to Chinese policymakers during its preference formation 
process on issues including the clean development mechanism (CDM) and mitigation. 
The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for instance, issued repetitive 
warnings about China’s vulnerabilities against the consequences of climate change, with 
millions of people habituated by the coastlines potentially struck by sea-level rises, and 
severe ramifications on agricultural output and fresh-water resources, all of which result 
in significant economic costs (IPCC, 2001, 2007).  
To address Beijing’s uncertainties about how mitigation might affect national 
development, there was evidence that the presiding staff of the Conference of Parties 
(COP) under the UNFCCC have argued against heavy abatement costs. Rather it 
reasoned that mitigation improves energy efficiency, diversifies energy sources, 
reforestation, and improves the energy sector, all of which are consistent with China’s 
national development objectives. As well, mitigation can spawn the development of 
new technological and industrial sectors with long-term commercial profits and short-
term technical and financial transfers from abroad (Underdal, 1998: 8). These benefits 
ultimately outweigh the alternative, which is economic predicaments and air pollution 
from the combustion of coal – causes of respiratory diseases and cancer. A consistent 
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non-cooperative stance could also result in international sanctions and damages to 
China’s international prestige and reputation. On the whole, the real costs to China from 
a non-cooperative position are 100 per cent higher than the price of the abatement that is 
also beneficial to development (Saich, 2001: 295). Interviews suggest that arguments as 
such certainly contributed to Beijing’s decision to complete an Initial National 
Communication on Climate Change (2004), and for the first time, the government 
acknowledged in the report its vulnerabilities to climate change. The national leaders 
emphasised the need for adaptation measures to be adopted and economic support for 
climate change activities. What is more, interviews suggest that the UNFCCC agencies’ 
costs-and-benefits calculations triggered Beijing’s newfound willingness to negotiate a 
legally-binding mitigation framework for the post-2015 period. Taking these events as 
indications of effectiveness, it is arguable that the UNFCCC agencies restructured 
Beijing’s incentives on the issue of climate change through its costs-and-benefits 
calculus.   
 A similar claim can be made for the GPA and services trade cases. In services 
trade, Beijing has been deeply concerned about the regulatory uncertainties in the 
governance of further services trade liberalisation. In response, the WTO’s Council on 
Services Trade argued that further opening up to foreign services providers and 
competition can reduce the cartel effect and attenuate the cost efficiency effect. As well, 
it can introduce the domestic market to new technical know-hows, and contribute to the 
economy’s production and export of more sophisticated and advanced products. Above 
all, the Council argued that the increased competition in the services sectors can boost 
economic growth and serve China’s national development. Similar focuses on the 
benefits of acceding to the GPA were made by the WTO’s Committee on Government 
Procurement. For instance, the Committee emphasised on the GPA’s advantage in 
controlling government corruption, which has prevailed within Beijing, especially in the 
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bidding and tendering processes. The increased transparency of the procurement system 
means that officials are more likely to reduce their incentives for self-enrichment, while 
firms will be more willing to bid, rather than bribe, for government contracts and have 
the incentive to do a good job. Interviewed policymakers have indicated that these 
arguments were relatively convincing and could have contributed to the gradual 
increase in flexibility for both areas of policy preferences. In turn, one can then make 
the easy argument that the WTO agencies were able to effectively influence Chinese 
trade policy through the rationalist mechanism.  
 Yet, other empirical indications also call for more prudency in drawing such a 
conclusion. In spite of the WTO agencies’ costs-and-benefits exercises, China did not 
formally adopt a real transformative change in its preferences on services trade. True, 
the coverage of China’s opening-up has expanded over the years it is nonetheless 
incremental (instead of an all-out reform); and many barriers remain intact across 
numerous services sectors. Compared with the GPA, the costs-and-benefits calculation 
was much less effective in influencing actual preference change in services trade. 
Likewise, the case-pair under the UNFCCC also showed that the degree of impact this 
mechanism had on mitigation is comparatively milder compared to the CDM. This 
variance was measured by the length of time (i.e., years) it took before Beijing shifted 
their preferences. While it only took two to three years for this mechanism to catalyse a 
preference change on the CDM, it took five-times as long to see a slight increase in 
rhetorical flexibility from the Chinese delegation on the mitigation issue.  
A key contingency of influence is the perception of Chinese decision-makers. 
For the most part, the decision-makers in Beijing did not believe that the payoff from 
cooperating in the long-term global effort to combat climate change through mitigation 
actions was significant enough to prioritise the government’s limited professional and 
other resources in this area over other short-term demands such as economic growth and 
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poverty alleviation. This perception in turn undermined the UNFCCC agencies’ costs-
and-benefits calculation on mitigation. The situation could not have been more different 
for the CDM. Key decision-makers in Beijing believed that the benefits of joining the 
initiative would contribute to both the short-term development policy goals, and long-
term battles against global warming. The proximity between the UNFCCC agencies’ 
arguments and that of the decision-makers’ perceptions thereby granted the former with 
stronger influence. This contingency is of equal relevance to the WTO cases. A reason 
the GPA was more susceptible to the Committee’s costs-and-benefits calculations than 
services trade to the Council’s was that the decision-makers perceived the benefits of 
acceding to the GPA framework to be of significance to China’s political reform agenda 
and therefore the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
 Where the WTO and the UNFCCC cases differ is that the former indicates the 
importance of not just the perception of decision-makers but also the political rank of 
the decision-makers. For instance, the GPA case felt more external influence from the 
Committee’s costs-and-benefits calculation, not only because it appealed to the 
ministerial-level policymakers, but that it also attracted the elite members of the 
Politburo. Services trade, on the other hand, only appealed to the second-tier decision-
makers from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). This goes to show that the political rank 
of the receiver of the costs-and-benefits analysis matter, at least in the WTO context. 
This is not a surprising or unique finding about China; support from senior decision-
makers in any country enhances the MER agencies’ influence on preference formation. 
But in a system where policy preferences often rest in the hands of a few elite leaders as 
in Beijing, this factor is even more pertinent.  
By comparison, the UNFCCC cases did not present much evidence that this 
played a key role in either enhancing or undermining external influence. This is perhaps 
due to the inter-agency processes. In climate change, although the power structure can 
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at times marginalise second-tier agencies, the interests and objectives among the 
ministries and commissions involved are generally cohesive and the power structure 
clearly defined. However, decision-making for trade negotiations often involve various 
competing interests between agencies, with many having overlapping responsibilities 
and the power structure is rather ambivalent and fragmented. For example, although the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) coordinates trade policies, a constellation of other 
agencies take the lead across a range of specialised trade issues,
218
 which dampens-
down the MOFCOM’s authority and disturbs the inter-agency policy cohesion at large. 
In this context, it is important for agencies involved in trade policy to have the backing 
and support of the elite leaders in order to have their preferred preferences promoted 
above others. As such, it is also of imperative for the WTO agencies to establish good 
relations with the elite leaders in Beijing in order to enjoy greater influence through the 
mechanism of costs-and-benefits calculus.   
 
Overall, this study finds the costs-and-benefits mechanism of influence partially valid, 
with an absorption level of influence.   
 
6.3 Information Dissemination 
The preceding discussion on the limitation of the costs-and-benefits calculus includes a 
problem of uncertainty caused by incomplete information. Cognitivists would argue this 
demonstrates the important role of information in shaping Chinese preferences. As John 
S. Odell (2000: 189) argues, the importance of studying (technical) information about a 
problem, and designing the next plan of action according to the studies of the available 
information is of imperative for designing national negotiation positions and its success 
in reaching the optimal outcome. The MER agencies, including the UNFCCC, the 
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WTO, and others such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have played 
significant roles in conducting fiscal and other related research, for instance, not just for 
increasing technical awareness but also on how nations can cooperate.
219
 Cognitivists 
therefore believe information dissemination is an effective way for MER agencies to 
influence Chinese preference formation. 
   In contrast to rationalism, cognitivists downplay the factor of “interests” and 
claim that Chinese decision-makers hold imperfect information and tentative policy 
preferences when they enter political processes (Haas, 1990).
220
 In this situation, the 
MER agencies have the opportunity to adjust, reframe, and/or reshape the perceptions of 
the Chinese decision-makers through the dissemination of ideological and professional 
information (Softing, 2000: 24; Underdal, 1998: 21). According to the case studies, 
information dissemination activities from the UNFCCC and the WTO agencies were 
prevalent, and primarily in the form of informal dialogues, information exchanges, 
research collaborations, training workshops, and so on. Indication of these activities 
support the cognitive assumption that the growing complexity and uncertainties over 
global economic problems will often lead policymakers to turn to new and different 
channels for advice, and specifically to new networks of knowledge-based experts 
within the MERs in order to articulate its objectives in forthcoming negotiations; realise 
the real stakes or interests of the Chinese government; and the perceived appropriate 
policy remedies (Haas, 1992: 12). For the most part, interviewees across the cases 
commonly agree that external information affects the perceptions of Chinese decision-
makers, not least because the professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise 
possessed by the professional staff of the MER agencies are viewed with great respect 
in Beijing and thus accord them access to the Chinese political system in a way that 
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grants them great potential for influence. If the shortcoming of the rationalist 
mechanism was due to perception, then in theory, the cognitive mechanism of 
information dissemination should be much more impactful given its ability to shape 
decision-makers’ policy preferences.   
 Yet, the empirical data from the two case-pairs showed great variances in the 
degree of influence information dissemination can actually inflict. The variances are 
caused by three contingencies. The first relates to the political and economic costs 
involved with implementing international discourse; the higher the political and/or 
economic costs, the less influential the international discourse. In the GPA negotiations, 
the political costs of agreeing with the WTO agencies’ recommendations for accession 
would undermine Beijing’s autonomy, which is a political cost it was not willing to 
compromise at first. The economic costs of supporting the UNFCCC agencies’ 
proposals on mitigation would imply the need to restructure China’s entire energy 
sector, which can have dire consequences on China’s energy security and social stability 
in the short- and immediate-term. By contrast, the minimal political and economic costs 
as communicated by the international discourse on the CDM initiative led to a much 
faster adoption than any other climate change modality to date. Hence, the perceived 
economic and political costs conveyed through the information disseminated to Beijing 
can have substantial impacts on its influence levels. Here, it is clear to see that the 
degree of influence information dissemination can achieve is tightly intertwined with, 
and to an extent, determined by the government’s costs-and-benefits calculations of 
adopting international discourse. Although the real political and economic costs across 
the cases were relatively at par for all issues, the empirical data found that the 
policymakers nonetheless perceived the nominal costs to be slightly higher for the 
services trade and mitigation cases compared to the other issues. This might explain the 
slower pace in preference shifts among the issues. Thus, the management of the 
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government’s costs-and-benefits calculations is a key contingency to the influence of 
information dissemination.  
 It was previously mentioned that an advantage of information dissemination is 
its ability to shape the perceptions of decision-makers by tailoring information to that 
purpose. However, the cognitive theory does not explain how information can actually 
reform perception other than taking it as an automatic consequence. When this 
assumption was applied, results from the comparative empirical analyses was that it is 
often challenged by the  MER agencies’ real capacity to competently design discourse 
in a way that can induce perceptual changes especially where the policymaker holds 
strong beliefs; and/or tailor it according to actual perceptions. For starters, Chinese 
decision-makers have for many decades treated international discourse with scepticism 
and caution, partly due to its perceived poor quality and incompetence to even address 
questions posed by the Chinese decision-makers. In trade, such inadequacies were 
reflected in the GPA case study, where the WTO agencies failed to provide even the 
most basic information such as the definition of “government procurement.” Imprecise 
and vague information have challenged Beijing to ascertain what they should negotiate 
about. A similar case can be found in climate change, when  China asked the IPCC in 
2003 to develop practicable methodologies to “factor out” direct human-induced 
changes in carbon stocks from those due to indirect human-induced and natural effects, 
the IPCC responded that “the scientific community cannot currently provide a 
practicable methodology” that would do so (IPCC, 2003). The problem – known as 
“factoring out” – had to be brought back to the negotiating table to be addressed with a 
political decision. This goes to show that while there are some questions that are simply 
too complex for science to answer in a manner that satisfies the Chinese decision-
makers, others involving moral or ethical questions are perhaps better answered directly 
by the policymakers.  
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The Chinese decision-makers have additionally held the traditional view that 
most international discourse are too westernised to be applicable templates in the 
“China” context.221  For example, when the IPCC Working Group III attempted an 
economic valuation of the social costs of climate change impacts, including human life, 
for the Second Assessment Report, the writing team used controversial assumptions 
based on the available literature on the “value of statistical life.” These assumptions 
were based on the economists’ calculation that human life is valued differently in 
developed and developing countries, since the risk of death is not valued equally 
between countries (i.e., based on a “willingness to pay” approach). Chinese delegates 
like most of the developing world reacted with indignation at the suggestion that human 
lives in their countries were somehow worth less than in rich countries.
222
 The 
disagreement between the economists who had written the report and the Chinese 
policymakers was such that the Working Group III report failed to get plenary approval 
in July 1995, and although governments eventually accepted the chapter, they changed 
the “Summary for Policymakers” in such a way that it implicitly criticised the 
underlying chapter. In angry responses, the IPCC authors dissociated themselves from 
the summary (Brack and Grubb, 1996). Thus, a discussion on the form and function of 
information dissemination by the MER agencies, therefore, must acknowledge an 
underlying point, which is that for Chinese policymakers it matters who produces the 
information that are used to inform its preference formation. 
 The second explanation regards Beijing’s incoherent inter-agency processes.223 
Most economic issues involve multifaceted problems that require the involvement of 
numerous agencies, and each agency tends to have small staffs, and vary widely in their 
level of activity as well as in ministerial interests. In trade, a decision on the trade in 
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 Interview with a policy officer from the National Development and Reform Commission, Beijing, 21 
September 2012. 
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 A cash value of US$1.5 million was assigned to a human life in the OECD, for example, while one in 
a developing country was assigned a mere US$150,000. 
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Interview with an expert from Harvard University, Boston, 11 June 2012. 
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transport services, for instance, is attached with complicated, lengthy and changing 
procedures, requirements and documentation; and concerns a labyrinth of agencies, 
ranging from transport, customs, immigration, security, health, veterinary and 
phytosanitary issues, product quality, and the private sector actors. When compelled to 
come together for consensus-building, these agencies tend to aim to assert jurisdiction 
over the same issue, compete with each other for scarce budget resources, power, and 
recognition from higher government officials. Consequently, bureaucratic competition 
can sometimes result in the agencies declining to implement each other’s policies, based 
on the claim that they lack budget resources or man-power (Lawrence and Martin, 2012: 
10-11). The implication of this on negotiations is that Beijing will often act silently in 
order to buy more time to address internal conflicts. Dipak Das Gupta (1997) supports 
this finding by suggesting that the reason for China’s defensive positions in trade 
negotiations is often due to institutional challenges. Although China has established 
coordination organs (i.e., leading small groups or LSGs), they rarely function 
efficiently.  
 What is more, the case studies further show that international discourse can 
diversify ministerial interests and add further fragmentation between the government 
agencies. Such was seen in the services trade case. A policymaker for climate change 
issues said, “The WTO does a fantastic job distributing information, but sometimes the 
ministries are flooded with information to the extent that it becomes difficult for 
ministries to manage, synthesise and establish consensus accordingly. So contrary to 
studies (i.e., Yu, 2008) that argue engagement with international actors can improve 
inter-ministerial coordination, this study found that too much diverse information 
actually cause further inter-agency divergence, which is also why both MERs failed to 
achieve maximum influence through information dissemination. But learning from the 
CDM example, if MER agencies distribute identical information tailored for a diverse 
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audience and yet ensures its relevance, it is feasible to create inter-ministerial 
convergence in interests and consensus.   
 Finally, it is important for the international discourse to be supported by the 
Chinese business and industrial actors. This empirical finding contradicts an underlying 
cognitive assumption that the MER agencies usually equip the Chinese government 
with information and ideas for the conduct of analyses and for the purpose of reaching 
policy decisions independent of direct pressures from organised groups or citizens. In 
other words, business actors exert little direct influence on the policy decisions of the 
government officials (Jacobs and Page, 2005: 108). In reality, as one China expert puts 
it, “Enterprises are the skeleton of Chinese decision-making today.”224 This is not to say 
that Chinese enterprises today operate completely independently from the central 
government; China is still a top-down system. But domestic enterprises do have 
stronger influence over the government’s policy agenda. Ergo, holding their support can 
immensely boost the influence of MER agencies on the government’s preference 
formation.
225
 It was for this reason that the CDM case saw greater UNFCCC influence 
and more substantial preference shifts than mitigation; and it was the domestic 
enterprises that pushed the government to consider greater open-ups for services 
trade.
226
 Meanwhile it was the clear opposition from business actors concerning the 
information on mitigation that have kept the government’s preferences on the issue at 
relative constant resistance throughout much of the COPs negotiations. At the end of the 
day, without the support of domestic business actors, international ideas may not 
necessarily attract much attention from government agencies and officials.   
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 The enterprises’ independence is indicated by many companies’ convergence with international 
standards and has started competitive operations abroad against foreign firms; some have even entered the 
stock market. These indicate that many SOEs (including the oil companies) are no longer under pure 
government governance. Interview with an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 
8 November 2012.  
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 Interview with a financial advisor from the Export-Import Bank, Beijing, 20 November 2012. 
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 Interview with a policy advisor from the China Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 19 November 2012. 
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In all, it is clear to see that information dissemination does not have transformative 
influence, and that the cognitive assumptions do not inform Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation in a vacuum. But it is also not without any impact at 
all. Rather, information dissemination has an absorption level of influence, and the 
mechanism, as part of the primary hypothesis, is partially valid.     
 
6.4 Reputation Reinforcement  
Moving away from processes of socialisation, contractualists assume that social 
interactions have little or no effect on shaping preferences. Instead, actors generally 
emerge from interactions within MER agencies holding to the same perceptions and 
beliefs to which they entered with. Moreover, contractualists believe the quality and/or 
quantity of prior social interaction and information provision between the MER 
agencies and the Chinese decision-makers have no effect on the basic preferences of 
these decision-makers in the short- or long-run. So it should be irrelevant whether China 
decides to cooperate or not (Frank, 1988: 143). With this said, contractualists do share 
the cognitive assumption that the MER agencies can provide new information to reduce 
uncertainty about the credibility of the commitment of others’ and thus help China 
converge their expectations around some cooperative outcome (Martin 1999, 84). But 
their difference lies in that contractualists argue information only affect the policy 
actors’ perception of the strategic – rather than social – environment whereby the actor 
pursues a fixed set of policy preferences – there is no reassessment on the desirability of 
these preferences after the information engagement. In addition, contractualists argue 
that an assumption based on the information runs a regression problem. Unless there are 
prior agreements on a set of criteria about success and failure, what makes the 
information about success or failure conclusive? How are prior agreements on these 
criteria formed? In what way can actors be convinced of reliability of the information 
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concerning the validity of the criteria? What leads to an agreement of credibility based 
on the criteria about credibility? At any stage it could be suggested that policy actors 
received reliable information regarding an economic problem and leave it at that. But 
this does not escape the problem that at any given point, the criteria for establishing the 
credibility of new information are problematic.  
A better mechanism for the contractualists is through an under-socialised nature 
of motivating Chinese decision-makers based on arguments about reputation. Without 
rehearsing too much details of the assumptions, it suffices to say that with the changing 
global political and economic landscape, the proliferation of media and communication 
technologies, the emergence of new MER players, the complex confluence of these 
facets have meant that the credibility and effectiveness of standard Chinese 
communication practices in public diplomacy is increasingly under challenge (Wang, 
2006: 92). Hence, the desire to maximise reputation, both domestically and 
internationally, can motivate the Chinese government to cooperate and avoid social 
sanctions (i.e., psychological anxiety from opprobrium) (Frank, 1988: 32).
227
 It is 
widely accepted that a motivation for compliance is the fear of opprobrium even if this 
causes a suboptimal outcome for the actor. Oran Young (1989: 176-177) remarks, 
“Policymakers, like private individuals, are sensitive to the social opprobrium that 
accompanies violations of widely accepted behavioural prescriptions. They are, in short, 
motivated by a desire to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace that commonly 
befalls those who break widely accepted rules.” These specific micro-processes where 
actors are compelled to act in a way that prevents opprobrium are similar to those that 
encourage people to pursue back-patting.  
At the macro level, Beijing has an interest to maintain a consistently good 
reputation and credibility so other actors will be encouraged to deal with China in other 
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 Reversely, conforming to group behaviour could be rewarded with psychological benefits and 
wellbeing from back-patting. 
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areas.
228
 In this context, contractualists argue that the MER agencies can affect Chinese 
preference formation by reinforcing its reputation. Just as Beijing is concerned about 
how foreign parties view China, and how it projects itself abroad, the MER agencies 
that engage with Chinese policy actors should be interested in the impact of China’s 
projected reputation vis-à-vis their actualised behaviour. If reputation can affect 
behaviour, the MER agencies can influence China’s preference formation by shaping 
the kinds of reputation it endeavours for. Yet, the question becomes how will one know 
when a strategic reputation has a causal influence on China’s economic diplomacy 
preference formation? There are two obvious ways of identifying the causal 
relationship. The first is to try and identify any direct evidence in which Chinese 
decision-makers have adopted a preference in order to be consistent with the strategic 
reputation it seeks to project. The second is to identify any indirect evidence that a 
policy preference is (not) adopted because of intervening variables such as economic 
side-payments that may be consistent with the hoped-for reputation. Since direct 
evidence are difficult to find due to the largely opaque nature of China’s preference 
formation, this analysis relies on the indirect evidence.    
The empirical research finds that a prominent aspect of China’s approach to the 
MER agencies regards a concern about its reputation. This motivation stemmed out of 
historical experiences, and recovering its disrupted reputation was not only a national 
objective but a key reason for engaging with the MERs in the first place (Hatch 2003, 
51; Oksenberg and Economy, 1999: 21). In the late-1980s when the issues relating to 
climate change took momentum, China saw this as an opportunity to boost its prestige 
and bolster support especially from the developing countries (Zhang, 2003: 78). At the 
COP15 in Copenhagen, insiders interviewed for this research suggested that the 
UNFCCC Secretary-General, Christiana Figueres, stressed to the Chinese delegation the 
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 Interview with a policy advisor from the China Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 19 November 2012. 
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expense of their non-cooperative national preference on their reputation; and similar 
sentiments were expressed to the global media through press briefings. True to her 
words, China’s part in the eventual breakdown of the negotiations did not go unnoticed. 
When the Chinese leaders walked out on a leaders’ informal consultation, it became the 
face of blame for the collapse of yet another round of negotiations and it was labelled as 
“immoral” and “irresponsible” to human life.229 The impact of this was significant for a 
country sensitive to external criticisms. The effect is not unique to China. A parallel can 
be drawn when the United States (US) withdrew, in 2001, from the Kyoto Protocol, and 
caused heavy protests from many state representatives and the wider international civil 
society. In the subsequent negotiations, China carefully orchestrated its rhetoric and 
actions in a benign manner to avoid being taken as the scapegoat of failure. The trade 
negotiations similarly had the Chinese government bear the grant of international 
criticisms for acting “passively” and “selfishly” to protect its own interest at the expense 
of the global economic good. Members of the Chinese delegate indicated that senior 
members of the WTO (i.e., Pascal Lamy) often hinge at China about its reputation as a 
major economy and the responsibilities that comes with. Contractualists (i.e., Kreps, 
1992) believe doing so stems pro-social behaviour and incentivise nation-states to 
engage in norm-conforming acts.  
If reputation was a very important driving force, one could have expected a more 
proactive set of national preferences in both trade and climate change negotiations, even 
if the purpose was just to impress its domestic and international audiences. However, to 
date, the world has yet to see any drastic preference shifts from Beijing in areas such as 
the mitigation and services trade negotiations, among many others. In mitigation, 
despite being taken as a scapegoat for past failures, China has not, to date, made actual 
legally-binding commitments under the UNFCCC. The best it has done is pay lip 
service to potential future targets. Similarly, despite the international finger-pointing on 
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China in the trade talks, services trade remains an unfinished business. Why did 
reputation not trigger policy changes? A prevalent view from the interviews was that the 
degree of influence reputation reinforcements could have depends on the level of 
political pressures China feels from other negotiating partners or the perceived political 
risks of taking a non-commitment position. In the earlier years of negotiations for all the 
cases, even though Beijing was concerned about its reputation, the costs inflicted on 
reputation as a result of taking a low-commitment posture was not high enough to have 
the Chinese decision-makers insist on a shift in their national preferences towards 
climate change and international trade issues. As Elizabeth Economy (1997: 39) 
observes, China’s preferences for most economic negotiations are conditioned by how 
willing the US is in taking on serious commitments. China “has emphasised that as long 
as the US does not take on commitments, it would be politically unacceptable for them 
[China] to do so” (Bang, Heggelund and Vevatne, 2005: 26). In this context, the level of 
pressure placed on, and of which determines the reputation cost of China stems largely 
from the negotiating partners as well as the members of “G77 plus China” and the 
“Group of Twenty” (G20) as opposed to just the MER agencies per se. So contrary to 
the contractualist assumption, the reputation mechanism alone does not change China’s 
national preference. It usually requires geopolitical factors to supplement its 
effectiveness.  
Another point of caution, as the interviews stressed, is that the reputation card is 
only effective on China if it has material incentives attached to it, including the transfer 
of funds and technology, usually obtained through economic side-payments. For 
instance, there may be resistance by other players to transfer technologies to a country 
that is perceived as having a free-rider status – a reputation perhaps shaped by pass 
experiences. Hence, the more material and economic benefits a country receives, the 
more careful it will be regarding its reputation as a compliant and committed actor 
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(Johnston, 1998: 559). In this sense, it is not necessarily the effect of the MER agencies 
that causes China to treat reputation with care, but because of other materialistic 
incentives. In the words of one Chinese decision-maker, “Yes, reputation does play a 
part in China’s decision-making, especially within the economic arena. But mere 
pressure from the multilateral institutions does not usually lead to substantial preference 
change. There are usually other factors that come into play in conjunction.” The 
UNFCCC actors have certainly played the reputation card with the Chinese delegation 
since its inception. But it was only in recent years that China demonstrated growing 
concerns about its reputation vis-à-vis its national preferences. If the reputation 
mechanism alone can really generate effective influence, why has it taken this long to 
see effect?  
This leads us to the point that it is often difficult to judge whether a national 
preference change is due to the influence of the MER agencies or whether it is strategic 
play – i.e., China can set-up a positive image deceptively to convince other states to 
cooperate, setting them up for the sucker’s payoff in some exploitative prisoners’ 
dilemma game. As Robert Frank (1988) points out, one should be cautious not to take 
reputations of this nature as credible or reliable. In general, reputation-building 
behaviours are carried out under the assumption that it will be observed by a wide 
audience. China will see no point in engaging in reputation-building activities unless it 
is observable to others. But if reputation-building is carried out to be observed, then 
players within the observing audience are likely to doubt that it is actually a high-cost 
behaviour.  
With this said, such line of argument has three drawbacks. First, as Alastair I. 
Johnston (2008) points out, if other nations find out about this instrumentality, then 
China’s reputation as a responsible co-operator will be ruined, and in turn, place it in a 
relatively disadvantaged position. That is why it is within China’s interests to naturally 
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seek cooperation in order to strengthen its credible reputation. Second, instrumentality 
assumes that with a positive reputation, policy actors are able to seek more concrete and 
calculated benefits. This implies that a good reputation can be used as some form of 
leverage in some issue-areas. With this said, it is also the case that concrete benefits are 
hard to identify or that they are rather diffuse and ambiguous (Kelley, 2004). Finally, 
instrumental arguments about reputation invoke external (and material) costs as the 
disincentive to acting in anti-social ways. That is, observed anti-social behaviour is 
costly because it might lead to a loss of trust and thus a loss of exchange opportunities 
and payoffs (mostly calculated in streams of economic welfare or political power).  
 
In sum, this study finds the primary hypothesis on the mechanism of reputation 
reinforcement partially valid, with an influence level between inertia and absorption.  
  
6.5 Measuring Influence  
It is one thing to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of theoretical assumptions in 
light of the empirical data and quite another to measure the level of influence, given that 
the MER agencies can produce different sorts of policy preference shifts across various 
issue-areas, which renders them difficult to not just compare with each other but also 
judge accurately the comparative strength of each mechanism. Nevertheless, the 
dependent variable of this research – China’s economic diplomacy preference formation 
– has been measured in a consistent and flexible way. And the qualitative scale has 
covered all the possible magnitudes and directions of preference change and it is 
comprehensive enough to include different sorts of change. As explained in the Chapter 
One, four indicators of influence are used in this thesis for measuring influence: inertia, 
absorption, transformation, and retrenchment. Table 6.1 summarises the four indicators 
vis-à-vis the empirical findings.   
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 The levels of influence were measured based on the qualitative findings and the 
extent in which the MER agencies’ influence were constrained by contingencies. As can 
be seen, substantial variances in the degrees of influence present itself across the 
mechanisms, case studies, and at different levels of analysis. As expected, the capacity 
of the MER agencies in altering China’s national preferences is unevenly distributed, 
and the variation of influence needs to be accounted for. One thing for sure is that none 
of the case studies have shown a retrenchment effect. That is, the Chinese government 
have not reacted against any of the MER agencies, at least within the time period of this 
research. This means that the MER agencies do have a level of influence. If the MER 
agencies have a lack of influence, it would have been suggested by an active and 
explicitly negative attitude from China towards the MER agencies. In addition, we 
would expect to see China to take specific measures to counteract the effects of the 
MER agencies. However, the empirical research has not identified any data that 
correspond to these realities. Therefore, it is argued that the MER agencies do hold a 
degree of influence on China’s preference formation. 
 
Table 6.1    Levels of Influence 
 
MER Negotiation 
Modality 
Costs-and-Benefits 
Calculus  
(Rationalism) 
Information 
Dissemination  
(Cognitivism) 
Reputation 
Reinforcement  
(Contractualism) 
UNFCCC CDMs Absorption Absorption Inertia/Absorption 
 Mitigation Absorption Absorption Inertia/Absorption 
WTO GPA Absorption Absorption Inertia/Absorption 
 Services Absorption Absorption Inertia/Absorption 
 
 The focus then shifts to how and through which mechanism the MER agencies 
can exert influence most effectively and efficiently. To do so, let us proceed in 
accordance with the three remaining indicators of impact, beginning with 
transformation. Transformation indicates a deep MER influence on China’s preference 
formation to the extent of drastic paradigm shifts. Empirically, however, this study finds 
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no cases where the MER agency was able to cause transformative changes in China’s 
national preferences through a single mechanism without any contingencies. A similar 
case can be made for the inertia level of influence. Inertia indicates a level of influence 
that is only slightly above minimal impact by the MER agency in question. Under this 
situation, the Chinese government may only acknowledge the MER agencies’ proposals 
and recommendations but its policy preferences remains constant. Like transformation, 
the study did not find any mechanisms to which satisfy the criteria of this indicator. 
Again, to have transformation level of influence, the mechanism cannot be constrained 
by any contingencies. This study, however, did not identify any mechanism that is not 
limited by a situational factor, one way or another. Therefore, no mechanism has this 
kind of influence.    
The only mechanism that came close to, though it cannot be placed as having, an 
inertia level of influence is reputation reinforcement. This mechanism was found to 
have a mid-range influence of both inertia and absorption, which implies that the MER 
agencies may have triggered some momentum, but that it did not catalyse actual 
national preference shifts. The justification for determining the reputation mechanism as 
having this level of influence is that not only is reputation reinforcement constrained by 
situational factor contingencies, but that it is challenged by a vague distinction between 
the impact of the MER agencies, and the influence of other factors such as the national 
governments of other countries. Such ambivalence cannot qualify the mechanism to an 
absorption level of influence. And yet, the evidence that suggest some MER 
significance in the preference formation implies that it does not have just an inertia-
level of influence. For this reason, reputation reinforcement is considered to be 
somewhere in between. Overall, it can be concluded that the MER agencies does not 
have a transformation or an inertia level of influence on China’s national preference 
formation.    
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 The last indicator is absorption. Absorption implies some influence on China, 
but this influence only propels the country to the point of adaptation, and any preference 
change is the result of both the MER agencies and other intervening variables. In other 
words, absorption refers to a situation in which China formally adopts the features and 
underlying collective understandings attached to them as derived from the MER 
agencies, but may not adopt any real policies and measures derived from a MER unless 
other factors (i.e., domestic constituents, existing interests) complements absorption. 
Looking at the preceding analyses, information dissemination and the costs-and-benefits 
calculus mechanisms are identified with this level of influence consistently across the 
cases. The absorption of the MERs’ proposals, recommendations, norms and practices 
has allowed the Chinese government to acquire new capacities to address the relevant 
issues, both internally and externally. But both mechanisms only reformed Chinese 
preferences to the point of acceptance and perhaps attitudinal and rhetorical adaptation 
in various forms.   
 
Given that two out of the three mechanisms have this level of influence it is arguable 
that, in general, and on average, the MER agencies have, at best, an absorption level of 
influence over China’s economic diplomacy preference formation. In addition, the 
costs-and-benefits calculation and information dissemination mechanisms are the most 
consistent and effective ways to channel influence.  
 
Although the thesis finds the MER agencies holding an absorption level of 
influence, it nonetheless implies that they do have a degree of impact. This impact is 
made possible because Chinese policy actors and agencies, under normal circumstances, 
do not reject the influence of the MER agencies. Instead, they are open to engagements 
with the MER agencies and absorb the consequential effects to policymaking. 
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Evidences of this were seen in China’s generally adaptive reactions to the MER 
agencies’ costs-and-benefits calculus and information dissemination activities during 
the preference formation processes. Moreover, the Chinese policy actors generally 
respect the analyses and viewpoints of the MER agencies and take them into serious 
consideration during the decision-making process. This is particularly the case when the 
Chinese decision-makers lack adequate information to make an informed and utility-
maximising decision. At times, the influence of the MER agencies is also used by 
certain government agencies to support their own ministerial interests and/or desired 
policy outcome. This was the case when the MEP and the MOST pushed for the 
adoption of the CDM initiative; and when the MOF encouraged a revision of China’s 
position for the GPA framework. In all, China’s reception of the MER agencies’ 
influence is generally a positive one.     
 
6.6 Accounting for the Variance of Influence  
In Chapter Two, it was assumed that the level of influence the MER agencies have can 
be affected, and is contingent on, policy settings, policy instruments, policy goals, and 
national objectives. This taxonomy of contingencies is referred to as the situational 
factors. The taxonomy of contingencies was informed by the structure-agency debate 
that pre-defined structures can enable or constrain agency, while agents can affect 
structure through reflexivity and cognition, among others. In this context, it was 
assumed that there are four categories of contingencies that determine (either by 
enhancing or undermining) the influence of the MER agencies. And the extent of their 
influence felt in Chinese preference formation depends on how well it complements the 
situational factors. The national objective is synonymous with national interests of 
which, in the present context, is the leadership legitimacy, of which Beijing is measured 
by its national development performances. The MER agencies’ influences often need to 
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be compatible with China’s development in order to affect preference formation. Policy 
goals are the targets and aim on Beijing’s political agenda that needs to be achieved in 
order to reach its national objectives. Policy setting is Beijing’s systemic political 
context, political dynamics and power relations across different levels of the 
government, and the bureaucratic interests. Finally, policy instruments are the 
mechanisms, channels, and political and professional tools that are used within a policy 
setting to carry out policymaking exercises. The qualitative data of this study found that 
much of the variances in the impact of the MER agencies across the case studies were 
due to different conformity to these situational factors. 
 National objective played a fundamental contingency role across all case studies 
and mechanisms. In the climate change cases, the influence of the costs-and-benefits 
mechanism, for instance, was undermined by a perceptive issue about the political 
opportunity costs that comes with a MER costs-and-benefits policy prescription. On the 
issue of mitigation, while Chinese decision-makers do not deny the predicament of 
climate change, they also perceive mitigation efforts as expensive to their short-term 
development goals, and ultimately to the government’s political legitimacy. For Beijing, 
the perceived cost is much more detrimental to them than the costs of non-action on 
mitigation. By comparison, the CDM initiative is attached with lower threats as it does 
not undermines but enhances China’s short-term priorities and contributes to its long-
term objectives. That is why the UNFCCC agencies’ costs-and-benefits analyses were 
more effective in shaping China’s CDM preferences compared to mitigation.  
The mechanism of information dissemination was likewise affected by the 
contingency of national objective. Continuing with the climate change cases, it was seen 
that a meaningful participation in mitigation would require a complete reorientation of 
China’s energy structure and substantial investment in new energy-efficient 
technologies. This implies an entire restructuring of the Chinese economy and 
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inevitably affects the country’s growth and social development, particularly in the short-
term. However, when the abatement costs of mitigation was later found to contribute to 
a rebalancing of China’s future development strategy, the government did overlook the 
short-term costs of economic restructuring and participated in the discussions about a 
future multilateral mitigation framework. Similar examples can be identified in the trade 
cases in support of this contingency. For instance, the influence of information 
dissemination was undermined in the GPA preference formation when regulations of 
the framework clashed with the government’s national objective of supporting the social 
development of the local indigenous population; as well as the realisation that a GPA 
membership could affect the government’s national autonomy. Thus, national objectives 
is a key determinant of the MER agencies’ influence, especially for the costs-and-
benefits and information dissemination mechanisms.  
 Related to national objectives is the policy goal contingency. The GPA case 
study illuminates that the costs-and-benefits calculations determined by the WTO’s 
Committee on Government Procurement effectively instigated preference shifts because 
the consequential benefits complement the government’s corruption control policy goal. 
The leaders were convinced that the GPA framework is a useful external force for 
addressing the domestic policy goal and as such, the Committee’s analyses galvanised 
much support in Beijing. China’s gradual flexibility in the services negotiations is a 
reflection of the fact that it had existing policy goals to reform the domestic services 
infrastructure and market. Therefore, the costs-and-benefits determined by the Council 
on Trade in Services also had gradual influence given that its estimated outcome 
converged with China’s policy goal in this regard. In the CDM case study, it was found 
that Beijing had a policy goal to transform its domestic economy to a low-carbon 
framework, which required significant amounts of investments that were available 
through the initiative. This provided a strong incentive for Beijing to reach an 
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agreement with the help of economic side-payments. Thus, the extents to which the 
MER agencies’ efforts are compatible with China’s policy goals matter much in 
determining its ultimate level of impact especially for the costs-and-benefits 
mechanism.  
 The third contingency is the policy setting. Across the case studies, it was seen 
that China’s political structure and system was a major impediment to the MER 
agencies’ influence, especially through the mechanism of information dissemination. In 
climate change, the earlier information dissemination efforts were overshadowed by the 
power structure between the key ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the 
periphery ones like the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the China 
Meteorological Administration (CMA), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP). Although the CMA, alongside the MOST and the MEP lead the policy 
coordination process and policy drafting, they are marginalised by the MFA and the 
NDRC when the political debates begin. In trade, although the MOFCOM is responsible 
for the GPA negotiations and policy coordination processes, the MOF also leads 
numerous dimensions of the negotiations due to its high-level content relevance. 
Meanwhile, the NDRC is the oversight agency against the GPA, although the MOF has 
on numerous occasions implemented national positions outside the NDRC’s authority. 
All the while, the MOFCOM has the discretion to either accept or ignore other 
ministerial proposals, depending on the consensus and support of the top leaders. 
Decision-making for services points to a likewise situation. Although the MOFCOM is 
formally the leading trade policy agency, and usually represents China in trade 
negotiations, it only has the authority of a negotiator on behalf of industries but not the 
authority of a real coordinator. Fragmented decision-making settings as these make it 
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very difficult for the WTO agencies to channel information successfully, let alone 
produce impact.  
In a likewise fashion, the external setting that surrounds China’s preference 
formation (i.e., MER monitoring, foreign country observations, international scrutiny, 
and global media pressures) can impose much impact on China’s ultimate preference as 
the government does care about its domestic and international reputation. The study 
found that the higher the pressures in this regard, the more susceptible Beijing becomes 
to MER influence. In all, policy setting plays a crucial role in determining MER 
influence, especially for the cognitive and contractual mechanisms.   
 Last but not least, policy instruments determine much of the MER agencies’ 
influence. A particularly useful and effective policy instrument for the information 
dissemination mechanism across all case-pairs was support from the Chinese business 
and industrial actors – a key constituent group for the CPC. Gaining support from 
domestic industries, state-owned and private alike enhances the political weight of the 
discourse disseminated to Beijing, because it raises the political anti of non-action. 
Hence, the availability of industrial support for the CDM case, and the lacklustre of it in 
mitigation was a key reason for the difference in the influence level of the UNFCCC 
agencies. Similarly, the clash of the WTO agencies’ discourse with the interests of the 
SOEs played a significant part in China’s initial rejection to further liberalise services 
trade. Then support from the domestic private enterprises in services prompted the 
government to reform their position, though incrementally.  
Another notable instrument that affected the MER agencies’ influence was the 
systemic mechanisms within the UNFCCC and the WTO. The UNFCCC agencies’ role 
as provider of operational advice can sometimes fall prey to concerns relating to the 
credibility of the output that are unrelated to the quality of the science as such. While 
broad membership subsidiary bodies lend well to legitimacy in providing the expert 
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advice required for achieving a treaty’s governance goals, in practice they often fail to 
deliver salient and timely advice to China. Likewise, interviews point out that the 
WTO’s services norms tend to be vague, and there is limited support available to China. 
Within the WTO’s Council on Services Trade, there is only a handful of expert staff 
that provides sectoral/regulatory expertise to China among other countries. The limited 
support from the WTO means that China has often had to seek support from elsewhere. 
Hence, the MER agencies’ deficiencies served to undermine their own attempts at 
influence. In all, having effective and reliable policy instruments is important for 
boosting the influence of the MER agencies, especially for the information 
dissemination mechanism. 
 With all considered, it can be concluded that, as expected, the underlying 
assumption of the primary hypothesis holds in the China context. That is, the level of 
actualised influence the MER agencies have on China’s preference formation is 
contingent on four situational factors: national objective, policy goals, policy setting, 
and policy instruments. 
 All four situational factors are dynamic by nature; that is, they are not fixed 
variables. The four factors can be affected by a change in the decision-makers’ beliefs, 
worldviews, and/or a change in the central government’s strategy of governance. Hence, 
a change in the core foundation of the state can alter abstract policy goals, or the type of 
policy instruments utilised for meeting the needs of those goals. According to the 
research interviews, the drivers of changes in the situational factors are fundamentally 
the emergence of new ideas and policy actors. An understanding about the relationship 
between the two variables – actors and ideas – can lead to new appreciations for the 
situational factors as determinants of China’s economic diplomacy preference 
formation. For example, China’s policy goal can evolve when new policy actors – 
emerged from a leadership change, for instance, or from the introduction of new policy 
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specialists and interested parties – have simultaneous preferences. Alternatively, policy 
goals could also change from the emergence of new ideas (which may include a shift in 
the general policy frames that emerges either from a change in the preference formation 
venue and/or through a policy learning process).  
However, the advent of new actors and ideas into the preference formation 
apparatus is not an automatic one, because factors such as informal politics (i.e., path 
dependencies and closed networks) can weaken the possibilities of altering the existing 
constellations of beliefs and the related policy actors (Hansen and King, 2001; Coleman 
and Perl, 1999). Hence, the emergence of new actors in a path-dependent situation, for 
example, is only likely to cause a change in the kind of policy instrument Chinese 
decision-makers use in preference formation as opposed to any broader shifts in policy 
goals or national objectives. In this context, the propensity for change in the situational 
factors can be considered as driven by the interactive effects of stable and change 
processes. This implies that an assessment on the influence of the MER agencies in 
China’s preference formation necessitates an analysis on how the macro-level processes 
impact the micro- and meso-level structures. As such, the likely impact of the China-
MER relationship on the decision-making structure in Beijing is discussed in the 
following section.          
 
6.7 Consequences of Influence on Decision-Making Structure 
Beyond mere influence on preference formation, this thesis also found implications 
from the Beijing-MER interaction on China’s decision-making structure. What are the 
long-term cumulative effects of engagements with the MER agencies on China’s overall 
policy structure? For some Chinese decision-makers, they believe that the MER 
agencies have marginal long-term impact because it is the issues that cause institution 
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rather than the institution on issues.
230
 This also implies that the trajectory and design of 
China’s national interests and policy agendas are immune from exterior forces. Without 
denying this view, the qualitative data of the present thesis also indicate that the MER 
agencies have an impact on the decision-making structure. In Chapter Three, it was 
argue that engagement with MERs decentralises the decision-making system. In 
addition to this effect, this section further argues that engaging with the MER agencies 
fundamentally shifts the domestic inter-agency balance by providing opportunities or 
constraints to certain agencies over others. As a result, it alters the distribution of 
power among the policy actors. This is even more so given that the MERs often demand 
the establishment of new internal agencies, as was seen in the climate change and trade 
case studies.  
As China’s interactions with the MER agencies increase, it strengthens the 
possibility for the former to influence the policy structure of the latter by means of 
empowering the comparatively more liberal government agencies at the expense of the 
conservative ones. The thought process is that frequent engagements between particular 
government agencies and the MER actors will over time establish a natural bondage 
synonymous to that of an alliance. This alliance shares a converged set of values, 
beliefs, and policy preferences. Such relationships are particularly useful for 
government agencies that face a decentralised environment like Beijing’s, with 
numerous veto points and uncertainties about the likelihood of an inter-agency 
cooperation.  
Under this circumstance, the MER agencies become useful for persuading and 
changing the incentives of some (often opposing) Chinese policy actors in the internal 
bargaining process. For instance, the MER agencies and its domestic allegiance can 
reward opposing agencies for accepting a policy proposal they had initially rejected by 
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providing resources, for instance, to offset any potential loses caused to the agency as a 
result of their cooperation. Reversely, the MER agency and its domestic allegiance can 
also impose costs on others upon the exercise of domestic vetoes. For instance, the 
agencies that do not fulfil MER commitments and obligations will be ineligible for 
subsequent programs that may benefit them. If this combination of carrots and sticks is 
strong enough, the MER agencies will have the capacity to effectively determine the 
process of reaching a desired preference formation outcome through a domestic 
intermediary agency.  
As a consequence, a spiral pattern of influence emerge when domestic actors 
bypass government leaders and directly search for international allies in an attempt to 
bring external pressure on government agencies in opposition to their preferences. Such 
was the case when the MEP, the MOST, and the MOF invited the Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF) and other UN agencies to invest in pilot simulations to test 
the applicability of the CDM, of which their relationships were then used as an alliance 
to pressure the NDRC to be more proactive on the flexible mechanism.
231
 In fact, 
interviews revealed that the MEP’s strong support from the UNFCCC played a 
significant role in the ministry’s promotion to Ministry-level status, because the GEF, 
among others, demonstrated the importance of the MEP to other governmental agencies 
involved in the internal climate change debate. The MOFCOM has similarly established 
alliances with agencies of the WTO, such as the Working Group on Transparency in 
Government Procurement on the issue of the GPA. The People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) and the MOF established special relations with the IMF.  
The implication is an empowerment of these government agencies over others 
without a similar bondage, or access to external support and resources – all of which 
collectively translate into policy leverage. A case in point is when Zhu Rongji used its 
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informational advantage regarding the WTO to tie the hands of the Politburo Standing 
Committee. The possibility of an adverse ruling from the WTO and the resulting 
sanctions implied too high costs for the Standing Committee. As a result, the Standing 
Committee ratified the liberalisation policy over vetoing it. The Chinese decision-
makers can use the available support from the MER agencies to promote a preference 
against the domestic critics, present these policies as part of an international package 
deal, and shift onto others the political costs of unpopular policies. The interviews 
indicate that this was what the MOF did in the months leading up to Beijing’s decision 
to participate in the GPA accession negotiations. The NDRC also deployed this method 
when attempting to convince senior leaders in Beijing the benefits of participating in 
mitigation activities. Thus, an intimate relationship with the MER agencies can 
empower certain government agencies through the redistribution of domestic power 
resources and permit them to loosen internal constraints imposed by the traditional 
government structure.  
 Still, the research data also suggest the influence of the MER agencies does not 
operate as an automatic system of power redistribution in Beijing. The ability of the 
MER agencies to systematically empower Chinese agencies can be weakened if certain 
conditions are not fulfilled. The re-centralisation of power is more likely to happen 
when: (i) domestic agencies are already granted a measure of institutional autonomy in 
the conduct of economic diplomacy preference formation; (ii) they enjoy privileged 
relations with the MER agencies in the sense that other domestic actors do not have a 
similar relationship; and (iii) a permissive consensus exist in favour of the policies 
endorsed by the agency in an intimate relationship with the MER. These conditions are 
less readily available for new issues, which are more prone to the mobilisation of 
agencies (Moravcsik, 1994: 61); and the existence of sizeable societal groups or publics 
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with intense issue-preferences can also decrease the likelihood of an empowered agency 
due to its association with the MER agencies.  
 Finally, the MER agencies tend to require China – like other countries – to 
establish a corresponding set of internal arrangements and institutions as part of its 
membership. For instance, the report on the seventh session of the UNFCCC required 
the set-up a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) team which entails a 
lead agency and other government stakeholders, responsible for preparing and 
coordinating the implementation of NAPA activities. Similar impositions from the 
World Bank can be identified. In this way, the MER agencies actually guide the creation 
of new domestic policymaking bodies and policy systemic plans that subsequently 
influence preference formation. In the process of interacting with the MER agencies, 
Chinese decision-makers will have observed how best to organise itself in accordance 
with the regimes and this in itself is a structural change process that can engender 
domestic institutions, sometimes at the expense of others. As well, these changes will 
promote the establishment of new government agencies in Beijing, and ultimately 
transform the decision-making structure that corresponds to certain international norms. 
This was true when entry into the UNFCCC and the WTO saw Beijing establish new 
inter-agency organs such as the Climate Change Coordination Leading Small Group 
(CCCLSG) and the World Trade Organization Leading Small Group (WTOLSG). 
Likewise, the ratification of the CDM was followed by the establishment of the China 
CDM Monitoring and Management Centre, responsible for monitoring and feeding 
performance related data to the UNFCCC; while WTO accession spawned new judicial 
review systems in China.
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 These organs were perceived as necessary because 
multilateral policies often entail ambiguous functions, vaguely defined power capacity 
and responsibilities, limited inter-departmental information sharing, and a prevalent 
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mentality of administering its affairs based on discretion rather than macro-interests (Yu 
2008, 504). Therefore, the MER agencies tend to promote “horizontal government 
policy institutions” to assist in clarifying departmental duties. Although it remains 
contested as to whether these agencies contribute or defect the inter-agency 
coordination processes, it is nevertheless true that their establishment has the effect of 
decentralising the national decision-making processes, increase the specialisation level, 
and reconfigure the government’s internal distribution of power.   
 Ultimately, the deepened relationship between Beijing and the MER agencies 
have opened China’s preference formation process to the MER agencies, and provided 
them the opportunities to establish themselves as interested parties that contribute inputs 
into the decision-making of China’s economic diplomacy. The thought process is that 
the reiterative processes of engagement with the MER agencies will, over time, 
integrate them into the general decision-making system of China – be it implicitly or 
explicitly, directly or indirectly, and intentionally or unintentionally. This is to suggest 
that as Chinese policy actors become used to regular communications and coordination 
with the related MER agencies throughout the preference formation, for instance, this 
kind of activities will eventually establish itself as a systemic norm within the decision-
making process. Over time, policy actors may believe it is perhaps even necessary to 
bypass certain proposals to the MER agencies for their professional perspective and 
feedback. Significantly, this conclusion implies that China’s economic diplomacy 
decision-making in the 21
st
 century is not necessarily a stand-alone domestic process. 
Although, on paper, China’s preference formation is determined by its national interests 
and other domestic political factors, a deeper examination of the agency-level activities 
suggests that the MER agencies also play critical behind-the-scenes roles that indirectly 
shape Chinese economic diplomacy. As such, China’s economic diplomacy is today 
arguably shaped by a collective system involving domestic and international agencies.   
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6.7.1 Stable factors 
In this evolving process, it is important to note that two characteristics remain crucially 
stable. The first is the need for consensus in preference formation. The consensus-driven 
nature of China’s preference formation entails much discussion and inter-agency 
bargaining for the purpose of reaching a mutual agreement as well as compromise. 
Government agencies that partake in the preference formation, from the Politburo to 
second-tier ministries, commonly endeavour to reach some sort of real or illusionary 
inter-agency consensus. Failure to do so will usually postpone the decision-making, so 
policy actors have more time to study the matter. In the words of a ministerial official, 
“Policymakers are trained from early on in their careers that the taller the tree, the more 
wind it attracts.”233 Even the most senior members of the government, such as the 
President, must seek consensus in the current collective leadership system. This is to 
maintain unity and loyalty within the CPC and prevent factions emerging. The 2012 
leadership transition is a case in point whereby even veteran Jiang Zemin was 
reportedly playing a greater influence over the selection of the succeeding group of 
leaders than Hu Jintao. As a Hong Kong-based China expert Willy Lam said, “He’s 
[Jiang] still very much the power behind the throne” (cited in Pomfret & Lim, 10 
November 2012). As a result, the economic diplomacy preference formation process 
can be lengthy and complicated, particularly if the issue is viewed as sensitive.  
To illustrate this point, in the process of China’s WTO accession preference 
formation, the negotiators believed that Zhu Rongji (former Premier) would not assent 
to a WTO package unless they consulted with and gained the consensus of most (if not 
all) domestic interests. Therefore, Li Langqing (former Vice Premier) would not send an 
accession deal up the hierarchy without accompanying documents demonstrating the 
agreement of key domestic interests (i.e., the assent of the grain bureau to the parts of 
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the deal related to agriculture). If a package were to be sent upward without such 
signatures or with dissents, Zhu would be expected to seek some explanations. He might 
take on the burden of trying to hammer out a compromise with the relevant 
constituencies, but he is more likely to refer to the problem back down the hierarchy, 
and the seemingly endless coordinating meetings would begin again. This highly 
bureaucratic decision-making process – a product of the need to generate agreement 
from many potentially hostile units – played a large part in creating the stalemate that 
engulfed the negotiations with the US during the late-1990s. It is also this process that 
was essentially scrapped in the months of 1999 leading up to a bilateral agreement 
(Pearson, 2001: 349-350). Within the Chinese policy and scholarly discourse, the 
weaknesses of the present consensus-driven nature of preference formation are candidly 
discussed. In the words of the former President of China, Hu Jintao, the system of  
“collective leadership with division of responsibilities among individuals” should be 
improved in order to “prevent arbitrary decision-making by an individual or a minority 
of people” (cited in Xinhua, 15 October 2007).  
 This takes us to the second stable factor: informal politics and allegiances. 
Attempts to institutionalise preference formation have been on-going since Deng 
Xiaoping inaugurated economic and political reforms in the late-1970s, within the state 
government and the CPC. Despite those efforts, China’s preference formation is still 
heavily affected by the informal channels of influence.
234
 Many China enthusiasts have 
stressed the importance of using a combination of the formal and informal channels. 
While the formal, consensus-driven system of preference formation requires both time 
and the willingness from all participants involved to reach compromises, the informal 
decision-making system based on personal relationships, or guanxi (关系) necessitates 
an understanding and consideration of the interests held within one’s own network.  
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In Beijing, both the formal and informal systems of preference formation need to 
be taken into account by policy actors vying to influence the preference formation 
outcome. Although a weak inter-agency process undermines any government’s 
preference formation processes, in China, the issue of bureaucratic rivalry is even more 
severe because of the lacklustre transparency in a vertical political regime where the 
agencies’ access to economic benefits, funds, and decision-making power, are fiercely 
contested between themselves. As such, establishing and maintaining personal 
relationships have been an endemic practice in China. In all, the characteristics of a 
consensus-driven preference formation process and the importance of informal politics 
are concrete stable factors that remain consistently immune from international 
influences. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the objective was to reach some conclusions about how the MER 
agencies influence China’s preference formation. From the discussion, it is clear to see 
that China does not reject the influence of the MER agencies. This claim is made on the 
grounds that none of the mechanisms had an inertia or retrenchment levels of influence. 
Instead, Chinese decision-makers absorb the consequential effects of engaging with the 
MER agencies, and adapts as well as integrates to it vis-à-vis the domestic situational 
factors. This is seen in the empirical findings for the costs-and-benefits calculus and 
information dissemination mechanisms, both of which were identified with an 
absorptive-level of influence. The fact that Beijing accepts and adapts to international 
forces is an important finding which contrasts with the existing scholarly assumption 
that Chinese decision-making is an opaque and highly autonomous process immune 
from external impacts.  
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What is more, not only do the MER agencies have some degrees of influence on 
preference formation, it also impacts on the distribution of power within the decision-
making structure. By establishing close relationships with various domestic actors, the 
long-term effect is an empowerment of those actors against others in the internal inter-
agency bargaining process. Of course, the influence of the MER agencies is 
conditioned, as expected, by a range of situational factors and stable conditions, 
including the consensus-driven preference formation, and informal politics. On the 
whole, the primary hypothesis is valid to the extent that both costs-and-benefits calculus 
and information dissemination mechanisms affect preference formation, but that they 
are conditioned by a range of situational factors. The only mechanism that is found to 
have an influence level below absorption is the reputation reinforcement. Overall, the 
thesis finds the primary hypothesis partially valid.  
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Chapter 7 
 
TURNING TABLES TO THE NEGOTIATION APPROACHES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the study of economic diplomacy, there is a two-fold research interest concerning the 
preference formation of nation-states, on the one hand, and the decision-making during 
a negotiation process, on the other hand. In this context, the thesis makes the 
assumption that the agencies of multilateral economic regimes (MERs) have the explicit 
or implicit capacity to influence both dimensions of China’s economic diplomacy; that 
is, the MER agencies have impact at different stages of the economic diplomacy 
decision-making. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the MER agencies have, at 
best, an absorption level of influence on China’s economic diplomacy preference 
formation. Here, the focus was place on the preparation stages of decision-making based 
primarily in Beijing. This chapter moves away from such focus and turns the attention 
to the second dimension of economic diplomacy to examine the extent to which the 
MER agencies can shape China’s negotiation approach. As party to multilateral 
economic negotiations, in what capacity can the MER agencies manoeuvre and shape 
China’s negotiation approach? The purpose of this chapter is to address this question. 
To that end, the secondary framework (presented in Chapter Two) is applied to guide 
the analysis.  
 Rationalists, cognitivists, and contractualists commonly assume that during the 
negotiation process, the international actors are most effective in shaping national 
postures from a function of mediation. Where they differ is in the type of cognition 
mediation alters and the steps the MER agencies have to take to impose effective 
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influence. The rationalists believe national negotiation approaches are determined by 
the policy and/or action options available to them and the expectation for the likely 
outcome. Although the preferences over the desired outcome are assumed to be fixed, 
the nation-state’s expectations are not. Rather, their uncertainties about the accuracy of 
its expectations cause them to perpetually inform and renew their perceptions as they 
encounter and get hold of new information (Walsh, 2005: 5). In this situation, the MER 
agencies in a mediation function can use the available private negotiation information 
(i.e., the utility associated with each available negotiation approach) that may be 
important to Chinese decision-makers to alter the expectations, and therefore the 
negotiation approach of China.      
 The cognitivists take a slightly different approach to rationalism. Drawing on the 
Habermasian theory of communicative action, the cognitivists hold that from a function 
of mediation, the MER agencies and the Chinese policy actors can communicate frankly 
with one another in the process of building consensus about the cause-effect 
relationships, for instance, and what is considered normatively correct behaviours. The 
MER agencies interact with the Chinese policy actors without being aided by material 
power resources to impose their own perspectives onto the Chinese decision-makers. In 
turn, the Chinese decision-makers become more open to the possibility of being 
convinced by the better argument regardless of whom that argument stems from. This 
viewpoint contrasts with rationalism, which rejects the possibility that mediation could 
transform how a government defines what is right and what constitutes normatively 
correct behaviour (Finnemore, 2003: 154; Risse, 2000: 20). The contractualists, in the 
meantime, believe that mediation is nothing more and nothing less than an effort to 
change the costs-and-benefit calculations of a negotiation approach with exogenously 
positive or negative incentives to secure cooperation. Furthermore, mediation does not 
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change that player’s underlying desire to defect in a suasion game, nor does it change 
basic beliefs – or common knowledge – about what kind of game is being played.  
 Building from the preceding assumption on a function of mediation, and based 
on the empirical research, a second framework of analysis was yielded (as explained in 
Chapter Two) to examine the MER agencies’ effect on China’s negotiation approach 
and the role it plays in doing so. Accordingly, this framework informs the secondary 
hypothesis of this thesis, which holds that, the agencies of the multilateral economic 
regimes can shape China’s negotiation approach through three capacities: as a 
mediator in shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, as a facilitator of informal negotiation 
practices, and as an instigator of side-payment bargaining. The underlying assumption 
of the secondary hypothesis is that the level of influence is contingent on three social 
instigators: expectation, trust, and personal reputation. All three social instigators are 
cumulatively necessary criteria of influence. The chapter finds that the MER agencies 
can affect China’s negotiation approach through the hypothesised mechanisms. 
However, their actualised influence varies according to the context of the 
communication and the negotiation process. For this reason, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions about a fixed level of influence. Rather, the chapter argues that 
the MER agencies as mediators of proximity talks and facilitators of INPs can achieve 
influences between absorption and transformation. Meanwhile, the MER agencies as 
instigators of side-payment bargaining can, at best, achieve an influence level between 
inertia and absorption. In addition, the chapter finds the social instigators as core drivers 
of China’s negotiation approach, and are fundamental contingencies of the MER 
agencies’ influence in this dimension of economic diplomacy decision-making.     
 The chapter proceeds as follows. Sections two, three, and four examine the 
influence of proximity talks, INPs, and side-payment bargaining respectively. Section 
five discusses the social instigators as drivers of Chinese economic diplomacy decision-
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making, and contingencies for the influence of the MER agencies on China’s 
negotiation approach. Finally, the last section provides some concluding remarks.  
   
7.2 Shuttle Diplomacy Proximity Talks 
Shuttle diplomacy is the act of meeting country representatives abroad to discuss 
contentious cross-border issues. The inter-personal meetings held in the course of the 
shuttle diplomacy are known as proximity talks. The micro-process of proximity is a 
case of persuasion and it involves changing the decision-makers’ minds, opinions, and 
attitudes about causality, and affects the absence of overtly material and/or mental 
coercion (Johnston, 2008: 25-26; Walsh, 2005: 3). Some political scientists believe 
persuasion is the “central aim of political interaction” (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody, 
1996: 1). Others consider politics as all about persuasion (Gibson, 1998: 821). The 
rationalists, cognitivists and contractualists mutually agree that persuasion triggers 
policy impact. For instance, the rationalists believe the hoped-for effect of the costs-
and-benefits calculation is to use it to persuade the Chinese government of better 
negotiation approach equilibria. The cognitivists likewise assume the purpose of 
information dissemination is to persuade Chinese decision-makers that the international 
discourse guides a better negotiation approach. As well, the contractualists argue that 
reputation reinforcement is effective in persuading the Chinese government to be 
cooperative. These understandings of persuasion differ from other tactics of influence 
(i.e., rhetorical action or heresthetics) where one party manipulates the context (i.e., 
political environment or the rules of decision-making) to achieve an objective of their 
interest (Schimmelfennig, 2002). Despite the conciliatory nature of mediatory 
persuasion, 91 per cent of the research interviews indicated that it works more 
effectively in China than other methods. This is because the MER agencies generally 
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have better knowledge about how to engage with the Chinese decision-makers in a 
meaningful and reasoned communicative manner.
235
 
Based on the case studies of this thesis, two strategies of persuasion under 
proximity talks were identified as actively exercised by the agencies of the UNFCCC 
and the WTO: the central route and the peripheral route. The central route is where the 
MER agencies weigh evidences and puzzles through counter-attitudinal arguments, and 
comes to a conclusion that is different from what the Chinese government had begun 
with. This form of mediatory persuasion involves a high-intensity process of cognition, 
reflection, and argument about the content of new information (Bar-Tal, 1990: 122). In 
the case of mitigation, albeit the Chinese government’s view that mitigation measures 
are threatening to economic growth, the UNFCCC Secretariat and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided calculated evidence to 
persuade the Chinese decision-makers that improving energy efficiency, diversifying 
energy sources and reforestation are all “no-regret” policy options, and contribute to the 
efficiency of the energy sector. Furthermore, these policies can spawn the development 
of new commercially profitable technologies, as well as new access to technical and/or 
economic assistance from abroad. In the case of the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), the GPA Committee attempted to persuade the Chinese decision-
makers – who viewed entry to the GPA with ambiguous benefits for China – that the 
benefit of a GPA membership enhances the country’s rule-making in this area and 
contribute to better governance over the private regulations on the participants of 
procurement activities. Doing so can mitigate internal corruption and other illegal 
behaviours as well as strengthen the efficiency of the system. Due to the visible 
attitudinal changes from Beijing in both areas, it is easy to argue that Chinese decision-
makers are susceptible to the central route of persuasion which occurs in proximity 
talks.  
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Yet, the empirical data also indicate that the impact of the central route 
persuasion declines if the initial attitude in Beijing was already linked to a larger 
internally consistent network of beliefs. This drawback resembles that of the information 
dissemination mechanism; and it explains why after years of proximity talks, the 
UNFCCC agencies were only able to achieve a slight attitudinal change from Beijing 
concerning the issue of mitigation, as opposed to actual shifts in the negotiation 
approach. The widely held conviction, particularly within the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), that mitigation efforts endanger economic growths 
essentially undermine the effects of persuasion of the UNFCCC agencies. Likewise, the 
wider beliefs held by numerous services ministries (i.e., public transport and 
telecommunication) that China’s services is still shaped by weak infrastructures 
prompted a consistent negotiation approach that is characterised by a resistance to 
further service trade liberalisation in much of the early years of negotiations. With these 
said, as long as decision-makers are open to the MER agencies – which the Chinese 
government is – and as long as they continue to face uncertainties about the available 
policy options, and the approximated net benefits of each available option, the central 
route can still be effective. Of course, this effect will be even greater when decision-
makers hold weaker prior beliefs.  
 The second strategy is the peripheral route. This strategy promotes the 
establishment of institutionalised relationships between the MER agencies and the 
Chinese decision-makers in informal and private settings. The Chinese decision-makers 
often search for cues about the nature of a given relationship with a MER agency to 
judge the legitimacy of their counter-attitudinal arguments – a point that was raised in 
the previous chapter as a weakness of information dissemination. Like other countries, 
Beijing finds proximity talks with in-groups to be more effective than with out-groups; 
and talks with the liked sources are usually better-received than sources that are 
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disliked. The determining factor of like is based on familiarity and the level of exposure 
to the agency. For example, this study finds ministries with regular contacts with the 
agencies of the UNFCCC and the WTO to not only embody deeper knowledge about 
the related issues for negotiation, but are also generally more sympathetic toward the 
global agenda. By comparison, the ministries with little or no contact with the MER 
agencies tend to perceive them with less legitimacy. As a result, the ministries with 
established relationships with one or more MER agencies often consider them with 
greater credibility than other ministries that do not have similar relationships and 
associations.  
This point is nicely encapsulated by the rationalist assumption that even though 
preferences over the desired outcome are fixed, the actors’ beliefs are not, and their 
uncertainties about the accuracy of these beliefs cause them to renew their beliefs 
infinitely as new information are encountered (Walsh, 2005: 5). This assumption 
complements the cognitive view that the dynamisms of beliefs, and the new information 
about the utility associated with each available policy, can alter the beliefs of the 
Chinese decision-makers. In 2000, the COP5 President held proximity talks with the 
Chinese decision-makers in an effort to alter their CDM negotiation approach. The 
COP5 president emphasised the net benefits (i.e., new investments, technology 
development, and job creation) that will come with cooperation. Interestingly, Chinese 
decision-makers responded with enthusiasm only when it viewed the COP5 President as 
informed and credible.
236
 That is, the Chinese decision-makers need to be convinced 
that the COP5 presiding staff possessed more and accurate information concerning the 
negotiations and the policy options available to China. At the time, the Chinese 
decision-makers faced some degrees of uncertainty about which of the available policies 
on the Kyoto Mechanisms will maximise their utility. As one member of the COP5 
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Presidency involved in the process interviewed for this research indicates, in order to be 
successful at persuasion, the Chinese decision-makers need to face some degrees of 
uncertainty about the relationship between policies and outcomes. When this 
uncertainty is low, the information from the MER agencies will be taken as accurate and 
reliable guidance for the net benefits that are spawned from each available policy 
option. It is understandable that when the Chinese decision-makers faced high 
uncertainties about the CDMs, they searched for and evaluated the new information to 
determine as close to the correct estimations of potential economic payoffs as possible 
from each available negotiation approach, and that they will resort to the guidance of 
the COP5 presiding staffs’ suggestions based on the belief that they might have a better 
capture of the real relationship between the available policy options and its associated 
outcomes than their own. In the end, the Chinese decision-makers adopted the CDMs 
with the conclusion that the COP5 Presidency had superior and credible information 
concerning the true relationship between the policy and outcome nexus.   
 In addition, whether the Chinese decision-makers accept MER persuasion rest 
on how honestly the MER agencies have communicated their superior information. As 
China’s negotiation approach can affect the utility of the MERs (i.e., by determining the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement and the kind of agreement), the MER agencies may 
thus not necessarily act on neutral grounds when advising and mediating the 
negotiations; rather, it could hold preferences over the type of negotiation policies 
China adopts. The MER agencies have an incentive to play around with their 
information resources so that the preferred negotiation approach is adopted by China. In 
this situation, Chinese decision-makers will think the most credible MERs are the ones 
with agencies that desire outcomes similar to China’s. When the Chinese decision-
makers know that the MER agencies endeavour to lock-down outcomes that are similar 
to their own, they trusts that the MER agencies will then communicate on a more honest 
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level with regards to their information and of the true consequences of the proposed 
negotiation approach. On the other hand, however, if China holds different preferences 
over the outcome compared to the MER in question, then it may refuse any suggestions 
made by the MER’s agencies on the grounds that it is not considered credible. In other 
words, the Chinese government might fear that their divergent preferences may cause 
the MER agency to deliberately communicate incorrect information for the purpose of 
persuading China to take-on their desired negotiation approach. This sentiment was 
communicated by an interviewed Chinese negotiator to the WTO and with a particular 
focus on the services trade.
237
 He recalled that in the early years of the DDA, the WTO 
Secretariat envisioned a complete liberal international structure on services with 
minimal restrictions, and in turn, played his words around however way he thought was 
necessary to have China jump on board to the imagined scenario. However, the 
interviewee felt that much of the arguments made were not congruent to China’s 
domestic situation, and therefore, he could not go along with this vision of an agreement 
in services. The Chinese decision-makers’ estimated degree of preference convergence 
between them and the MER agencies are usually based on past interactions and 
experiences, and/or from a general expectation about the international environment and 
behaviour. With this said, the MER agencies can enhance their credibility by 
demonstrating its commitment to a proposal regardless of China’s actions. The 
UNFCCC agencies are particularly good at this and they often do so by sponsoring 
domestic pilot projects across various regions in China to illustrate its intentions and 
persuade through doing. The success of the CDM negotiations is a case in point.   
As mediators, the MER agencies can further overcome China’s expectation 
issues in proximity talks by sharing their insights obtained from caucus sessions (i.e., 
proximity talks) held with other member-states. Of course, as mentioned earlier, the 
problem with this strategy is if China knows that a MER agency is going to share what 
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they learn with the other parties, what reasons do they have to distribute their own 
private information that may come back to bite them? On the one hand, if the MER 
agency in question keeps its insights from the proximity talks confidential, then it has 
limited ability to utilise the insights for improving the negotiation outcome. That said, 
when the MER agencies encounter this dilemma, in practice, they might exercise “noise 
translation” (Brown and Ayres, 1994: 356) in private dialogues with China – i.e., share 
their insights about the views of other parties without explicitly stating any one party’s 
perspectives. In this way, China might communicate more honestly with the MER 
agency with the knowledge that whatever they share will not be directly relayed to other 
parties. On the other hand, even partial information is beneficial for the other side in 
moving towards the best possible agreement. And yet, David A. Hoffman (2010: 16-17) 
stressed, although the notion of communicating only partial information may seem 
wrong, in practice, the principle of transparency is difficult to implement. The only 
feasible way for this strategy to work is if China, like other parties, has prefect 
knowledge about how the MER agency intends to apply the insights acquired from 
proximity talks. As such, “noise communication” and other inexplicit means of 
communication such as signalling are commonly used to guide parties toward 
productive negotiations.     
In the empirical research, it was found that in the mediatory function, MER 
agencies frequently exercise signalling in their proximity talks. Signals are actions 
which convey a kind of information that reduces uncertainty (Jervis, 1976). In strategic 
interactions, where the MER agencies hold private information regarding the 
preferences of other parties, for instance, signalling can be effective for converging 
China’s negotiation approach to one desired by the MER actors. In the process of 
setting the climate change negotiation agendas and in the process of drafting the Chair’s 
text, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC requires all signatories to send their national 
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reports to Bonn, Germany – the UNFCCC headquarters – on an annual basis (Softing, 
2000: 23). The UNFCCC can, in turn, use the information to alter China’s negotiation 
approach. The same function can be found for the WTO Secretariat. One Chinese 
decision-maker notes that member-states of the WTO had to submit proposals 
containing elements relating to the regulatory cooperation such as transparency 
disciplines and negotiation intents for the DDA to Geneva. This implies that the WTO 
holds substantial private information it can use for signalling.  
With this said, the empirical research finds that the MER agencies do not 
necessarily have as much private information in practice as cognitivists assume, 
especially access to the true versus revealed preferences of the member-states. It is often 
difficult for the MER agencies to verify claims by parties that their hands are tied by 
domestic constraints, for instance, and it is not obvious when a member-state is bluffing 
when they claim that they have attractive alternatives in hand. The situation is further 
exacerbated when deciphering the preferences of states through coalitions. This 
challenge in identifying the real preference orderings is nicely illustrated by the DDA 
negotiations. When faced with a coalition of states putting forth a collective demand, as 
is often the case at the DDA negotiations, it is difficult for the WTO to determine the 
intent and resistance points of the individual parties. A coalition may claim complete 
commitment to a particular position, and its members may threaten to collectively block 
the negotiation process unless their joint demand is met. But unless the WTO has some 
additional information about the credibility of this position, it may assume that the 
members of the coalition are bluffing and could actually be bought off through 
individual side-deals. In the DDA negotiations, the difficulty in identifying the real 
preference orderings of all the parties constitute a key reason why trade-offs through the 
Single Undertaking, win-win situation, has been difficult to achieve. All parties 
recognise to some degree that the stated positions do not represent the bottom-line of 
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the negotiating parties. But amidst uncertainty about the extent to which coalitions (and 
countries within them) are willing to stand firm over certain areas and concede on 
others, the zone of agreement itself remains ambiguous.  
Furthermore, signalling exercised in proximity talks are expected to inform 
policy. This expectation naturally affects the way negotiation questions are framed and 
how it should be approached (i.e., certain matters are attended to at the expense of 
others; some questions are identified as political and removed from inquiry, while 
others are addressed as if they were merely technical and had no political implications). 
However, the MER agencies’ signalling exercises may not reflect a state of neutrality. 
Rather, it is located in a context of competing national and institutional interests, and 
their influence tends to be either enhanced or circumscribed by this context. At times, 
the signalling exercises may not translate well into policy and the uncertainties spawned 
out of shallow-detailed mediatory recommendations from the MER agencies can 
dampen their credibility. For instance, the WTO is in principle charged with the 
function of reporting independent and private information to China and the United 
States (US) regarding each other’s demands and intents. Another case in point is the 
“signalling conference” held in 2008, and the subsequent informal discussions with 
some 25 groups, each focused on a distinct service sector. These activities helped 
identify sectors and activities where liberalisation might be possible (Oxford Analytica 
Daily Brief Service, 28 May 2012).
238
 However, since the WTO is also uncertain of 
either the Chinese or American costs, but does have some independent information it 
can pass on, it must be biased in order to have any effect on the outcome of the 
bargaining. The intuition is that if the WTO only cares about preventing a deadlock, 
then it will always tell China and the US the situation is resolute (regardless of whether 
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the WTO believes it) and therefore China should moderate its demands.
239
 This advice, 
if followed, could lead to an agreement, but most likely on either actual or perceived 
unfair terms. And China, seeing the WTO as having an incentive to lie, will 
consequently discount its advice, and the WTO agencies’ influence is therefore 
undermined; the imminent regression problem ultimately reduces its effectiveness.  
In general, the level of influence proximity talks can install in shaping China’s 
negotiation approach depends on two factors: how informative the MER agencies are, 
and the level of perceived credibility the MER agencies have to the Chinese decision-
makers. It is difficult to convince China to alter their negotiation approach by a 
trustworthy but ill-informed MER agency. The same goes for the reverse situation. To 
be sure, China certainly absorbs the mediation of the MER agencies, but this needs to be 
supplemented by superior information and credibility to communicate honestly. In this 
situation, Chinese decision-makers acknowledge that the MER agencies have better 
understandings about a negotiation environment and therefore trust in their information.  
Ultimately, a matrix of four scenarios is most probable. First, if the MER agency 
has superior information and credibility, proximity talks are likely to have an 
absorptive/transformative level of influence in shaping China’s negotiation approach. 
Second, if the MER agency has superior information but lacks credibility, China may be 
unwilling to respond to the MER agency’ mediation at the fear that they may have been 
manipulated to select a course of action that serves to optimise the benefit of the MER 
agency. In this situation, proximity talks are likely to have an inertia level of influence. 
The third scenario is where the MER agency is viewed as credible but lacks superior 
information. Here, the Chinese decision-makers will consider the agency as trustworthy 
but will not fully absorb the mediated effects. As such, proximity talks will have an 
inertia/absorption level of influence. Finally, the combination of no superior 
information and lacklustre credibility will cause China to believe that the MER agency 
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is dishonest and manipulative in its communications to serve its own ends. Thus, 
proximity talks in this situation will have a retrenchment effect in the shape and form of 
China’s negotiation approach. The four scenarios are summarised in figure 7.1.   
 
Figure 7.1 Scenarios of the Influence of Proximity Talks 
 
 Credibility No credibility 
Superior  
information 
 
Absorption/ 
transformation 
 
Inertia 
No superior  
information 
 
Inertia/absorption 
 
Retrenchment 
         
 
Overall, this chapter concludes that the hypothesised capacity of the MER agencies as 
mediators of proximity talks to influence China’s negotiation approach partially valid. 
 
7.3 Informal Negotiation Practices 
Cognitivists believe that influencing negotiation approaches does not just occur at the 
national level. The negotiation processes itself can contribute to the actor’s perceptions 
of how a problem should be handled (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 3-7; Finnemore 
1996, 333). Hence, informal negotiation practices or the INPs facilitated by the MER 
agencies during the negotiation process can modify China’s expectations, strategies, and 
posture, all of which underline their approach to the negotiations. Under the normal 
circumstance, negotiations in an open, formal plenary with all the attending national 
delegates tend to be cumbersome at best and unmanageable when the agenda grows in 
complexity. In turn, the INPs are strategically designed by the MER actors to streamline 
the negotiation proceedings by allowing the texts to be discussed by smaller and 
specialised groups of negotiators. The INPs can come in numerous forms, one of which 
is known as informal consultations. These are open-ended and off-the-record meetings, 
often steered by the figure-head of a MER or the Chair of a general council or 
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committee. In July 2008, the WTO’s Director-General, Pascal Lamy, acted as Chairman 
of the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) and steered a “services signalling 
conference” with a small group of key economies including China, to discuss 
outstanding services issues and exchanged potential offers (Footer, 2011: 230). Lamy’s 
predecessor, Mike Moore, was also recorded to have steered informal consultations with 
China, Kenya, the US, and India on agricultural tariffs for instance in 2001. According 
to one witness negotiator, Moore had “firmly retorted back to any doubts and objections 
Chinese Minister Shi and Indian Minister Maran had” about the Chair’s draft text (cited 
in Jawara and Kwa, 2004: 110).  
Another form of INP is roundtable discussions. Member-states in this situation 
are divided into smaller groups and sit across – rather than behind – each other. During 
the 2011 COP17 conference, the South African COP President called a roundtable (or 
the “huddle”) including representative from China, the US, the European Union (EU), 
and India to discuss a final resolution on mitigation issues as part of the Durban 
Package. Based on personal observations inside the negotiation room, the South African 
COP President, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, acted as Chair of the roundtable discussion 
and had placed particular pressure on China, India, and the US to accept the middle-
range proposal forwarded by the EU. Finally, the INPs can come in the form of inter-
personal corridor or lobby dialogue outside the main meetings. According to one 
Chinese delegate, these corridor conversations are very effective in guiding the 
negotiation proceedings and outcome; and even more so when China encounters a 
negotiation dilemma with other parties.
240
 In 2008, the Chair of the “services signalling 
conference” exercised signalling with members of the Chinese delegation in corridor 
conversations. It was suggested that Lamy indicated that the participating ministers may 
improve their services offers for an agreement on agriculture and NAMA from China 
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(Hoekman and Mattoo, 2011: 7-8). China apparently approached the negotiations 
thereafter with more flexibility and approved the 2008 Chair’s draft text on services.    
 The strength of the MER agencies acting as facilitators of the INPs – 
characterised as confidential and informal/off-the-record processes of negotiation – for 
securing agreements is the capacity’s effectiveness in elevating the probabilities that 
negotiating parties will reciprocate. The probable settlement-effect stems from the 
setting of the INPs, which is conducive to problem-solving. For instance, a fundamental 
principle of the INPs is that nations can select freely how and on what grounds they 
should settle. As such, it is a more comfortable environment for Chinese decision-
makers to consider the best negotiation approach. The setting is particularly important 
because, in some negotiations, especially concerning highly contentious issues, the 
clash of communication styles can undermine China’s willingness to cooperate. In some 
cases, certain delegates can communicate abrasively that the Chinese decision-makers 
cannot tolerate being in the same room.
241
 In one DDA joint session about how certain 
business interests should be valued, one Chinese delegate could not tolerate the tone of 
voice of the foreign delegate that is making a statement. The Chinese delegate sat 
uncomfortably, a pained look swept her face, and it became clear that this delegate was 
unable to listen to what he was saying.
242
 The fact that the native spoken language 
between the two delegates also differed further compounded to the severity of the issue. 
In this situation, the informal nature of the INPs is much better at easing any discomfort 
felt by members of the Chinese delegation, and in turn, enables a much more effective 
process of honest and receptive communication.  
In addition, and perhaps more important, is that INPs such as informal 
consultations involve processes of rationalisation in the communications between the 
MER agencies and the Chinese negotiators. The rationalisation is itself a source of 
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constraint because the form of justification for a recommended set of possibilities 
communicated by the MER agencies structures how the Chinese decision-makers view 
the available options in terms of the negotiation approaches.   
Moreover, when the parties are stuck for options in a stalemate, the MER 
agencies facilitate INPs to brainstorm alternative solutions. Brainstorming in a formal 
plenary can impede thinking outside the box because distrust can undermine the joint 
sessions regardless of how skilful the MER agency frames the brainstorming exercises 
and explain the ground rules. The Chinese delegation may fear that advancing an idea 
could disclose private aspects of their negotiation approach, such as the level of their 
flexibility to solutions; or the spontaneity of the discussion can disclose more details 
about China’s position than they are willing to reveal. Thus, the MER agencies like to 
encourage brainstorming through a form of the INPs and vet out some initial ideas in a 
separate and safer-feeling environment before hosting joint sessions. In the process of 
brainstorming, the mediatory effects of the MER agencies (i.e., by conveying their own 
ideas alongside that of nation-states) will naturally be absorbed into China’s final 
negotiation approach. In a way, this can be considered as the MER agencies’ attempts to 
level the playing field by engaging in some form of negotiation coaching. For instance, 
the MER agencies have a high tendency to encourage the Chinese delegates to explore 
each side’s underlying interests, help decision-makers generate negotiation options, and 
discuss the ways that different elements of a deal might be structured. Coaching of this 
kind is virtually impossible to do in formal plenaries, partly because it gives the 
appearance of partiality, and partly because candour about bargaining strategies in joint 
sessions is rare (Hoffman, 2010: 28). The implication of these exercises is that the MER 
agencies will soften the edges of China’s national position and assert their beliefs in the 
framing of China’s negotiation approach. At the same time, the MER agencies 
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implicitly and indirectly impose international norms on China to constrain the possible 
negotiation approaches they can adopt.  
To be sure, the MER agencies, by design, have no capacity to make negotiation 
decisions; their designated roles are by definition primarily administrative. Multilateral 
economic agreements are, in theory, member-driven. But in reality, leading MER 
representatives can exercise powers comparable to national leaders.
243
 In the 2001 
ministerial conference, Chairman Kamal, for instance, refused to take a backseat during 
the negotiation proceedings, demanding that he play a central role in the process of 
reaching a compromise (Jawara and Kwa, 2004: 84). Likewise, although Lamy remains 
neutral and impartial in public, he has, on numerous occasions, pointed out to the 
Chinese delegation on what he perceives as right or wrong with China’s negotiation 
approach, and has made recommendations accordingly behind closed doors.
244
 Some 
interviewed Chinese delegates also revealed that the WTO facilitators sometimes 
request China to agree to the inclusion on the negotiation agenda despite Beijing’s 
reluctance; and senior personnels often play very active roles in the final green room 
meetings of ministerial conferences to harness the Chinese delegates to accept draft 
declarations.
245
 One developing country delegate observed,  
 
Those who supported the [chair’s] text were given the floor to speak first…it was arranged  
in this way to literally set the consensus…People cheered and clapped after every endorse- 
ment of the text…This made those who wanted more clarifications feel like they were the  
bad guys…This is a common tactic, to make a certain viewpoint appear more dominant (ci- 
ted in Jawara and Kwa, 2004: 108).  
 
This view is supported by an interviewed Asian delegate to the WTO during the 2011 
ministerial conference:   
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Being Chair of a committee at the WTO gave me the opportunity to see how the Secret- 
ariat functions, and how some group of countries would subtly get what they want into  
draft documents. It is done in a very clever, sophisticated and subtle manner…If, for e- 
xample, the majority of delegates don’t agree with a negotiating text produced by a ch- 
airperson and thus demand changes, the chair could turn to the Secretariat for help, esp- 
ecially if he or she is not technically competent. The clever lawyers of the Secretariat  
will the redraft the text in such a way that it would lean towards what it wants, and, im- 
portantly, it would also seem that consensus was reached. The chair would then be pla- 
ced with the responsibility of presenting this skewed document to the membership with- 
out further consultations.
246
 
 
This shows the level of control the Secretariat has over the direction of the negotiations. 
This reality was echoed by an interviewed African delegate during COP17: “The 
Secretariat has very strong views on mitigation, and they do aggressively pursue that 
way of thinking. You get questions like ‘Why don’t China want to talk about emissions-
reduction?’ forgetting how much China has already achieved domestically.” 247  An 
interviewed Central American delegate to the COPs similarly said, “The Secretariat has 
biased positions, which has helped create another layer on to the COPs negotiating 
structure. Mission officials from the developing countries not only have to negotiate 
with their counterparts, they also have to negotiate with a so-called ‘neutral’ 
Secretariat.” 248  By helping the developing countries extract commitments from 
developed countries (i.e., aid, technology transfers, market access, commodity prices, 
and debt relief), whilst helping developed countries demand economic reforms in 
developing countries; and/or by simply listening to the different positions and redrafting 
a compromise text him- or her-self, the MER actors are running the show behind-the-
scenes, with immense capacity to influence the negotiation outcomes as they see best 
through its facilitator function.  
 With these said, some Chinese negotiators have noted during interviews that it 
does take measures to ensure the presiding staffs of the MER agencies do not go beyond 
their job descriptions as a “secretary” during the negotiation process; and that they 
remain in a limited capacity to interfere with the member-driven decision-making 
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system.
249
 Undoubtedly, the actions and decisions of the MERs’ staffs are constantly 
under tight scrutiny of the Chinese negotiators; but this does not deny the fact that the 
presiding staffs do exercise strategies and tactics – though not on an open and prevalent 
basis. For instance, in the DDA negotiations, the WTO Secretariat has a tendency to 
host informal consultations in remote locations where few national embassies reside 
(i.e., Cancun). This makes it difficult for many national delegates including the Chinese 
to seek decision approvals from their capital cities, and in the spur of the moment with 
added pressure and stress, negotiators are more likely to give in to the Chair’s draft 
texts.
250
 One negotiator also mentions that when there is a prevalent and dominant 
consensus, the Chinese negotiators find it harder to keep to its bottom-line and have a 
high tendency to give-in and reach agreement due to the imminent pressures and 
environmental influences.
251
 Most Chinese negotiators generally believe that the MERs’ 
presiding staffs does interfere at times in the negotiations, and the facilitators do tend to 
coordinate between member-states – all of which can have consequences on China’s 
negotiation approach.
252
 
 Advocates of rationalism, however, argue that how China shapes their 
negotiation approach should be exogenous to the social interaction dimension of the 
INPs (Reus-Smit, 2005: 192). This is because China enters negotiation processes with 
pre-defined interests, beliefs, and expectations. Given the strategic and rational nature of 
nation-states, they only participate in processes such as the INPs to maximise their pre-
defined interests. As a result, it is difficult to imagine the INPs as having much 
influence over China’s negotiation approach.  
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The drawback of this form of rational argument is that it takes China’s 
negotiation approach as a given, without consideration for how such negotiation 
approach developed in the first place. As the preceding discussion showed the informal 
and inter-personal social element of the INPs form a strong basis of decision-making 
among Chinese policy actors at the negotiation-stage. The informal and unstructured 
setting and nature of the INPs stem normative and ideational structures which can 
condition the available negotiation manoeuvre China has. It does so in three ways. First, 
as cognitivists argue, the non-material structures of the INPs affect what China views as 
the realm of possibility. That is to say, how it believe it should act in negotiations, what 
the perceived limitations on their actions are, and what strategies they imagine to 
achieve their objectives. The ideas and norms floating around in the INPs thus condition 
what China considers, as well as expects, as necessary and possible in practical and 
ethical terms.  
Second, the roundtable brainstorming and coaching exercises show that the INPs 
constrain China’s negotiation approach through an emphasis on the international norms. 
For instance, the MER agencies can seek to justify its ideas and recommendations by 
appealing to the established information norms of legitimate conduct. Third, the 
processes of rationalisation in INPs (i.e., the informal consultations) are a form of 
constraint in itself. Certainly the very language of justification provides constraints on 
the available actions China has in a given negotiation. In all cases, these structures 
would not exist without the MER agencies facilitating the INPs. Thus, the dialogical 
effect of brainstorming exercises, roundtable discussions, and corridor conversations 
define much of the Chinese perceptions regarding the appropriate negotiation approach 
to a given economic and/or political problem.           
It is important to recognise, however, that the INPs usually occur at the later 
stages of economic diplomacy decision-making, during multilateral negotiations. By 
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this time, Chinese decision-makers arrive in negotiation settings with relatively strong 
pre-defined postures, expectations, and beliefs. Although these elements are not fixed 
and can be reshaped, the task of doing so is nonetheless a tough one for external 
agencies through a facilitating capacity. For this reason, one can be certain that the 
MER agencies as facilitators of the INPs do not have a transformation level of 
influence. Given that influence through this capacity is context- and situation-
dependent, it is difficult to prescribe a definitive level of influence. But based on the 
empirical findings, it suffices to say that the MER agencies as facilitators of INPs have 
an influence level between absorption and transformation. This is because even though 
the MER agencies cannot fully reconstruct the pre-defined value-sets, it has few 
contingencies and generally produces immediate effects – which can be felt during the 
negotiation processes. As such, it can be considered as capable of more than just an 
absorption level of influence. For this reason, it sits somewhere in between.       
 
Overall, the chapter finds the secondary hypothesis on the role of the MER agencies as 
facilitators of the INPs partially valid.    
  
7.4 Side-Payment Bargaining 
The third way the MER agencies can affect China’s approach to economic negotiations 
is by instigating side-payment bargaining. Rationalists believe that side-payment 
bargaining alters Chinese incentives by bringing material payoffs into the decision-
making. Theoretically speaking, this mechanism works well in the China context 
because a primary motivation Beijing sought MER memberships was to access foreign 
assistance (Economy, 2001: 232). Access to foreign economic and financial capital and 
technical know-how was a key motivation for China’s long march to the WTO. The 
UNFCCC case studies demonstrated how Beijing often uses its economic and social 
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vulnerabilities to justify for foreign funding and technologies. For instance, the section 
on the “needs for funds, technologies and capacity-building” in China’s Initial National 
Communication (2004: 18) states, “China is relatively sensitive and vulnerable to 
climate change in the fields such as agriculture. Technical support and funds are needed 
for mitigating or adapting to the effects of climate change.” As the head of the Chinese 
delegation, Xie Zhenhua, said at a COP18 news conference, the core issue blocking 
progress at the UN negotiations is finance – an incentive that would “create very good 
conditions for the settlement of other issues” (cited in Reuters, 5 December 2012). 
Technology transfer has also featured as a high incentive for the government to move 
some of the cost of putting its own economy on a low-carbon path onto other countries. 
As well, the acquisition of advanced climate technologies would help it not only 
decrease the energy and carbon-intensity of its economy, but also develop its growing 
green technology sector as a way to move from the low-level manufacturing to a skilled 
labour production of high-tech goods (Conrad, 2012: 498-499). In order to use the 
international climate regime to aid these efforts, China has spearheaded proposals for 
technology transfer mechanisms within the framework of the UNFCCC.
253
 And when 
the CDM simulation exercises demonstrated the initiative as a promising way of 
accessing technologies and finance, it acted as a key catalyse for China’s proactive 
approach towards the initiative. But how can one be sure that the UNFCCC agencies 
was the main creditor of facilitating or provoking side-payment rather than mere forces 
of national interests or acts of inter-governmental reciprocity? Since the material 
benefits already motivated China to adopt new positions for the CDM, to what extent 
can it be argued that the UNFCCC was responsible for a change in negotiation 
approach? 
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Although the UNFCCC agencies’ influence did not seem to go beyond its role as 
a facilitator of the climate change negotiations on the surface, a closer examination of 
the events reveal a somewhat more interesting story. During the earlier stages of the 
side-payment bargaining between China and the developed nations, any positive 
dynamic that could have developed was significantly dampened by the developed 
nations’ reluctance to agree to a significant expansion of technology transfers to China. 
This is because the developed nations thought the transfer of advanced technologies – 
usually owned by private western companies – raised a spectrum of complex questions 
that ranging from legal issues of ownership to the protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) and the potential distortion of markets and competition. This is especially 
true for China, which features a questionable record in terms of the IPR protection. As a 
result, it failed to gain the developed countries’ trust due to uncertainties in its 
willingness and capability to deal responsibly with IPR and the fair utilisation of 
innovative technologies (Conrad, 2012: 498-499). It became clear that the debate on 
technology transfers would be treated as a sideshow at best; and the Chinese team’s 
game plan, which might or might not have included some Chinese concessions, was 
stifled from the outset. Under this circumstance, the COP presiding staffs at the time 
believed it was necessary to subject China to surveillance measures before any side-
payment bargaining success could be realised.  Initially, the Chinese delegation refused 
such suggestion, arguing that it is a breach of national sovereignty. But as the interviews 
revealed, after numerous informal discussions with the Negotiation Committee, and 
side-payment bargaining with developed nations, China agreed to submit to the 
international monitoring, validation, and verification systems in response to the 
conclusion of a “too good to miss” package deal. As one Chinese negotiator remarked, 
"the UNFCCC have their own visions about the kind of agreement member states 
should endeavour to achieve and they certainly know how to guide China towards that 
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end.”254 In this way, the UNFCCC agencies certainly catalysed the proceedings and 
details of the side-payment agreement and subjected China to a position it was initially 
uncomfortable with.  
By comparison, side-payment in the case of climate change mitigation was 
identified with minimal influence. Interviewed negotiators recalled that side-payment 
bargaining did occur in the earlier years of negotiations but less so recently. As a 
leading contender in the international green technology market, China has less need to 
seek technologies elsewhere. Already, China has become the world’s largest producer 
of solar cells; and the government poured US$34.6 billion into investment and financing 
for clean energy in 2009 – nearly double the US$18.6 billion spent by the US and about 
a quarter of the global total invested according to a report by the Pew Charitable Trusts 
(Tran, 9 October 2010). In addition, the government has announced a further investment 
of US$738 billion over the next decade on alternative energy (Stone 2010). Meanwhile, 
as most mitigation efforts are nationally-based, it is not realistic to receive foreign 
funds, which makes the financial resources incentive irrelevant. For these reasons, 
material incentives were less attractive.
255
  
With respect to the WTO cases, this study found minimal side-payment 
activities for both cases. In the GPA negotiations, side-payment bargaining was seldom 
exercised, and the lack thereof made verifying this variable difficult. But for the present 
purposes, an estimation of the potential influence of side-payment is worthwhile 
considering. In 2006, the Chinese government increased the utilisation of the national 
procurement regime for industrial, environmental, and other social policy goals. For 
instance, in 2007 a “buy national” policy was implemented as part of the Ministry of 
Finance’s (MOF) Measure on Government Procurement of Imported Products. This 
policy suggests that only imported products with approval from the designated 
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authorities can be procured. Approvals are usually granted based on expert assessment 
reviews and with the satisfaction of certain criteria. In addition, preferences are usually 
given to foreign suppliers who offer offsets (i.e., technology transfers). This criterion 
could imply that by raising the material incentives through side-payment bargaining, it 
could pull some weight over China’s negotiation approach on the issue. Yet, mandated 
by the government’s 15 year strategy for the promotion of science and technology, 
numerous administrative decrees and regulations were enforced between 2006 and 2007 
in order to accommodate the procurement of energy-efficiency and products certified as 
environmentally friendly products,
256
 and indigenous innovation products.
257
 These 
policies are generally incompatible with the rules of the GPA. For instance, in spite of 
the enforcement of transitional measures (i.e., a domestic price preference programme 
and offsets for assisting in the promotion of indigenous innovation products and 
technology transfers), they are nonetheless confined to a relatively short transitional 
period. In a similar fashion, even though the GPA 2007 Article X: 6 permits a party to 
“prepare, adapt, or apply technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural 
resources or protect the environment,” the existing system is nevertheless incompatible. 
In particular, the product lists are determined by administrative organs that give little 
consideration for international standards, and therefore, the Chinese system have much 
inconsistencies with the requirements contained in the GPA 2007 Article X: 3. These 
regulatory clashes could reduce Beijing’s enthusiasm towards the material incentives 
realised from side-payment bargaining, because of the political and economic costs it 
will have to endure in the aligning the domestic system to the international one through 
reforms.   
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Like the GPA case, few side-payment activities were found for the services 
negotiation except for one Green Room meeting in January 2007. Pascal Lamy 
provoked a side-payment bargaining between the services trade demandeurs (i.e., the 
US, EU, Japan) and major developing countries including China. It was suggested that 
if China, for instance, could present a meaningful offer in services liberalisation, then it 
could unlock possible concessions by the major developed countries in agriculture and 
industrial goods (Leal-Arcas, 2007). Then in 2011, Pascal Lamy reportedly oversaw 
another round of side-payment bargaining to reach an agreement on Modes 2 and 3 
services – liberalisation in exchange for increased financial transfers. 258  As China 
subsequently announced plans to gradually open these sectors after the 2011 
negotiations, one can draw the convenient conclusion that side-payment triggered a shift 
in China’s negotiation approach. Yet, one should be careful to suggest that this was the 
doing of the WTO. Since this study only found evidence of Lamy facilitating and 
overseeing side-payment bargaining rather than actively negotiating the terms and 
details of the end package – this was the job of the member-states – it is risky to draw 
correlations between the WTO and China’s negotiation approach. Still, interviews with 
members of the Chinese delegation and the Council on Services Trade revealed that 
while Lamy did not negotiate the details of the package, he did lay-out a vision of what 
an agreement would look like. Also, Lamy was suggested to have stimulated the 
bargaining process by presenting the worse-off alternative scenarios. For instance, he 
emphasised to the Chinese delegation that in the absence of a multilateral agreement for 
services, China would have to carry out delicate economic reforms in its service sectors 
with less international institutional support. This was argued to be a worse-off situation 
than one where Beijing endures varying degrees of economic dislocation as a result of 
entering a multilateral agreement but those compromises are less formidable than 
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navigating openings into the international markets without an institutional platform as a 
guideline. Hence, Lamy was instrumental in both stimulating China to join the 
bargaining process and also by framing the bargaining from the outset.  
Based on the qualitative findings, the MER agencies’ influence through side-
payment is not as straightforward as anticipated with mixed outcomes across the cases. 
While the CDM and services trade cases indicate positive influence from the UNFCCC 
and WTO respectively, the mitigation and GPA cases revealed minimal influence as a 
result of side-payment bargaining facilitation. One explanation for the variance 
concerns whether the economic side-payments are compatible with China’s policy 
goals. The CDM case revealed that Beijing’s motive to transform its domestic economy 
to a low-carbon path, which requires enormous investments and efforts, provided 
decision-makers with a strong incentive to use the multilateral framework to solicit the 
necessary assistance (especially in the field of technology transfer) to achieve its goals. 
As a result of its needs, it has also weakened its bargaining win-set abroad; and in turn, 
granted the UNFCCC agencies higher influences over China’s negotiation approach. 
This scenario is less likely if China had a stronger win-set that would usually emerge 
when the side-payment is less compatible with China’s policy needs. This finding was 
supported by the interviews, which suggest a key reason China eventually agreed to 
submit to the international monitoring, validation, and verification systems was because 
Beijing needed the economic payoffs in order to support its domestic (and resource-
short) efforts such as the industrial gas projects to reduce hydroflurocarbon-23 (HFC23) 
and nitrous oxide (N₂O), and other renewable energy developments. 259  Hence, 
participating in the CDM therefore meant that it would help fill the resource gaps in this 
regard and help the government realise its goals. Likewise, in services, the government 
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already planned pilot programmes to liberalise its domestic services; and for this reason, 
any foreign technical assistance it can get access to was seen as attractive and fitting.   
In contrast, the possible material gains did not appeal to Beijing for mitigation 
issues because it did not have any need for technologies or finances for mitigation 
activities – it was already an internationally-recognised innovator in low-carbon 
technologies, and renewable energy. Therefore, the economic gains in this regard were 
comparatively insignificant to China. In the GPA example, the economic payoffs from 
side-payment were less attractive due to regulatory conflicts between China’s existing 
procurement regime and the GPA. For instance, albeit a national price preference 
programme and offsets which may enable China to retain certain policies for promoting 
indigenous innovation products and technology transfers, these measures will 
nevertheless be confined to a relatively short transitional period under the GPA. 
Likewise, even though GPA 2007 Article X: 6 allows a party to “prepare, adapt, or 
apply technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or 
protect the environment,” the existing practice are incompatible to China’s product lists. 
These regulatory clashes reduced Beijing’s enthusiasm towards the material incentives 
realised from side-payment bargaining. At the end of the day, domestic policy and 
politics surpass material benefits. As one American official observed, “There’s no 
bigger influence than China’s own policy agenda, which is shaped by the interest of the 
government and its constituents. Third Parties are mere supplemental variables.” 260 
Numerous interviewees further emphasised that as China prosper into a middle-income 
country, its reliance on international support is declining, which implies less feasibility 
for side-payment to be a likely mechanism of influence in the future.
261
   
The second explanation for the variances has to do with trust. The mitigation 
case showed that after previous failures to receive technologies and funding from the 
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industrialised countries, Beijing lacked trust in the UNFCCC agencies’ actual ability to 
facilitate and mediate a degree of willingness amongst the Annex I countries to actually 
commit and follow through with any financial transfer pledge they make. One 
interviewee questioned, “If the major donors have not followed up on their existing 
technology transfer commitments under the UNFCCC framework, why should China 
believe in anything different for mitigation?” 262  In addition, albeit China’s past 
reputation as a direct beneficiary of international financial support, this situation has 
changed and it is today further down the list of potential recipients of financial climate 
support from donor countries. This fact was articulated by Todd Stern, head of the US 
delegation, well in advance of the Copenhagen conference, that he “does not envision 
public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China” (cited in Wong, 10 December 
2009). The Chinese team responded instantaneously that it has never seen itself as a 
“first candidate” for climate support. This little exchange of statements highlighted the 
fact that China’s days as a beneficiary of direct climate support are over. China’s doubts 
are further amplified by the reality that the UNFCCC’s financial capacity is limited. 
Although China can benefit from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), its 
resources are also constrained by Annex I countries’ willingness to contribute. To put 
things into perspective, the UNFCCC (2007) estimates that the investment needed each 
year for climate change mitigation and adaptation for developing countries is in the 
range of US$104-143 billion. However, a rough calculation by Gareth Porter et al. 
(2008) shows that the total amount of funding from all climate funds worldwide equates 
to less than US$6 billion a year. It is therefore understandable why China’s confidence 
in international funding is lacklustre, to say the least. The CDM negotiations were 
different in this regard because the pilot simulations allowed decision-makers to see 
how transactions are made and therefore build the necessary trust in the system. As 
Robert Powell (2002: 6) have criticised, “A striking feature of [this] actual [rationalist] 
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bargaining [assumption] is that it often results in costly delays and inefficient 
outcomes.” Even rationalists themselves have acknowledged that a nation will only 
revise their national approach if the expected marginal costs (i.e., damage or abatement 
costs) of cooperation is lower than (or at most equal to) the marginal benefits it expects 
to receive from such a position (Underdal, 1998: 8). But with distrust, even the slightest 
cost could be perceived in magnified scales. Hence, establishing trust is a precondition 
to effective imposition of the MER agencies’ influence through side-payment dealings.  
In general, the MER agencies as instigators of side-payment bargaining can 
produce partial influence at best. That is, they may be able to push China’s negotiation 
approach towards a desired direction but it does not necessary transforms the 
fundamental negotiation approach – that is the game between China and other nation-
states. Therefore, in measuring its level of influence, it is certain that side-payment 
bargaining does not have a transformative or retrenchment effect. At the same time, 
side-payment bargaining do not have inertia effect because the CDM and services cases 
showed that it can restructure China’s incentives. But the actualised success depends on 
how relevant are the economic payoffs to China’s policy goals and trust factor. 
Consequently, it is argued that side-payment bargaining has an influence level between 
inertia and absorption. 
 
On the whole, the chapter finds the hypothesised role of the MER agencies as 
instigators of side-payment bargaining partially valid.  
 
7.5 The Social Instigators 
Throughout the qualitative analyses of this thesis, uncertainty has been a common 
theme across the cases. When designing, framing, and eventually setting their 
negotiation approach, the Chinese government, put simply, faces at least two different 
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kinds of uncertainty – each with an undermining effect on the MER agencies’ capacity 
to influence China. They face uncertainty about the political and economic environment 
in which their policies are implemented in, and of which can change dramatically with 
little notice or recognition abroad. They also face uncertainty about one another’s 
preferences and intentions, which may not be fully articulated in negotiations. Hence, 
uncertainty is a concept that emphasises the limits of our ability to obtain accurate 
information particularly about the future (Best, 2012). In the rationalist literature, 
uncertainty is often seen as a product of imperfect or asymmetrical information. In the 
present context, China, as like other nations, lack perfect information about the future 
since political and economic events are difficult to predict. At the same time, they must 
also contend with limited information, knowing more about their own intentions than 
about each other’s. Drawing on Douglass North’s (1990: 27) work on institutional 
economics, liberal institutionalists argue that one of the key functions of the MER 
agencies is to reduce uncertainty (Keohane, 1984: 245). Building on this line of thought, 
uncertainty runs unnervingly throughout China’s economic diplomacy decision-making, 
and this is the result of low expectations for foreign reciprocity, distrust, and a concern 
for personal reputation. These three factors constitute the social instigators 
contingencies. As an underlying assumption of the secondary hypothesis, the thesis 
assumes that the level of influence the MER agencies have on China’s negotiation 
approach is contingent on three social instigators: expectation, trust, and personal 
reputation. All three social instigators are cumulatively necessary criteria of influence. 
This section delves into the significance of the social instigator contingencies as 
enhancers and constraints of the MER agencies’ influence on China’s negotiation 
approach. In the process, the section makes a case for the proximity talks, INPs, and 
side-payment bargaining (though to a lesser extent) as have the comparative advantage 
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of enhancing the social instigators and thereby strengthens the influence of the MER 
agencies.  
 
7.5.1 Expectation 
According to the research interviews, a fundamental reason for China’s seemingly low 
proactivity in many multilateral economic negotiations is due to Beijing’s low 
expectations that foreign parties will reciprocate any commitment pledge they make. 
During the 2011 DDA ministerial conference, numerous interviewed Chinese 
negotiators indicated that they did not intend to work hard towards reaching an 
agreement because they did not think other national delegations were interested in any 
form of an agreement. This attitude was echoed by a senior member of the WTO 
Secretariat, who remarked that there is no political will amongst the member-states to 
push through an agreement or any expectations to be pragmatic.
263
 Chinese negotiators 
to the COPs similarly indicated low expectations that foreign parties have any 
willingness to commit to a post-2020 framework at COP18 even before the conference 
took place.  
 Where there is low expectations, the MER agencies have the opportunity to 
enhance the situation through proximity talks, INPs, and side-payment bargaining. 
Through signalling private information on the (likely) bottom-lines of other negotiating 
parties, for instance, the MER agencies can minimise doubts about reciprocity among 
Chinese decision-makers and elevate its expectations. Although this study was unable to 
find explicit evidence of this, multiple Chinese negotiators did not deny its possibility. 
Moreover, based on first-hand observations, Chairs of informal plenary meetings do try 
to steer meetings and extract mutual commitment from member-states by going around 
the groups and asking each delegation to promise the other that they will follow a joint 
strategy. They frequently end with comments such as, “Now remember everyone that 
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we all do much better if we all follow X strategy.” It is probable that this form of 
intervention can stipulate the Chinese delegation to reframe their expectations towards 
others and how it should act accordingly.  
In the climate change negotiations, it is well-known that China tightly eyes the 
actions of the US and especially design their negotiation approaches based on a reactive 
strategy determined by their expectations on how the US is likely to act. In light of this, 
senior members of the UNFCCC Secretariat together with the Mexican and South 
African presidencies attempted to reshape China’s expectation of a non-commitment 
American position at COP16 and COP17 by placing stronger pressures on the US 
decision-makers to set an example and lead the climate change efforts. In the words of 
one Chinese negotiator to COP16 and COP17, “Our [China’s] expectations and actions 
very much depend on how the Americans act. If they move, we move. If they stall, we 
stall. Of course, the facilitators [UNFCCC] play a crucial role in shaping our 
expectations by mediating with the US.” Similarly, during the 2011 DDA ministerial 
meeting, the Chinese delegation made clear at a press briefing that although it is 
committed to the negotiations, its expectations on cooperation rests with the nature of 
the American position. And one interviewed Chinese negotiator goes further to suggest 
that, “The WTO Secretariat’s inability to mediate between China and the US is a key 
explanation for China’s low expectations and the many deadlocks that exist in the 
negotiations today.” In this sense, the abilities of MER agencies to mediate between 
China and its most important counterparts have substantial effects on the nature of 
China’s expectations.  
 A broader perspective of this cognitive and rationalist argument is the extent the 
MER agencies can influence Chinese negotiation approaches depends on its capacity to 
mediate and general a situation of reciprocity, which is a precondition for shaping 
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Chinese expectation on cooperation.
264
 Reciprocity refers to a family of strategies that 
can be used in social dilemma situations. It involves (i) an effort to identify the actors 
involved; (ii) an assessment of the likelihood that other actors are conditional co-
operators; (iii) a decision to cooperate initially with other actors if they are perceived as 
trusted conditional co-operators; (iv) a refusal to cooperate with those who do not 
reciprocate; and (v) punish those who betray the trust (Ostrom, 1998: 10). If the MER 
agencies can facilitate positive actions of others, then it will also influence positive 
expectations from China. The reverse is also true. If MER agencies are unable to 
mediate positive actions from others, it will not influence positive expectations from 
China. In this tit-for-tat situation, it is important that the MER agencies are willing to 
use retribution to some degree (i.e., punish defectors) so as to demonstrate to China that 
it has authoritative capacity. Doing so can boost the expectations of the Chinese 
decision-makers. At present, as one Chinese trade negotiator on trade said, “In both 
climate change and trade governances, China cannot be assured of strong and 
authoritative institutional bodies at the multilateral level. This causes uncertainties for 
the Chinese decision-makers, but that’s the member-driven system for you.”265 
 There are three imaginable limitations to an argument on expectation. One 
possible limitation is that since reciprocity norms are learned, the MER agencies may 
find a hard time mediating with all the member-states in order to shape a cooperative 
Chinese expectation given that not all nations necessarily understand the same norms of 
behaviour for effective reciprocity. In this way, expectation-building may be difficult to 
do if a universal understanding of reciprocity cannot be established. True, intangible 
variables such as culture and context can make it difficult to converge normative 
understanding between nations. But it is also not an impossible barrier to overcome. As 
cognitivists believe, normative understandings that are repeatedly emphasised will, over 
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time, be unconsciously internalised within negotiators across cultures and the natural 
tendencies for mimicking of behaviours will eventually manifest. This was verified by 
interviews with Chinese negotiators.  
 A second potential limitation regards the reality that reciprocity-related 
expectations are contingent on the issues of concern. For instance, although the CDM, 
mitigation, and GPA issues require confident expectations of reciprocity in order to 
move forward with the negotiations, the services area requires comparatively less 
traditional reciprocity-driven market access negotiations. Instead, other considerations 
such as the costs of inefficient services industries and the likelihood of enduring heavier 
pressures for unilateral reform may cause negotiation break-downs rather than poor 
expectations on reciprocity. That said it is often difficult to dismiss the relevance of 
expectation in any economic negotiation. For instance, the pre-defined expectation that 
other countries will expect China to liberalise its services sector has caused much 
domestic disagreements and anti-reform sentiments. The consequent domestic pressures 
contribute immensely to the ultimate expectation and thus negotiation approach of the 
Chinese government.
266
 And since Beijing has had a long held expectation that a policy 
reform in services, made at the request of a trading partner, is often automatically going 
to benefit other countries more than China, it has withdrew itself from a higher bottom-
line at the negotiation table. In this way, China refuses its own willingness to take on a 
case of reciprocity. As such, the reciprocity-driven expectation does matter in Chinese 
decision-making.         
 A third possible limitation is that even when it seems as if the MER agencies 
have contributed to an enhanced expectation on the part of China, such displays of 
positive expectations could be mere tactical play in order to lure other negotiation 
parties into a dilemma only to defect on them later. The motivation behind such tactic is 
access to foreign resources or to gain leverage over others. When a nation-state follow 
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reciprocity norms (for real or tactically), the MER agencies’ ability to detect cheaters 
are undermined. If this happens, the Chinese decision-makers can take advantage of the 
situation whilst silently reject the MER agencies’ influence. Hence, it is risky to be too 
trusting with mere displays of positive expectations, and draw quick conclusions that 
such equates with the doing of the MER agency. Even within the Chinese delegation, 
there are variances among the negotiators in terms of the probability that they will adapt 
to the multilateral norms, and in the ways that the structural variables propel their 
willingness to cooperate in a given context. For some Chinese decision-makers, as like 
those from other nations, the norm of reciprocity will only be used if they know that 
they are closely monitored by a MER and therefore may face strong probabilities of 
retribution if they did not do so. Therefore, it is of imperative that the MER agency 
knows what kind of delegate(s) it is dealing with before making efforts in expectation-
building.         
 
7.5.2 Trust 
Second to expectation is trust. It is often the case that a root cause of uncertainty is 
trust,
267
 and the lack thereof from China. This problem was admitted by a senior 
member of the WTO Secretariat: “You don’t feel trust among negotiators in the 
WTO…or in the climate change negotiations” not just in other countries but also 
towards the multilateral institutions, its agenda, and intentions.
268
 And one Chinese 
policy advisor to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) observed, when there is 
distrust from individual negotiators, they can simply reject a proposal based on personal 
grudge.
269
 China’s trust in the general multilateral system is a major concern.270 In the 
CDM negotiations, China held severe distrust with regards to the motivation of the 
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CDM initiative and who will benefit the most. It was only after the GEF/UN pilot 
simulations that Chinese trust was rejuvenated. In the mitigation case, many interviewed 
Chinese negotiators and the UNFCCC Secretariat staffs have indicated that China’s lack 
of trust in other member-states’ actual commitment towards an internationally-binding 
agreement was a root cause of its hesitant approach to the negotiations. Again, the trust 
issue is very much stemmed from China’s relationship with other nation-states, 
especially the US. In the negotiations on the GPA, Beijing has struggled to trust the 
WTO’s protocol and the framework at large, arguing it is too vague and ambiguous. It is 
clear to see that the lack of trust have undermined China’s willingness to positively 
approach negotiations.  
For the Chinese government, when it comes to multilateral economic 
negotiations under an international framework, trust is seen as the “bedrock” of 
effective negotiations, and the presence of trust is indispensable to reaching an 
agreement. This is supported by the theoretical presupposition that in the context of a 
social dilemma, trust affects whether an individual is willing to initiate cooperation with 
the expectation that it will be reciprocated (Ostrom, 1998: 12). Hence, one central 
variable that has hindered China from taking a cooperative approach to the negotiations 
is trust, especially over whether its negotiating counterparts will actually comply with 
agreements. This is not surprising given that multilateral economic negotiations often 
comprise of multifaceted conflicts of interests amongst a large pool of member-states, 
and therefore, there is little trust between them to begin with.   
 A labyrinth of theorists has attempted to identify methods for enhancing 
cooperation through trust (e.g., Axelrod 1984; Olson, 1965). However, much of the 
research has focused on how the MER agencies might monitor and improve the 
enforcement of agreements or how the comparatively more significant countries can 
foster or coerce their way to an agreement. Yet, anything that is monitored or coerced 
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tends to have an impeding effect on trust-building. In theory, a more effective method of 
building trust is by shaping national identity, which expands the potential range of 
possibilities for fostering cooperative outcomes. This is for two reasons. First, past 
research (i.e., Ostrom, 1998) has confirmed that the intuitive assumption that mutual 
identification with a common group is associated with trust between the members of 
that group. The level of trust varies, and trust may of course may be misplaced or 
abused. But trust levels usually vary most strongly with the degree to which a trustor 
identifies with the trustee as members of the same group. Second, national identity 
evolves over time, and new identities can be fostered with the belief that humans, by 
nature, crave to belong and seek-out like-minded others with whom attachments can be 
formed. This argument is supported by the theory of cognitivism, which further argues 
that identity can influence one’s interests far more than any other single factor, such as 
desire for wealth or power, as has been assumed by theorists of other schools such as 
liberal economics and mercantilism (i.e., Gilpin 1987; Morgenthau 1956; Oye 1986).  
 Over the last 20 years of multilateral economic negotiations, there have been 
increased efforts by the MER agencies to reduce the trust barriers between China and 
other nations by reducing competitive behaviours and through building unity and 
empathy among the negotiators. As acquiring trust from China is ever-more important, 
innovative mechanisms for trust-building were designed by various MER agencies to 
establish common identities. The MER agencies believe doing so not only foster trust 
but realise any overlapping and perhaps unexpressed state interests between nations. In 
climate change, the UNFCCC agencies have made such efforts through informal, 
unofficial initiatives – known as the Track II methods271 – that take place outside the 
official negotiating modes, to help Chinese negotiators overcome negotiation barriers 
and alter their perceptions of each other, and of the issues. Given the high economic, 
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social, environmental, and political stakes, Chinese decision-makers often view the 
UNFCCC negotiations with high-intensity distrust and suspicion. As part of the efforts 
to remedy trust issues, numerous experiments for trust-building were trialled under 
Track II, and one of which was characterised by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) 
(2005: 7) as the “Comfy Armchair Theory.” Through INPs, organisers promoted a laid-
back approach that seems to put the Chinese participants at ease. Chinese delegates 
explained that comfortable red armchairs (for government experts) were placed on a 
podium that was lowered to be more at level with the participants to lessen the formality 
of the discussions. Some compared it to a “television talk show” setting, while others 
likened the use of “comfy chairs” and the informal approach to a “nice fireside chat.”272 
According to the ENB (2005: 7) observers, the technique helped generate a positive 
atmosphere and an “open, frank and broad-ranging…exchange of information.”  
 The initial success of this tactic inspired other in-session seminars to adopt 
similar methods for reducing the formality, encourage open exchanges and build mutual 
understandings. The underlying assumption is that such exercises executed in INP 
settings can help China build openness to and appreciation of others’ positions as well 
as “win-win” compromises that emerge from a positive environment conducive to 
agreement. Equally important is that this approach rejects notions that negotiations are 
zero-sum games with winners and losers. The in-session seminars and other informal 
discussions, commencing with the comfy chair format, helped the Chinese delegates 
gain a greater appreciation of each other’s positions on their weighty agenda leading up 
to COP13 in Bali in 2007. The conference effectively finalised the Bali Roadmap, 
which set out a clear framework and deadline for reaching a hoped-for bigger agreement 
in Copenhagen in 2009. Although the Bali success can be attributed to many factors, 
including the painstaking preparations and the unprecedented high-level political, 
media, and public attention (ENB 2007: 18), the concerted trust-building exercises, 
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including the informal dialogues held over the previous two years, played a significant 
part in transforming uncertainty to a clear roadmap. One Chinese negotiator claims that 
the “raised level of trust” resulted in agreement on the Adaptation Fund and was 
brought about, at least in part, by informal discussions which helped China reach an 
understanding with other countries.
273
  
Similar trust-building efforts fell flat at Copenhagen in December 2009. 
Expectations for this meeting were high, with many hoping for a legally binding treaty 
that would chart a clear path forward in the post-2012 period. Instead, the meeting 
ended acrimoniously, resulting only with a non-binding agreement known as the 
Copenhagen Accords that is “noted” (rather than adopted) by parties (ENB, 2009). On 
the surface, the organisers were holding a strong hand at the start of the meeting. They 
had succeeded in persuading over 120 world leaders (including Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao) to attend, thus raising the stakes and the pressure for a strong outcome. But 
Chinese negotiators were unable to bring talks to a point that would allow their leaders 
to put their signatures to a strong outcome. Instead, Primer Wen Jiabao arrived in the 
final days of the meeting faced with a wide array of outstanding and immensely 
complex issues left on the table. Furthermore, the sheer number of participants (40,000 
in a 20,000 capacity venue) meant that it was impossible to achieve the sense of 
inclusiveness and openness for Chinese stakeholders that have characterised some of the 
negotiations in previous years. Some Chinese stakeholders were literally left out in the 
cold due to space limitations at the venue, while organisers mis-timed the release of 
documents, and not distributing them to all players, making them appear to be “secret” 
texts. These missteps left a sense of exclusion and back-room horse-trading that was in 
opposition to the transparency and trust-building organisers had sought to generate in 
the early stages, prior to the adoption of the Bali Road Map (ENB, 2009).  
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The UNFCCC process redeemed itself somewhat in December 2010, when a 
more satisfactory outcome was gained with the help of the new UNFCCC Executive-
Secretary, Christiana Figueres, working in close alliance with the Mexican hosts of the 
Cancun climate change conference. This time, there were no “secret” texts, but periodic 
“stock-taking” briefings in the plenary hall for all participants, thus it greatly increased 
the real transparency of the process. Another innovation at Cancun was the decision to 
pair up key ministers to work together on some of the thornier issues. For each key 
topic, one developing country minister and one developed country minister were tasked 
with convening talks among negotiators and identify a way forward. This approach 
seemed to find favour with the Chinese, and perhaps the sense of ownership it generated 
for Chinese officials helped move things forward. At the end of the meeting, there was a 
far greater sense of agreement and achievement than had existed in Copenhagen, with 
China supporting the consensus (ENB, 2010). Similarly, the WTO Secretariat staffs 
have apparently played a significant role as a mediator during China’s WTO accession 
negotiation challenges with the US. According to a Chinese decision-maker, the 
demonstration by the WTO that they are able to do this portrayed a sense of trust from 
Beijing towards the multilateral trade system at large.
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 As a result, China ended-up 
taking on more concessions than its initial bottom-line in order to enter the WTO. These 
examples show the importance of the INP exercises in generating and building trust. At 
the same time, they illustrate how a lack of trust can break the negotiation process. By 
acting in the capacity of a trustworthy middle-agency, the MER agencies are ultimately 
able to bring up issues of contention and settle inter-governmental differences.  
However, one can imagine that even trust has its limitations; and the possibility 
for MER agencies to influence China’s negotiation approach through trust-building is 
not universally befitting. China may argue that there are risks of manipulation and 
exploitation attached to trusting someone. In other instances, the Chinese decision-
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makers may wonder whether making a commitment for a multilateral trust-based 
relationship will undermine the rights to seek competitive advantages, even in cases 
where the benefits outweigh the costs. Alternatively, China’s interest could be 
jeopardised if trust is misplaced. A third possibility is that once China decides on a 
trustworthy counterpart, other (weaker) qualities of that country are likely to be 
conceived as consistent with this favourable impression even if the reality would 
suggest otherwise. This is the “halo effect” which occurs when one positive 
characteristic of a country dominates the way that country is viewed by others. Such 
calculus can pull-up China’s defensive immunity from the MER agencies’ influence and 
undermine the trust-building exercises.  
What is more, often trust-building through the MER agencies can result in the 
establishment of a deterrence-based trust centred on a consistency of behaviour (i.e., 
countries will follow-up on what they promised to do). Such behavioural consistency is 
usually maintained through threats and/or knowledge of unfavourable consequences if 
consistency is broken. This interpretation of trust seems somewhat paradoxical with a 
strong power connotation attached. Compared to an identification-based trust – which 
operates at the level of intrinsic motivation, deterrence-based trust is more costly to 
maintain as it often requires external monitoring of national compliance in order to 
sustain it. What is more, it risks backfiring because national decision-makers can react 
negatively to having their policy freedoms controlled by the MER agencies.    
If the MER agencies wish to mitigate these limitations, and maintain a level of 
influence, then identification-based trust must be established. That is, trust-building 
exercises based on qualities of empathy between member-states so that China is willing 
take on the values of other players as a result of the emotional connection between 
them. In practice, both Christiana Figueres and Pascal Lamy have, over the years, 
cultivated friendly relationships with members of the Chinese government through 
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repeated face-to-face dialogue. They have also pursued non-hostile environments for the 
execution of the INPs, actively diffused tensions, and used their sense of humour and 
humane personalities.
275
 The result of such personal relationships is a more sustainable 
trust. On the whole, it is important for the multilateral economic negotiations to 
cultivate a culture of trust-building and treat this as a precondition to, as well as an 
objective of, reaching an agreement. At least, for China, this is a mundane imperative 
and a determinant driver of their negotiation approaches.    
 
7.5.3 Personal reputation 
Investing in trust is only possible if the initial degree of personal reputation is 
sufficiently high. Thus, personal reputation is the third interrelated element of which 
the MER agencies’ influence depends. When national delegates gather in small INP 
settings, the social dynamic is similar to that of a high school classroom. There are clear 
social cliques or distinct groups of friends. No one wants to be the odd one out or be 
seen as obsolete. The weaker negotiators admire representatives of larger nations, and 
no one wants to be seen as difficult and non-cooperative. In this mental vulnerable state 
of mind, negotiators have a relatively high desire to acquire and/or maintain a 
respectable reputation amongst its peers. Under this circumstance, the MER agencies 
are granted the most opportune time to influence Chinese decision-makers. One Chinese 
delegate to COP17 remarked, “When a Chinese negotiator is in an informal, they are 
most prone to the logics of other parties and the Chair. The repeated encounter to new 
ideas makes it mentally acceptable simply because everyone else accepts it. As people, 
we all want to be respected and feel that we fit-in. So the Chinese negotiator is likely to 
be more sympathetic to the Secretariat’s text.”276 In this context, the proximity talks and 
the INPs are especially useful for boosting Chinese negotiators’ reputation. If the MER 
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agencies are effective in this regard, it is likely to motivate the Chinese negotiator to 
converge with the MER agencies’ interests. At the same time, the MER agencies can 
stigmatise personal reputation with the use of retribution against a Chinese negotiator 
for not keeping to its promises, for instance.     
 In China, an individual’s reputation rests on having mianzi (saving face; 面子). 
The Chinese notion of saving face is closely related with American concepts of dignity 
and prestige. Mianzi defines a person’s place in his social network; it is the most 
important measure of social worth. Hence, if a national delegate cause Chinese 
negotiators embarrassment or a loss of composure, even unintentionally, it can be 
disastrous for the negotiations. Hence, it is important that the MER facilitators always 
maintain mianzi for Chinese negotiators in order to increase their influence over China’s 
negotiation approach.
277
 Maintaining mianzi is a reason why Chinese negotiators prefer 
proximity talks and INPs – it saves them from embarrassment in the consequence of 
tensions with other negotiating parties. The 2011 DDA negotiations demonstrated acts 
of upholding the reputations of Chinese negotiators when the Chair of an informal 
plenary meeting on the GPA raised the importance of emerging market economies.  
In addition, informed by a strong tradition of Confucian values of obedience and 
deference to one’s superiors, it is mundane that the MER agencies acknowledge the 
value of shehuidengji (social status; 社会等级), where officials of a higher rank must be 
respected by those at a lower position. At some point, multilateral economic 
negotiations may require a meeting of equals in the hope of stimulating more 
cooperation. But top-level Chinese officials will not be prepared to bargain and will 
definitely not be persuaded, as it is not within their professional repertoire to do so. 
Rather, they will evaluate the relationship during a show of chengyi (sincerity; 诚意) by 
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their Western counterparts. If the MER agencies can embrace this value, it is anticipated 
that Chinese decision-makers will be more accepting of their influence.  
 
7.5.4 A reinforcing relationship 
At the core of China’s negotiation approach are a set of key drivers of decision-making. 
The triangular relationship between expectation, trust, and personal reputation 
essentially shapes China’s international posture. If Chinese decision-makers see that the 
initial levels of cooperation from others are at least moderately high, then they will also 
learn to trust other players and expect itself to adopt reciprocity norms. In a situation 
where China sees more countries genuinely using reciprocity norms, then it will place 
more importance to establishing a trustworthy reputation. Thus, trust, expectation, and 
personal reputation are intrinsically reinforcing (figure 7.2). As well, this implies that a 
defect in any one of the three core elements will cause a downward spiral especially in 
the influence of MER agencies. At times, China’s negotiation approach is not just 
circumscribed by their national policy. The decision-makers’ judgments on the 
reinforcing core triangle can be influenced by variables of structure and by past 
experiences, personal norms, and the individual’s level of trust in others. If the MER 
agencies desire to effectively influence China’s negotiation approach, it is necessary to 
embrace and be compatible with the core triangle to affect China’s level of cooperation 
and perceived net benefit as a result of cooperation.  
 
Figure 7.2 The Core Triangle of Social Instigators 
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In the previous sections, it was suggested that, to this end, proximity talks, INPs, 
and side-payment bargaining are particularly well-suited and effective mechanisms for 
this purpose. This is because in order to affect China’s negotiation approach, it is 
necessary to start at the individual level (i.e., those that makes policy). The face-to-face 
nature of these mechanisms enable Chinese decision-makers to assess whether he or she 
trusts the other players (including members from the MER) enough to alter their 
negotiation approach. Here, it is important that the MER agencies control the dialogue 
that goes on between Chinese negotiators and other national delegates because the 
nature of communication can often increase as much as their trust in the reliability of 
others can decrease. The MER agencies also need to take greater leadership and initiate 
the direction of dialogue to be taken as well as control the level of symmetry in 
economic payoffs in side-payment bargaining, for instance, among the delegations. 
Otherwise any asymmetry can undermine the MER agencies’ influence and trust-
building.              
Arguably, the Chinese decision-makers also depend on the MER agencies to 
make a contingent agreement work. For instance, contingent agreements may deal with 
both cooperation and punishment those considered as non-co-operators (Levi 1988). 
Keeping in balance how to punish defectors enables Chinese decision-makers a stronger 
personal reputation; however this is much more challenging in a multilateral setting 
than a bilateral one. In a multilateral environment, it is difficult for Chinese decision-
makers to interpret outcomes that do not meet the initial expectation regardless of how 
much a party may have cheated, or that a mistake was made by a country, or if a random 
exogenous variable undermined the expected result. The problem is even worse if there 
are no MER representatives to facilitate and steer these discussions in settings like the 
INPs. The counter argument could be that the Chinese decision-makers may prefer a 
non-MER facilitated situation because then its external and internal reputation will not 
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be at stake, especially if no agreement is reached. As a result, the individual is not 
required to take further action. However, once a multilateral agreement has been 
reached, be it verbal or in writing, it turns into the pivot of future decisions within the 
parameters of the agreement. This means that China’s negotiation approach could be 
further constrained to its disliking. At the same time, it puts their reputation at stake if 
they did not reciprocate in the future. In a comparative sense, the Chinese decision-
makers may therefore prefer the former outcome, which makes the MER agencies’ role 
less favourable.  
 Yet, the interview data indicate that most Chinese decision-makers and 
negotiators across the trade and climate change spectrums do prefer to reach 
cooperation if possible based on mutual trust. For many interviewees, this is not just 
beneficial to China’s international integration process and the road to forming a more 
robust and defined international role, but also beneficial to its domestic development. 
One Chinese policymaker points out that, “China is not a lazy nation and if an 
agreement is possible within China’s capacity and interest, then China is willing to 
participate.”278 Another Chinese negotiator commented, “The MERs in general needs to 
assert more authority in my opinion in negotiation settings. Many delegates like to 
observe the way these institutions have conducted themselves in negotiations and our 
own sense of trust in the system depends on how well and effectively they have 
facilitated the meetings. However, many institutions still lack this authority and need to 
do a better job at it.”279 In particular, the interviewees widely shared the view that the 
MER agencies should be better at sanctioning non-conformers for not keeping their 
commitments. Such behaviour easily breaks China’s fragile trust. Consequently, one 
way the MER agencies can obtain trust is to first build their own credibility by 
improving its capacity to manage the multilateral system. Only when the Chinese 
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decision-makers view the MER agencies as credible will they believe in their capacity 
to help build inter-state trust.                           
This is why the face-to-face method of communication works more effectively 
than the alternative (i.e., sending computerised messages). The Chinese decision-makers 
like to judge the others’ trustworthiness by watching facial expressions and hearing the 
way something is said. It is hard to establish trust in a group of strangers who will make 
decisions independently and privately without seeing and talking with one another. This 
is why the MER agencies’ role as facilitators is so vital. The ways it embraces and/or 
constrains the behaviour of national delegates shape the expectations of Chinese 
decision-makers about the others’ behaviours, which are also preconditioned by their 
capacity to build trust in Chinese decision-makers. The norms disseminated by the MER 
agencies and past experiences also shape Chinese decision-makers’ trust levels. Finally, 
how the MER agencies identify with, project their intentions and norms, and relate to 
the Chinese negotiators can affect the global identities of these individuals and their 
reputation.
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 If all three variables of the core triangle are satisfied, then the MER 
agencies should expect a relatively high level of influence. Of course, the reverse effect 
is also true. Consequently, understanding how the social instigators feed into one 
another helps explain why the mechanisms of proximity talks, INPs, and side-payment 
bargaining are either effective of not in influence China’s negotiation approach.    
In general the chapter finds the assumption that the level of influence the MER 
agencies have on China’s negotiation approach is contingent on the social instigators 
holds.  
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
Between the proximity talks, the INPs, and the side-payment bargaining, the underlying 
impact is rooted from the fact that the MER agencies, as the intermediaries of economic 
negotiations, possess diverse motives for choosing a certain form of behaviour or set of 
values and recommendations towards a policy they are attempting to effect. 
Paradoxically, the fact that the MER agencies possess goals and objectives that they 
attempt to further through mediatory practices has been a neglected aspect of studies in 
economic diplomacy. It tends to assume that while the member-states possess goals and 
objectives that underlie the behaviour they undertake – the incompatibility of which 
forms the basis of disagreements and negotiation impasse – any MER agency is wholly 
or, at worst, largely motivated by a desire to bring about a settlement. To this point, it is 
crucial to note that the goals and objectives of the MER agencies’ mediatory 
mechanisms should not be taken for granted and are a proper subject for academic 
analysis. 
 In this concluding section, rather than reiterate the findings, it is perhaps more 
interesting to close the present chapter by reflecting on some key strengths and likely 
weaknesses of the three mediums discussed throughout the preceding analysis. In 
general, the strengths of the three mediatory mechanisms in shaping Chinese 
negotiation approach come in three forms. First, the venue change – the endogenous 
shift in China’s negotiation approach as a corollary of a change in the location of 
decision-making – provides more receptive hearings of Chinese and non-Chinese 
concerns. As E. Schattschneider (1960) puts it, “This process takes the form of actors 
transferring the policy to another subsystem by altering the understanding of a policy 
with the objective of altering the resulting policy outputs in a way that suits the actors’ 
interests.” In the present context, the effectiveness of the INPs lie in the fact that 
sensitive discussions were taken out of the formal plenary sessions and in more casual 
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and comfortable small-group settings where negotiators feel more at ease about talking 
honestly and accepting counter-vantage-points, and thus help build trust, expectations, 
and personal reputation. In a similar light, as interviews have suggested, the shuttle 
diplomacy proximity talks are generally effective simply because Chinese leaders are 
able to communicate on an inter-personal level with the MER representatives and in 
their local vicinities whereby the Chinese context can be better reflected and the MER 
agencies’ objectives clarified. The effect of venue change is not unique to China. Frank 
R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (1993) found in the American decision-making 
process that policy actors deploy numerous common strategies to gain access to the 
policymaking process and affect the policy outcome by changing the venue where 
decisions are made. Michael Howlett (1994) similarly points to Canada and Australia, 
where successful venue-shifting activities have been undertaken over the recent decades 
by First Nations or Aboriginal groups.  
 Second, the mechanisms have the capacity to create settlement by boosting 
expectation. For an interested MER agency, using any one of the mechanisms often 
communicates a provision of a safety net for China from a threatened negotiation 
impasse; and this often derives influence for the MER agencies. Such is the payoff that 
is derived from changing the patterns of interaction and/or from establishing a new 
relationship between the MER agency and Chinese decision-makers. The preceding 
section mentioned the importance of establishing a good relationship with Chinese 
decision-makers when attempting to frame the course of a negotiated outcome. Through 
the mechanisms, and the change of venue, a trusting relationship can be built, and 
thereafter, converge differential interests between China and other parties, clarify 
resoluble disagreements, and build consensus that agrees with their own objectives. At 
the same time, the mechanisms provide the MER agencies the capacity to use its 
intermediary role to affect the actual course of a deadlock through a judiciously timed 
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mediation offer. Through both shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, and INPs, the MER 
agencies can delay or alter a negotiating trend to provide a breathing space for China, 
for instance, to buy time to regroup, reorganise, re-strategise. This way, during the 
actual process of negotiations, the MER agencies can use its various roles to increase its 
own influence on China through numerous bargaining/persuasion strategies such as 
side-payments. It may be able to buy promises of future compliance or increased 
sensitivity to its wishes with rewards offered itself or with promises of concessions to 
be extracted from other parties to the negotiation, over which an interested MER agency 
may have some considerable influence. 
 Third, the mechanisms have the advantage of deriving tangible and intangible 
benefits for China. For instance, side-payment bargaining yields material benefits for 
China, which may include the restoration or increase of previous transfers of goods and 
resources between the MER agency and China or between other parties and China; or in 
some cases, the denial of goods and resources to others. Influence benefits include base 
rights, rights to information or of passage; and the promises of future support, greater 
sensitivity to the wishes of China, and greater openness to the goods, information and 
personnel of the MER agency to the Chinese agencies. Intangible benefits include 
reputational rewards that can be enhanced through the INPs, which accrue to a country 
that is deemed to have made a commendable attempt to bring about a negotiated 
agreement (Mitchell, 1988: 44-45). Such benefits are of particular importance to China 
as it is often perceived as having some special responsibility for the maintenance and 
restoration of global welfare.  
 Of course, for each advantage of the mechanisms, there are also disadvantages. 
Disadvantages can be incurred both through undertaking the processes of mediating 
itself and through achieving a settlement, although it seems more likely that 
disadvantages will accrue through an unpopular or unsuccessful settlement than for 
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merely adopting the role of go-between or honest broker. Similarly, using the 
aforementioned channels to influence Chinese negotiation approach can sometimes 
backfire and the MER agencies are left with less influence, and less opportunity to 
establish what it regards as a satisfactory relationship with China. Equally, mechanisms 
can damage reputation as well as enhance it. In short, although China is generally ready 
to approve the MER agencies’ mediatory role, is necessary to recognise that, although 
somewhat asymmetric, there is always a balance of potential strengths and weaknesses 
in undertaking influence through these mechanisms.  
With all said and done, this chapter finds the secondary hypothesis partially 
true, although it is close-to-complete validation. 
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Chapter 8  
 
THE ‘DRAGONOMIC DIPLOMACY’ DECODED 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The present thesis began with an objective to examine the ways multilateral economic 
regimes (MERs) and their agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference 
formation. In recognising that economic diplomacy is not just concerned with 
preference formation, but also the decision-making that takes place during multilateral 
negotiation processes, the study added a second element to the research interest and 
investigated the role(s) of the MER agencies in shaping the negotiation approach of 
China. The thought process is that Chinese economic diplomacy can be affected by the 
MER agencies at different stages of decision-making, from policy discovery, to policy 
definition, policy determination, and policy deliberation. To guide the investigation, two 
sets of mechanisms of influence were tested as part of the primary and secondary 
hypotheses. The study on preference formation focused on examining the costs-and-
benefits calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement. The analysis 
on negotiation approach discussed the MER agencies as mediators in shuttle diplomacy 
proximity talks, facilitators of informal negotiation practices (INPs), and instigators of 
side-payment bargaining.       
 An examination of economic diplomacy is not possible without empirical 
substance to form the basis of the discussions. Hence, two on-going negotiations were 
adopted as the focal points of this thesis. They are the Conference of Parties (COP) 
climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) trade 
negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO). China’s participation in these 
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multilateral processes consists of both continuities and changes in its national 
preferences and negotiation approaches. In the climate change negotiations, although 
China’s fundamental principles remained constant, national preference evolved for the 
clean development mechanism (CDM) and mitigation issues. In the international trade 
negotiations, what remained the same are the core principles that were hammered out 
since the first round of talks in Doha. What changed are China’s national preferences 
for the trade in services modality and the government procurement agreement (GPA) 
framework. Where China demonstrated shifts in preferences and/or negotiation 
approaches, the transformation is one from absolute resistance to either acceptance or 
augmented flexibility.  
In this final chapter of the thesis, a summary of the primary findings regarding 
the primary and secondary hypotheses is presented. In light of the findings, a discussion 
on the relative explanatory value of the study’s theoretical frameworks is necessary. The 
chapter claims that while the approaches used to guide this thesis are comprehensive, 
the thesis find them to commonly dismiss crucial variables that drive Chinese economic 
diplomacy, such as the cause-effect of social political relations and the micro-processes 
of decision-making. In an effort to address this theoretical shortfall, an inclusive and 
integrative agenda is provided. It builds from the existing approaches and integrates 
new variables identified throughout the present study to yield a more sophisticated 
understanding about the preference formation of Chinese economic diplomacy and how 
the MER agencies become integral players in the process. This is a significant claim and 
may, perhaps, shock the mainstream scholarly assumption that China’s decision-making 
is a national process immune from external forces. By no means does this thesis suggest 
that the domestic variables are by any means inferior or less important. The empirical 
discussions certainly showed that domestic variables dressed as the situational factors 
and the social instigators play rather decisive roles in shaping Chinese economic 
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diplomacy. At the same time, however, this study also finds China’s preference 
formation to have a less definitive boundary against the participation of the MER 
agencies. There seems to be an invisible fence between the two sides and where the 
MER agencies can or cannot participate in China’s decision-making processes is 
increasingly blurred due to their relevance, function, and resources.  
In the latter sections of this chapter, the implication of this thesis is discussed in 
light of China’s economic diplomacy in the future; the potential of shuttle diplomacy 
and INPs; and the relevance of the findings to other emerging market economies. Of 
course, all studies come with constraints and this research is no exception. Hence, the 
study acknowledges some research limitations in the section that follows. The chapter 
ends with some concluding thoughts about how this thesis leads the way for a future 
research direction.  
 
8.2 Primary Findings 
The thesis set out to test two claims. The first was a primary claim that addresses the 
primary research question about how the MER agencies influence Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation. This hypothesis is mainly concerned with the 
preference discovery, definition, and determination stages of decision-making. It holds 
that the agencies of multilateral economic regimes influence Chinese economic 
diplomacy preference formation through three primary mechanisms: costs-and-benefits 
calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement. The underlying 
assumption of the primary hypothesis is that the level of actual influence the MER 
agencies have through the three mechanisms is contingent on four situational factors: 
national objective, policy goals, policy settings, and policy instruments.  
The second claim of this thesis formed the secondary hypothesis, which 
addresses the role(s) the MER agencies play in shaping China’s negotiation approach. 
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The hypothesis is therefore concerned with the decision-making that occurs at the 
multilateral negotiation processes. As such, it holds that the agencies of the multilateral 
economic regimes shape China’s negotiation approach through three capacities: as a 
mediator of shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, as a facilitator of informal negotiation 
practices, and as an instigator of side-payment bargaining. The underlying assumption 
of the secondary hypothesis is that the actualised influence rest on the social instigators 
which drives China’s negotiation approach. They are expectation, trust, and personal 
reputation. The three social instigators are cumulatively necessary criteria for 
maximising the MER agencies’ impact.  
 
8.2.1 Findings for the primary hypothesis  
In general, the thesis finds the primary hypothesis partially valid. Based on the 
qualitative examinations, none of the hypothesised mechanisms of influence on 
preference formation have the capacity to trigger a transformation of China’s preference 
formation in the cases examined. The MER agencies, at best, achieve an absorption 
level of influence. This means that the MER agencies do have the capacity to affect 
Chinese preferences, and can, to an extent, alter the decision-makers’ perspectives on 
the issues at hand. It also allows the Chinese decision-makers to acquire new capacities 
for addressing issues of a technical nature both internally and externally. However, the 
decision-makers will only adapt to the influence rather than allow it to trigger a 
paradigm shift in its preference formation. The influence also does not change the pre-
defined features of the preference or the underlying beliefs held by the decision-makers 
regarding the issues at hand. The two mechanisms with consistent absorption levels of 
influence are the costs-and-benefits calculus and information dissemination.     
 When a MER agency uses a costs-and-benefits mechanism to influence 
preference formation, it frames the way the pros and cons of cooperation is framed 
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through counter-attitudinal analyses that generally skew towards the benefits over the 
costs. The study finds this framework partially effective with absorption influence. To 
illustrate, consider the WTO example. In spite of the WTO’s costs-and-benefits 
exercises, China did not formally adopt a real transformative change in negotiation 
positions on services trade. True, the coverage of China’s opening-up has expanded 
over the years. But this expansion was largely incremental – as opposed to a full reform 
– and many barriers remain intact across numerous services sectors. Likewise, the 
climate change case-pair showed that the degree of impact this mechanism has on 
mitigation is comparatively milder compared to the CDM. While it only took two to 
three years for this mechanism to catalyse a CDM preference change, it took five-times 
as long to see a slight increase in rhetorical flexibility on the mitigation issue. In reality, 
the costs-and-benefits calculus mechanism is conditioned by the situational factors, 
national objective and policy setting.  
The former situational factor regards the perception of the Chinese decision-
makers. For the most part, the decision-makers in Beijing did not believe the payoff 
from cooperating in the long-term global effort to mitigate climate change justified 
prioritising the government’s limited professional and economic resources over the 
pressing short-term demands such as economic growth and poverty alleviation. This 
perception in turn undermined the UNFCCC agencies’ costs-and-benefits calculations 
on mitigation. The situation could not have been more different for the CDM. Key 
decision-makers in Beijing believed that the benefits of joining the initiative would 
contribute to both the short-term development policy goals, and the long-term battles 
against global warming. The proximity between the UNFCCC agencies’ calculations 
and that of the decision-makers’ perceptions thereby enabled the former to assert a 
stronger influence.  
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The second situational factor relates to the political rank of the decision-maker 
to which the costs-and-benefits calculus is communicated to. For instance, the GPA 
case felt more impact from the Committee’s costs-and-benefits calculation not only 
because it appealed to the ministerial-level policymakers, but also because it attracted 
the elite members of the Politburo. The services trade, on the other hand, only appealed 
to the second-tier decision-makers from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for instance. So 
the political rank of the receiver of the costs-and-benefits analysis matter. The 
immediate effect of the engagement is therefore different between the cases on the basis 
of the decision-makers’ perception and the rank of the policy actors whom the MER 
agency communicates a costs-and-benefits calculus with. As the mechanism of the 
costs-and-benefits calculus is conditioned by situational factors, it is at best capable of 
partial influence. 
Like the costs-and-benefits calculus, information dissemination was found with 
an absorption level of influence. The case studies showed that information 
dissemination activities from the UNFCCC and the WTO agencies were prevalent, and 
primarily in the form of informal dialogues, information exchanges, research 
collaborations, training workshops, and so on. Indication of these activities support the 
cognitive assumption that the growing complexity and uncertainties over global 
economic problems will often lead policymakers to turn to new and different channels 
for advice, and specifically to new networks of knowledge-based experts from the 
MERs in order to articulate its objectives in forthcoming negotiations; realise the real 
stakes or interests of the Chinese government; and the perceived appropriate policy 
remedies (Haas, 1992: 12). For the most part, interviewees across the cases commonly 
agree that external information affect the perceptions of the Chinese decision-makers. 
However, the actual influence varies greatly between the cases, and this is due to three 
reasons. The first relates to the political and economic costs involved with 
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implementing international discourse; the higher the political and/or economic costs, the 
less influential the international discourse. In the GPA negotiations, the political costs 
of agreeing with the WTO agencies’ recommendations for accession would undermine 
Beijing’s regulatory autonomy, which is a political cost it was not willing to 
compromise at first. By contrast, the minimal political and economic costs 
communicated by the international discourse on the CDM initiative stipulated a much 
faster adoption in Beijing than any other climate change modality to date. Hence, the 
perceived economic and political costs conveyed through the disseminated information 
can have substantial impacts on its influence levels.  
The second explanation regards Beijing’s incoherent inter-agency processes.281 
Most economic issues involve multifaceted problems that require the involvement of 
numerous agencies, and each agency tends to vary widely in their ministerial interests. 
In trade, a decision on the trade in transport services, for instance, is attached with 
complicated, lengthy and changing procedures, requirements and documentation; and 
concerns a labyrinth of agencies, ranging from transport, customs, immigration, 
security, health, veterinary and phytosanitary issues, product quality, and the private 
sector actors. When compelled to come together for consensus-building, these agencies 
aim to assert jurisdiction over the same issues, and compete against each other for 
scarce budget resources, power, and recognition from the senior officials. At times, the 
fragmentation can be made even worse by the widely diversified information 
disseminated by various MER agencies, causing a divergence in ministerial interests. 
The implication of these realities is the undermining of the actualised influence of the 
MER agencies through an information dissemination function. Finally, how well the 
MER agencies’ influences perform is contingent on whether their efforts are supported 
by the Chinese industrial and business actors. A key reason China’s preference for the 
CDM initiative changed so quickly was because the UNFCCC discourse was supported 
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Interview with an expert from Harvard University, Boston, 11 June 2012. 
298 
 
by the local industries. In contrast, the lacklustre industrial support for mitigation 
contributed to China’s modest profile at the multilateral mitigations negotiations. 
Consequently, the influence of the MER agencies through information dissemination 
does not exist in a vacuum. But it does inform Chinese preferences. For this reason, it is 
concluded that information dissemination has partial influence.     
The third mechanism tested for the primary hypothesis is reputation 
reinforcement. This mechanism has an influence level between inertia and absorption. 
Historically, China has valued its national and international reputation, and the 
experiences of the 20
th
 century have further highlighted the significance of this value. If 
reputation was an important driving force, then one would expect to see a more 
proactive national preference on the trade and climate change issues. Yet, this study did 
not find any indications that considerations for reputation correlates to a change in 
preference formation; and to date, Beijing has not indicated any preference shifts in 
mitigation, services trade, among others. In mitigation, despite being taken as a 
scapegoat for past failures, China did not commit to any legally-binding agreements 
under the auspice of the UNFCCC. The most it has done is set future rhetorical targets. 
Similarly, despite the many blame games in the trade talks, services trade remains an 
unfinished business. Why did reputation not trigger preference changes? A prevalent 
view from the interviews was that the degree of influence reputation reinforcements 
depends on the level of political pressures China feels from other negotiating partners or 
the perceived political risks of taking a non-commitment position, as opposed to the 
MER agencies per se. So contrary to the contractualist assumption, the reputation 
mechanism alone does not change China’s preference formation. It requires geopolitical 
incentives to supplement its effectiveness.  
From the preceding findings, it is clear to see that no single mechanism of 
influence has the capacity to generate a transformative change in China’s policy 
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preference without the presence of at least one contingency. One way or another, all the 
mechanisms are circumscribed by one or more of the situational factors. This finding is 
consistent with the research assumption that the institutional macrostructure of the 
Chinese political system goes hand-in-hand with external mechanisms of influence in 
determining China’s preference formation. This said, China does not necessarily reject 
the influence of the MER agencies. Rather, their influences are accepted, and one way or 
another, absorbed into the broader preference formation processes. One can consider 
this as an important intrinsic influence of and in itself.   
As an offshoot implication of the China-MER engagement, the study finds the 
MER agencies to have influence beyond the preference formation. It can also affect 
China’s decision-making structure. The thought process is that in the process of 
adapting to the multilateral processes, China feels the need to undergo institutional 
adaptation where domestic decision-making structures are pluralised and decentralised 
to ensure it meets the requirements of the multilateral system. In contrast to the existing 
literature that imagines the structure and process as a fixed and static one, Chapter 
Three showed that China’s economic diplomacy decision-making has already evolved 
three times in the short life-span of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The first was 
the exclusion period (1949-1971) of which China was largely isolated from the MERs. 
The second was the transition period (1972-2002), in which China began its integration 
to MERs. Since 2003, China has entered into the proactive period. Here, China not only 
became an active international political and economic actor, but also began to question 
some of the structures and norms of the MERs it holds memberships to. The study finds 
that the more MERs China participates in, the deeper its engagements with the MER 
agencies, the more decentralised the decision-making process becomes. This is because 
MER participation spawns the introduction of new actors and issues, undermines the 
traditional policy structure and monopolies, and promotes new policy goals and 
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instruments. This trend is driven either by the conditions of joining a MER and/or 
Beijing’s conviction that doing so would enable them a more effective and efficient 
management system of the MER-related affairs.   
The impact does not stop there. The regular China-MER engagements have 
provided some bureaucratic agencies new opportunities to establish network allegiances 
with the MER agencies. With new access to resources and therefore leverage, the policy 
actors involved are consequently empowered by their relationship with the MER 
agencies. The implication of this is an alteration of the inter-ministerial distribution of 
power. This is an important consequence because it stipulates a spiral pattern of 
influence when domestic actors bypass government leaders to push through certain 
issues above others with the use of external force. In most cases, however, the MER 
agencies’ capacities to assert this form of influence will only be achieved if they have 
established robust institutional relationships with domestic policy actors and/or 
agencies.   
 
With all said, the study finds the primary hypothesis partially valid. 
 
8.2.2 Findings for the secondary hypothesis     
Although the primary concern of this thesis is how the MER agencies can influence 
Chinese preference formation, it also concerns itself with a second dimension that looks 
at the formulation of national approaches to economic negotiations. A dismissal of this 
dimension would leave the present study on economic diplomacy incomplete. For this 
reason, a secondary hypothesis was derived to study the role(s) of the MER agencies in 
shaping China’s negotiation approach. The claim is that the MER agencies shape 
China’s negotiation approach through three capacities: as a mediator in shuttle 
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diplomacy proximity talks, as a facilitator of INPs, and as an instigator of side-payment 
bargaining.  
Proximity talks involve processes of inter-personal counter-attitudinal 
discussions and the establishment of institutionalised relationships with the Chinese 
decision-makers. Its influence level varies depending on the kind of information the 
MER agencies hold and its perceived credibility. If the MER agency has superior 
information and credibility, proximity talks are likely to have an 
absorptive/transformative level of influence in shaping China’s negotiation approach. If 
the MER agency has superior information but lacks credibility, China may be unwilling 
to respond to the MER agencies’ mediation at the fear that they have been manipulated 
to optimise the benefit of the MER agency. In this situation, proximity talks are likely to 
have an inertia level of influence. Where the MER agency is viewed as credible but 
lacks superior information, the Chinese decision-makers consider the agency as 
trustworthy but will not fully absorb the mediated effects. As such, proximity talks will 
have an inertia/absorption level of influence. Finally, the combination of no superior 
information and a lack of credibility lead China to conclude that the MER agency is 
dishonest and manipulative in its communications to serve its own ends. Thus, 
proximity talks in this situation have a retrenchment effect on the shape and form of 
China’s negotiation approach. 
The ideational and normative structures of the INPs shape China’s negotiation 
approach through three ways. First, the INPs affect how China believes it should act in 
negotiations, what the perceived limitations on their actions are, and what strategies 
they imagine to achieve their objectives. The ideas and norms floated around in the 
INPs thus condition what China considers and expects as necessary and possible in 
practical and ethical terms. Second, the INPs constrain China’s negotiation approach 
through an emphasis on the international norms. For instance, the MER agencies can 
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seek to justify its ideas and recommendations by appealing to the established 
information norms of legitimate conduct. Third, the processes of rationalisation in the 
INPs are a form of constraint in itself. The very language of justification imposes a form 
of constrains the options available to China in a given negotiation. It is important to 
recognise that INPs usually occur at the later stages of economic diplomacy decision-
making and by the time Chinese decision-makers arrive in at the negotiation settings, 
they would have had a relatively strong set of pre-defined positions, attitudes, and 
postures. Although these pre-defined positions are dynamic – rather than fixed – they 
are tough factors to undermine through a facilitator role. Hence, it is expected that this 
mechanism will not achieve a transformation level of influence. But given the number 
of probable ways it can assert immediate impacts and the minimal contingencies it is 
argued that the INPs have an influence between absorption and transformation.                  
Side-payment bargaining has an influence level between inertia and absorption. 
The influence of side-payment can either be strengthened or undermined by how 
complementary potential economic benefits are with China’s national objective or 
policy goals. If a deal serves the government’s development programmes and ambitions, 
for instance, then it is likely to be received relatively well. The reverse is also true; the 
government will reject the influence of the MER agencies if the economic side-payment 
clashes with Beijing’s policy agenda or is perceived as irrelevant. Another contingency 
of this mechanism has to do with trust. How much China trusts the MER agencies as 
well as foreign counterparts play a decisive role in China’s decision-making. The study 
finds that the levels of trust decision-makers have are shaped by their past experiences, 
and expectations on whether foreign parties can deliver on their promises.   
 When considered together, a key advantage of the three roles of influence is 
their ability to enhance the social instigators; that is, they are good for building 
expectation, trust, and the personal reputations of the Chinese decision-makers – the 
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core drivers of the nature of China’s negotiation approach. The study finds that a 
fundamental reason for China’s poor cooperative behaviour is due to Beijing’s low 
expectations that other negotiating parties take on the norm of reciprocity if China did 
take on commitments. Through proximity talks, INPs, and side-payment bargaining, 
such expectations can be raised with the use of communicative strategies (i.e., the tools 
of persuasion). A second root problem with China’s lack of agreement is its on-going 
uncertainties caused by problems of trust. The informality settings and smaller-group 
discussions in proximity talks and the INPs humanises the negotiation process, and in 
turn, build both unity and empathy between the negotiators. The outcome is improved 
inter-personal trust. Finally, investing in trust and expectations are only possible if the 
initial degree of personal reputation is high. For this reason, personal reputation is an 
interrelated variable. Through the three capacities, the MER agencies can demonstrate 
their sincerity to Chinese negotiators and decision-makers as well as a willingness to 
integrate China’s cultural values at the international level, as long as it is within their 
capacity and interest. 
 In the existing literature as like in the original theoretical framework of the 
present study, the social instigators are rarely discussed as determinants of China’s 
economic diplomacy decision-making. This is an unfortunate dismissal because for 
Chinese decision-makers, the core of their negotiation behaviour depends on this 
triangular relationship between the level of trust decision-makers have in the 
counterparts, the level of investment decision-makers make in building a trustworthy 
reputation, and the expectation of the probability that others will cooperate. The 
lacklustre of any one of these variables can lead to a downward spiral in their incentive 
to cooperate multilaterally. If the MER agencies wish to effectively influence China’s 
negotiation approach, it is necessary to embrace, and understand the mundane nature of 
these elements in Chinese economic diplomacy.  
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On the whole, this thesis finds the secondary hypothesis partially valid. 
   
 This thesis has focused on separate processes, though based on the same cases, 
in order to highlight each process individually for analytical purposes. But this does not 
mean these processes cannot interact, and by no means are they incompatible or 
incommensurate. Rather, they are mutually complementary and reinforcing. For 
instance, the costs-and-benefits mechanism complements in effect the information 
dissemination activities. The INPs usually sets the provocation process for side-payment 
bargaining. The costs-and-benefits calculus and information dissemination are the 
prerequisites for the shuttle diplomacy proximity talks and the INPs. Often the Chinese 
decision-makers have to be subscribed to the same information and frame of mind and 
issue before he or she can be persuaded through the mediatory practices of proximity 
talks and INPs. When the MER actors travel to Beijing for proximity talks, it is likely 
that a discussion of the costs and benefits will occupy the meetings. As well, reputation 
is usually assessed and reinforced in proximity talks and the INPs. These are but a few 
of the many possibilities in the ways that the mechanisms reinforce each other. 
 
8.2.3 Some additional findings  
Based on the results from the primary and secondary hypotheses, it is argued that a 
correlation between the deepened China-MER engagements and the growing dynamism 
in China’s economic diplomacy does exist to some extent. That is, the MER agencies do 
generally influence China’s economic diplomacy preference formation and negotiation 
approach. This claim is informed by three additional conclusions that are drawn out of 
the primary and secondary findings. First, the Chinese government and its policy actors 
and agencies do not reject the influences of the MER agencies. Instead, it is open to 
305 
 
engagements with the MER agencies and absorbs the consequent effects of the 
engagements. Evidence of this can be found in China’s generally adaptive reactions to 
the MER agencies’ costs-and-benefits calculus and information dissemination during 
the preference formation processes. Under normal circumstances, the study finds that 
Chinese policy actors generally respects the analyses and viewpoints of the MER 
agencies and takes them into serious consideration during the decision-making process. 
At times, they are also used by certain government agencies to support their interests 
and/or desired policy outcome. In addition, the fact that China generally like 
participating in proximity talks and INPs as it addresses their social instigator problems 
is also an indication that it views the effects of the MER agencies’ as helpful to their 
multilateral involvement. In this sense, China’s reception of the MER agencies’ 
influence is generally a positive one.  
Second, the influence of the MER agencies occur on a progression and it is 
asserted at different stages of China’s economic diplomacy decision-making process. 
The four broad stages of decision-making are policy discovery, policy definition, policy 
determination, and policy deliberation. For instance, some MER agencies influence 
Chinese preference formation at the preference discovery stage through a mechanism of 
information dissemination. Others do so at the preference definition and determination 
stage through a costs-and-benefits calculus. A third possibility is to influence the 
preference determination stage of decision-making through side-payment bargaining. 
Through its capacity as a mediator of proximity talks, the MER agencies influence 
China’s negotiation approach in between negotiation sessions (i.e., between mini-
ministerials and formal ministerials) in the policy revision stage of decision-making. By 
facilitating INPs, and instigating side-payment bargaining, the MER agencies influence 
Chinese negotiation approaches during the multilateral negotiations phase where the 
final package is being established. Finally, the MER agencies can further influence the 
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preference deliberation stage through a mechanism of reputation reinforcement (figure 
8.1). At any stage, the Chinese policy actors do not reject the influence of the MER 
agencies. Rather, it absorbs the implicit and explicit influences and integrates it into the 
broader macro-processes and design of the preference formation and negotiation 
approach, consciously and unconsciously. Important to note is that the MER agencies 
do not necessarily strategically plan to assert influence at all stages of the decision-
making process. Nor do the same agencies assert influence at all stages of decision-
making. Rather, it is believed to be a generally eclectic process executed by different 
agencies across different MERs at different stages of China’s decision-making. The 
result of this is that Chinese policy actors and agencies are challenged from maintaining 
a state of immunity from the influences of the MER agencies when forming national 
preferences and negotiation approaches. Consequently, a sustained and reiterative 
engagement process between Chinese policy actors and the MER agencies throughout 
the decision-making process will gradually internalise the effect of the latter in the 
preference formation of the former.  
The resultant outcome of this constitutes the third overarching conclusion: the 
reiterative engagements with the MER agencies will, over time, integrate them into the 
general decision-making system of China – be it implicitly or explicitly, directly or 
indirectly, and intentionally or unintentionally. This is to suggest that as Chinese policy 
actors become used to regular communications and coordination with the related MER 
agencies throughout the preference formation, for instance, this kind of activities will 
eventually establish itself as a systemic norm within the decision-making process. Over 
time, policy actors may believe it is perhaps even necessary to bypass certain proposals 
to the MER agencies for their professional perspective and feedback. Significantly, this 
conclusion implies that China’s economic diplomacy decision-making in the 21st 
century is not necessarily a stand-alone domestic process. Although, on paper, China’s 
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preference formation is determined by its national interests and other domestic political 
factors, a deeper examination of the agency-level activities suggests that the MER 
agencies also play critical behind-the-scenes roles that indirectly shape Chinese 
economic diplomacy. As such, China’s economic diplomacy is today arguably shaped 
by a collective system involving domestic and international agencies.      
 
Figure 8.1 Decision-Making Timeline and Stages of MER Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
8.2.4 Road blocks and facilitating conditions 
When influence is taken as a whole, the MER agencies’ capacity to assert its desired 
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Chapter Two, the primary hypothesis was supplemented by an underlying belief that the 
influence of the MER agencies is constrained by four general situational factors. The 
preceding discussion further highlighted the way they do so in the context of the 
variables tested. In addition to the situational factors, the present study identified two 
important road blocks in the preference formation process that causes the Chinese 
decision-makers to reject the influence of the MER agencies. They are path 
dependencies and closed networks.  
Path dependency refers to the manner in which current policy decisions are 
influenced by the internal institutional and behavioural legacies of past decisions made 
by the Chinese decision-makers (Pierson, 2000; Rose, 1990). Policy legacies affect 
current policymaking because of factors such as the sunk costs or institutional routines 
and procedures, all of which can force decision-making towards certain directions by 
either eliminating or distorting the range of options available to the Chinese government 
(Weir 1992). Hence, a decision to alter China’s core energy structure or domestic 
services infrastructure in which billions of RMB may already have been invested by the 
government is a much more difficult decision to make than a corresponding decision 
about a program that has not yet started (i.e., the CDM) or is vaguely institutionalised 
(i.e., the government procurement regime).  
 Closed networks refer to policy stability promoted by the ability of the existing 
key policy actors (i.e., the NDRC) to prevent new members from entering into policy 
debates and discourses. This logic is in line with the works of R.A.W. Rhodes (1997), 
L. Schaap and M.J.W. van Twist (1997), and Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones 
(1991). They commonly share the view that all bureaucratic policy actors attempt to 
construct “policy monopolies” in which the interpretation and approach to an issue is 
more or less fixed. In Beijing, the uneven distribution of power within the bureaucratic 
system have frequently seen the NDRC, and at times, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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(MFA) marginalise the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) in the climate change preference formation 
processes, even though the latter two agencies probably has more competencies in this 
issue-area. This road block is even more so for the preference formation of international 
trade. The power-clingy NDRC often block the interests of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in preference formation even 
though the latter is charged with trade policy coordination responsibilities. In most 
sectors, the structure of the policy system provides certain actors with the ability to veto 
or block changes in the preference or negotiation approach for that sector; and 
sometimes this can be done so by establishing “critical subsectors” with special abilities 
or resources vis-à-vis other subsectors (Rayner et al., 2001). This was the case when the 
NDRC established the National Center for Climate Strategy and International 
Cooperation of China (NCSC), a new think tank on climate research directly under the 
NDRC, to increase its climate change policy capacities and resources.  
In spite of these road blocks, there are also facilitating conditions that ensure the 
influence of the MER agencies are effectively absorbed into the preference formation 
process. One facilitating condition regards the meso-level networks. The MER agencies 
that deal with issues prone to be grasped by the meso-level networks within the Chinese 
government are more likely to see their asserted influence absorbed and internalised into 
the preference formation process. Meso-level networks develop within and among the 
myriad of government agencies run by the specialised middle-ranking policymakers and 
bureaucrats. On this level, technocratic and expert rationality tends to prevail, in that 
decisions are approached technically even when they are of a political nature. In this 
context, when the MER agencies disseminate specialised information and/or transfer 
calculations of the costs and benefits to the meso-level networks, their views are more 
likely to be absorbed due to the reduced politicisation of the process. A similar outcome 
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may not be possible if the specialised information was disseminated to the highly 
politicised policy actors whose main concern revolves around power politics. When the 
MER agencies engage directly with the meso-level networks, they have increased 
capacity to frame preferences and shape the policy debates. A case in point is when the 
UNFCCC agencies communicated directly with the implicit network consisting of the 
MEP, the MOST, and the CMA with regards to the CDM initiative. As Chapter Four 
showed, there were clear indications that the UNFCCC agencies’ viewpoints were 
reflected in the policy recommendations that emerged from this network. Similar effects 
presented itself in the GPA example. When the WTO agencies communicated directly 
with the implicit network consisting of the MOFCOM and the MOF, the international 
influence was gradually absorbed by these government agencies. Against the NDRC, 
the MOFCOM and the MOF eventually managed to promote entry into the GPA despite 
their initial opposite position. This goes to show that transnational network relations 
between the agencies of the Chinese government and the MERs can induce and push a 
dynamic to which Beijing cannot escape from. An added implication of engagements in 
this form is that it will encourage the meso-level network agencies to act as policy 
entrepreneurs and promote policies in line with the preferences of the MER agencies. 
Naturally, not all issues are equally suitable for such processes. Issues as such can thus 
be expected to be less permeable to the influence of MERs.  
A possible limitation to this facilitating condition is that not all issues are 
suitable for such processes, which means that they are also less open to the influence of 
the MER agencies. Highly politicised issues are a key factor of this equation. This can 
be so for at least two different, but complementary reasons. First, by definition the more 
politicised an issue is, the less it will be dealt with in a technocratic manner, which is 
the way issues are framed at the meso-level of the Chinese government. The WTO’s 
lacklustre impact in the rules on the hormone-treated beef, Genetically Modified 
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Organisms (GMOs), and sugar are cases in point.
282
 These are unlikely cases for the 
influence of international norms on China precisely because they are highly politicised 
issues. As such, the likelihood that external pressure will prompt preference changes is 
reduced. Second, in a more speculative way, issues that are framed more politically fit 
better with the nature of the Chinese government. And by establishing its own political 
platforms for policy debates, the government can control the direction of its preference 
formation. With these said, the fact that a strong MER presence in the preference 
formation process implies the necessity to nuance this assumed limitation. Politicisation 
being a debated concept, the key parameter might not (only) be where an issue is 
located along the continuum of high and low politics, but also whether an issue is new 
to China’s political agenda, or that it has already been dealt with, for instance.  
 Another facilitating condition has to do with the open-ended characteristic of the 
Chinese government. The fact that the country is in a developing phase with many 
multilateral economic policies still in the making means that it has a range of policies 
within the purview of the Chinese government that is not clearly defined. In turn, the 
MER agencies may be able to use any one of the assumed mechanisms or capacities to 
expand the range of issues under consideration, and with it, expand the scope of China’s 
willingness to cooperate. In their study, H. Farrell and A. Heritier (2003, 580) have 
shown how “substantive issues may be instrumentalised to establish informal 
institutional gains” which can create a new status quo and therefore changes in the 
formal institutions. In this sense, the MER agencies that promote actions for enhancing 
China’s international capacity are expected to find more supporters in Beijing, 
especially among those that favour a greater degree of Chinese integration to the 
multilateral economic system. Once these supporters absorb the discourse of the MER 
agencies, it is expected to expand China’s policy spheres with the introduction of new 
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issues, and/or competences of government institutions. The MER agencies’ impacts are 
anticipated to be even stronger when China faces new issues it has not previously dealt 
with. Such impacts were seen in the cases of the CDM and the GPA.    
A similar argument applies to the MER agencies’ recommendations which help 
build the international actorness of the Chinese government, or which empower specific 
government institutions. The existing research has identified a quid pro quo, in the 
relationship between the Chinese government and the MERs. It is as if China offered 
openness vis-à-vis the influence of the MERs in exchange for a role, particularly a 
leadership role, in multilateral negotiations. Or as if it had to compensate for her sui 
generis character as an international actor and pay the price of a rather high degree of 
influence by (some) MERs. This is of course especially so in the domains of which the 
actorness of the Chinese government is not (perhaps yet) well established. Certainly, 
the influence of the WTO on China has been, in part, a function of the attempt by the 
latter to establish itself and exert its preferred positions on international trade 
governance. Martijn Groenleer (2012) advances a similar argument in the context of the 
European Union (EU). According to him, the EU agencies often must align themselves 
with the goals and interests of international institutions in order to be able to act as a 
partner of these institutions. In other words, on occasions the influence of the MER 
agencies seems to be, in part, a function of the attempt by China to establish itself as an 
actor before them. Yet, the increase in policy powers induced by the decision to adopt 
policies and norms derived from the MER agencies should not cross a certain (probably 
issue-specific) threshold. If the increase is perceived as too large, then (reluctant) 
bureaucratic polities will be more likely to oppose it. 
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8.2.5 Does the MERs’ strength matter? 
In the debate on institutional influence, Oriol Costa and Knud Erik Jorgenson (2012) 
point to the strength (i.e., the stringency of the constraints it imposed on China and the 
robustness and endurance of its organisational setting) of the MERs as an indicator of 
the extent to which they can affect preference formation. Can institutional design affect 
the resilience of the MER influence in light of the road blocks? The empirical findings 
of this study suggest that strong MERs, despite their strength, can be insignificant (i.e., 
the WTO); and comparatively weaker MERs (i.e., the UNFCCC) can have an important 
effect. These findings accord well with the growing scholarship on the effects of 
international institutions, and especially studies that highlight the power of weak 
international institutions (Dai, 2007). In this context, a broad conclusion on the strength 
of the MERs can be made: the comparatively stronger MERs do not necessarily 
generate greater degrees of influence on China.  
Even when they seem to impact China’s preference formation and negotiation 
approach, it is often not through their coercive power. The WTO is a strong MER with 
relatively robust enforcement mechanisms. Agreements through the WTO are legally 
binding. States sign and ratify these treaties holding them accountable to the obligations 
endorsed in these agreements. If a state violates these obligations, other states may file a 
case against the state within the WTO’s dispute resolution process. With the WTO’s 
approval, other states may legally sanction the violator. These are powerful mechanisms 
that give strength to the WTO. However, in the case-pair examined in Chapter Five, the 
evidence did not reveal any real apparent correlation between the strength of the WTO 
and a strong degree of influence on China’s preference formation. Clearly, the WTO 
does not always have domestic influence, and when they do, it is not necessarily 
through the coercive mediums. This study certainly did not find any domestic actors 
that were mobilised or changed their preferences due to the WTO rulings. Just as well, 
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the WTO did not attempt to do so in any case. So despite the strength of the WTO, the 
MER does not necessarily stem more significant influences. 
 By comparison, the degree of policy and attitude changes in the UNFCCC – a 
non-binding MER – negotiations were comparatively higher than those in the WTO 
despite the latter’s more stringent legal framework. The research on the CDM and the 
mitigation negotiations show how some of the stronger influences are generated by the 
MERs that are only loosely formalised, have few (or no) substantive binding 
commitments, and contain no (or only toothless) compliance mechanisms. In this vein, 
the UNFCCC has proven to be influential even before the relevant international treaties 
are adopted. On the other hand, the WTO’s formalised and legalised rules on trade in 
services are a case of imposing a comparatively weaker influence on China. Moreover, 
the research interviews suggest that China is less likely to feel any constraint stemmed 
from the strength of the MERs given that it is a rule-setter.
283
  
Thus, international rules embedded in strongly legalised organisations equipped 
with compelling compliance mechanisms (i.e., WTO) do not seem to be systematically 
more influential on China than the MERs consisting of non-binding treaties (i.e., 
UNFCCC). Obviously, the limited number of cases considered in this study makes 
generalisation a challenge. What the research demonstrates, however, is that the 
stronger MERs are not always able to have domestic influence. It also reveals the 
importance of domestic factors and the role of government agencies, and even industrial 
actors, in transferring the influence of the MERs. Without the support of domestic 
actors, the MERs will find it much more difficult to impose influence.     
 However, Alastair Iain Johnston (2008) lends strong support to the proposition 
that the institutional design of the MERs do matter, especially when concerning 
channelling influence through cognitive mechanisms such as information dissemination 
or sociological ones such as proximity talks and INPs. With this said, the MERs that are 
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weakly institutionalised and make decisions by consensus (i.e., G20) can be ideal for 
persuasion efforts. By contrast, contracting strategies involving back-patting and 
opprobrium are more influential under a large audience, such as the World Bank and the 
UNFCCC (Johnston, 2008). This implies that it is not necessarily a case of institutional 
strength; rather this feature is contingent on the issue of concern. The MERs with small 
membership are well suited for persuasion strategies, while the MERs with large 
memberships is preferred for social influence. Johnston’s analysis suggests that the 
notions of “efficient” institutional design employed in a rationalist sense must be 
complemented by analyses of the sociological processes by which institutions shape 
actor preferences. Consistent with his constructivist approach, he recognises that 
institutions vary not only according to formal design features but also in terms of the 
less tangible processes, internal cultures, and working philosophies. In other words, they 
are social environments as well as incentive structures.  
Based on this analysis, it is fair to say that the rationalist’s contracting strategy is 
usually most effectively done by the more formal and bureaucratic organisations such as 
the WTO and UN because commitments to such organisations are more explicit and 
difficult to reverse. Among the cognitive persuasion strategies, if the intention is only to 
legitimise a policy with an external endorsement, a politically independent MER with a 
large and diverse membership represent the best avenue for channelling its actions. On 
the other hand, if the purpose is to change interests or values of competing domestic 
agencies, then a more functionally focused institution with expertise and authority in a 
particular issue-area is perhaps more effective.          
 
8.3 A Revisit to the Theoretical Brickworks 
The arguments made in this thesis contribute to a growing body of theoretically 
informed empirical works that crosses geographical boundaries to look at a long-
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neglected source of actor motivations and preferences in economic diplomacy, namely 
the social context in which agents find themselves when they are supposed to be 
representing or constructing the interests of a national government. Such arguments do 
not replace or necessarily even subsume the theories applied for this study – namely 
rationalism, cognitivism, and contractualism – about how the MER agencies influence 
the nation-states in shaping preferences and approaches to multilateral economic 
negotiations. But as realised through the empirical findings, this study does believe 
these three theories by and large neglects attention on the social context and the 
psychologically-driven factors of motivation in political behaviour. This dismissal 
makes the assumptions of these theories incomplete and less-than-optimal in their 
explanatory powers. The three theories would benefit from more consideration of the 
social and psychological arguments about actor motivation and motivational change in 
the standard list of independent variables used to explain the domestic-international 
relationship. As seen in the China case, such assumption not only rules out the plausible 
alternative motives of political behaviour, but also hinders thinking about motivation, 
behaviour and social context in the endogenous interactive fashion.  
In an effort to contribute to the theoretical debate, a revised inclusive and 
integrative agenda for understanding Chinese preference formation is presented in this 
section. The framework builds from the approaches adopted in this thesis, and further 
incorporates the new variables identified in the empirical research, notably the 
situational factors and the social instigators. The agenda additionally integrates all the 
independently assessed processes into one interrelated system. The study is a step 
forward in the works on the source of actor motivations and preferences in IR and IPE, 
especially regarding the social context in the construction of economic diplomacy. Of 
course, the arguments made in this thesis by no means replace or even subsume more 
mainstream assumptions about influence, motivation (i.e., material power preservation 
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or maximisation), and state-MER relations in the study of IR and IPE. But it does 
suggest that the current literature embody thin underpinnings about the developing 
country context, and the corresponding social and individual motivations in political 
behaviour are incomplete. The IR and IPE fields need to consider including social 
psychological arguments about actor motivation and motivational change alongside the 
rationalist, cognitive, and contractualist ensemble of standard independent variables 
used for explaining the ways the MER agencies influence economic diplomacy 
preference formation. The integrative analysis of the present study also underscores the 
risks of starting one’s analysis by assuming fixed preferences and systems. Such an 
assumption not only rules out plausible alternative mechanisms and contingencies, 
including motivation, behaviour, and social or political contexts in an endogenous, 
interactive fashion to which defines economic diplomacy.        
 
8.3.1 The China-MER engagement   
The relationship between China and MERs are shaped by the cyclical interactions of 
actors that administer the two polities. The interactions occur over time, either in a face-
to-face context or through virtual communication technologies. For Beijing, policy 
actors and decision-makers are concerned with designing preferences that serve their 
national interests while preventing adverse consequences on their multilateral 
developments. In the doing so, meso-level policymakers seek to expand their share of 
the decision-making power by forming informal allegiances within the bureaucracy. On 
the other side of the chessboard, the MER agencies seek to encourage the Chinese 
decision-makers to adopt preferences that complement their own visions of an 
international agreement and interests. The MER agencies strive to satisfy the pressures 
of its member-states and other concerned parties, while minimising the adverse effects 
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and costs on China. In the end, the China-MER cyclical interactions serve to solve 
policy and negotiation problems.         
MERs engage with China at different stages of decision-making. Possible 
mechanisms of influence at the policy drafting stage (in Beijing) include the costs-and-
benefits calculus, information dissemination, and reputation reinforcement. In the later 
stages of decision-making that takes place simultaneous to the multilateral negotiations, 
the MER agencies may act as mediators of shuttle diplomacy proximity talks, 
facilitators of INPs, and instigators of side-payment bargaining to shape China’s 
negotiation approach.  
Through each of these mechanisms, the MER agencies participate in four 
general stages of preference formation: discovery, definition, determination, and 
deliberation.
284
 Through this iterative process, the MER agencies seek to develop a 
shared sense of purpose (i.e., an agreement on tackling climate change) and a shared 
plan of action for achieving that purpose. This shared action plan includes a common 
understanding of the size of the problem or challenge in need of addressing, and the 
scope and scale of the chosen activities or interventions (Koontz et al., 2004; Leach and 
Pelkey, 2001).  
At the policy discovery stage, the MER agencies attempt to identify shared 
interests, concerns, and values between China and the multilateral community. Such are 
done through the identification and analysis of relevant and pertinent information and 
their implications that are communicated through the mechanism of information 
dissemination. In the policy definition stage, the MER agencies attempt to build shared 
meaning with China by articulating common purposes and objectives; agreeing on the 
concepts and terminologies used to describe and discuss problems and opportunities; 
clarify and adjust tasks and expectations of one another; and set forth shared criteria 
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with which to assess information and alternatives. These efforts are possibly carried out 
through the costs-and-benefits calculus and information dissemination.  
The MER agencies play a role in the joint determination of the procedural 
decision-making process (e.g., agenda-setting, tabling a discussion, assigning a working 
group) and more substantive determinations (e.g., reaching agreements on action items 
or final recommendations). Although substantive determination can be an end product, 
in the interaction between the MER agencies and Beijing, it is also made over time and 
is integrated in the framework as a reiterating element of their engagement. The most 
likely mechanisms used here to transfer the influence of the MER agencies include the 
proximity talks and the INPs.  
 
Figure 8.2 China’s Economic Diplomacy Decision-Making and the China-MER 
Engagements  
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Finally, the MER agencies play a role in the deliberation of China’s negotiation 
policy. Through proximity talks and INPs, the MER actors thoughtfully examine and 
listen to Chinese decision-makers and their perspectives on negotiated issues, and 
thereafter derive judgements about what represents the common good, advocate the 
global interests, and establish effective strategies for conflict resolution. Included in this 
process are MER actors participating in hard conversations, constructive self-assertion, 
asking and answering challenging questions, and expressing honest disagreements. 
Here, the MER agencies may also constrain preference formation by reinforcing the 
nation-state’s reputation through institutional assessments of their performance or media 
pressures. These stages are summarised in figure 8.1. Figure 8.2 depicts the general 
inter-agency coordination process and the MER agencies’ respective participation. 
It is important to note is that in between the four general stages of decision-
making are probable intervening stages. An example is the semi-ministerial negotiation 
stage, which are the meetings with foreign delegations before the formal joint sessions. 
At this stage, the MER agencies seek to bridge a consensus regarding an agenda for 
negotiation, mediate inter-governmental tensions, and provide logistic support to its 
member-states. As such, they are likely to channel influence through a costs-and-
benefits calculus and the INPs. Another probable intervening stage is policy revision. 
This usually follows the semi-ministerial meetings whereby the decision-makers would 
have encountered new information about the underpinnings of other parties, their 
intentions and about their own posture, expectations and perceptions about the 
forthcoming joint session negotiations. With the new information, China is likely to 
revise their initial national preferences and negotiation approach. At the same time, the 
MER agencies may exercise proximity talks in their continual efforts to shape Chinese 
economic diplomacy preference formation.    
8.3.2 The contingencies: situational factors and social instigators   
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In most situations, however, the China-MER engagements occur within a multi-layered 
context of domestic constraints and contingencies that come in two forms: the 
situational factors and the consequential incentives. The situational factors generate 
opportunities and constraints not just on the outcome but also on the dynamics of the 
China-MER engagement at the outset, and over time. Researchers have recognised 
several chief elements that may determine the nature of the MER agencies’ influence 
(i.e., Ansell and Gash, 2008; Bingham, 2008; Thomson and Perry, 2006; Radin, 1996; 
Selin and Chavez, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). This study finds four primary factors as most 
relevant: policy settings, policy instruments, policy goals, and national objectives. 
Policy setting refers to the policy framework (i.e., administrative and regulatory); the 
political dynamics and power relations within and across levels of the government; the 
degree of connectedness within and across existing policy networks; and the historic 
levels of conflict among recognised bureaucratic and sectoral interests and the resulting 
levels of trusts and impact on working relationships. Policy instruments are internal and 
external operational mechanisms and tools used to deliberate policy options; and the 
resource conditions needed to reach a policy outcome. Here, policy instruments can be 
those in Beijing and/or from the MER systems.  
Policy goals are the short- to medium-term ambitions of the national 
government which may include targets and aims from five-year development plans or 
global commitments, among others. As such, it pre-sets the boundaries and parameters 
of preference formation. Similarly, national objective regards the ultimate interest and 
aim of the government to which defines their (business) model of governance and 
justification for their political legitimacy. Like policy goals, this factor sets the general 
boundaries of preference formation. But unlike policy goals, these boundaries are more 
expansive in coverage as it concerns the government’s long-term ambitions. In any case, 
the decision-makers are concerned about whether a policy initiative is of the interest to 
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the country; i.e., does it serve its goals or objectives? Is the proposed preference or 
negotiation approach costly or beneficial to its goals or objectives? Important to note 
that the situational factors are not fixed as starting conditions; rather, they are broader 
ulterior contexts to which external conditions (i.e., economic downturn, or newly 
enacted regulation) may influence the dynamics not only at the outset but at any time 
during the engagements, thus opening up new possibilities or posing unanticipated 
challenges. The offshoot implication is that situational factors circumscribe the China-
MER engagement and affects the level of influence the MER agencies can assert.  
The social instigators constitute the second set of contingencies. The social 
instigators refer to the internal drivers that are behavioural and psychological by nature, 
and can either enhance or undermine the impact of the China-MER engagements, 
especially the influence of the MER agencies. The drivers include the ability of the 
MER agencies to build trust with the Chinese decision-makers, enhance their 
expectations on the norm of reciprocity, and promote the personal reputation of the 
Chinese decision-makers and negotiators in the multilateral arena. In an ideal world, 
where Chinese decision-makers have high expectations that other negotiation parties 
will adopt the norm of reciprocity, there is an incentive for the Chinese negotiators and 
decision-makers alike to acquire positive and respectable personal reputations as 
promise-keeping and action-performing global actors. Thus, trustworthy individual 
decision-makers who trust policymakers of other countries with a reputation for being 
trustworthy can engage in mutually productive negotiated exchanges, so long as they 
limit their dealings primarily to those with a reputation for keeping promises. As such, a 
personal reputation for being trustworthy becomes a valuable asset. Similarly, 
developing trust in an environment where others are expected to be trustworthy is also 
an asset. Trust is the expectation of one person about the actions of others that affects 
the first person’s choice, when an action must be taken before the actions of others are 
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known (Dasgupta, 1997: 5). In this context, trust affects whether China is willing to 
initiate cooperation based on the expectation that it will be reciprocated by its 
negotiating counterpart nation-states. Thus, the trust in other countries, the investment 
in a trustworthy reputation of the individual decision-makers, and the expected 
probability that other countries will use reciprocity are intricately interlinked. This 
mutually reinforcing core is affected by structural variables as well as the past 
experiences of the Chinese decision-makers.  
In reality, the level of expectation and trust held by the Chinese decision-makers 
are typically low because of unpleasant past experiences. For this reason, individual 
decision-makers, when abroad, can lack in confidence about their perceived reputation 
by the international community. Through soft mediatory mechanisms like proximity 
talks and INPs, the MER agencies have the capacity to improve Beijing’s confidence in 
these three regards and produce outcomes including improved clarity on key issues and 
concerns; effective management of the differences and negotiation conflicts; enhance 
trust and mutual respect between the parties; increase social, operational, and decision-
making capacities; improve the integration of relevant knowledge into deliberations and 
decisions; and greater perceived legitimacy within and outside the multilateral 
processes. Some scholars went a step further to combine these outcomes dynamically 
with engagement processes, whereby a “virtuous cycle” is set in motion (i.e., Ansell and 
Gash, 2008; Imperial 2005; Huxham 2003). Upon achieving these outcomes, it is 
probable that the MER agencies will kindle a reformation in China’s negotiation 
approach from prudent resistance to active cooperation.  
The claims of this section are depicted in figure 8.3. The diagram has three 
nested dimensions, shown as boxes, representing the general systemic context. The 
outermost box, depicted by solid lines, represents the surrounding situational factors 
which are the national objectives, policy goals, policy settings, and policy instruments. 
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These situational factors generate opportunities and constraints for the MER agencies’ 
influence. From the outset, and over time, situational factors affect the dynamics of the 
China-MER engagements, represented by the first dashed-line box within the situational 
factors systemic context. Within this box entails the interactions and decision-making 
processes as depicted in figure 8.2. From the China-MER engagements emerge the 
consequential incentive drivers, including expectation, trust, and reputation, which 
either drive a paradigm shift instigated by the China-MER engagements or impede a 
cooperative negotiation approach from China.  
 
Figure 8.3  The Causal Effects of Contingencies  
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8.3.3 Implication on policymaking structure 
Generally speaking, the process China-MER engagements are expected to influence a 
decentralisation of the decision-making structure. The thesis holds that regular 
interactions not only pluralises the range of policy actors and issues involved in the 
preference formation process, it also alter the government’s inter-agency distribution of 
power by empowering certain individuals and/or bureaucratic entities over others. The 
thought process is that regular engagements provide the MER agencies the opportunity 
to build close allegiances with Chinese government agencies. In a decentralised 
policymaking environment with numerous veto points, the MER agencies become 
useful empowerment to the related government agencies in the inter-agency bargaining 
process given their new access to external support, leverage and resources. Thus, 
through the process of empowerment, the MER agencies weaken the traditional 
distribution of power and elevate the agencies and actors that are supportive of 
international initiatives. 
 Furthermore, the MER agencies promote shifts in domestic policies by 
promoting change processes, such as the advent of new political agencies, the internal 
adaptation to the MER systems, and venue change for building expectation, trust, and 
personal reputation, while undermining stability factors including path dependencies 
and closed networks. The new actors and ideas that come to dominate the policy system 
in this phase promote further changes by increasing the potential for new systemic spill-
overs and venue changes. This outcome is augmented by the new policy processes set in 
motion by direct engagements with the MER agencies. In this evolving process, 
however, two characteristics remain constant. The first is the consensus-based decision-
making culture that involves inter-agency discussion and bargaining between the 
ministerial actors involved. The second is informal politics, which are the inter-
bureaucratic allegiances between political actors and their interests. Thus, the suggested 
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influence is only feasible under the following conditions: (i) when the decision-maker(s) 
or ministry/commission already wield a level of authority or autonomy in preference 
formation; (ii) when a bureaucratic entity is in a privileged relation with one or more 
MER agencies compared to other agencies; and (iii) when a permissive consensus exist 
in favour of the policies endorsed by the decision-maker of concern.     
 
8.4 Some Further Implications 
Besides the theoretical implications, it is important to recognise practical implications 
of this study. To this end, and based on the findings of the present thesis, some thoughts 
on China’s economic diplomacy decision-making characteristics under the new era of 
political governance are shared in this section. This is followed by the researcher’s 
views on the most effective ways the MER agencies can assert influence in the future. 
Additionally, this section examines the relevance and applicability of the findings to 
understanding the economic diplomacy preference formation of other emerging market 
economies.  
 
8.4.1 Economic diplomacy with Chinese characteristics 
Although it is both tricky and risky to predict the characteristics of China’s economic 
diplomacy in the future, it is expected that China will reinvent itself as an active 
governor and rule-setter of future multilateral economic negotiations. The philosophies 
of modernisation and nationalisation are likely to continue in the post-Hu Jintao and 
Wen Jiabao era. That is, any future national preference and negotiation approach will be 
designed to serve Beijing’s commitment to modernise China, and this is more than 
likely to remain as its first priority and national objective. Such is already highlighted in 
the country’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), and emphasised by the new generation 
of leaders at the 18
th
 Party Congress in early-2013. To this end, China’s international 
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objective will remain with the pragmatic quest for a stable environment needed for 
effective modernisation and development. In this way, China’s economic diplomacy 
will remain pragmatic, economically-oriented, independent and yet generally disposed 
toward trying to fit-in with the multilateral economic system. That is why Beijing is 
likely to continue experiencing institutional adaptation in order to converge with the 
multilateral processes by transforming their decision-making system from a vertical to a 
horizontal system, and to ensure that all possible political inputs and interests are 
considered in the formulation of China’s economic diplomacy.  
 Worthy to note is that national reputation is likely to continue to be in the minds 
of decision-makers in the future. As William A. Callahan (2010) claims, there is a 
combination of national pride and national humiliation in the Chinese dual identity that 
has affected the mind-set of Chinese decision-makers and the wider public. With 
China’s rise, the government has boosted its national pride, but national humiliation has 
always affected its decision-making. In this respect, China’s pride and humiliation are 
interwoven. While China does promote a positive and proud image of itself, it also 
presents a very negative view of its relationship with the world based on the history of 
its national humiliation. China’s view of the world and dealings with its neighbours 
present two images of itself: China as a victim state and China as a great power. Some 
China scholars (i.e., Guo, 2013) look at the dual identity as contradictions constraining 
Chinese foreign economic policymaking; i.e., China views itself as a major power and 
wants to play a global role accordingly, while lacking adequate power to do so. China 
wants to be fully integrated into the multilateral economic system, while strong 
concerns over sovereignty makes it difficult for Beijing to embrace some of the 
mainstream international values born out of Western philosophy. China agrees on a set 
of principles embedded in the multilateral economic negotiations, while considerations 
of its national interests cause Beijing to make a pragmatic compromise from time to 
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time. Beijing has long been accustomed to dealing with foreign counterparts in bilateral 
settings, but the post-Cold War era is witnessing a rise of multilateralism that challenges 
China’s traditional concepts of diplomacy. In general, Beijing will continue to 
emphasise reputation-building in the future given its centrality and importance to 
Chinese politics and its people.       
Where there are continuities lies changes. The fact that the government plans to 
implement administrative reforms indicate several changes that could effectively 
transform China’s future national preferences and negotiation approaches. The first 
regards changes in the symbolic macrostructure (i.e., ideology) which may have a 
decisive impact on the decision-makers’ interpretation of the internal and external 
environments at the micro level. Many foreign policy analysts have found a decline or 
irrelevance of ideology in Chinese foreign policymaking (Guo, 2013). But the 
qualitative data of this study finds that ideology continues to play an important role in 
the decision-making process of Chinese economic diplomacy, especially for setting out 
the principles and policy guidelines. Concepts and slogans are often symbols of 
ideological orientation and representation of those principles and guidelines. These 
concepts and slogans are also used by the government to educate the world about itself, 
establish its international reputation, and justify its negotiation approaches. China have 
traditionally declaimed to the world that its foreign policy decisions are based on the 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (和平共处五项原则).285  More recently, 
“peaceful development” (和平发展) and “harmonious world” (和谐世界) have become 
slogans under Hu Jintao to guide China’s integration with the world. As well, it has 
offered the world an alternative for a new world order in which all nation-states 
perceive the value of peaceful development, respect the internal affairs of other nations, 
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principle of Chinese foreign policy and negotiation behaviour.  
329 
 
and cooperate to create a harmonious relationship with one another (Guo, 2013). At the 
2013 18
th
 Party Congress, the new leader, Xi Jinping has further introduced new 
development strategies and outlook. It is expected that under his leadership, the 
ideological framework will further evolve. In particular, it will bring about changes in 
China’s foreign policy priorities. It is likely that ideas will serve as the road maps in the 
future design China’s economic diplomacy. As Bernard Giesen (1987: 351) claims, 
“The symbolic macrostructure can have explanatory emergence in relation to micro-
social processes of interaction, whereas practical macrostructure cannot.” And as 
Quansheng Zhao (1996) argues, major orientation changes in the symbolic 
macrostructure are likely to bring about fundamental and strategic changes in Chinese 
foreign policy, such as the shift from a “closed” policy under Mao to an “open” one 
under Deng. Under Xi Jinping, the ideas of “proactivity” away from “modesty and 
transparent social democracy” away from “asymmetric transparency” are ever more 
apparent. It is probable that these macro-structural shifts will cause a new policy focus, 
new national preferences, and a new negotiation approach in the near future.  
 Second, tactical changes in Chinese economic diplomacy are likely to be 
governed by the dynamics of a new internal-plus-external institutional macrostructure. 
That is to say, external agencies such as the Secretariat bodies and Working Groups of 
MERs are gradually becoming integral policy instruments for the Chinese government. 
This trend has a direct influence on the rules and norms of political actions and 
mechanisms in the policymaking processes of Beijing. Furthermore, the institutional 
macrostructure is also influenced by changes at the symbolic macro-structural level. For 
example, the enlarged scope of participants in the formulation of China’s negotiation 
positions is not simply an institutional arrangement, but also reflects the changes of 
basic beliefs in China’s political system.  
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Third, concerns about the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) political 
legitimacy and internal power politics will continue to be a central element in the 
formation of national preferences. As China transitions away from “strong man” politics 
to “collective leadership,” Chinese decision-making in economic diplomacy is will be 
evermore influenced by formal and informal channels. Bureaucratic institutions are 
formal channels by which officials in different sectors within the government have 
striven to influence the top leadership’s decision-making. At the same time, other 
emerging actors since China’s reform have also maneuverer to influence the preference 
formation process through informal channels. These new actors operate outside the 
official realm of the decision-making establishment and include not just ministerial 
actors but also industrial and business actors, financial institutions, energy companies, 
local governments, research institutions, the media and netizens. These new actors have 
emerged from the process of professionalisation of the expert-based bureaucratic elite 
with a higher level of specialised knowledge in world economic affairs; corporate 
pluralisation with the proliferation of social organisations; the decentralisation of the 
authority to local authority and local actors in cross-border economic exchanges; and 
the economic and information globalisation with increased interdependence and 
pressure on Chinese cooperation and conformity with the international norms. All these 
actors seek to assert influence on decisions in international economic affairs, which 
increases the diversity of views and interests in the preference formation processes and 
makes for an increasing amount of coordination in policy implementation. As a result, 
the central leadership has been forced to consult more broadly, and consider different 
views, which puts the formal preference formation process in a position of reacting to 
issues and challenges imposed by the bureaucratic elites, local governments, society, 
and global actors, especially when dealing with multilateral economic issues and 
challenges. This makes establishing robust relations and meso-level networks with 
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Chinese decision-makers all-the-more important for the MER agencies, given that 
informal politics tend to affect, sometimes invisibly, the formation of China’s national 
preferences.  
 Finally, the intertwined picture of the three dimensions of the macro reality 
opens up the possibility of more alternative and different channels through which 
decision-makers can consider their preferences and make choices. The growing 
engagements with MER agencies play a key role in this trend. One of the primary tasks 
before international economic policy specialists is therefore to explore and examine the 
opportunities and channels faced by the Chinese decision-makers. These available 
choices are situational and case contingent, and thereby creating never-ending exercises 
in the study of Chinese economic diplomacy.  
 
8.4.2 Shuttle diplomacy and INPs as the way forward 
In the long-run, it is expected that shuttle diplomacy proximity talks and the INPs will 
facilitate much more sustainable mediums for the MER agencies to influence Chinese 
economic diplomacy. As the global nature of economic issues have forcibly entered the 
international arena, and debates and discussions on economic issues have transpired to 
greater and more global levels, these mechanisms of influence presents the MER 
agencies the most relevant and effective roles and mediums to manage and guide future 
national preference formation and multilateral negotiation approaches. This is due to 
three reasons. First, future multilateral economic agreements will be determined largely 
by the nature of the North-South relationship. Whether agreements can be reached 
largely depends on whether the MER administering the negotiations can coordinate 
between the polarised camps and construct a common interest. This task generally 
requires much mediatory efforts of which the relevant tools and settings are typically 
available from the practices of informal negotiation and proximity talks. In doing so, the 
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MER agencies will shape the interests and policy directions of China, as it does for 
other countries, and the best perceived policy option for the common public good.  
 The second reason regards the social dilemma that characterises China’s 
relationship with the United States (US). The US is the most powerful and the largest 
developed country with a strong capacity to influence multilateral economic 
negotiations. Yet, the US is not immune to the changing world order and American 
policymakers are now influenced by a wide array of forces external to Washington, 
D.C. These include the rise of the emerging market economies, including China, rising 
requirements emanating from international treaty obligations, pressures from 
transnational interests groups and multinational corporations, global civil society, and 
so forth. In light of the changing world system, the US has begun to propose that other 
rising powers should also take on the burden of leadership. This kind of argument runs 
unfavourably in Beijing, a government that considers itself as a developing country. A 
parallel dilemma can be found in numerous economic negotiations, where the Chinese 
and American delegations constantly eye each other for their next move. The 
significance of this mutual tactic was emphasised by numerous interviewed delegates 
from both countries. The Sino-US prisoner’s dilemma has typically been at the centre of 
negotiation impasse across different arenas. Hence, it is of imperative that the MER 
agencies play a stronger mediatory role through the mechanisms of proximity talks and 
the INPs to break the ice between the world’s largest and second largest economies. The 
potential of these mechanisms is concentrated on their ability to improve national 
expectations for reciprocity, trust, and reputation – factors that have caused negotiation 
stalemates.  
 Third, China’s perception of the MERs has, for the most part, been characterised 
with distrust. This is not least because Beijing did not participate in the initial design of 
the multilateral architectures; and that it is to the present day still characterised by the 
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values, interests, and norms of the major developed countries. Therefore, Beijing has 
consistently held onto its scepticism towards the MERs despite its harmonious and 
encouraging rhetoric. The mediatory roles of these mechanisms have the ability to 
establish new trust between China and the MERs and demonstrate the interest of these 
systems to renew their governance in an integrative and incorporated way that also 
supports Chinese interests and professional culture. As well, these mechanisms enhance 
the perceived personal and national reputations of China and its decision-makers. For 
these three reasons, proximity talks and the INPs are likely to enable stronger future 
impacts. Of course, the activities through the costs-and-benefits calculus, information 
dissemination, and reputation reinforcements are also likely to have effects but their 
level of impact is expected to be comparatively less defined than proximity talks and the 
INPs.                
 
8.4.3 Relevance to other nations 
From the policy and methodological standpoints, the findings of this research are useful 
for developing a more nuanced understanding of the policy effects the MER agencies 
have on the emerging market economies than is currently found in the literature. For 
instance, the United Nationals Conference on Environment and Development have, 
through the costs-and-benefits mechanism, played a part in reforming Brazil’s 
traditional resistant climate change attitude to embrace. The traditional attitude in Brazil 
concerning climate change issues was that sovereignty is the sole defining factor for 
preference formation. Of course, this position was adopted by all the emerging market 
economies, especially in the fore-years of negotiations. However, this attitude changed 
after the United Nationals Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92). 
Evidence from the meeting suggest that the Negotiation Committee emphasised that 
Brazil’s autonomy could be strengthened if it integrated with the multilateral 
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environmental regime – the legitimacy mainstream, not by repudiating the social and 
international pressures to cooperate (Fonseca, 2011). The political benefit was 
welcomed by Brazil at the time as it undergoes political regime changes from the former 
military government. Hence, the external force was perceived as a useful leverage for 
tackling their domestic challenges. As a result, Brazil’s former resistance evolved to one 
that admitted to international cooperation. It hosted the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and 
became a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the UN discourse has significantly 
shaped Brazil’s multilateral diplomacy outlook thereafter. This was indicated when the 
Brazilian government claimed the UN to be at the core of their multilateral ideology 
(Fonseca, 2011). While it may not be unique to Brazil, it is nevertheless a key to 
understanding Brazil’s multilateral diplomacy. The international discourse, in this 
respect, have, not only informed, but reformed Brazil’s national preferences to a 
willingness to accept greater responsibilities for the costs of attenuating the effects of 
climate change, for instance, without abandoning the need to find a balanced and just 
solution for developing countries. 
 This leads us to the point that the MER agencies have engaged with the 
emerging market economies through activities of information dissemination. For 
example, South Africa has had a history of resource deficiency from human to 
economic capitals. The South African government often struggled to retain good staff, 
and in June 2005, the Department of Foreign Affairs was the most understaffed agency 
within the government. There was a lack of capable personnel for managing global 
economic affairs; and due to poor information distribution, many ministerial agencies 
and missions abroad lacked sufficient information flow, and they often had to rely on 
old information when formulating policies (Landsberg, 2005). Circumstances as such 
caused the South African government to face difficult challenges in the preference 
formation process for multilateral economic negotiations. According to an interview 
335 
 
with a former South African diplomat, the MER agencies played very important, though 
informal, roles in this respect. The decision-makers that had personal contacts with 
MER agencies had better access to more and new information – the quality of their 
works was therefore naturally better and more liberal compared to those without similar 
connections.
286
 Moreover, it was indicated that the World Bank, for instance, worked 
closely with members of the policy unit in the presidency, and the Policy Research and 
Analysis Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs. These engagements were relatively 
effective in raising awareness among the policy actors.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also enjoyed remarkable influence in 
the early-1990s disseminated information and policy recommendations to Argentina 
following the manifesto of a hyperinflation crisis after their transitions to democracy. 
The IMF succeeded in impressing upon the new government that overcoming 
hyperinflation required drastic macroeconomic policy corrections. This 
recommendation prompted the Argentinian President, Carlos Menem, to turn the 
economic portfolio over to Domingo Cavalo, a technocrat and former central banker, 
whom he knew held considerably more orthodox economic views that are more in line 
with the IMF’s. After discussions with the IMF agencies, the country decided to opt for 
exchange-rate based stabilisation, which included a Convertibility Law which 
established a currency board regime, and fixed the peso at parity with the dollar – a 
short-term solution that was supported by the IMF agencies for slowing down inflation 
during a transition (Fang and Stone, 2012).  
 Brazil and South Africa both attach particular weight to reputation and each has 
a respective special unit in the office of the Minister of Foreign Relations to oversee 
reputation-related activities. Brazil’s emphasis on international reputation is particularly 
important in decision-making because of the regime change in the mid-1980s. As Igor 
F. Fonseca (2011: 387-388) observed, Brazil’s “new and essential objective was to 
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recover its international status and, to achieve this goal, an assertive multilateral attitude 
would be crucial.” Thus, the country sought to achieve two distinct challenges. First, it 
sought to transform its negative image – a legacy of the authoritarian years. For many 
years, Brazilians were viewed as enemies of the environment, and timid in 
commitments to multilateralism. In response, the Brazilian government began to change 
its internal institutions and its international conducts for the purpose of bringing itself 
closer to the principles of international legitimacy in environmental matters. 
Furthermore, arguments were made by members of the UN that commitments to the 
multilateral environmental framework will contribute to its reputation-building as it 
demonstrates Brazil’s awareness of environmental problems and show that the country 
was open to international cooperation in this area (Fonseca, 2011). Thus, it is 
imaginable that the MER agencies can have much impact on Brazil’s preference 
formation through a reputation reinforcement mechanism.     
 Of course, these mechanisms of influence, when applied to the emerging 
economies, are not without contingencies. A key reason the costs-and-benefits 
mechanism worked well in Brazil was because it served their national objectives. That 
is, it was perceived to serve Brazil’s national development. In his inaugural speech, 
former President Lula stated that “Foreign policy would reflect the aspirations for 
change seen on the streets, guided by humanistic perspectives and as an instrument for 
national development” (cited in Landsberg, 2006). Similarly, the national objective 
contingency was compatible with the information disseminated by the MER agencies to 
South Africa. As a country also concerned about development, the African National 
Congress-led government has since 2000 infused heavy emphasis on multilateral 
agencies as a strategy for development due to its huge import and positive implications 
for development.  
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Meanwhile, Argentina in the late-1990s demonstrates a case where the policy 
goal contingency undermined the influence of the IMF through information 
dissemination. By the late-1990s, the domestic economic circumstances shifted in that a 
policy of exchange-rate based stabilisation was no longer a necessary radical reform 
proposal. Elections had been waged and won on the basis of the fixed exchange rate, a 
policy that the IMF criticised as unsustainable in the long-run. The clash of opinions 
triggered by their incongruent policy goals therefore had the IMF’s leverage deteriorate 
markedly, and its staff found it harder to convince the Argentinian policy actors to 
change their views (Fang and Stone, 2010).  
 The South African case projects the significance of the policy setting 
contingency. While the information dissemination mechanism raised political 
awareness, the fragmented policymaking structure and processes in the South African 
system undermined the MER agencies’ actual influence as its information were often 
not disseminated to all the relevant and imminent government agencies with veto 
power. This goes to show that the fragmented political setting to which information 
flows can undermine the ultimate impact of the MER agencies. This is also a reflection 
of the road blocks of path dependency and closed network whereby the Department of 
Foreign Affairs have demonstrated tendencies to monopolise the policy space, refusing 
to let new actors enter into the process. Of course, this kind of behaviour is the product 
of past political legacies to which the Department of Foreign Affairs merely inherited. 
Other emerging market economies like India reveal similar shortcomings.  
In India, institutional disharmony is a major weakness of their preference 
formation, particularly in the shape of turf battle between the Ministry of External 
Affairs and the ministries with an economic focus. For instance, the Ministry of 
External Affairs sometimes swaps posts abroad with the Ministry of Commerce in 
exchange for placements in that ministry for its officials. As a result, those holding 
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commercial assignments abroad are answerable to both ministries. The permanent 
secretary that heads the Ministry of Commerce serves on the Ministry of External 
Affairs personnel board, which selects officials for sub-ambassador level assignments 
abroad. But all MER-related issues such as those concerning the WTO are handled 
primarily by the Ministry of Commerce, which also appoints the envoy handling this 
subject in Geneva. The Economics Division under the Ministry of External Affairs 
receives less than fulsome cooperation from the Ministries of Commerce and Industry. 
The Finance Ministry’s Department of Economic Affairs, which handles inbound aid as 
well as the interface with the World Bank and the IMF, has even less to do with the 
Ministry of External Affairs. Hence, the Ministry of External Affairs essentially works 
on closed-shop policies, with no placement among the economic ministries.
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 In 
corollary, India’s negotiation postures at the WTO, for instance, are not often 
sufficiently backed with matching advocacy at the key bilateral capitals; nor is 
investment promotion activity sufficiently harmonised, producing the “approved-but-
not-implemented” limbo. India does not have, as yet, a diplomacy board where the 
foreign ministry takes the lead in suggesting cohesive actions to autonomous agencies. 
Instead, actors have to seek harmonisation with their sectoral interests and national 
priorities through reaching out. Such coordination cannot impose or dictate. Hence, the 
inter-ministry coordination has been uneven, and sometimes notably absent. In these 
circumstances, it is hard to imagine the MER agencies holding much capacity to 
influence these nation-states through information dissemination.      
 Brazil’s diplomatic behaviour often also rests on the policy instrument 
contingency which serves their national development. The main tools for national 
development include the promotion of multilateral trade, the building-up of capacities 
through advanced technologies including alternative energy ones, and the search for 
productive investments, global and regional integration, and negotiations with other 
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blocs and countries (Visentini and Silva, 2010: 55). However, the policy instruments 
that the MER agencies use to contribute to those tools and the grandeur national 
objective has at times caused doubts among Brazilian decision-makers. One case in 
point is the competence of the WTO to manage and oversee the Chair of a DDA panel. 
For instance, former Brazilian Ambassador, Clodoaldo Hugueney Filho, secretary-
general for Economic and Technological Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
main negotiator for the country in the WTO, has criticised various Chairs of the 
meetings, including the Uruguayan candidature, Perez del Castillo, for steering the 2003 
Cancun negotiations to its failure; and finger-pointed at the WTO Secretariat for their 
inabilities to drive the process with professionalism. The South African government 
likewise has doubts in the managerial instrument of the MERs and their capacity to 
adequately manage the multilateral system. These governments are further critical of the 
MERs’ capacity to ensure the major industrial countries, especially, the US, will come 
to respect the multilateral rules more than they have done so in the past. These concerns 
were suggested to have prompted hesitation from the South African decision-makers to 
formulate cooperative national preferences for numerous economic negotiations.
288
    
 These uncertainties reflect the salience and importance of the social instigators. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the MER agencies produced better results in 
addressing national uncertainties through proximity talks and the INPs. In December 
2003, the former WTO Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, travelled to Brazil as 
special guests and met with Brazilian leaders and ministers. On that occasion, they held 
proximity talks and discussed issues such as national and international goals, namely the 
elimination of distorted trade and agricultural practices along with food security. The 
Minister reiterated the need to preserve the whole of the DDA and emphasised that any 
reinterpretation or dilution of the mandate would affect the delicate balance among the 
various negotiation fronts, compromising the focus of the work program. They also 
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affirmed that an effective liberalisation and reform of agricultural trade would largely 
contribute to the development goals in the DDA (Visentini and Silva, 2010: 59). 
 Evidence of the INPs were identified when the WTO Secretariat oversaw 
numerous technical and political consultations with the G20 group as a means to make 
the negotiation process more dynamic in light of the stalemate after the Cancun meeting 
in 2003. These consultations took place in Brasilia (December 2003), Sao Paulo (June 
2004), New Delhi (March 2005), Durban (September 2005), and Geneva (October and 
November 2005). During these meetings, specific proposals were asked to be discussed 
regarding the WTO negotiations on agriculture, for instance. The results include greater 
understandings about the intents of other nation-states – hence, new levels of trust, 
expectation, and personal reputations were established – and an agreement for the way 
forward (Visentini and Silva, 2010: 58). Using the same indicators for measuring 
influence, the preceding discussion shows that, in general, due to the constraint of the 
situational factors, the mechanisms for influencing national preference formation have 
an absorption level of influence. Meanwhile, the proximity talks and the INPs measure 
slightly above. These outcomes essentially reinforce that of the China case.    
 As for the long-term consequence of the MER agencies’ influence on decision-
making structure, the Brazil example suffices evidence that the consequential impact of 
the Brazil-MER engagements on their decision-making structure is, like China, a 
pluralisation of actors and a reshaping of the internal distribution of power. For 
instance, the Ministry of External Relations (or Itamaraty) had to accommodate to the 
entry of new subjects in the international dialogue by establishing new departments 
(Lampreia and da Cruz, 2005: 108). The increasing technicality of subjects has 
prompted the Itamaraty to hand over some responsibilities to the Ministry of 
Commerce’s specialists and shift its economic diplomacy management to a multi-
agency mode where a Trade Council based in the Presidency carries out the inter-
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agency coordination process. In the Argentina case, it was also found that the IMF’s 
insistence on the severity of the hyperinflation crisis and the need for radical policy 
change lent crucial credibility to the domestic policy teams’ calls for economic austerity 
(Fang and Stone, 2010). This is a further illustration of the impact the MER agencies 
have on the national distribution of power structure.  
 Although the countries discussed above share a common nickname as the 
emerging market economies, their political regimes are nonetheless different from that 
of China’s; and their economic structures and governing cultures are in and among 
themselves deviant. Yet, the level of applicability of the findings based on a study of 
China is relevant to the other emerging market economies. In the brief discussion here, 
all country cases showed that the mechanisms of influencing national preference had an 
absorption-level of influence due to a series of contingencies similar to that of the 
situational factor taxonomy. Meanwhile, the mechanisms for influencing the national 
negotiation approaches produced accommodating outcomes because of its ability to 
embrace and address the social instigators. And as the Brazil example showed, despite 
its different political system as a democracy – while China’s is a socialist model – 
engagements with the MER agencies triggered the same consequences on Brazil’s 
decision-making structure as was found in the China case. Therefore, the findings and 
theoretical assumptions yielded in this study significantly embody much resonance and 
applicability to a range of emerging market economies across the continents of the 
world. 
 
8.5 Limitations of Study 
One key limitation to the present study is a methodological one. Since much of the 
evidence for and against the primary and secondary hypotheses are spawned from 
evidence on the micro-processes of the MER agencies’ influence on China’s economic 
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diplomacy preference formation, the more access to the details of China’s decision-
making and the internal operations of the MERs, the better. However, the China case 
makes this difficult compared to other national focuses such as the US and Europe, 
where political realities are less conditioned by asymmetric transparency. For this 
reason, the findings of this research should be taken as relative rather than absolute 
generalisations.  
With this said, and by necessity, the data for the case studies did come from an 
eclectic mix of sources for the purpose of achieving the closest possible accuracies. The 
primary basis for the arguments is interviews with climate change and international 
trade practitioners and specialists from the Chinese government, foreign governments, 
international organisations, and non-governmental entities (including think tanks, 
universities, industries, civil society, and journalists). Most of the interviewees have 
been involved in the policy processes, the interagency discussions, and/or the 
multilateral negotiations. Generally speaking, the IR and IPE fields of study have 
undervalued interviews. There are a number of reasons for this, but a primary 
explanation is a distrust that agents are willing or able to accurately report on their 
intentions behind an action or the reality of a process. Such reporting may be 
deliberately deceptive, or exaggerated, or overly modest due to the personality or 
cognitive abilities of the interviewee. Often, to overcome this challenge, researchers 
have preferred to face the interpretive uncertainties to deduce intentions from prior 
theoretical assumptions about the organisational affiliation of the actor, or about his or 
her material interest (Johnston, 2008: 42). But this is problematic on empirical grounds. 
In particular, it biases the search for the effects of the MER agencies on the policy 
interests and preferences of Chinese decision-makers from the outset. True, intentions 
of appropriateness are difficult to observe regardless of research tactic. But if 
interviewing is done carefully with attention paid to where the interviewee fits into the 
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decision processes, with follow-ups, with careful wording of questions, with sensitivity 
to the interpersonal dynamics between the interviewer and interviewee, with careful 
observation of the interviewees’ body language as indications of honesty, and with 
triangulation interviews with others, it is possible to reduce some of the measurement 
error that inheres in using face-to-face self-reporting of events and intentions behind 
actions. 
Still, to be sure, the interview data were cross-checked with information found 
from personal first-hand observations at a multilateral climate change negotiation 
(COP17) and the international trade talks (WTO in December 2011). In addition, open-
sourced documents and information circulated by Chinese government staff were used. 
Some are internal circulation analyses and documents, not secret information in theory 
but nonetheless on average likely to reflect more authoritative views and arguments than 
official government statements. As well, open-source analyses appearing in specialists’ 
articles in journals or newspapers written for a range of non-governmental and 
international conferences were used. On the whole, given the limited access to China’s 
policymaking process, the study has accumulated numerous relevant sources to reflect 
the closest-possible realities that serve the current research puzzle.    
 
8.6 Future Research Directions 
The implication of this study and its case studies is a clear understanding about Chinese 
economic diplomacy in a multilateral setting. Bearing in mind the risks of generalisation 
about a country with asymmetric transparency, this study keeps its claims modest. 
Nevertheless, this thesis adds value to the minimal understanding about Chinese 
economic diplomacy decision-making. Although there is growing literature on China’s 
involvement in MERs, there is still limited insight into China’s participation in 
multilateral economic negotiations. Except for a handful of research, most work on 
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Chinese political economy focuses on China’s relationships with major powers and 
regional blocs, or the historical perspective of China’s integration with the world 
systems. For instance, Samuel Kim (1998) was the first to alert the field to the 
importance of examining China’s behaviour in international institutions, and have added 
critical insights into Beijing’s worldviews. Elizabeth Economy (1997) and Margaret 
Pearson (2001) are pioneers in providing evidence about empirical behaviour to test 
hypotheses and assumptions about how the international institutions may affect what 
China does. Undeniably, these contributions are critical parts of understanding Chinese 
political economy. But they are also limited semi-equilibriums in the broader studies of 
China in the international political economy.  
 This study follows on the tremendous scholarly efforts of Kim (1998), Harold 
Jacobson and Michael Oksenberg (1992), Economy (1997), Pearson (2001), among 
others. But unlike these studies, it focuses primarily on the application of a combination 
of convention and unorthodox analytical tools from a variety of theories to so-called 
hard cases of MERs. This thesis highlights four dimensions on which the economic 
diplomacy field in China studies has generally lacked attention. The first is the 
processes by which China’s international economic policy’s ideational base and its 
interests may change as a result of engagements with external actors (i.e., through costs-
and-benefits calculation, information dissemination, reputation reinforcement, 
proximity talks, INPs, and side-payment bargaining). Second, the interests that are hard 
to observe but appear critical for Chinese leaders when they calculate trade-offs from 
cooperation (i.e., national and personal reputation). Third, the internal and external 
motives that are contextual, instrumental, and psychological by nature and that weigh 
the plausibility of cooperation from the Chinese decision-makers. Fourth, the causal 
relationship between the China-MER engagement and the evolution of China’s 
decision-making processes and the actors and issues that becomes integral structural 
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assets. The hope of this study is that future policy actors and China enthusiasts alike can 
apply the thought processes and theoretical logics introduced in this study to predict 
future strategies for cooperation with the Chinese government as part of the 
international efforts to establish new public goods critical to the development of the 
international economic system.  
This study, of course, only looked at a relatively small part of the totality of 
Chinese economic diplomacy and its transformation over the recent decades and in the 
years ahead. Can the cases examined in this thesis explain anymore more general about 
other areas of Chinese economic diplomacy not just at the multilateral level but on a 
bilateral or regional level? Are the cooperative tendencies and the related contingencies 
examined in this study representative of China’s cooperation in other areas? And how 
applicable and relevant is the model developed in this research to other developing and 
transition countries beyond the emerging market economies, such as that of the African 
and the Central American countries? These are pertinent topics for future research.  
    Further efforts should also be made to the social psychological factors that 
drive or undermine cooperative policy outcomes in China. Are there identifiable 
institutions, be it international or domestic, which could help hypothesise the influence 
of the social psychological factors as new definitions of interest and policy tools for 
economic diplomacy? Are there identifiable policy processes that allow these factors to 
impact China’s external negotiation behaviours? Can one also identify the domestic 
institutions that contribute to the hypothesisation of the MER agencies, as agents of 
enhancing the social psychological factors, in shaping the attitudes of the Chinese 
decision-makers that might be resistant or enhancing to the mechanisms of influence? 
Can one hypothesise about the kind of hybridity and/or level of resistance that these 
competing mechanisms produce in the Chinese economic diplomacy decision-making? 
These questions constitute a research agenda for future testing, and its contribution will 
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be critical to the theorisation of Chinese economic diplomacy as well as that of other 
(especially developing) countries. 
 Finally, the integrative agenda introduced in this chapter raises future areas of 
theoretical research for the study of Chinese economic diplomacy. New attention should 
be paid to the structural and substance aspects of the model to increase its applicability 
to policy realities. Here, it is important, to acknowledge again the limit of this study – 
that there is not yet sufficient access to empirical micro-level material to cover a 
thorough application of this model, to fully cover the interactions between different 
levels with regard to diplomatic policy choices, or the impact of the China-MER 
engagements. In the future, it will be beneficial for China scholars to further build on 
this theoretical agenda through similar research.       
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